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THE 
APPROACH   TO   PHILOSOPHY 


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THE  APPROACH   TO 
PHILOSOPHY 


BY 
RALPH    BARTON    PERRY,  Ph.D. 

ASSISTANT  PROFESSOR  OF   PHILOSOPHY    IN    HARVARD   UNIVERSITY 


NEW    YORK 

CHARLES    SCRIBNER'S    SONS 

1908 


COPTRIGHT,   1905,    JiT 

CHARLES  SCRIBNER  S  SONS 


THIS  VOLUME  IS  DEDICATED  TO 

MY    FATHER 

AS  A   TOKEN   OF   MY  LOVE  AND   ESTEEM 


PREFACE 

In  an  essay  on  ''The  Problem  of  Philosophy  at 
the  Present  Time,"  Professor  Edward  Caird  says 
that  "philosophy  is  not  a  first  venture  into  a  new 
field  of  thought,  but  the  rethinking  of  a  secular 
and  religious  consciousness  which  has  been  devel- 
oped, in  the  main,  independently  of  philosophy."  * 
If  there  be  any  inspiration  and  originality  in  this 
book,  they  are  due  to  my  great  desire  that  philoso- 
phy should  appear  in  its  vital  relations  to  more 
familiar  experiences.  If  philosophy  is,  as  is  com- 
monly assumed,  appropriate  to  a  phase  in  the  de- 
velopment of  every  individual,  it  should  grow  out 
of  interests  to  which  he  is  already  alive.  And  if 
the  great  philosophers  are  indeed  never  dead,  this 
fact  should  manifest  itself  in  their  classic  or  his- 
torical representation  of  a  perennial  outlook  upon 
the  world.  I  am  not  seeking  to  attach  to  philoso- 
phy a  fictitious  liveliness,  wherewith  to  insinuate 
it  into  the  good  graces  of  the  student.     I  hope 

*  Edw.  Caird:  Literature  and  Philosophy,  Vol.  I,  p.  207. 


viii  PREFACE 

rather  to  be  true  to  the  meaning  of  philosophy. 
For  there  is  that  in  its  stand-point  and  its  problem 
which  makes  it  universally  significant  entirely 
apart  from  dialectic  and  erudition.  These  are 
derived  interests,  indispensable  to  the  scholar,  but 
quite  separable  from  that  modicum  of  philosophy 
which  helps  to  make  the  man.  The  present  book 
is  written  for  the  sake  of  elucidating  the  inevitable 
philosophy.  It  seeks  to  make  the  reader  more 
solicitously  aware  of  the  philosophy  that  is  in  him, 
or  to  provoke  him  to  philosophy  in  his  own  in- 
terests. To  this  end  I  have  sacrificed  all  else  to 
the  task  of  mediating  between  the  tradition  and 
technicalities  of  the  academic  discipline  and  the 
more  common  terms  of  life. 

The  purpose  of  the  book  will  in  part  account 
for  those  shortcomings  that  immediately  reveal 
themselves  to  the  eye  of  the  scholar.  In  Part  I 
various  great  human  interests  have  been  selected 
as  points  of  departure.  I  have  sought  to  intro- 
duce the  general  stand-point  and  problem  of  phi- 
losophy through  'ts  implication  in  practical  life, 
poetry,  religion,  and  science.  But  in  so  doing 
it  has  been  necessary  for  me  to  deal  shortly  with 
topics  of  great  independent  importance,  and  so  risk 
the  disfavor  of  those  better  skilled  in  these  several 


PREFACE  IX 

matters.  This  is  evidently  true  of  the  chapter 
which  deals  with  natural  science.  But  the  prob- 
lem which  I  there  faced  differed  radically  from 
those  of  the  foregoing  chapters,  and  the  method 
of  treatment  is  correspondingly  different.  In  the 
case  of  natural  science  one  has  to  deal  with  a 
body  of  knowledge  which  is  frequently  regarded 
as  the  only  knowledge.  To  write  a  chapter  about 
science  from  a  philosophical  stand-point  is,  in  the 
present  state  of  opinion,  to  undertake  a  polemic 
against  exclusive  naturalism,  an  attitude  which  is 
itself  philosophical,  and  as  such  is  well  known  in 
the  history  of  philosophy  as  positivism  or  agnosti- 
cism. I  have  avoided  the  polemical  spirit  and 
method  so  far  as  possible,  but  have,  nevertheless, 
here  taken  sides  against  a  definite  philosophical 
position.  This  chapter,  together  with  the  Conclu- 
sion, is  therefore  an  exception  to  the  purely  in- 
troductory and  expository  representation  which  I 
have,  on  the  whole,  sought  to  give.  The  relatively 
great  space  accorded  to  the  discussion,  of  religion 
is,  in  my  own  belief,  fair  to  the  general  interest 
in  this  topic,  and  to  the  intrinsic  significance  of 
its  relation  to  philosophy. 

I  have  in  Part  II  undertaken  to  furnish  the 
reader  with  a  map  of  the  country  to  which  he  has 


X  PREFACE 

been  led.  To  this  end  I  have  attempted  a  brief 
survey  of  the  entire  programme  of  philosophy. 
An  accurate  and  full  account  of  philosophical 
temis  can  be  found  in  such  books  as  Kiilpe's  "In- 
troduction to  Philosophy"  and  Baldwin's  "Diction- 
ary of  Philosophy,"  and  an  attempt  to  emulate 
their  thoroughness  would  be  superfluous,  even  i£ 
it  were  conformable  to  the  general  spirit  of  this 
book.  The  scope  of  Part  II  is  due  in  part  to  a 
desire  for  brevity,  but  chiefly  to  the  hope  of  fur- 
nishing an  epitome  that  shall  follow  the  course 
of  the  natural  and  historical  differentiation  of  the 
general  philosophical  problem. 

Finally,  I  have  in  Part  III  sought  to  present 
the  tradition  of  philosophy  in  the  form  of  general 
types.  My  purpose  in  undertaking  so  difficult  a 
task  is  to  acquaint  the  reader  with  philosophy  in 
the  concrete ;  to  show  how  certain  underlying  prin- 
ciples may  determine  the  whole  circle  of  philosoph- 
ical ideas,  and  give  them  unity  and  distinctive 
flavor.  Part  II  offers  a  general  classification  of 
philosophical  problems  and  conceptions  indepen- 
dently of  any  special  point  of  view.  But  I  have 
in  Part  III  sought  to  emphasize  the  point  of  view, 
or  the  internal  consistency  that  makes  a  system  of 
philosophy  out  of  certain  answers  to  the  special 


DEFACE  XI 

problems  of  philosophy.  In  such  a  division  into 
types,  lines  are  of  necessity  drawn  too  sharply. 
There  will  be  many  historical  philosophies  that 
refuse  to  fit,  and  many  possibilities  unprovided 
for.  I  must  leave  it  to  the  individual  reader  to 
overcome  this  abstractness  through  his  own  reflec- 
tion upon  the  intermediate  and  variant  stand- 
points. 

Although  the  order  is  on  the  whole  that  of  pro- 
gressive complexity,  I  have  sought  to  treat  each 
chapter  with  independence  enough  to  make  it  pos- 
sible for  it  to  be  read  separately ;  and  I  have  pro- 
vided a  carefully  selected  bibliography  in  the  hope 
that  this  book  may  serve  as  a  stimulus  and  guide 
to  the  reading  of  other  books. 

The  earlier  chapters  have  already  appeared  as 
articles :  Chapter  I  in  the  International  Journal  of 
Ethics,  Vol.  XIII,  No.  4 ;  Chapter  II  in  the  Philo- 
sophical Review,  Vol.  XI,  No.  6 ;  Chapter  III  in 
the  Monistj  Vol.  XIV,  No.  5 ;  Chapter  IV  in  the 
International  Journal  of  Ethics,  Vol.  XV,  No.  1 ; 
and  some  paragraphs  of  Chapter  V  in  the  Journal 
of  Philosophy,  Psychology,  and  Scientific  Methods, 
Vol.  I,  No.  7.  I  am  indebted  to  the  editors  of 
these  periodicals  for  permission  to  reprint  with 
minor  changes. 


xii  PREFACE 

In  the  writing  of  this,  my  first  book,  I  have 
been  often  reminded  that  a  higher  critic,  skilled 
in  the  study  of  internal  evidence,  could  probably 
trace  all  of  its  ideas  to  suggestions  that  have  come 
to  me  from  my  teachers  and  colleagues  of  the  De- 
partment of  Philosophy  in  Harvard  University. 
I  have  unscrupulously  forgotten  what  of  their 
definite  ideas  I  have  adapted  to  my  o-\vn  use,  but 
not  that  I  received  from  them  the  major  portion 
of  my  original  philosophical  capital.  I  am  espe- 
cially indebted  to  Professor  William  James  for  the 
inspiration  and  resources  which  I  have  received 
from  his  instruction  and  personal  friendship. 

Ralph  Baeton  Pekry. 

Cambridge,  March,  1905. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 


PART  I 

APPROACH  TO  THE  PROBLEM  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

PAQE 

Chapter  I.     The  Practical  Man  and  the  Philoso- 
pher    3 

§  1.  Is  Philosophy  a  Merely  Academic  Interest?. ...  3 

§  2.  Life  as  a  Starting-point  for  Thought 4 

§  3.  The  Practical  Knowledge  of  Means 8 

§  4,  The  Practical  Knowledge  of  the  End  or  Purpose.  10 
§  5.  The  Philosophy  of  the  Devotee,  the  Man  of  Af- 
fairs, and  the  Voluptuary 12 

§  6.  The  Adoption  of  Purposes  and  the  Philosophy 

of  Life 17 

Chapter  II.    Poetry  and  Philosophy 24 

§    7.  Who  is  the  Philosopher-Poet? 24 

§    8.  Poetry  as  Appreciation 25 

§    9.  Sincerity  in  Poetry.     Whitman 27 

§  10.  Constructive   Knowledge   in   Poetry.    Shake- 
speare    30 

§11.  Philosophy  in  Poetry.  The  World- view.   Omar 

Khayyam 36 

§  12.  Wordsworth 38 

§  13.  Dante 42 

§  14.  The  Difference  between  Poetry  and  Philosophy  48 
xiii 


xiv  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

FA6B 

Chapter  III.    The  Religious  Experience 53 

§  15.  The  Possibility  of  Defining  Religion 53 

§  16.  The  Profitableness  of  Defining  Religion 54 

§  17.  The  True  Method  of  Defining  Religion 56 

§  18.  Religion  as  Belief 59 

§  19.  Religion  as  Belief  in  a  Disposition  or  Attitude.  62 
§  20.  Religion  as  Belief  in  the  Disposition  of  the  Re- 
sidual Environment,  or  Universe 64 

§  21.  Examples  of  Religious  Belief 66 

§  22.  Typical  Religious  Phenomena.     Conversion. . .  69 

§  23.  Piety 72 

§  24.  Religious  Instruments,  Symbolism,  and  Modes 

of  Conveyance 74 

§  25.  Historical  Types  of  Religion.     Primitive  Re- 
ligions    77 

§  26.  Buddhism 78 

§  27.  Critical  Religion 79 

Chapter  IV.    The   Philosophical    Implications    of 

Religion 82 

§  28.  R6sum6  of  Psychology  of  Religion 82 

§  29.  Religion  Means  to  be  True 82 

§  30.  Religion  Means  to  be  Practically  True.     God  is 
a  Disposition  from  which  Consequences  May 

Rationally  be  Expected 85 

§  31.  Historical  Examples  of  Religious  Truth  and 

Error.     The  Religion  of  Baal 88 

§  32.  Greek  Religion 89 

§  33.  Judaism  and  Christianity 92 

§  34.  The  Cognitive  Factor  in  Religion 96 

§  35.  The  Place  of  Imagination  in  Religion 97 

§  36.  The  Special  Functions  of  the  Religious  Imagi- 
nation    101 

§  37.  The  Relation  between  Imagination  and  Truth 

in  Religion 105 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  XV 

TJLBM 

§  38.  The  Philosophy  Implied  in  Religion  and  in  Re- 
ligions     108 

Chapter  V.     Natural  Science  and  Philosophy 114 

§  39.  The  True  Relations  of  Philosophy  and  Science. 

Misconceptions  and  Antagonisms 114 

§  40.  The  Spheres  of  Philosophy  and  Science 117 

§  41.  The  Procedure  of  a  Philosophy  of  Science 120 

§  42.  The  Origin  of  the  Scientific  Interest 123 

§  43.  SkUl  as  Free 123 

§  44.  Skill  as  Social 126 

§  45.  Science  for  Accommodation  and  Construction.  127 
§  46.  Method    and    Fundamental    Conceptions    of 

Natural  Science.     The  Descriptive  Method .  .  128 

§  47.  Space,  Time,  and  Prediction 130 

§  48.  The  Quantitative  Method 132 

§  49.  The  General  Development  of  Science 134 

§  50.  The  Determination  of  the  Limits  of  Natural 

Science 135 

§  51.  Natural  Science  is  Abstract 136 

§  52.  The  Meaning  of  Abstractness  in  Truth 139 

§  53.  But  Scientific  Truth  is  Valid  for  Reality 142 

§  54.  Relative  Practical  Value  of  Science  and  Phi- 
losophy   143 


PART    II 
THE  SPECIAL  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Chapter  VI.    Metaphysics  and  Epistomology 149 

§  55.  The  Impossibility  of  an  Absolute  Division  of 

the  Problem  of  Philosophy 149 

§  56.  The  Dependence  of  the  Order  of  Philosophical 

Problems  upon  the  Initial  Interest 152 


XVI  TABLE   OF  CONTEXTS 

PASB 

§  57.  Philosophy  as  the  Interpretation  of  Life 152 

§  58.  Philosophy  as  the  Extension  of  Science 154 

§  59.  The  Historical  Differentiation  of  the  Philosoph- 
ical Problem 155 

§  60.  Metaphysics  Seeks  a  Most  Fundamental  Con- 
ception      157 

§  61.  Monism  and  Pluralism 159 

§  62.  Ontology  and  Cosmology  Concern  Being  and 

Process 159 

§  63.  Mechanical  and  Teleological  Cosmologies 160 

§  64.  Dualism 162 

§  65.  The  New  Meaning  of  Monism  and  Pluralism ...    163 
§  66.  Epistemology  Seeks  to  Understand  the  Possi- 
bility of  Knowledge 164 

§  67.  Scepticism,  Dogmatism,  and  Agnosticism  ....    166 
§  68.  The  Source  and  Criterion  of  Knowledge  ac- 
cording   to   Empiricism    and   Rationalism. 

Mysticism 168 

§  69.  The  Relation  of  Knowledge  to  its  Object  ac- 
cording to  Realism,  and  the  Representative 

Theory .- 172 

§  70.  The  Relation  of  Knowledge  to  its  Object  ac- 
cording to  Idealism 175 

§  71.  Phenomenalism,    Spiritualism,    and    Panpsy- 

chisra 176 

§  72.  Transcendentalism,  or  Absolute  Idealism 177 

Chapter  VII.     The    Normative    Sciences    and   the 

Problems  of  Religion 180 

§  73.  The  Normative  Sciences 180 

§  74.  The  Affiliations  of  Logic 182 

§  75.  Logic  Deals  w'th  the  Most  General  Conditions 

of  Truth  in  Belief 183 

§  76.  The  Parts  of  Formal  Logic.     Definition,  Self- 
evidence,  Inference,  and  Observation 184 

§  77.  Present  Tendencies.     Theory  of  the  Judgment.  187 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  xvii 

PAGE 

§  78.  Priority  of  Concepts 188 

§  79.  Esthetics  Deals  with  the  Most  General  Con- 
ditions of  Beauty.     Subjectivistic  and  For- 

malistic  Tendencies 189 

§  80.  Ethics  Deals  with  the  Most  General  Conditions 

of  Moral  Goodness 191 

§  81.  Conceptions  of  the  Good.     Hedonism 191 

§  82.  Rationalism 193 

§  83.  Euda'monism    and    Pietism.      Rigorism    and 

Intuitionism 194 

§  84.  Duty  and  Freedom.     Ethics  and  Metaphysics  196 

§  85.  The  Virtues,  Customs,  and  Institutions 198 

§  86.  The  Problems  of  Religion.     The  Special  In- 
terests of  Faith 199 

§  87.  Theology  Deals  with  the  Nature  and  Proof  of 

God 200 

§  88.  The  Ontological  Proof  of  God 200 

§  89.  The  Cosmological  Proof  of  God 203 

§  90.  The  Teleological  Proof  of  God 204 

§  91 .  God  and  the  World.     Theism  and  Pantheism . .  205 

§  92.  Deism 206 

§  93.  Metaphysics  and  Theology 207 

§  94.  Psychology  is  the  Theorj'  of  the  Soul 208 

§  95.  Spiritual  Substance 209 

§  96.  Intellectualism  and  Voluntarism 210 

§  97.  Freedom  of  the  Will.     Necessitarianism,  De- 
terminism, and  Indeterminism 211 

§98.  Immortality.     Survival  and  Eternalism 212 

§  99.  The  Natural  Science  of  Psychology.     Its  Prob- 
lems and  Method 213 

§  100.  Psychology  and  Philosophy 216 

§  101.  Transition  from  Classification  by  Problems  to 
Classification  by  Doctrines.  Naturalism. 
Subjectivism.  Absolute  Idealism.  Absolute 
Realism 217 


xviii  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

PART   III 
SYSTEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

FAGS 

Chapter  VIII.     Naturalism 223 

§  102.  The  General  Meaning  of  Materialism 223 

§  103.  Corporeal  Being 224 

§  104.  Corporeal  Processes.     Hylozoism  and  Mech- 
anism    225 

§  105.  Materialism  and  Physical  Science 228 

§  106.  The  Development  of  the  Conceptions  of  Phys- 
ical Science.     Space  and  Matter 228 

§  107.  Motion  and  its  Cause.     Development  and  Ex- 
tension of  the  Conception  of  Force 231 

§  108.  The  Development  and  Extension  of  the  Con- 
ception of  Energy 236 

§  109.  The  Claims  of  Naturalism 239 

§  110.  The  Task  of  Naturalism 241 

§  111.  The  Origin  of  the  Cosmos 242 

§  112.  Life.     Natural  Selection 244 

§  113.  Mechanical  Physiology 246 

§  1 14.  Mind.     The  Reduction  to  Sensation 247 

§  115.  Automatism 248 

§  116.  Radical  Materialism.     Mind  as  an  Epiphe- 

nomenon 250 

§  117.  Knowledge.     Positivism  and  Agnosticism. . .  252 

§  118.  Experimentalism 255 

§  119.  Naturalistic  Epistemology  not  Systematic. . .  256 

§  120.  General  Ethical  Stand-point 258 

§  121.  Cynicism  and  Cyrenaicism 259 

§  122.  Development  of  Utilitarianism.     Evolution- 
ary Conception  of  Social  Relations 260 

I  123.  Naturalistic  Ethics  not  Systematic 262 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  xix 

PAGE 

124.  Naturalism  as  Antagonistic  to  Religion 263 

125.  Naturalism  as  the  Basis  for  a  Religion  of  Ser- 

vice, Wonder,  and  Renunciation 265 


Chapter  IX.    Subjectivism 267 

§  126.  Subjectivism  Originally  Associated  with  Rel- 
ativism and  Scepticism 267 

§  127.  Phenomenalism  and  Spiritualism 271 

§  128.  Phenomenalism  as  Maintained  by  Berkeley. 
The  Problem  Inherited  from  Descartes  and 

Locke 272 

§  129.  The  Refutation  of  Material  Substance 275 

§  130.  The  Application  of  the  Epistemological  Prin- 
ciple     277 

§  131.  The    Refutation   of   a   Conceived   Corporeal 

World 278 

§  132.  The  Transition  to  Spiritualism 280 

§  133.  Further  Attempts  to  Maintain  Phenomenal- 
ism     281 

§  134.  Berkeley's  Spiritualism.     Immediate  Knowl- 
edge of  the  Perceiver 284 

§  135.  Schopenhauer's  Spiritualism,  or  Voluntarism. 

Immediate  Ivnowledge  of  the  Will 28.5 

§  136.  Panpsychism 287 

§  137.  The  Inherent  Difficulty  in  Spiritualism.     No 

Provision  for  Objective  Knowledge 288 

§  138.  Schopenhauer's  Attempt  to  Universalize  Sub- 
jectivism.    Mysticism 290 

§  139.  Objective  Spiritualism 292 

§  140.  Berkeley's  Conception  of  God  as  Cause,  Good- 
ness, and  Order 293 

§  141.  The   General   Tendency  of  Subjectivism  to 

Transcend  Itself 297 

§  142.  Ethical  Theories.     Relativism 298 

§  143.  Pessimism  and  Self-denial   299 


XX  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

FAOE 

§  144,  The  Ethics  of  Welfare 300 

§  145.  The  Ethical  Community 302 

§  146.  The  Religion  of  Mysticism 303 

§  147.  The  Religion  of  Individual  Cooperation  with 

God 304 

Chapter  X.     Absolute  Realism 306 

§  148.  The  Philosopher's  Task,  and  the  Philosopher's 

Object,  or  the  Absolute 306 

§  149.  The  Eleatic  Conception  of  Being 309 

§  150.  Spinoza's  Conception  of  Substance 311 

§  151.  Spinoza's  Proof  of  God,  the  Infinite  Substance. 

The  Modes  and  the  Attributes 312 

§  152.  The  Limits  of  Spinoza's  Argument  for  God. .   315 

§  153.  Spinoza's  Provision  for  the  Finite 317 

§  154.  Transition  to  Teleological  Conceptions 317 

§  155.  Early  Greek  Philosophers  not  Self-critical .  .  .  .   319 
§  156.  Curtailment  of  Philosophy  in  the  Age  of  the 

Sophists 319 

§  157.  Socrates  and  the  Self-criticism  of  the  Phi- 
losopher      321 

§158.  Socrates's  Self-criticism  a  Prophecy  of  Truth.   323 

§  159.  The  Historical  Preparation  for  Plato 324 

§  160.  Platonism:     Reality  as  the  Absolute  Ideal  or 

Good 326 

§  161.  The  Progression  of  Experience  toward  God.  .   329 
§  1G2.  Aristotle's  Hierarchy  of  Substances  in  Rela- 
tion to  Platonism 332 

§  163.  The  Aristotelian  Philosophy  as  a  Reconcilia- 
tion of  Platonism  and  Spinozism 335 

§  164.  Leibniz's  Application  of  the  Conception  of 
Development  to  the  Problem  of  Imperfec- 
tion     336 

§  165.  The  Problem  of  Imperfection  Remains  Un- 
solved     338 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  xxi 

PAOB 

§  166.  Absolute  Realism  in  Epistemology.  Ration- 
alism     339 

§  167.  The  Relation  of  Thought  and  its  Object  in 

Absolute  Realism 340 

§  168.  The  Stoic  and  Spinozistic  Ethics  of  Neces- 
sity     342 

§  169.  The  Platonic  Ethics  of  Perfection 344 

§  170.  The  Religion  of  Fulfilment  and  the  Religion 

of  Renunciation 346 

Chapter  XI.     Absolute  Idealism 349 

§  171.  General  Constructive  Character  of  Absolute 

Idealism 349 

§  172.  The  Great  Outstanding  Problems  of  Absolu- 
tism     351 

§  173.  The  Greek  Philosophers  and  the  Problem 
of  Evil.  The  Task  of  the  New  Absolu- 
tism  352 

§  174.  The  Beginning  of  Absolute  Idealism  in  Kant's 

Analysis  of  Experience 354 

§  175.  Kant's  Principles  Restricted  to  the  Experi- 
ences which  they  Set  in  Order 356 

§  176.  The  Post-Kantian  Metaphysics  is  a  Generali- 
zation of  the  Cognitive  and  Moral  Conscious- 
ness as  Analyzed  by  Kant.  The  Absolute 
Spirit .  .  , 358 

§  177.  Fichteanism,  or  the  Absolute  Spirit  as  Moral 

Activity 360 

§  178.  Romanticism,  or  the  Absolute  Spirit  as  Senti- 
ment     361 

§  179.  Hegelianism,  or  the  Absolute  Spirit  as  Dia- 
lectic     361 

§  180.  The  Hegelian  Philosophy  of  Nature  and  His- 
tory    363 

§  181.  R6sum^.     Failure   of  Absolute   Idealism  to 

Solve  the  Problem  of  Evil 365 


xxii  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

PASS 

§  182.  The  Constructive  Argument  for  Absolute 
Idealism  is  Based  upon  the  Subjectivistic 
Theory  of  Knowledge 368 

§  183.  The  Principle  of  Subjectivism  Extended  to 

Reason 371 

§  184.  Emphasis    on    Self-consciousness    in    Early 

Christian  Philosophy 372 

§  185.  Descartes's  Argument  for  the  Independence 

of  the  Thinking  Self 374 

§  186.  Empirical  Reaction  of  the  English  Philoso- 
phers     376 

§  187.  To  Save  Exact  Science  Kant  Makes  it  Depen- 
dent on  Mind 377 

§  188.  The  Post-Kantians  Transform  Kant's  Mind- 
in-general  into  an  Absolute  Mind 380 

§  189.  The  Direct  Argument.     The  Inference  from 

the  Finite  Mind  to  the  Infinite  Mind 382 

§190.  The  Realistic  Tendency  in  Absolute  Idealism .   385 

§  191.  The  Conception  of  Self-consciousness  Central 

in  the  Ethics  of  Absolute  Idealism.     Kant .  386 

§  192.  Kantian  Ethics  Supplemented  through  the 
Conceptions  of  Universal  and  Objective 
Spirit 388 

§  193.  The  Peculiar  Pantheism  and  Mysticism  of 

Absolute  Idealism 390 

§  194.  The  Religion  of  Exuberant  Spirituality 393 

Chapter  XII.     Conclusion 395 

§  195.  Liability  of  Philosophy  to  Revision  Due  to  its 

Systematic  Character 395 

§  196.  The  One  Science  and  the  Many  Philoso- 
phies    396 

§  197.  Progress  in  Philosophy.     The  Sophistication 

or  Eclecticism  of  the  Present  Age 398 

§  198.  Metaphysics.     The  Antagonistic  Doctrines  of 

Naturalism  and  Absolutism 399 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  XXlil 

PAOB 

199.  Concessions   from   the   Side   of   Absolutism. 

Recognition  of  Nature.  The  Neo-Fich- 
teans 401 

200.  The  Neo-Kantians 403 

201.  Recognition    of    the    Individual.     Personal 

Idealism 404 

202.  Concessions   from   the   Side   of   Naturalism. 

Recognition  of  Fundamental  Principles ....  405 

203.  Recognition  of  the  Will.     Pragmatism 407 

204.  Summary  and  Transition  to  Epistemology . .  .  408 

205.  The  Antagonistic  Doctrines  of  Realism  and 

Idealism.  Realistic  Tendency  in  Empirical 
Idealism 409 

206.  Realistic    Tendency    in    Absolute    Idealism. 

The  Conception  of  Experience 410 

207.  Idealistic  Tendencies  in  Realism.     The  Im- 

manence Philosophy 412 

208.  The  Interpretation  of  Tradition  as  the  Basis 

for  a  New  Construction 413 

209.  The  Truth  of  the  Physical  System,  but  Fail- 

ure of  Attempt  to  Reduce  all  Experience 

to  it 414 

210.  Truth  of   Psychical  Relations  but  Impossi- 

bility of  General  Reduction  to  them 415 

211.  Truth  of  Logical  and  Ethical  Principles.    Va- 

lidity of  Ideal  of  Perfection,  but  Impos- 
sibility of  Deducing  the  Whole  of  Experi- 
ence from  it 415 

I  212.  Error  and  Evil  cannot  be  Reduced  to  the 

Ideal 417 

I  213.  Collective  Character  of  the  Universe  as  a 

Whole 419 

i  214.  Moral  Implications  of  Such  Pluralistic  Phi- 
losophy.    Purity  of  the  Good 420 

I  215.  The  Incentive  to  Goodness 422 

i  216.  The  Justification  of  Faith 423 


xxiv  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

FAGB 

§  217.  The  Worship  and  Service  of  God 425 

§  218.  The  Philosopher  and  the  Standards  of  the 

Market-Place 425 

§  219.  The  Secularism  of  the  Present  Age 427 

§  220.  The  Value  of  Contemplation  for  Life 428 

Bibliography 431 

Index 441 


PART   I 

APPROACH     TO     THE     PROBLEM     OF 
PHILOSOPHY 


CHAPTER   I 

THE   PEACTICAL    MAN    AND   THE    PHILOSOPHER 

§  1.  Philosophy  suffers  the  distinction  of  being 
regarded  as  essentially  an  academic  pursuit.  The 
Is  Philosophy   term  philosophy,  to  be  sure,  is  used  in 

a  Merely  commOU  SpeCcll  tO  dcUOtC  a  stoical  man- 

Academic  I 

Interest?  ^^^  ^£  accepting  the  vicissitudes  of  life ; 
but  this  conception  sheds  little  or  no  light  upon  the 
meaning  of  philosophy  as  a  branch  of  scholarship. 
The  men  who  write  the  books  on  "  Epistemology  " 
or  "  Ontology,"  are  regarded  by  the  average  man 
of  affairs,  even  though  he  may  have  enjoyed  a 
"  higher  education,"  with  little  sympathy  and  less 
intelligence.  Not  even  philology  seems  less  con- 
cerned with  the  real  business  of  life.  The  pursuit 
of  philosophy  appears  to  be  a  phenomenon  of  ex- 
treme and  somewhat  effete  culture,  with  its  own 
peculiar  traditions,  problems,  and  aims,  and  with 
little  or  nothing  to  contribute  to  the  real  enterprises 
of  society.  It  is  easy  to  prove  to  the  satisfaction 
of  the  philosopher  that  such  a  view  is  radically 

3 


4  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

mistaken.  But  it  is  another  and  more  serious  mat- 
ter to  bridge  over  the  very  real  gap  that  separates 
philosophy  and  common-sense.  Such  an  aim  is 
realized  only  when  philosophy  is  seen  to  issue  from 
some  special  interest  that  is  humanly  important; 
or  when,  after  starting  in  thought  at  a  point  where 
one  deals  with  ideas  and  interests  common  to  all, 
one  is  led  by  the  inevitableness  of  consistent  think- 
ing into  the  sphere  of  philosophy. 

§  2.  There  is  but  one  starting-point  for  reflec- 
tion when  all  men  are  invited  to  share  in  it. 
Life  as  a  Start-  Though  there  be  a  great  many  special 

ing- point  for         ,       .  ,  .    ,  - 

Thought.  platforms  where  special  groups  oi  men 
may  take  their  stand  together,  there  is  only  one 
platform  broad"  enough  for  all.  This  universal 
stand-point,  or  common  platform,  is  life.  It  is 
our  more  definite  thesis,  then,  that  philosophy, 
even  to  its  most  abstruse  technicality,  is  rooted  in 
life ;  and  that  it  is  inseparably  bound  up  with  the 
satisfaction  of  practical  needs,  and  the  solution  of 
practical  problems. 

Every  man  knows  what  it  is  to  live,  and  his 
immediate  experience  will  verify  those  features  of 
the  adventure  that  stand  out  conspicuously.  To 
begin  with,  life  is  our  birtliright.  We  did  not  ask 
for  it,  but  wlicn  we  grew  old  enough  to  be  self- 


THE  PRACTICAL  MAN  AND  PHILOSOPHER        5 

conscious  we  found  ourselves  in  possession  of  it. 
Nor  is  it  a  gift  to  be  neglected,  even  if  we  had  the 
will.  As  is  true  of  no  other  gift  of  nature,  we 
must  use  it,  or  cease  to  be.  There  is  a  unique 
urgency  about  life.  But  we  have  already  implied 
more,  in  so  far  as  we  have  said  that  it  must  be 
used,  and  have  thereby  referred  to  some  form  of 
movement  or  activity  as  its  inseparable  attribute. 
To  live  is  to  find  one's  self  compelled  to  do  some- 
thing. To  do  something — there  is  another  impli- 
cation of  life :  some  outer  expression,  some  medium 
in  -which  to  register  the  degree  and  form  of  its 
activity.  Such  we  recognize  as  the  environment 
of  life,  the  real  objects  among  which  it  is  placed ; 
which  it  may  change,  or  from  which  it  may  suffer 
change.  Not  only  do  we  find  our  lives  as  unso- 
licited active  powers,  but  find,  as  well,  an  arena 
prescribed  for  their  exercise.  That  we  shall  act, 
and  in  a  certain  time  and  place,  and  with  reference 
to  certain  other  realities,  this  is  the  general  condi- 
tion of  things  that  is  encountered  when  each  one 
of  us  discovers  life.  In  short,  to  live  means  to  bo 
compelled  to  do  something  under  certain  circum- 
stances. 

There  is  another  very  common  aspect  of  life 
that  would  not  at  first  glance  seem  worthy  of  men- 


6  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

tion.  ]^ot  only  does  life,  as  Ave  have  just  described 
it,  mean  opportunity,  but  it  means  self-conscious 
opportunity.  The  facts  are  such  as  we  have  found 
them  to  be,  and  as  each  one  of  us  has  previously 
found  them  for  himself.  But  when  we  discover 
life  for  ourselves,  we  who  make  the  discovery,  and 
we  who  live,  are  identical.  From  that  moment 
we  both  live,  and  know  that  we  live.  Moreover, 
such  is  the  essential  unity  of  our  natures  that  our 
living  must  now  express  our  knowing,  and  our 
knowing  guide  and  illuminate  our  living.  Con- 
sider the  allegory  of  the  centipede.  From  the 
beginning  of  time  he  had  manipulated  his  count- 
less legs  with  exquisite  precision.  Men  had  re- 
garded him  with  wonder  and  amazement.  But 
he  was  innocent  of  his  oa\ti  art,  being  a  contrivance 
of  nature,  perfectly  constructed  to  do  her  bidding. 
One  day  the  centipede  discovered  life.  He  dis- 
covered himself  as  one  who  walks,  and  the  newly 
awakened  intelligence,  first  observing,  then  fore- 
seeing, at  length  began  to  direct  the  process.  And 
from  that  moment  the  centipede,  because  he  could 
not  remember  the  proper  order  of  his  going,  lost 
all  his  former  skill,  and  became  the  poor  clumsy 
victim  of  his  own  self-consciousness.  This  same 
self -consciousness    is    the    inconvenience    and    the 


THE  PRACTICAL  MAN  AND  PHILOSOPHER      7 

great  glory  of  human  life.  We  must  stumble 
along  as  best  we  can,  guided  by  the  feeble  light 
of  our  own  little  intelligence.  If  nature  starts 
us  on  our  way,  she  soon  hands  over  the  torch,  and 
bids  us  find  the  trail  for  ourselves.  Most  men 
are  brave  enough  to  regard  this  as  the  best  thing 
of  all;  some  despair  on  account  of  it.  In  either 
case  it  is  admittedly  the  true  story  of  human  life. 
We  must  live  as  separate  selves,  observing,  fore- 
seeing, and  planning.  There  are  two  things  that 
we  can  do  about  it.  We  can  repudiate  our  nat- 
ures, decline  the  responsibility,  and  degenerate 
to  the  level  of  those  animals  that  never  had  our 
chance ;  or  we  can  leap  joyously  to  the  helm,  and 
with  all  the  strength  and  wisdom  in  us  guide  our 
lives  to  their  destination.  But  if  we  do  the  for- 
mer, we  shall  be  unable  to  forget  what  might  have 
been,  and  shall  be  haunted  by  a  sense  of  igno- 
miny; and  if  we  do  the  second,  we  shall  experi' 
ence  the  unique  happiness  of  fulfilment  and  self- 
realization. 

Life,  then,  is  a  situation  that  appeals  to  intelli- 
gent activity.  Humanly  speaking,  there  is  no 
such  thing  as  a  situation  that  is  not  at  the  same 
time  a  theory.  As  we  live  we  are  all  theorists. 
Whoever  has  any  misgivings  as  to  the  practical 


8  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

value  of  theory,  let  him  remember  that,  speaking 
generally  of  human  life,  it  is  true  to  say  that  there 
is  no  practice  that  does  not  issue  at  length  from 
reflection.  That  which  is  the  commonest  experi- 
ence of  mankind  is  the  conjunction  of  these  two, 
the  thought  and  the  deed.  And  as  surely  as  we 
are  all  practical  theorists,  so  surely  is  philosophy 
the  outcome  of  the  broadening  and  deepening 
of  practical  theory.  But  to  understand  how  the 
practical  man  becomes  the  philosopher,  we  must 
inquire  somewhat  more  carefully  into  the  manner 
of  his  thought  about  life. 

§  3.  Let  anyone  inspect  the  last  moment  in  his 
life,  and  in  all  probability  he  will  find  that  his 
The  Practical  mind    was    employed    to    discover    the 

Knowledge   of  . 

Means.  mcaus  to  somc  end.     He  was  already 

bent  upon  some  definite  achievement,  and  was 
thoughtful  for  the  sake  of  selecting  the  economical 
and  effectual  way.  His  theory  made  his  practice 
skilful.  So  through  life  his  knowledge  shows  him 
how  to  work  his  will.  Example,  experience,  and 
books  have  taught  him  the  uses  of  nature  and 
society,  and  in  his  thoughtful  living  he  is  enabled 
to  reach  the  goal  he  has  set  for  the  next  hour,  day, 
or  year  of  his  activity.  The  long  periods  of 
Inniiaii  life  are  spout  in  chiborating  the  means  to 


THE  PRACTICAL  MAN  AND  PHILOSOPHER      9 

some  unquestioned  end.  Here  one  meets  the 
curious  truth  that  we  wake  up  in  the  middle  of 
life,  already  making  headway,  and  under  the  guid- 
ance of  some  invisible  steersman.  When  first  we 
take  the  business  of  life  seriously,  there  is  a  con- 
siderable stock  in  trade  in  the  shape  of  habits, 
and  inclinations  to  all  sorts  of  things  that  we  never 
consciously  elected  to  pursue.  Since  we  do  not 
begin  at  the  beginning,  our  first  problem  is  to 
accommodate  ourselves  to  ourselves,  and  our  first 
deliberate  acts  are  in  fulfilment  of  plans  outlined 
by  some  predecessor  that  has  already  spoken  for 
us.  The  same  thing  is  true  of  the  race  of  men. 
At  a  certain  stage  in  their  development  men  found 
themselves  engaged  in  all  manner  of  ritual  and 
custom,  and  burdened  with  concerns  that  were  not 
of  their  own  choosing.  They  were  burning  in- 
cense, keeping  festivals,  and  naming  names,  all 
of  which  they  must  now  proceed  to  justify  with 
myth  and  legend,  in  order  to  render  intelligible 
to  themselves  the  deliberate  and  self-conscious 
repetition  of  them.  Even  so  much  justification 
was  left  to  the  few,  and  the  great  majority  con- 
tinued to  seek  that  good  which  social  usage  coun- 
tenanced and  individual  predisposition  confirmed. 
So  every  man  of  us  acts  from  day  to  day  for 


10  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

love's  sake,  or  wealth's  sake,  or  power's  sake,  or 
for  the  sake  of  some  near  and  tangible  object; 
reflecting  only  for  the  greater  efficiency  of  his 
endeavor. 

§  4.  But  if  this  be  the  common  manner  of  think- 
ing about  life,  it  does  not  represent  the  whole  of 
The  Practical  ^^^^h  thought.  'NoT  docs  it  foUow  that 
S°End'*or  °'  because  it  occupies  us  so  much,  it  is 
Purpose.  therefore  correspondingly  fundamental. 
Like  the  myth  makers  of  old,  we  all  want  more 
or  less  to  know  the  reason  of  our  ends.  Here, 
then,  we  meet  with  a  somewhat  different  type  of 
reflection  upon  life,  the  reflection  that  underlies 
the  adoption  of  a  life  purpose.  It  is  obvious  that 
most  ends  ara  selected  for  the  sake  of  other  ends, 
and  so  are  virtually  means.  Thus  one  may  strug- 
gle for  years  to  secure  a  college  education.  This 
definite  end  has  been  adopted  for  the  sake  of  a 
somewhat  more  indefinite  end  of  self-advance- 
ment, and  from  it  there  issues  a  whole  series  of 
minor  ends,  which  form  a  hierarchy  of  steps  as- 
cending to  the  highest  goal  of  aspiration.  Now 
upon  the  face  of  things  we  live  very  unsystematic 
lives,  and  yet  were  we  to  examine  ourselves  in  this 
fashion,  we  should  all  find  our  lives  to  be  marvels 
of  organization.     Their  gro^vth,  as  we  have  seen, 


THE  PRACTICAL  MAN  AND  PHILOSOPHER     H 

began  before  we  were  conscious  of  it ;  and  we  are 
commonly  so  absorbed  in  some  particular  flower 
or  fruit  that  we  forget  the  roots,  and  the  design 
of  the  whole.  But  a  little  reflection  reveals  a  re- 
markable unitary  adjustment  of  parts.  The  unity 
is  due  to  the  dominance  of  a  group  of  central  pur- 
poses. Judged  from  the  stand-point  of  experience, 
it  seems  bitter  irony  to  say  that  everyone  gets 
from  life  just  what  he  wishes.  But  a  candid 
searching  of  our  own  hearts  will  incline  us  to 
admit  that,  after  all,  the  way  we  go  and  the  length 
Ave  go  is  detennined  pretty  much  by  the  kind  and 
the  intensity  of  our  secret  longing.  That  for 
which  in  the  time  of  choice  we  are  willing  to  sac- 
rifice all  else,  is  the  formula  that  defines  the  law 
of  each  individual  life.  All  this  is  not  intended 
to  mean  that  we  have  each  named  a  clear  and 
definite  ideal  which  is  our  chosen  goal.  On  the 
contrary,  such  a  conception  may  be  almost  mean- 
ingless to  some  of  us.  In  general  the  higher  the 
ideal  the  vagiier  and  less  vivid  is  its  presentation 
to  our  consciousness.  But,  named  or  unnamed, 
sharp  or  blurred,  vivid  or  half -forgotten,  there  may 
be  found  in  the  heart  of  every  man  that  which  of 
all  things  he  wants  to  be,  that  which  of  all  deeds 
he  wants  to  do.     If  he  has  had  the  normal  youth 


12  HE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

of  dreaming,  he  has  seen  it,  and  warmed  to  the 
picture  of  his  imagination;  if  he  has  been  some- 
what more  thoughtful  than  the  ordinary,  his  rea- 
son has  defined  it,  and  adopted  it  for  his  vocation ; 
if  neither,  it  has  been  present  as  an  undertone 
throughout  the  rendering  of  his  more  inevitable 
life.  He  will  recognize  it  when  it  is  named  as 
the  desire  to  do  the  will  of  God,  or  to  have  as 
good  a  time  as  possible,  or  to  make  other  people 
as  happy  as  possible,  or  to  be  equal  to  his  respon- 
sibilities, or  to  fulfil  the  expectation  of  his  mother, 
or  to  be  distinguished,  wealthy,  or  influential. 
This  list  of  ideals  is  miscellaneous,  and  ethically 
reducible  to  more  fundamental  concepts,  but  these 
are  the  terms  in  which  men  are  ordinarily  con- 
scious of  their  most  intimate  purposes.  We  must 
now  inquire  respecting  the  nature  of  the  thought 
that  determines  the  selection  of  such  a  purpose, 
or  justifies  it  when  it  has  been  unconsciously  ac- 
cepted. 

§  5.  What  is  most  worth  while  ?  So  far  as 
liuman  action  is  concerned  this  obviously  depends 
The  Phiioso-  i^P^^i^  what  is  possiblc,  upon  what  is 
D^ivofee'^the  Gxpected  of  US  by  our  own  natures,  and 
Man  of  Affairs,  ^^pQj^  what  interests  and  concerns  are 

and  the  '■ 

Voluptuary,     couservcd  by  the  trend  of  events  in  our 


THE  PRACTICAL  MAN  AND  PHILOSOPHER    13 

environment.  What  I  had  best  do,  presupposes 
what  I  have  the  strength  and  the  skill  to  do,  what 
I  feel  called  npon  to  do,  and  what  are  the  great 
causes  that  are  entitled  to  promotion  at  my  hands. 
It  seems  that  practically  we  cannot  separate  the 
ideal  from  the  real.  We  may  feel  that  the  high- 
est ideal  is  an  immediate  utterance  of  conscience, 
as  mysterious  in  origin  as  it  is  authoritative  in 
expression.  We  may  be  willing  to  defy  the  uni- 
verse, and  expatriate  ourselves  from  our  natural 
and  social  environment,  for  the  sake  of  the  holy 
law  of  duty.  Such  men  as  Count  Tolstoi  have 
little  to  say  of  the  possible,  or  the  expedient,  or  the 
actual,  and  are  satisfied  to  stand  almost  alone 
against  the  brutal  facts  of  usage  and  economy. 
We  all  have  a  secret  sense  of  chivalry,  that 
prompts,  however  ineffectually,  to  a  like  devotion, 
But  that  which  in  such  moral  purposes  appears 
to  indicate  a  severance  of  the  ideal  and  the  real, 
is,  if  we  will  but  stop  to  consider,  only  a  severance 
of  the  ideal  and  the  apparent.  The  martyr  is 
more  sure  of  reality  than  the  adventurer.  He  is 
convinced  that  though  his  contemporaries  and  his 
environment  be  against  him;  the  fundamental  or 
eventual  order  of  things  is  for  him.  He  believes 
in   a   spiritual   world   more   abiding,    albeit   less 


14  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

obvious,  than  the  material  world.  Though  every 
temporal  event  contradict  him,  he  lives  in  the  cer- 
tainty that  eternity  is  his.  Such  an  one  may  have 
found  his  ideal  in  the  voice  of  God  and  His  proph- 
ets, or  he  may  have  been  led  to  God  as  the  justi- 
fication of  his  irresistible  ideal ;  but  in  either  case 
the  selection  of  his  ideal  is  reasonable  to  him  in 
so  far  as  it  is  harmonious  with  the  ultimate  nature 
of  things,  or  stands  for  the  promise  of  reality.  In 
this  wise,  thought  about  life  expands  into  some 
conception  of  the  deeper  forces  of  the  world, 
and  life  itself,  in  respect  of  its  fundamental 
attachment  to  an  ideal,  implies  some  belief  con- 
cerning the  fundamental  nature  of  its  environ- 
ment. 

But  lest  in  this  account  life  be  credited  with  too 
much  gravity  and  import,  or  it  seem  to  be  as- 
sumed that  life  is  all  knight-errantry,  let  us  turn 
to  our  less  quixotic,  and  perhaps  more  effectual, 
man  of  affairs.  He  works  for  his  daily  bread, 
and  for  success  in  his  vocation.  He  has  selected 
his  vocation  for  its  promise  of  return  in  the  form 
of  wealth,  comfort,  fame,  or  influence.  He  like- 
wise perfonns  such  additional  service  to  his  family 
and  his  community  as  is  demanded  of  him  by  pub- 
lic opinion  and  his  own  sense  of  responsibility. 


THE  PRACTICAL  MAN  AND  PHILOSOPHER     15 

He  may  have  a  certain  contempt  for  the  man  who 
sees  visions.  This  may  be  his  manner  of  testify- 
ing to  his  own  preference  for  the  ideal  of  useful- 
ness and  immediate  efficiency.  But  even  so  he 
would  never  for  an  instant  admit  that  he  was  pur- 
suing a  merely  conventional  good.  He  may  be 
largely  imitative  in  his  standards  of  value,  recog- 
nizing such  aims  as  are  common  to  some  time  or 
race;  nevertheless  none  would  be  more  sure  than 
he  of  the  truth  of  his  ideal.  Question  him,  and 
he  will  maintain  that  his  is  the  reasonable  life 
under  the  conditions  of  human  existence.  He 
may  maintain  that  if  there  be  a  God,  he  can  best 
serve  Him  by  promoting  the  tangible  welfare  of 
himself  and  those  dependent  upon  him.  He  may 
maintain  that,  since  there  is  no  God,  he  must  win 
such  rewards  as  the  world  can  give.  If  he  have 
something  of  the  heroic  in  him,  he  may  tell  you 
that,  since  there  is  no  God,  he  will  labor  to  the 
uttermost  for  his  fellow-men.  Where  he  has  not 
solved  the  problem  of  life  for  himself,  he  may 
believe  himself  to  be  obeying  the  insight  of  some 
one  wiser  than  himself,  or  of  society  as  expressed 
in  its  customs  and  institutions.  But  no  man  ever 
admitted  that  his  life  was  purely  a  matter  of  ex- 
pediency, or  that  in  his  dominant  ideal  he  was 


16  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

the  victim  of  chance.  In  the  background  of  the 
busiest  and  most  preoccupied  life  of  affairs,  there 
dwells  the  conviction  that  such  living  is  appropri- 
ate to  the  universe;  that  it  is  called  for  by  the 
circumstances  of  its  origin,  opportunities,  and 
destiny. 

Finally,  the  man  who  makes  light  of  life  has  of 
all  men  the  most  transparent  inner  consciousness. 
In  him  may  be  clearly  observed  the  relation 
between  the  ideal  and  the  reflection  that  is  as- 
sumed to  justify  it. 

"A  Moment's  Halt — ^a  momentary  taste 
Of  Being  from  the  Well  amid  the  Waste — 
And  Lo! — the  phantom  Caravan  has  reach'd 
The  Nothing  it  set  out  from —     ..." 

"  We  are  no  other  than  a  moving  row 
Of  Magic  Sliadow-shapes  that  come  and  go 
Round  with  the  Sun-illumin'd  Lantern  held 
In  Midnight  by  the  Master  of  the  Show." 

Where  the  setting  of  life  is  construed  in  these 
terms,  there  is  but  one  natural  and  appropriate 
manner  of  life.  Once  believing  in  the  isolation 
and  insignificance  of  life,  one  is  sceptical  of  all 
worth  save  such  as  may  be  tasted  in  the  moment 
of  its  purchase.  If  one's  ideas  and  experiences 
are  no  concern  of  the  world's,  but  incidents  of  a 
purely  local  and  transient  interest,  they  will  real- 


THE  PRACTICAL  MAN  AND  PHILOSOPHER     17 

ize  most  when  they  realize  an  immediate  gratifi- 
cation. Where  one  does  not  believe  that  he  is  a 
member  of  the  universe,  and  a  contributor  to  its 
ends,  he  does  well  to  minimize  the  friction  that 
arises  from  its  accidental  propinquity,  and  to 
kindle  some  little  fire  of  enjoyment  in  his  own 
lonely  heart.  This  is  the  life  of  abandonment  to 
pleasure,  accompanied  by  the  conviction  that  the 
conditions  of  life  warrant  no  more  strenuous  or 
heroic  plan. 

§  6.  In  such  wise  do  we  adopt  the  life  purpose, 
or  justify  it  when  unconsciously  adopted.  The 
The  Adoption  pursuit  of  an  ideal  implies  a  belief  in 

of  Purposes 

and  the  its  effectuality.     Such  a  belief  will  in- 

of  Life.  variably  appear  when  the  groundwork 

of  the  daily  living  is  laid  bare  by  a  little  reflection. 
And  if  our  analysis  has  not  been  in  error,  there 
is  something  more  definite  to  be  obtained  from  it. 
We  all  believe  in  the  practical  wisdom  of  our  fun- 
damental ideals ;  but  we  believe,  besides,  that  such 
wisdom  involves  the  sanction  of  the  universe  as 
a  whole.  The  momentousness  of  an  individual's 
life  will  be  satisfied  with  nothing  less  final  than 
an  absolutely  wise  disposition  of  it.  For  every  in- 
dividual, his  life  is  all  his  power  and  riches,  and 
is  not  to  be  spent  save  for  the  greatest  good  that 


18  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

he  can  reasonably  pursue.  But  the  solution  of 
such  a  problem  is  not  to  be  obtained  short  of  a 
searching  of  entire  reality.  Every  life  will  rep- 
resent more  or  less  of  such  wisdom  and  enlighten- 
ment; and  in  the  end  the  best  selection  of  ideal 
will  denote  the  greatest  wealth  of  experience.  It 
is  not  always  true  that  he  who  has  seen  more  will 
live  more  wisely,  for  in  an  individual  case  in- 
stinct or  authority  may  be  better  sources  of  aspira- 
tion than  experience.  But  we  trust  instinct  and 
authority  because  we  believe  them  to  represent  a 
comprehensive  experience  on  the  part  of  the  race 
as  a  whole,  or  on  the  part  of  God.  He  whose 
knowledge  is  broadest  and  truest  would  know  best 
what  is  finally  worth  living  for.  On  this  account, 
most  men  can  see  no  more  reasonable  plan  of  life 
than  obedience  to  God's  will,  for  God  in  the  abun- 
dance of  his  wisdom,  and  since  all  eternity  is  plain 
before  him,  must  see  with  certainty  that  which  is 
supremely  worthy. 

We  mean,  then,  that  the  selection' of  our  ideals 
shall  be  determined  by  the  largest  possible  knowl- 
edge of  the  facts  pertaining  to  life.  We  mean  to 
select  as  one  would  select  who  knew  all  about  the 
antecedents  and  surroundings  and  remote  conse- 
quences of  life.     In  our  own  weakness  and  fini- 


THE  PRACTICAL  MAN  AND  PHILOSOPHER     19 

tude  we  may  go  but  a  little  way  in  the  direction 
of  such  an  insight,  and  may  prefer  to  accept  tiie 
judgment  of  tradition  or  authority,  but  we  recog- 
nize a  distinct  type  of  knowledge  as  alone  worthy 
to  justify  an  individual's  adoption  of  an  ideal. 
That  type  of  knowledge  is  the  knowledge  that  com- 
prehends the  universe  in  its  totality.  Sueh  knowl- 
edge does  not  involve  completeness  of  information 
respecting  all  parts  of  reality.  This,  humanly 
speaking,  is  both  unattainable  and  inconceivable. 
It  involves  rather  a  conception  of  the  kind  of  real- 
ity that  is  fundamental.  For  a  wise  purpose  it 
is  unnecessary  that  we  should  know  many  matters 
of  fact,  or  even  specific  laws,  provided  we  are  con- 
vinced of  the  inner  and  essential  character  of  the 
universe.  Some  of  the  alternatives  are  matters  of 
every-day  thought  and  speech.  One  cannot  tell 
the  simplest  story  of  human  life  without  disclos- 
ing them.  To  live  the  human  life  means  to  pur- 
sue ideals,  that  is,  to  have  a  thing  in  mind,  and 
then  to  try  to  accomplish  it.  Here  is  one  kind  of 
reality  and  power.  The  planetary  system,  on  the 
other  hand,  does  not  pursue  ideals,  but  moves  un- 
conscious of  itself,  with  a  mechanical  precision 
that  can  be  expressed  in  a  mathematical  formula ; 
and  is  representative  of  another  kind  of  reality 


20  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

and  power.  Hence  a  very  common  and  a  very 
practical  question:  Is  there  an  underlying  law, 
like  the  law  of  gravitation,  fundamentally  and  per- 
manently governing  life,  in  spite  of  its  apparent 
direction  by  ideal  and  aspiration?  Or  is  there 
an  underlying  power,  like  purpose,  fundamentally 
and  permanently  governing  the  planetary  system 
and  all  celestial  worlds,  in  spite  of  the  apparent 
control  of  blind  and  irresistible  forces?  This  is 
a  practical  question  because  nothing  could  be  more 
pertinent  to  our  choice  of  ideals.  Nothing  could 
make  more  difference  to  life  than  a  belief  in  the 
life  or  lifelessness  of  its  environment.  The  faiths 
that  generate  or  confirm  our  ideals  always  refer  to 
this  great  issue.  And  this  is  but  one,  albeit  the 
most  profound,  of  the  many  issues  that  arise  from 
the  desire  to  obtain  some  conviction  of  the  inner 
and  essential  character  of  life.  Though  so  inti- 
mately connected  with  practical  concerns,  these 
issues  are  primarily  the  business  of  thought.  In 
grappling  with  them,  thought  is  called  upon  for 
its  greatest  comprehensiveness,  penetration,  and 
self-consistency.  By  the  necessity  of  concentra- 
tion, thought  is  sometimes  led  to  forget  its  origin 
and  the  source  of  its  problems.  But  in  naming 
itself  philosophy,  thought  has  only  recognized  the 


THE  PRACTICAL  MAN  AND  PHILOSOPHER     21 

definiteness  and  earnestness  of  its  largest  task. 
Philosophy  is  still  thought  ahont  life,  representing 
but  the  deepening  and  broadening  of  the  common 
practical  thoughtfnlness. 

We  who  began  together  at  the  starting-point  of 
life,  have  now  entered  together  the  haven  of  plii- 
losophy.  It  is  not  a  final  haven,  but  only  the 
point  of  departure  for  the  field  of  philosophy 
proper.  ISTevertheless  that  field  is  now  in  the 
plain  view  of  the  man  who  occupies  the  practical 
stand-point.  He  must  recognize  in  philosophy  a 
kind  of  reflection  that  differs  only  in  extent  and 
persistence  from  the  reflection  that  guides  and  jus- 
tifies his  life.  He  may  not  consciously  identify 
himself  with  any  one  of  the  three  general  groups 
Avliich  have  been  characterized.  But  if  he  is 
neither  an  idealist,  nor  a  philistine,  nor  a  pleasure 
lover,  surely  he  is  compounded  of  such  elements, 
and  does  not  escape  their  implications.  He  de- 
sires something  most  of  all,  even  though  his  high- 
est ideal  be  only  an  inference  from  the  gradation 
of  his  immediate  purposes.  This  highest  ideal 
represents  what  he  conceives  to  be  the  greatest 
worth  or  value  attainable  in  the  universe,  and  its 
adoption  is  based  upon  the  largest  generalization 
that  he  can  make  or  borrow.     The  complete  justi- 


22  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

fication  of  his  ideal  would  involve  a  true  knowl- 
edge of  the  essential  character  of  the  universe. 
For  such  knowledge  he  substitutes  either  authority 
or  his  own  imperfect  insight.  But  in  either  case 
his  life  is  naturally  and  organically  correlated 
with  a  thought  about  the  universe  in  its  totality, 
or  in  its  deepest  and  essential  character.  Such 
thought,  the  activity  and  its  results,  is  philoso- 
phy. Hence  he  who  lives  is,  ipso  facto,  a  philoso- 
pher. He  is  not  only  a  potential  philosopher,  but 
a  partial  philosopher.  He  has  already  begun  to 
be  a  philosopher.  Between  the  fitful  or  prudential 
thinking  of  some  little  man  of  affairs,  and  the  sus- 
tained thought  of  the  devoted  lover  of  truth,  there 
is  indeed  a  long  journey,  but  it  is  a  straight  jour- 
ney along  the  same  road.  Philosophy  is  neither 
accidental  nor  supernatural,  but  inevitable  and 
normal.  Philosophy  is  not  properly  a  vocation, 
but  the  ground  and  inspiration  of  all  vocations. 
In  the  hands  of  its  devotees  it  grows  technical  and 
complex,  as  do  all  efforts  of  thought,  and  to  pur- 
sue philosophy  bravely  and  faithfully  is  to  encoun- 
ter obstacles  and  labyrinths  innumerable.  The 
general  problem  of  philosophy  is  mother  of  a 
Avliolc  brood  of  problems,  little  and  gi'cat.     But 


THE  PRACTICAL  MAN  AND  PHILOSOPHER    23 

whether  we  be  numbered  among  its  devotees,  or 
their  beneficiaries,  an  equal  significance  attaches 
to  the  truth  that  philosophy  is  continuous 
with  life. 


CHAPTEK   II 

POETEY   AND    PHILOSOPHY 

§  7.  As  the  ultimate  criticism  of  all  human  in- 
terests, philosophy  may  be  approached  by  avenues 
Who  is  the      as    various    as    these    interests.     Only 

Philosopher-  .,.-,, 

Poet?  Avhen   philosophy   is  discovered   as  the 

implication  of  well-recognized  special  interests,  is 
the  significance  of  its  function  fully  appreciated. 
For  the  sake  of  such  a  further  understanding  of 
philosophy,  those  who  find  either  inspiration  or 
entertainment  in  poetry  are  invited  in  the  present 
chapter  to  consider  certain  of  the  relations  between 
poetry  and  philosophy. 

We  must  at  the  very  outset  decline  to  accept 
unqualifiedly  the  poet's  opinion  in  the  matter,  for 
he  would  not  think  it  presumptuous  to  incorporate 
philosophy  in  poetry.  "  No  man,"  said  Cole- 
ridge, "  was  ever  yet  a  great  poet  without  being  at 
the  same  time  a  great  philosopher."  This  would 
seem  to  mean  that  a  great  poet  is  a  great  philos- 
opher, and  more  too.  We  shall  do  better  to  begin 
with  the  prosaic  and  matter  of  fact  minimum  of 

24 


POETRY  AND  PHILOSOPHY  25 

truth:  some  poetry  is  philosophical.  This  will 
enable  us  to  search  for  the  portion  of  philosophy 
that  is  in  some  poetry,  without  finally  defining 
their  respective  boundaries.  It  may  be  that  all 
true  poetry  is  philosophical,  as  it  may  be  that  all 
true  philosophy  is  poetical;  but  it  is  much  more 
certain  that  much  actual  poetry  is  far  from  philo- 
sophical, and  that  most  actual  philosophy  was  not 
conceived  or  written  by  a  poet.  The  mere  poet 
and  the  mere  philosopher  must  be  tolerated,  if  it 
be  only  for  the  purpose  of  shedding  light  upon  the 
philosopher-poet  and  the  poet-philosopher.  And 
it  is  to  the  philosopher-poet  that  we  turn,  in  the 
hope  that  under  the  genial  spell  of  poetry  we  may 
be  brought  with  understanding  to  the  more  forbid- 
ding land  of  philosophy. 

§  8.  Poetry  is  v.'ell  characterized,  though  not 
defined,  as  an  interpretation  of  life.  The  term 
Poetry  as  Ap-  "  ^^^^  "  ^^^^  signifies  the  human  pur- 
preciation.  posivc  cousciousness,  and  active  pursuit 
of  ends.  An  interpretation  of  life  is,  then,  a 
selection  and  account  of  such  values  in  human  ex- 
perience as  are  actually  sought  or  are  worth  the 
seeking.  For  the  poet  all  things  are  good  or  bad, 
and  never  only  matters  of  fact.  He  is  neither  an 
annalist  nor  a  statistician,  and  is  even  an  observer 


26  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

only  for  the  sake  of  a  higher  design.  He  is  one 
who  appreciates,  and  expresses  his  appreciation  so 
fittingly  that  it  becomes  a  kind  of  truth,  and  a  per- 
manently communicable  object.  That  "  unbodied 
joy,"  the  skylark's  song  and  flight,  is  through  tlie 
genius  of  Shelley  so  faithfully  embodied,  that  it 
may  enter  as  a  definite  joy  into  the  lives  of  count- 
less human  beings.  The  sensuous  or  suggestive 
values  of  nature  are  caught  by  the  poet's  quick 
feeling  for  beauty,  and  fixed  by  his  creative  activ- 
ity. Or  with  his  ready  sympathy  he  may  perceive 
the  value  of  some  human  ideal  or  mastering  pas- 
sion, and  make  it  a  reality  for  our  common  feeling. 
A\Tiere  the  poet  has  to  do  with  the  base  and  hate- 
ful, his  attitude  is  still  appreciative.  The  evil  is 
apprehended  as  part  of  a  dramatic  whole  having 
positive  moral  or  irsthetic  value.  Moral  ideas 
may  appear  in  both  poetry  and  life  as  the  inspira- 
tion and  justification  of  struggle.  Where  there  is 
no  conception  of  its  moral  significance,  the  repul- 
sive possesses  for  the  poet's  consciousness  the 
ivsthetic  value  of  diversity  and  contrast.  Even 
where  the  evil  and  ugly  is  isolated,  as  in  certain 
of  Browning's  dramatic  monologues,  it  forms,  both 
for  the  poet  and  the  reader,  but  a  ])art  of  some 
larger  perception  of  life  or  character,  whicli  is  sub- 


POETRY  AND  PHILOSOPHY  27 

lime  or  beautiful  or  good.  Poetry  involves,  then, 
the  discovery  and  presentation  of  human  experi- 
ences that  are  satisfying  and  appealing.  It  is  a 
language  for  human  pleasures  and  ideals.  Poetry 
is  without  doubt  a  great  deal  more  than  this,  and 
only  after  a  careful  analysis  of  its  peculiar  lan- 
guage could  one  distinguish  it  from  kindred  arts : 
but  it  will  suffice  for  our  purposes  to  characterize 
and  not  differentiate.  Starting  from  this  most 
general  truth  respecting  poetry,  we  may  now  look 
for  that  aspect  of  it  whereby  it  may  be  a  witness 
of  philosophical  truth. 

§  9.  For  the  answer  to  our  question,  we  must 
turn  to  an  examination  of  the  intellectual  elements 
Sincerity  in      of  poctry.     In  the  first  place,  the  com- 

Poetry. 

Whitman.  mon  demand  that  the  poet  shall  be  ac- 
curate in  his  representations  is  suggestive  of  an 
indispensable  intellectual  factor  in  his  genius. 
As  we  have  seen,  he  is  not  to  reproduce  nature, 
but  the  human  appreciative  experience  of  nature. 
K^evertheless,  he  must  even  here  be  true  to  his 
object.  His  art  involves  his  ability  to  express 
genuinely  and  sincerely  what  he  himself  experi- 
ences in  the  presence  of  nature,  or  what  he  can 
catch  of  the  inner  lives  of  others  by  virtue  of  his 
intelligent  sympathy.     'No  amount  of  emotion  or 


28  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

even  of  imagination  Avill  profit  a  poet,  unless  he 
can  render  a  true  account  of  them.  To  be  sure, 
he  need  not  define,  or  even  explain;  for  it  is  his 
function  to  transfer  the  immediate  qualities  of  ex- 
perience: but  he  must  be  able  to  speak  the  truth, 
and,  in  order  to  speak  it,  he  must  have  knovra  it. 
In  all  this,  however,  we  have  made  no  demand  that 
the  poet  should  see  more  than  one  thing  at  a  time. 
Sincerity  of  expression  does  not  require  what  is 
distinctly  another  mode  of  intelligence,  comprehe?i- 
siveness  of  view.  It  is  easier,  and  accordingly 
more  usual,  to  render  an  account  of  the  moments 
and  casual  units  of  experience,  than  of  its  totality. 
There  are  poets,  little  and  great,  who  possess  the 
intellectual  virtue  of  sincerity,  without  the  intel- 
lectual power  of  synthesis  and  reconciliation. 
This  distinction  will  enable  us  to  separate  the  in- 
telligence exhibited  in  all  poetry,  from  that  dis- 
tinct form  of  intelligence  exhibited  in  such  poetry 
as  is  properly  to  be  called  philosophical. 

The  "  barbarian  "  in  poetry  has  recently  been 
defined  as  "  the  man  who  regards  his  passions  as 
their  owti  excuse  for  being;  who  does  not  domes- 
ticate them  either  by  understanding  their  cause  or 
by  conceiving  their  ideal  goal."  ^      One  will  read- 

'  Gcorjic  .Santayana,  in  liis  Poelry  and  Religion,  p.  17G. 


POETRY  AND  PHILOSOPHY  29 

ily  appreciate  the  application  of  this  definition  to 
Walt  Whitman,  What  little  unity  there  is  in  this 
poet's  world,  is  the  composition  of  a  purely  sensu- 
ous experience, 

"  The  earth  expending  right  hand  and  left  hand, 
The  picture  alive,  every  part  in  its  best  light, 
The  music  falling  in  where  it  is  wanted,  and  stopping 
where  it  is  not  wanted." 

In  many  passages  Whitman  manifests  a  marvel- 
lous ability  to  discover  and  communicate  a  fresh 
gladness  about  the  commonest  experiences.  We 
cannot  but  rejoice  with  him  in  all  sights  and 
sounds.  But  though  we  cannot  deny  him  truth, 
his  truth  is  honesty  and  not  understanding.  The 
experiences  in  Avhich  he  discovers  so  much  worth, 
are  random  and  capricious,  and  do  not  constitute 
a  universe.  To  the  solution  of  ultimate  questions 
he  contributes  a  sense  of  mystery,  and  the  convic- 
tion 

"  That  you  are  here — that  life  exists  and  identity. 
That  the  powerful  play  goes  on,  and  you  may  contribute 
a  verse." 

His  world  is  justly  described  by  the  writer  just 
quoted  as  "  a  phantasmagoria  of  continuous  vis- 
ions, vivid,  impressive,  but  monotonous  and  hard 
to  distinguish  in  memory,  like  the  waves  of  the  sea 


30  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

or  the  decorations  of  some  barbarous  temple,  sub- 
lime only  by  the  infinite  aggregation  of  parts."  " 

As  is  Walt  Whitman,  so  are  many  poets  greater 
and  less.  Some  who  have  seen  the  world-view,  ex- 
hibit the  same  particularism  in  their  lyric  moods ; 
although,  generally  speaking,  a  poet  who  once 
has  comprehended  the  world,  will  see  the  parts  of 
it  in  the  light  of  that  wisdom.  But  Walt  Whit- 
man is  peculiarly  representative  of  the  poetry  that 
can  be  true,  without  being  wdse  in  the  manner  that 
we  shall  come  shortly  to  understand  as  the  manner 
of  philosophy.  He  is  as  desultory  in  his  poet  rap- 
tures as  is  the  common  man  when  he  lives  in  his 
immediate  experiences.  The  truth  won  by  each  is 
the  clear  vision  of  one  thing,  or  of  a  limited  col- 
lection of  things,  and  not  the  broad  inclusive  vision 
of  all  things. 

§  10.  The  transition  from  Whitman  to  Shake- 
speare may  seem  somewhat  abrupt,  but  the  very 
_     ,     ,.        differences   between   these    poets   serve 

Constructive  '^ 

Knowledge  in   ^q    mark    out    an    interestiner    affinitv. 

Poetry.  ° 

Shakespeare.  Xeitlior  lias  put  any  unitary  construc- 
tion upon  human  life  and  its  environment. 
Neither,  as  poet,  is  the  witness  of  any  world-view ; 
which  will  mean  for  us  that  neither  is  a  philos- 

*Santayana  :  op.  cit.,  p.  180. 


POETRY  AND  PHILOSOPHY  31 

oplier-poet.  As  respects  Shakespeare,  this  is  a 
liard  saying.  We  are  accustomed  to  the  critical 
judgment  that  finds  in  the  Shakespearian  dramas 
an  apprehension  of  the  universal  in  human  life. 
But  though  this  judgment  is  true,  it  is  by  no  means 
conclusive  as  respects  Shakespeare's  relation  to  the 
philosophical  type  of  thought.  For  there  can  be 
universality  without  philosophy.  Thus,  to  know 
the  groups  and  the  marks  of  the  vertebrates  is  to 
know  a  truth  which  possesses  generality,  in  con- 
tradistinction to  the  particularism  of  Whitman's 
poetic  consciousness.  Even  so  to  know  well  the 
groups  and  marks  of  human  character,  vertebrate 
and  invertebrate,  is  to  know  that  of  which  the  aver- 
age man,  in  his  hand  to  hand  struggle  with  life, 
is  ignorant.  Such  a  wisdom  Shakespeare  pos- 
sessed to  a  unique  degree,  and  it  enabled  him  to 
reconstruct  human  life.  He  did  not  merely  per- 
ceive human  states  and  motives,  but  he  understood 
human  nature  so  well  that  he  could  create  consist- 
ent men  and  women.  Moreover,  Shakespeare's 
knowledge  was  not  only  thus  universal  in  being 
a  knowledge  of  general  groups  and  laws,  but  also 
in  respect  of  its  extensity.  His  understanding 
was  as  rich  as  it  was  acute.  It  is  true,  then,  that 
Shakespeare  read  human   life   as  an  open  book, 


32  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

knowing  certainly  the  manner  of  human  thinking 
and  feeling,  and  the  power  and  interplay  of  human 
motives.  But  it  is  equally  true,  on  the  other  hand, 
that  he  possessed  no  unitary  conception  of  the 
meaning  and  larger  relations  of  human  life.  Such 
a  conception  might  have  been  expressed  either  by 
means  of  the  outlook  of  some  dominating  and  per- 
sistent type  of  personality,  or  by  a  pervading  sug- 
gestion of  some  constant  world-setting  for  the 
variable  enterprise  of  mankind.  It  could  appear 
only  provided  the  poet's  appreciation  of  life  in  de- 
tail were  determined  by  an  interpretation  of  the 
meaning  of  life  as  a  whole.  Shakespeare  appar- 
ently possessed  no  such  interpretation.  Even 
when  Hamlet  is  groping  after  some  larger  truth 
that  may  bear  upon  the  definite  problems  of  life, 
he  represents  but  one,  and  that  a  strange  and  un- 
usual, type  of  human  nature.  And  Hamlet's  re- 
flections, it  should  be  noted,  have  no  outcome. 
There  is  no  Shakespearian  answer  to  the  riddles 
that  Hamlet  propounds.  The  poet's  genius  is  not 
less  amazing  for  this  fact ;  indeed,  his  peculiar  dis- 
tinction can  only  be  comprehended  upon  this  basis. 
Shakespeare  put  no  construction  upon  life,  and  by 
virtue  of  this  very  reserve  accomplished  an  art  of 
surpassing  fidelity  and  vividness.     The  absence  of 


POETRY  AND  PHILOSOPHY  33 

l)liilosophy  in  Shakespeare,  and  the  presence  of 
the  most  characteristic  quality  of  his  genius,  may 
both  be  imputed  by  the  one  affirmation,  that  there 
is  no  Shakespearian  point  of  view. 

This  truth  signifies  both  gain  and  loss.  The 
philosophical  criticism  of  life  may  vary  from  the 
ideal  objectivity  of  absolute  truth,  to  the  subjec- 
tivity of  a  personal  religion.  Philosophy  aims  to 
correct  the  partiality  of  particular  points  of  view 
by  means  of  a  point  of  view  that  shall  comprehend 
their  relations,  and  effect  such  reconciliations  or 
transformations  as  shall  enable  them  to  constitute 
a  universe.  Philosophy  always  assumes  the  hypo- 
thetical view  of  omniscience.  The  necessity  of 
such  a  final  criticism  is  implicit  in  every  scientific 
item  of  knowledge,  and  in  every  judgment  that  is 
passed  upon  life.  Philosophy  makes  a  distinct 
and  peculiar  contribution  to  hiunan  knowledge  by 
its  heroic  effort  to  measure  all  knowledges  and  all 
ideals  by  the  standard  of  totality.  Nevertheless 
it  is  significant  that  no  human  individual  can  pos- 
sibly possess  the  range  of  omniscience.  The  most 
adequate  knowledge  of  which  any  generation  of 
men  is  capable,  will  always  be  that  which  is  con- 
ceived by  the  most  synthetic  and  vigorously  meta- 
physical minds;  but  every  individual  philosophy 


34  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

will  nevertheless  be  a  premature  synthesis.  The 
effort  to  complete  knowledge  is  the  indispensable 
test  of  the  adequacy  of  prevailing  conceptions,  but 
the  completed  knowledge  of  any  individual  mind 
will  shortly  become  an  historical  monument.  It  will 
belong  primarily  to  the  personal  life  of  its  creator, 
as  the  articulation  of  his  personal  covenant  with 
the  universe.  There  is  a  sound  justification  for 
such  a  conclusion  of  things  in  the  case  of  the  indi- 
vidual, for  the  conditions  of  human  life  make  it 
inevitable;  but  it  will  always  possess  a  felt  unity, 
and  many  distinct  features,  that  are  private  and 
subjective.  Now  such  a  projection  of  personality, 
with  its  coloring  and  its  selection,  Shakespeare  has 
avoided;  and  very  largely  as  a  consequence,  his 
dramas  are  a  storehouse  of  genuine  human  nature. 
Ambition,  mercy,  hate,  madness,  guilelessness,  con- 
ventionality, mirth,  bravery,  deceit,  purity — these, 
and  all  human  states  and  attributes  save  piety,  are 
upon  his  pages  as  real,  and  as  mysterious  withal, 
as  they  are  in  the  great  historical  society.  For 
an  ordinary  reader,  these  states  and  attributes  are 
more  real  in  Hamlet  or  Lear  than  in  his  own 
direct  experience,  because  in  Hamlet  and  Lear  he 
can  see  them  with  the  eye  and  intelligence  of  gen- 
ius.    But  Shakespeare  is  the  world  all  over  again. 


Poetry  amd  philosophy  35 

and  there  is  loss  as  well  as  gain  in  such  realism. 
Here  is  human  life,  no  doubt,  and  a  brilliant  pag- 
eantry it  is;  but  human  life  as  varied  and  as  prob- 
lematic as  it  is  in  the  living.  Shakespeare's  fun- 
damental intellectual  resource  is  the  historical  and 
psychological  knowledge  of  such  principles  as 
govern  the  construction  of  human  natures.  The 
goods  for  which  men  undertake,  and  live  or  die, 
are  any  goods,  justified  only  by  the  actual  human 
striving  for  them.  The  virtues  are  the  old  win- 
ning virtues  of  the  secular  life,  and  the  heroisms 
of  the  common  conscience.  Beyond  its  empirical 
generality,  his  knowledge  is  universal  oidy  in  the 
sense  that  space  and  time  are  universal.  His  con- 
sciousness contains  its  representative  creations,  and 
expresses  them  unspoiled  by  any  transforming 
thought.  His  poetic  consciousness  is  like  the  very 
stage  to  which  he  likens  all  the  world:  men  and 
women  meet  there,  and  things  happen  there.  The 
stage  itself  creates  no  unity  save  the  occasion  and 
the  place.  Shakespeare's  consciousness  is  univer- 
sal because  it  is  a  fair  field  with  no  favors.  But 
even  so  it  is  particular,  because,  though  each  may 
enter  and  depart  in  peace,  when  all  enter  together 
there  is  anarchy  and  a  babel  of  voices.  All 
Shakespeare  is  like  all  the  world  seen  through  the 


36  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

eyes  of  each  of  its  inhabitants.  Human  experi- 
ence in  Shakespeare  is  human  experience  as  every- 
one feels  it,  as  comprehensive  as  the  aggregate  of 
innumerable  lives.  But  human  experience  in  phi- 
losophy is  the  experience  of  all  as  thought  by  a 
synthetic  mind.  Hence  the  wealth  of  life  depicted 
by  Shakespeare  serves  only  to  point  out  the  phi- 
losopher's problem,  and  to  challenge  his  powers. 
Here  he  will  find  material,  and  not  results ;  much 
to  philosophize  about,  but  no  philosophy. 

§  11.  The  discussion  up  to  this  point  has  attrib- 
uted to  poetry  very  definite  intellectual  factors 
Philosophy  in  that  nevertheless  do  not  constitute  phi- 

Poetry.   The 

World-View,    losophy.     Walt    Whitman    speaks    his 

Omar  Khay-      «     ,-.  .  ,  i      i  • 

yam.  feeling  With  truth,  but  m  general  mani- 

fests no  comprehensive  insight.  Shakespeare  has 
not  only  sincerity  of  expression  but  an  understand- 
ing mind.  He  has  a  knowledge  not  only  of  par- 
ticular experiences,  but  of  human  nature;  and  a 
consciousness  full  and  varied  like  society  itself. 
But  there  is  a  kind  of  knowledge  possessed  by 
neither,  the  knowledge  sought  by  coordinating  all 
aspects  of  human  experience,  both  particular  and 
general.  Not  even  Shakespeare  is  wise  as  one 
who,  having  seen  the  whole,  can  fundamentally 
interpret  a  part.     But  though  the  philosopher-poet 


POETRY  AND  PHILOSOPHY  37 

may  not  yet  be  found,  we  cannot  longer  be  ignorant 
of  his  nature.  He  will  be,  like  all  poets,  one  who 
appreciates  experiences  or  finds  things  good,  and 
he  will  faithfully  reproduce  the  values  which  he 
discovers.  But  he  must  justify  himself  in  view 
of  the  fundamental  nature  of  the  universe.  The 
values  which  he  apprehends  must  be  harmonious, 
and  so  far  above  the  plurality  of  goods  as  to  trans- 
cend and  unify  them.  The  philosopher-poet  will 
find  reality  as  a  whole  to  be  something  that  accred- 
its the  order  of  values  in  his  inner  life.  He  will 
not  only  find  certain  things  to  be  most  worthy 
objects  of  action  or  contemplation,  but  he  will  see 
why  they  are  worthy,  because  he  will  have  con- 
strued the  judgment  of  the  universe  in  their 
favor. 

In  this  general  sense,  Omar  Khayyam  is  a  phi- 
losopher-poet. To  be  sure  his  universe  is  quite  the 
opposite  of  that  which  most  poets  conceive,  and  is 
perhaps  profoundly  antagonistic  to  the  very  spirit 
of  poetry ;  but  it  is  none  the  less  true  that  the  joys 
to  which  Omar  invites  us  are  such  as  his  universe 
prescribes  for  human  life. 

"  Some  for  the  Glories  of  This  World ;  and  some 
Sigh  for  the  Prophet's  Paradise  to  come; 
Ah,  take  the  Cashj  and  let  the  Credit  go, 
Nor  heed  the  rumble  of  a  distant  Drum." 


38  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

Herein  is  both  poetry  and  philosophy,  albeit  but 
a  poor  brand  of  each.  We  are  invited  to  occupy 
ourselves  only  with  spiritual  cash,  because  the 
universe  is  spiritually  insolvent.  The  immedi- 
ately gratifying  feelings  are  the  only  feelings  that 
the  world  can  guarantee.  Omar  Khayyam  is  a 
philosopher-poet,  because  his  immediate  delight  in 
"  youth's  sweet-scented  manuscript "  is  part  of  a 
consciousness  that  vaguely  sees,  though  it  cannot 
grasp,  "  this  sorry  scheme  of  things  entire." 

"  Drink  for  you  know  not  whence  you  come,  nor  why ; 
Drink  for  you  know  not  why  you  go,  nor  where." 

§  12.  But  the  i^oet  in  his  world-view  ordinarily 
sees  other  than  darkness.  The  same  innate  spir- 
Wordsworth.  itiud  enterprise  that  sustains  religious 
faith  leads  the  poet  more  often  to  find  the  universe 
positively  congenial  to  his  ideals,  and  to  ideals  in 
general.  He  interprets  human  experience  in  the 
light  of  the  spirituality  of  all  the  world.  It  is  to 
Wordsworth  that  we  of  the  present  age  are  chiefly 
indebted  for  such  imagery,  and  it  will  profit  us 
to  consider  somewhat  carefully  the  philosophical 
quality  of  his  poetry. 

Walter  Pater,  in  introducing  his  appreciation 
of    Wordsworth,    writes    that    ''  an    intimate    con- 


POETRY  AND  PHILOSOPHY  39 

sciousness  of  the  expression  of  natural  things, 
which  weighs,  listens,  penetrates,  where  the  earlier 
mind  passed  roughly  by,  is  a  large  element  in  the 
complexion  of  modern  poetry."  We  recognize  at 
once  the  truth  of  this  characterization  as  applied 
to  Wordsworth.  But  there  is  something  more  dis- 
tinguished about  this  poet's  sensibility  even  than 
its  extreme  fineness  and  delicacy ;  a  quality  that  is 
suggested,  though  not  made  explicit,  by  Shelley's 
allusion  to  Wordsworth's  experience  as  ''  a  sort  of 
thought  in  sense."  Nature  possessed  for  him  not 
merely  enjoyable  and  describable  characters  of 
great  variety  and  minuteness,  but  an  immediately 
apprehended  unity  and  meaning.  It  would  be  a 
great  mistake  to  construe  this  meaning  in  sense 
as  analogous  to  the  crude  symbolism  of  the  educa- 
tor Froebel,  to  whom,  as  he  said,  "  the  world  of 
crystals  proclaimed,  in  distinct  and  univocal  terms, 
the  laws  of  human  life."  Wordsworth  did  not 
attach  ideas  to  sense,  but  regarded  sense  itself  as 
a  communication  of  truth.  We  readily  call  to 
mind  his  unique  capacity  for  apprehending  the 
characteristic  flavor  of  a  certain  place  in  a  certain 
moment  of  time,  the  individuality  of  a  situation. 
I^ow  in  such  moments  he  felt  that  he  w^as  receiving 
intelligences,  none  the  less  direct  and  significant 


40  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

for   their   inarticulate    form.     Like    the    boy   on 

Windermere,  whom  he  himself  describes, 

"  while  he  hung 
Loitering,  a  gentle  shock  of  mild  surprise 
Has  carried  far  into  his  heart  the  voice 
Of  mountain  torrents ;  or  the  visible  scene 
Would  enter  unawares  into  his  mind. 
With  all  its  solemn  imagery,  its  rocks, 
Its  woodSj  and  that  uncertain  heaven  received 
Into  the  bosom  of  the  steady  lake." 

For  our  j)urpose  it  is  essential  that  we  should 
recognize  in  this  appreciation  of  nature,  expressed 
in  almost  every  poem  that  Wordsworth  wrote,  a 
consciousness  respecting  the  fundamental  nature 
of  the  world.  Conversation,  as  we  know,  de- 
notes an  interchange  of  commensurable  meanings. 
Whatever  the  -code  may  be,  whether  words  or  the 
most  subtle  form  of  suggestion,  communication  is 
impossible  without  community  of  nature.  Hence, 
in  believing  himself  to  be  holding  converse  with 
the  so-called  physical  world,  Wordsworth  conceives 
that  world  as  fundamentally  like  himself.  He 
finds  the  most  profound  thing  in  all  the  world  to 
be  the  universal  spiritual  life.  In  nature  this  life 
manifests  itself  most  directly,  clothed  in  its  own 
proper  dignity  and  peace.  But  it  may  be  discov- 
ered in  the  humanity  that  is  most  close  to  nature, 
in  the  avocations  of  plain  and  simple  people,  and 


POETRY  AND  PHILOSOPHY  4I 

the  unsophisticated  delights  of  children ;  and,  with 

the  perspective  of  contemplation,  even  '^  among  the 

multitudes  of  that  huge  city." 

So  Wordsworth  is  rendering  a  true  account  of 

his  own  experience  of  reality  when,  as  in  "  The 

Prelude,"  he  says  unequivocally: 

"  A  gracious  spirit  o'er  this  earth  presides. 
And  in  the  heart  of  man ;  invisibly 
It  comes  to  works  of  imreproved  delight, 
And  tendency  benign;  directing  those 
Who  care  not,  know  not,  think  not,  what  they  do." 

Wordsworth  is  not  a  philosopher-poet  because  by 
searching  his  pages  we  can  find  an  explicit  philo- 
sophical creed  such  as  this,  but  because  all  the  joys 
of  which  his  poet-soul  compels  him  to  sing  have  their 
peculiar  note,  and  compose  their  peculiar  harmony, 
by  virtue  of  such  an  indwelling  consciousness.  Here 
is  one  who  is  a  philosopher  in  and  through  his 
poetry.  He  is  a  philosopher  in  so  far  as  the  detail 
of  his  appreciation  finds  fundamental  justification 
in  a  world-view.  From  the  immanence  of  "  the 
universal  heart "  there  follows,  not  through  any 
mediate  reasoning,  but  by  the  immediate  experi- 
ence of  its  propriety,  a  conception  of  that  which 
is  of  supreme  worth  in  life.  The  highest  and  best 
of  which  life  is  capable  is  contemplation,  or  the 
consciousness  of  the  universal  indwelling  of  God. 


42  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

Of  those  who  fail  to  live  thus  fittingly  in  the  midst 
of  the  divine  life^  Walter  Pater  speaks  for  Words- 
worth as  follows: 

"To  higher  or  lower  ends  they  move  too  often  with  some- 
thing of  a  sad  countenance,  with  hurried  and  ignoble  gait, 
becoming,  unconsciously,  something  like  thorns,  in  their 
anxiety  to  bear  grapes;  it  being  possible  for  people,  in  the 
pursuit  of  even  great  ends,  to  become  themselves  thin 
and  impoverished  in  spirit  and  temper,  thus  diminish- 
ing the  sum  of  perfection  in  the  world  at  its  very 
sources."' 

The  quiet  and  worshipful  spirit,  won  by  the  culti- 
vation of  the  emotions  appropriate  to  the  presence 
of  nature  and  society,  is  the  mark  of  the  complet- 
est  life  and  the  most  acceptable  service.  Thus  for 
Wordsworth  the  meaning  of  life  is  inseparable 
from  the  meaning  of  the  universe.  In  apprehend- 
ing that  which  is  good  and  beautiful  in  human 
experience,  he  was  attended  by  a  vision  of  the 
totality  of  things.  Herein  he  has  had  to  do,  if 
not  with  the  form,  at  any  rate  with  the  very  sub- 
stance of  philosophy. 

§  13.  Unquestionably  the  supreme  philosopher- 
poet  is  Dante.  He  is  not  only  philosophical  in  the 
Dante.  temper  of  his  mind,   but  his   greatest 

poem  is  the  incarnation  of  a  definite  system  of 

^Appreciations,  p.  50. 


POETRY  AND  PHILOSOPHY  43 

philosophy,  the  most  definite  that  the  world  has 
seen.  That  conception  of  the  world  which  in  the 
thirteenth  century  found  argumentative  and  or- 
derly expression  in  the  "  Summa  Theologise  "  of 
Thomas  of  Aquino,  and  constituted  the  faith  of 
the  church,  is  visualized  by  Dante,  and  made  the 
basis  of  an  interpretation  of  life. 

The  "  Divina  Commedia "  deals  with  all  the 
heavens  to  the  Empyrean  itself,  and  with  all  spirit- 
ual life  to  the  very  presence  of  God.  It  derives 
its  imagery  from  the  cosmology  of  the  day,  its 
dramatic  motive  from  the  Christian  and  Greek 
conceptions  of  God  and  his  dealings  with  the 
world.  Sin  is  punished  because  of  the  justice  of 
God ;  knowledge,  virtue,  and  faith  lead,  through 
God's  grace  and  mercy  manifested  in  Christ,  to  a 
perpetual  union  with  Him.  Hell,  purgatory,  and 
paradise  give  place  and  setting  to  the  events  of 
the  drama.  But  the  deeper  meaning  of  the  poem 
is  allegorical.  In  a  letter  quoted  by  Lowell,  Dante 
writes : 

"The  literal  subject  of  the  whole  work  is  the  state  of  the 
soul  after  death,  simply  considered.  But  if  the  work  be 
taken  allegorically  the  subject  is  man,  as  by  merit  or  de- 
merit, through  freedom  of  the  will,  he  renders  himself 
liable  to  the  reward  or  punishment  of  justice."* 

*  Letter  to  Can  Grande.  See  Lowell's  Essay  on  Danie,  p.  34. 


44  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

In  other  words,  the  inner  and  essential  meaning 
of  the  poem  has  to  do  not  with  external  retribution, 
but  with  character,  and  the  laws  which  determine 
its  own  proper  ruin  or  perfection.  The  punish- 
ments described  in  the  "  Inferno  "  are  accounts  of 
the  state  of  guilt  itself,  implications  of  the  will 
that  has  chosen  the  part  of  brutishness.  Sin  itself 
is  damnable  and  deadening,  but  the  knowledge 
that  the  soul  that  sinneth  shall  die  is  the  first  way 
of  emancipation  from  sin.  The  guidance  of  Virgil 
through  hell  and  purgatory  signifies  the  knowledge 
of  good  and  evil,  or  moral  insight,  as  the  guide 
of  man  through  this  life  of  struggle  and  progress. 
The  earthly  paradise,  at  the  close  of  the  "  Purga- 
torio,"  represents  the  highest  state  to  which  human 
character  can  attain  when  choice  is  determined  by 
ordinary  experience,  intelligence,  and  understand- 
ing. Here  man  stands  alone,  endowed  with  an 
enlightened  conscience.  Here  are  uttered  the  last 
words  of  Virgil  to  Dante,  the  explorer  of  the  spir- 
itual country: 

"Expect  no  more  or  word  or  sign  from  me.  Free,  up- 
right, and  sane  is  thine  own  free  will,  and  it  would  be 
wrong  not  to  act  according  to  its  pleasure;  wherefore  thee 
over  thyself  I  crown  and  mitre."* 

*  Purgatorio,  Canto  XXVII.     Translation  by  Norton. 


POETRY  AND  PHILOSOPHY  45 

But  moral  self-reliance  is  not  the  last  word.     As 

Beatrice,   the   image  of  tenderness   and  holiness, 

comes  to  Dante  in  the  earthly  paradise,  and  leads 

him  from  the  summit  of  purgatory  into  the  heaven 

of  heavens,  and  even  to  the  eternal  light ;  so  there 

is   added   to   the   mere   hirnian,   intellectual,   and 

moral  resources  of  the  soul,  the  sustaining  power 

of  the   divine  grace,   the   illuminating  power   of 

divine  truth,  and  the  transforming  power  of  divine 

love.     Through  the  aid  of  this  higher  wisdom,  the 

journey  of  life  becomes  the  way  to  God.     Thus 

the  allegorical  truth  of  the  "  Divina  Commedia  " 

is  not  merely  an  analysis  of  the  moral  nature  of 

man,  but  the  revelation  of  a  imiversal  spiritual 

order,  manifesting  itself  in  the  moral  evolution 

of  the  individual,  and  above  all  in  his  ultimate 

community  with  the  eternal  goodness. 

"Thou  shouldst  not,  if  I  deem  aright,  wonder  more  at 
thy  ascent,  than  at  a  stream  if  from  a  high  mountain  it 
descends  to  the  base.  A  marvel  it  would  be  in  thee,  if, 
deprived  of  hindrance,  thou  hadst  sat  below,  even  as 
qxiiet  by  living  fire  in  earth  would  be."' 

Such,  in  brief,  is  Dante's  world-view,  so  suggestive 

of  the  freer  idealistic  conceptions  of  later  thought 

as  to  justify  a  recent  characterization  of  him  as 

one  who,  "  accepting  without  a  shadow  of  a  doubt 

'  Paradiso,  Canto  I. 


46  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

or  hesitation  all  the  constitutive  ideas  of  mediseval 
thought  and  life,  grasped  them  so  firmly  and  gave 
them  such  luminous  expression  that  the  spirit  in 
them  broke  away  from  the  form."  "^ 

But  it  must  be  added,  as  in  the  case  of  Words- 
worth, that  Dante  is  a  philosopher-poet  not  be- 
cause St.  Thomas  Aquinas  appears  and  speaks  with 
authority  in  the  Thirteenth  Canto  of  the  "  Para- 
diso,"  nor  even  because  a  philosophical  doctrine 
can  be  consistently  formulated  from  his  writings, 
but  because  his  consciousness  of  life  is  informed 
with  a  sense  of  its  universal  bearings.  There  is 
a  famous  passage  in  the  Twenty-second  Canto  of 
the  "  Paradiso,"  in  which  Dante  describes  himself 
as  looking  down  upon  the  earth  from  the  starry 
heaven. 

'"Thou  art  so  near  the  ultimate  salvation,' began  Bea- 
trice, 'that  thou  oughtest  to  have  thine  eyes  clear  and 
sharp.  And  therefore  ere  thou  further  enterest  it,  look 
back  downward,  and  see  how  great  a  world  I  have  already 
set  beneath  thy  feet,  in  order  that  thy  heart,  so  far  as  it 
is  able,  may  present  itself  joyous  to  the  triumphant  crowd 
which  comes  glad  through  this  round  ether.'  With  my 
sight  I  returned  tl' rough  each  and  all  the  seven  spheres, 
and  saw  this  globe  such  that  I  smiled  at  its  mean  sem- 
blance; and  that  counsel  I  approve  as  the  best  which 
holds  it  of  least  account;  and  he  who  thinks  of  other 
things  may  be  called  truly  worthy." 

*  Edward  Caird,  in  his  Literature  and  Philosophy,  Vol.  I,  p.  24. 


POETRY  AND  PHILOSOPHY  47 

Dante's  scale  of  values  is  that  which  appears  from 
the  starry  heaven.  His  austere  piety,  his  invin- 
cible courage,  and  his  uncompromising  hatred  of 
wrong,  are  neither  accidents  of  temperament  nor 
blind  reactions,  but  compose  the  proper  character 
of  one  who  has  both  seen  the  world  from  God, 
and  returned  to  see  God  from  the  world.  He  was, 
as  Lowell  has  said,  "  a  man  of  genius  who  could 
hold  heartbreak  at  bay  for  twenty  years,  and  would 
not  let  himself  die  till  he  had  done  his  task  " ; 
and  his  power  was  not  obstinacy,  but  a  vision  of 
the  ways  of  God.  He  knew  a  truth  that  justified 
him  in  his  sacrifices,  and  made  a  great  glory  of 
his  defeat  and  exile.  Even  so  his  poetry  or  ap- 
preciation of  life  is  the  expression  of  an  inward 
contemplation  of  the  world  in  its  unity  or  essence. 
It  is  but  an  elaboration  of  the  piety  which  he 
attributes  to  the  lesser  saints  of  paradise,  when  he 
has  them  say : 

"  Nay,  it  is  essential  to  this  blessed  existence  to  hold  our- 
selves within  the  divine  wUl,  whereby  our  very  wills  are 
made  one.  So  that  as  we  are  from  stage  to  stage  through- 
out this  realm,  to  all  the  realm  is  pleasing,  as  to  the  King 
who  inwills  us  with  His  will.  And  His  will  is  our  peace; 
it  is  that  sea  whereunto  is  moving  all  that  which  It  creates 
and  which  nature  makes."  * 

^Paradiso,  Canto  III. 


48  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

§  14.  There  now  remains  the  brief  task  of  dis- 
tinguishing the  philosopher-poet  from  the  philoso- 
The  Difference  P^ier  himself.  The  philosopher-poet  is 
p^lTr^and  ^^^^  who,  having  made  the  philosophical 
Philosophy,  point  of  view  his  own,  expresses  himself 
in  the  form  of  poetry.  The  philosophical  point 
of  view  is  that  from  which  the  universe  is  compre- 
hended in  its  totality.  The  wisdom  of  the  philos- 
opher is  the  knowledge  of  each  through  the  knowl- 
edge of  all.  Wherein,  then,  does  the  poet,  when 
possessed  of  such  wisdom,  differ  from  the  philoso- 
pher proper  ?  To  this  question  one  can  give  read- 
ily enough  the  general  answer,  that  the  difference 
lies  in  the  mode  of  utterance.  Furthermore,  we 
have  already  given  some  account  of  the  peculiar 
manner  of  the  poet.  He  invites  us  to  experience 
with  him  the  beautiful  and  moving  in  nature  and 
life.  That  which  the  poet  has  to  express,  and 
that  which  he  aims  to  arouse  in  others,  is  an  appre- 
ciative experience.  He  requires  what  Words- 
worth calls  "  an  atmosphere  of  sensation  in  which 
to  move  his  wings."  Therefore  if  he  is  to  be 
philosophical  in  intelligence,  and  yet  essentially  a 
poet,  he  must  find  his  universal  truth  in  immediate 
experience.  He  must  be  one  who,  in  seeing  the 
many,  sees  the  one.     The  philosopher-poet  is  he 


POETRY  AND  PHILOSOPHY  49 

M'ho  visualizes  a  fundamental  interpretation  of  the 
world.  "  A  poem/'  sajs  one  poet,  "  is  the  very 
image  of  life  expressed  in  its  eternal  truth." 

The  philosopher  proper,  on  the  other  hand,  has 
the  sterner  and  less  inviting  task  of  rendering  such 
an  interpretation  articulate  to  thought.  That 
which  the  poet  sees,  the  philosopher  must  define. 
That  which  the  poet  divines,  the  philosopher  must 
calculate.  The  philosopher  must  dig  for  that 
which  the  poet  sees  shining  through.  As  the  poet 
transcends  thought  for  the  sake  of  experience,  the 
l)hilosopher  must  transcend  experience  for  the  sake 
of  thought.  As  the  poet  sees  all,  and  all  in  each, 
so  the  philosopher,  knowing  each,  must  think  all 
consistently  together,  and  then  know  each  again. 
It  is  the  part  of  philosophy  to  collect  and  criticise 
evidence,  to  formulate  and  coordinate  conceptions, 
and  finally  to  define  in  exact  terms.  The  reani- 
mation  of  the  structure  of  thought  is  accomplished 
primarily  in  religion,  which  is  a  general  con- 
ception of  the  world  made  the  basis  of  daily 
living. 

For  religion  there  is  no  subjective  correlative 
less  than  life  itself.  Poetry  is  another  and  more 
circumscribed  means  of  restoring  thought  to  life. 
By  the  poet's  imagination,  and  through  the  art  of 


50  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

his  expression,  thought  may  be  sensuously  per- 
ceived. "  If  the  time  should  ever  come,"  says 
AVordsworth,  "when  what  is  now  called  Science, 
thus  familiarized  to  men,  shall  be  ready  to  put  on, 
as  it  wercj  a  form  of  flesh  and  blood,  the  Poet  will 
lend  his  divine  spirit  to  aid  the  transfiguration, 
and  will  welcome  the  Being  thus  produced,  as  a 
dear  and  genuine  inmate  of  the  household  of 
man."  ^  As  respects  truth,  philosophy  has  an  in- 
dubitable priority.  The  very  sternness  of  the  phi- 
losopher's task  is  due  to  his  supreme  dedication  to 
truth.  But  if  validity  be  the  merit  of  philosophy, 
it  can  well  be  supplemented  by  immediacy,  which 
is  the  merit  of  poetry.  Presuppose  in  the  poet 
conviction  of  a  sound  philosophy,  and  we  may  say 
with  Shelley,  of  his  handiwork,  that  "  it  is  the  per- 
fect and  consummate  surface  and  bloom  of  all 
things ;  it  is  as  the  odor  and  the  color  of  the  rose 
to  the  texture  of  the  elements  which  compose  it, 
as  the  form  and  splendor  of  unfadcd  beauty  to  the 
secrets  of  anatomy  and  corruption."  "  Indeed," 
as  he  adds,  "  what  were  our  consolations  on  this 
side  of  the  grave — and  our  aspirations  beyond  it — 
if  poetry  did  not  ascend  to  bring  light  and  fire 

•  Observations  prefixed   to  the  second  edition  of  Lyrical 
Ballads. 


rOETRY  AND  PHILOSOPHY  51 

from  those  eternal  regions  where  the  owl-winged 
faculty  of  calculation  dare  not  ever  soar?  "  ^^ 

The  unity  in  outlook,  attended  by  differences  of 
method  and  form,  which  may  exist  between  poet 
and  philosopher,  is  signally  illustrated  by  the  rela- 
tion betw^een  Goethe  and  Spinoza.  What  Goethe 
saw  and  felt,  Spinoza  proved  and  defined.  The 
universal  and  eternal  substance  was  to  Spinoza,  as 
philosopher,  a  theorem,  and  to  Goethe,  as  poet,  a 
perception  and  an  emotion.  Goethe  writes  to 
Jacobi  that  when  philosophy  "  lays  itself  out  for 
division,"  he  cannot  get  on  w'ith  it,  but  when  it 
"  confirms  our  original  feeling  as  though  we  were 
one  with  nature,"  it  is  w^elcome  to  him.  In  the 
same  letter  Goethe  expresses  his  appreciation  of 
Spinoza  as  the  complement  of  his  own  nature: 

"  His  all-reconciling  peace  contrasted  with  my  all-agita- 
ting endeavor;  his  intellectual  method  was  the  opposite 
counterpart  of  my  poetic  way  of  feeling  and  expressing 
myself;  and  even  the  inflexible  regularity  of  his  logical 
procedure,  which  might  be  considered  ill-adapted  to  moral 
subjects,  made  me  his  most  passionate  scholar  and  his 
devoted  adherent.  Mind  and  heart,  understanding  and 
sense,  were  drawn  together  with  an  inevitable  elective 
affinity,  and  this  at  the  same  time  produced  an  intimate 
union  between  individuals  of  the  most  different  types."" 

^"  A  Defence  of  Poetry. 

"  Quoted  by  Caird  in  his  Literature  and  Philosophy,  Vol.  I, 
p.  60 


52  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

It  appears,  then,  that  some  poets  share  with  all 
philosophers  that  point  of  view  from  which  the 
horizon  line  is  the  boundary  of  all  the  world. 
Poetry  is  not  always  or  essentially  philosophical, 
but  may  be  so;  and  when  the  poetic  imagination 
restores  philosophy  to  immediacy,  human  experi- 
ence reaches  its  most  exalted  state,  excepting  only 
religion  itself,  wherein  God  is  both  seen  and  also 
served,  ^or  is  the  part  of  philosophy  in  poetry 
and  religion  either  ignoble  or  presumptuous,  for, 
humanly  speaking,  "  the  owl-winged  faculty  of  cal- 
culation "  is  the  only  safe  and  sure  means  of  access 
to  that  place  on  high, 

"  Where  the  niglitingale  doth  sing 
Not  a  senseless,  tranced  thing, 
But  a  divine   melodious  truth; 
Philosophic  numbers  smooth; 
Tales  and  golden  histories 
Of  heaven  and  its  mysteries." 


CHAPTEE    III 

THE    KELIGIOUS    EXPERIENCE 

§  15.  The  least  religious  experience  is  so  mys- 
terious and  so  complex  that  a  moderate  degree  of 
The  Possibility  reflection  upon  it  tends  to  a  sense  of 

of  Defining 

ReUgion.  intellectual  impotence.  "  If  I  speak," 
says  Emerson,  "  I  define  and  confine,  and  am  less." 
One  would  gladly  set  do\ATi  religion  among  the  un- 
speakable things  and  avoid  the  imputation  of  de- 
grading it.  It  is  certain  that  the  enterprise  of 
defining  religion  is  at  present  in  disrepute.  It  has 
been  undertaken  so  often  and  so  unsuccessfully  that 
contemporary  students  for  the  most  part  prefer 
to  supply  a  list  of  historical  definitions  of  religion, 
and  let  their  variety  demonstrate  their  futility. 
Metaphysicians  and  psychologists  agree  that  in 
view  of  the  differences  of  creed,  ritual,  organiza- 
tion, conduct,  and  temperament  that  have  been  true 
of  different  religions  in  different  times  and  places, 
one  may  as  well  abandon  the  idea  that  there  is  a 

constant  element. 

53 


54  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

But  on  the  other  hand  "\ve  have  the  testimony 
afforded  by  the  name  religion;  and  the  ordinary 
judgments  of  men  to  the  effect  that  it  signifies 
something  to  be  religious,  and  to  be  more  or  less 
religious.  There  is  an  elementary  logical  prin- 
ciple to  the  effect  that  a  group  name  implies  cer- 
tain common  grouj)  characters.  Impatience  with 
abstract  or  euphemistic  definitions  should  not  blind 
us  to  the  truth.  Even  the  psychologist  tends  in 
his  description  of  religious  phenomena  to  single  out 
and  emphasize  what  he  calls  a  typical  religious  ex- 
perience. And  the  same  applies  to  the  idealist's 
treatment  of  the  matter.^  Religion,  he  reasons, 
is  essentially  a  development  of  which  the  true 
meaning  can  be  seen  only  in  the  higher  stages. 
The  primitive  religion  is  therefore  only  implicit 
religion.  But  lower  stages  cannot  be  regarded  as 
belonging  to  a  single  development  with  higher 
stages,  if  there  be  not  some  actual  promise  of  the 
later  in  the  earlier,  or  some  element  which  endures 
throughout.  It  is  unavoidable,  then,  to  assume 
that  in  dealing  with  religion  we  are  dealing  with 
a  specific  and  definable  experience. 

§  16.  The  profitableness  of  undertaking  such  a 
definition  is  anollicr  inattor.      It  may  well  Ixi  that 

'  Cf.  Caird:   The  Evalnlion  of  Rrlifjioti,  Lectures  II,  III. 


THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE  55 

in  so  human  and  practical  an  affair  as  religion, 
definition  is  peculiarly  inappropriate.  But  is  there 
The  Profit-  ^^^  ^  liunian  and  practical  value  in  the 
abieness  of       ycrv  defininff  of  religion  ?    Is  there  not 

Defining  J  b  O 

ReUgion.  ^  demand  for  it  in  the  peculiar  rela- 
tion that  exists  between  religion  and  the  progress 
of  enlightenment  ?  Religion  associates  itself  with 
the  habits  of  society.  The  progress  of  enlighten- 
ment means  that  more  or  less  all  the  time,  and  very 
profoundly  at  certain  critical  times,  society  must 
change  its  habits.  The  consequence  is  that  religion 
is  likely  to  be  abandoned  with  the  old  habits.  The 
need  of  a  new  religion  is  therefore  a  chronic  one. 
The  reformer  in  religion,  or  the  man  who  wishes 
to  be  both  enlightened  and  religious,  is  chiefly  oc- 
cupied with  the  problem  of  disentangling  religion 
pure  and  undefiled  from  definite  discredited  prac- 
tices and  opinions.  And  the  solution  of  the  prob- 
lem turns  upon  some  apprehension  of  the  essence 
of  religion.  There  is  a  large  amount  of  necessary 
and  unnecessary  tragedy  due  to  the  extrinsic  con- 
nection between  ideas  and  certain  modes  of  their 
expression.  There  can  be  no  more  serious  and 
urgent  duty  than  that  of  expressing  as  directly, 
and  so  as  truly  as  possible,  the  great  permanent 
human  concerns.     The  men  to  whom  educational 


56  THE  APrROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

reform  has  been  largely  due  have  been  the  men 
who  have  remembered  for  their  fellows  what  this 
whole  business  of  education  is  after  all  for.  Co- 
menius  and  Pestalozzi  served  society  by  stripping 
educational  activity  of  its  historical  and  institu- 
tional accessories,  and  laying  bare  the  genuine 
human  need  that  these  are  designed  to  satisfy. 
There  is  a  similar  virtue  in  the  insistent  attempt 
to  disting-uish  between  the  essential  and  the  acces- 
sory in  religion. 

§  17.  Although  declining  to  be  discouraged  by 
the  conspicuousness  of  past  failures  in  this  connec- 
The  True  ^^^^'  °^^^  ^^^J  ^^^^  profit  by  tliem.  The 
D^fi^°n°^  amazing  complexity  of  religious  phe- 
ReUgion.  nomcna  must  somehow  be  seen  to  be  con- 
sistent with  their  common  nature.  The  religious 
experience  must  not  only  be  found,  but  must  also 
be  reconciled  with  "  the  varieties  of  religious  ex- 
perience." The  inadequacy  of  the  well-known 
definitions  of  religion  may  be  attributed  to  several 
causes.  The  commonest  fallacy  is  to  define  relig- 
ion in  terms  of  a  religion.  My  definition  of  re- 
ligion must  include  my  brother's  religion,  even 
though  he  live  on  the  other  side  of  the  globe,  and 
my  ancestor's  religion,  in  spite  of  his  prehistoric 
remoteness.     Error  may  easily  arise  through  the 


THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE  57 

attempt  to  define  religion  in  terms  of  my  own  re- 
ligion, or  what  I  conceive  to  be  the  true  religion. 
Whatever  the  relation  between  ideal  religion  and 
actual  religion,  the  field  of  religion  contains  by 
common  consent  cults  that  must  on  their  own 
grounds  condemn  one  another;  religions  that  are 
bad  religions,  and  yet  religions. 

A  more  enlightened  fallacy,  and  a  more  danger- 
ous one,  is  due  to  the  supposition  that  religion  can 
be  defined  exclusively  in  terms  of  some  department 
of  human  nature.  There  have  been  descriptions 
of  religion  in  terms  of  feeling,  intellect,  and  con- 
duct respectively.  But  it  is  always  easy  to  over- 
throw such  a  description,  by  raising  the  question 
of  its  application  to  evidently  religious  experiences 
that  belong  to  some  other  aspect  of  life.  Religion 
is  not  feeling,  because  there  are  many  phlegmatic, 
God-fearing  men  whose  religion  consists  in  good 
works.  Religion  is  not  conduct,  for  there  are 
many  mystics  whose  very  religion  is  withdrawal 
from  the  field  of  action.  Religion  is  not  intellec- 
tion, for  no  one  has  ever  been  able  to  formulate  a 
creed  that  is  common  to  all  religions.  Yet  with- 
out a  doubt  one  must  look  for  the  essence  of  relig- 
ion in  human  nature.  The  present  psychological 
interest   in    religion   has    emphasized   this    truth. 


58  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

How,  then,  may  we  describe  it  in  terms  of  certain 
constant  conditions  of  linman  life,  and  yet  escape 
the  abstractness  of  the  facultative  method  ?  Mod- 
ern psychology  suggests  an  answer  in  demon- 
strating the  interdependence  of  knowledge,  feeling, 
and  volition. 2  The  perfect  case  of  this  unity  is 
belief.  The  believing  experience  is  cognitive  in 
intent,  but  practical  and  emotional  as  well  in  con- 
tent. I  believe  what  I  take  for  granted ;  and  the 
object  of  my  belief  is  not  merely  known,  but  also 
felt  and  acted  upon.  What  I  believe  expresses 
itself  in  my  total  experience. 

There  is  some  hope,  then,  of  an  adequate  defi- 
nition of  the  religious  experience,  if  it  be  regarded 
as  belonging  to  the  psychological  type  of  belief.^ 
Belief,  however,  is  a  broader  category  than  relig- 
ion. There  must  be  some  religious  type  of  believ- 
ing. An  account  of  religion  in  terms  of  believing, 
and  the  particular  type  of  it  here  in  question, 
would,  then,  constitute  the  central  stem  of  a  psy- 
chology of  religion,  and  affords  the  proper  concep- 
tions for  a  description  of  the  religious  experience. 
Even  here  the  reserv^ation  must  be  made  that  belief 
is  always  more  than  the  believing  state,  in  that  it 

*Cf.  Leuba:  Introduction  to  a  Psychological  Study  of  Relig- 
ion, Monist,  Vol.  XI,  p.  195. 
3  Cf.  Leuba:  Ibid. 


THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE  59 

means  to  be  true.^  Hence  to  complete  an  account 
of  religion  one  should  consider  its  object,  or  its 
cognitive  implications.  But  this  direct  treatment 
of  the  relation  between  religion  and  philosophy 
must  be  deferred  until  in  the  present  chapter  we 
shall  have  come  to  appreciate  the  inwardness  of 
the  religious  consciousness.  To  this  end  we  must 
permit  ourselves  to  be  enlightened  by  the  experi- 
ence of  religious  people  as  viewed  from  within. 
It  is  not  our  opinion  of  a  man's  religion  that  is 
here  in  question,  but  the  content  and  meaning 
which  it  has  for  him. 

"I  would  have  you,"  says  Fielding,  in  his  "  Hearts  of 
Men,"  "go  and  kneel  beside  the  Mahommedan  as  he 
prays  at  the  sunset  hour,  and  put  your  heart  to  his  and 
wait  for  the  echo  that  will  surely  come.  ...  I 
would  have  you  go  to  the  hillman  smearing  the  stone 
with  butter  that  his  god  may  be  pleased,  to  the  woman 
crying  to  the  forest  god  for  her  sick  child,  to  the  boy 
before  his  monks  learning  to  be  good.  No  matter  where 
you  go,  no  matter  what  th^e  faith  is  called,  if  you  have 
the  hearing  ear,  if  your  heart  is  in  unison  with  the  heart 
of  the  world,  you  will  hear  always  the  same  song."* 

§  18.  The  general  identification  of  religion  with 

belief   is    made   without    serious    difficulty.     The 

essential  factor  in  belief,  is,  as  we  have 

Religion  '       ' 

as  Belief.         sccu,  the  rcactiou  of  the  whole  person- 
*  Cf.  §  29.  *  P.  322. 


60  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

ality  to  a  fixed  object  or  accepted  situation,  A 
similar  principle  underlies  common  judgments 
about  a  man's  religion.  He  is  accounted  most  re- 
ligious whose  religion  penetrates  his  life  most  inti- 
mately. In  the  man  whose  religion  consists  in  the 
outer  exercise  of  attendance  upon  church,  we  rec- 
ognize the  sham.  He  appears  to  be  religious. 
He  does  one  of  the  things  which  a  religious  man 
would  do;  but  an  object  of  religious  faith  is  not 
the  constant  environment  of  his  life.  He  may  or 
may  not  feel  sure  of  God  from  his  pew,  but  God 
is  not  among  the  things  that  count  in  his  daily 
life.  God  does  not  enter  into  his  calculations  or 
determine  his  scale  of  values.  Again,  discursive 
thinking  is  regarded  as  an  interruption  of  religion. 
When  I  am  at  pains  to  justify  my  religion,  I  am 
already  doubting;  and  for  common  opinion  doubt 
is  identical  with  irreligion.  In  so  far  as  I  am 
religious,  my  religion  stands  in  no  need  of  justifi- 
cation, even  though  I  regard  it  as  justifiable.  In 
my  religious  experience  I  am  taking  something  for 
granted;  in  other  words  I  act  about  it  and  feel 
about  it  in  a  manner  that  is  going  to  be  determined 
by  the  special  conditions  of  my  mood  and  tem- 
perament. The  mechanical  and  prosaic  man  ac- 
knowledges   God    in    liis    mechanical    and    prosaic 


THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE  61 

way.  He  believes  in  divine  retribution  as  he 
believes  in  commercial  or  social  retribution.  He 
is  as  careful  to  prepare  for  the  next  world  as  he 
is  to  be  respectable  in  this.  The  poet,  on  the  other 
hand,  believes  in  God  after  the  manner  of  his 
genius.  Though  he  worship  God  in  spirit  he  may 
conduct  his  life  in  an  irregular  manner  peculiar 
to  himself.  Difference  of  mood  in  the  same  in- 
dividual may  be  judged  by  the  same  measure. 
When  God  is  most  real  to  him,  brought  home  to 
him  most  vividly,  or  consciously  obeyed,  in  these 
moments  he  is  most  religious.  When,  on  the  other 
hand,  God  is  merely  a  name  to  him,  and  church 
a  routine,  or  when  both  are  forgotten  in  the  daily 
occupations,  he  is  least  religious.  His  life  on  the 
whole  is  said  to  be  religious  in  so  far  as  periods 
of  the  second  type  are  subordinated  to  periods  of 
the  first  type.  Further  well-known  elements  of 
belief,  corollaries  of  the  above,  are  evidently  pres- 
ent in  religion.  A  certain  imagery  remains  con- 
stant throughout  an  individual's  experience.  He 
comes  back  to  it  as  to  a  physical  object  in  space. 
And  although  religion  is  sporadically  an  exclusive 
and  isolated  affair,  it  tends  strongly  to  be  social. 
The  religious  object,  or  God,  is  a  social  object, 
common  to  me  and  to  my  neighbor,  and  presup- 


62  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

posed  in  our  collective  undertakings.  This  reduc- 
tion of  religion  to  the  type  of  the  believing  state 
should  thus  provide  us  with  an  answer  to  that  old 
and  fundamental  question  concerning  the  relative 
priority  of  faith  and  works.  The  test  of  the  faith 
is  in  the  works,  and  the  works  are  religious  in  so 
far  as  they  are  the  expression  of  the  faith.  Ke- 
ligion  is  not  the  doing  of  anything  nor  the  feel- 
ing of  anything  nor  the  thinking  of  anything, 
but  the  reacting  as  a  whole,  in  terms  of  all  pos- 
sible activities  of  human  life,  to  some  accepted 
situation. 

§  19.  We  may  now  face  the  more  interesting 
but  difficult  question  of  the  special  character  of 
Religion  as  rcligious  belief.  In  spite  of  the  fact 
D?posi«on  or  ^^^^^  ^^  ^^^^c  days  the  personality  of  God 
Attitude.  ig  Qf^gj^  regarded  as  a  transient  feature 
of  religion,  that  type  of  belief  which  throws  most 
light  upon  the  religious  experience  is  the  belief  in 
persons.  Our  belief  in  persons  consists  in  the 
practical  recognition  of  a  more  or  less  persistent 
disposition  toward  ourselves.  The  outward  be- 
havior of  our  fellow-men  is  construed  in  terms  of 
the  practical  bearing  of  the  attitude  which  it  im- 
plies. The  extraordinary  feature  of  such  belief 
is  the  disproportion  between  its  vividness  and  the 


THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE  63 

direct  evidence  for  it.  Of  this  we  are  most  aware 
in  connection  with  those  personalities  which  we 
regard  as  distinctly  friendly  or  hostile  to  ourselves. 
We  are  always  more  or  less  clearly  in  the  presence 
of  our  friends  and  enemies.  Their  well-wishing 
or  their  ill-wishing  haunts  the  scene  of  our  living. 
There  is  no  more  important  constituent  of  what 
the  j^sychologists  call  our  "  general  feeling  tone." 
There  are  times  when  we  are  entirely  possessed  by 
a  state  that  is  either  exuberance  in  the  presence  of 
those  who  love  us,  or  awkwardness  and  stupidity 
in  the  presence  of  those  whom  we  believe  to  sus- 
pect and  dislike  us.  The  latter  state  may  easily 
become  chronic.  Many  men  live  permanently  in  the 
presence  of  an  accusing  audieiice.  The  inner  life 
which  expresses  itself  in  the  words,  "  Everybody 
hates  me !  "  is  perhaps  the  most  common  form 
of  morbid  self-consciousness.  On  the  other  hand, 
buoyancy  of  spirits  springs  largely  from  a  con- 
stant faith  in  the  good-will  of  one's  fellows.  In 
this  case  one  is  filled  with  a  sense  of  security,  and 
is  conscious  of  a  sympathetic  reinforcement  that 
adds  to  private  joys  and  compensates  for  private 
sorrows.  And  this  sense  of  attitude  is  wonder- 
fully discriminating.  We  can  feel  the  presence  of 
a  "  great  man,"  a  "  formidable  person,"  a  superior 


64  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

or  inferior,  one  who  is  interested  or  indifferent  to 
our  talk,  and  all  the  subtlest  degrees  of  approval 
and  disapproval. 

A  similar  sensibility  may  quicken  us  even  in 
situations  where  no  direct  individual  attitude  to 
ourselves  is  implied.  We  regard  places  and  com- 
munities as  congenial  when  we  are  in  s^anpathy 
with  the  prevailing  purposes  or  standards  of  value. 
We  may  feel  ill  at  ease  or  thoroughly  at  home 
in  cities  where  we  know  no  single  human  soul. 
Indeed,  in  a  misanthrope  like  Rousseau  (and  who 
has  not  his  Rousseau  moods !)  the  mere  absence  of 
social  repression  arouses  a  most  intoxicating  sense 
of  tunefulness  and  security,  l^ature  plays  the 
part  of  an  indulgent  parent  who  permits  all  sorts 
of  personal  liberties. 

"The  view  of  a  fine  country,  a  succession  of  agree- 
able prospects,  a  free  air,  a  good  appetite,  and  the  health 
I  gain  by  walking;  the  freedom  of  inns,  and  the  distance 
from  everything  that  can  make  me  recollect  the  de- 
pendence of  my  situation,  conspire  to  free  my  soul,  and 
give  boldness  to  my  thoughts,  throwing  me,  in  a  manner, 
into  the  immensity  of  things,  where  I  combine,  choose, 
and  appropriate  thom  to  my  fancy,  without  restraint  or 
fear.     I  dispose  of  all  nature  as  I  please."' 

§  20.  In  such  confidence  or  distrust,  inspired 
'  Rousseau:  Confessions,  Book  IV,  p.  125. 


THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE  65 

originally  by  the  social  environment,  and  similarly 
suggested  by  other  surroundings  of  life,  we  have 
ReUgion  as  the  key  to  the  religious  consciousness, 
ntsp^jsition  of  ^^^t  it  i^  ^*^'^^'  t™G  t^  ^^^  that  in  the 
Environment  ^^^^  ^^  religion  these  attitudes  are  Con- 
or Universe,  ccrncd  with  the  universal  or  supernatu- 
ral rather  than  with  present  and  normal  human 
relationships.  Religious  reactions  are  "  total  re- 
actions." 

"To  get  at  them,"  says  William  James,  "you  must 
go  behind  the  foreground  of  existence  and  reach  down 
to  that  curious  serise  of  the  whole  residual  cosmos  as  an 
everlasting  presence,  intimate  or  alien,  terrible  or  amus- 
ing, lovable  or  odious,  which  in  some  degree  everyone 
possesses.  This  sense  of  the  world's  presence,  appealing 
as  it  does  to  our  peculiar  individual  temperament,  makes 
us  either  strenuous  or  careless,  devout  or  blasphemous, 
gloomy  or  exultant  about  life  at  large;  and  our  reaction, 
involuntary  and  inarticulate  and  often  half  unconscious 
as  it  is,  is  the  completest  of  all  our  answers  to  the  ques- 
tion, 'What  is  the  character  of  this  universe  in  which  we 
dwell?'  "-> 

This  residual  environment,  or  profounder  realm 
of  tradition  and  nature,  may  have  any  degree  of 
unity  from  chaos  to  cosmos.     For  religion  its  sig- 

'  William  James:  The  Varieties  of  Religious  Experience, 
p.  35.  The  italics  are  mine.  I  am  in  the  present  chapter 
under  constant  obligation  to  this  wonderfully  sympathetic 
and  stimulating  book. 


66  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

iiificance  lies  in  the  idea  of  original  and  far-reach- 
ing power  rather  than  in  the  idea  of  totality.  But 
that  which  is  at  first  only  "  beyond/'  is  practically 
the  same  object  as  that  which  comes  in  the  develop- 
ment of  thought  to  be  conceived  as  the  "  world  "  or 
the  "  universe."  We  may  therefore  use  these  latter 
terms  to  indicate  the  object  of  religion,  until  the 
treatment  of  special  instances  shall  define  it  more 
precisely.  Religion  is,  then,  man's  sense  of  the 
disposition  of  the  universe  to  himself.  We  shall 
expect  to  find,  as  in  the  social  phenomena  with 
which  we  have  just  dealt,  that  the  manifestation 
of  this  sense  consists  in  a  general  reaction  appro- 
priate to  the  disposition  so  attributed.  He  will  be 
fundamentally  ill  at  ease,  profoundly  confident,  or 
will  habitually  take  precautions  to  be  safe.  The 
ultimate  nature  of  the  world  is  here  no  specula- 
tive problem.  The  savage  who  could  feel  some  joy 
at  living  in  the  universe  would  be  more  religious 
than  the  sublimest  dialectician.  It  is  in  the  vivid- 
ness of  the  sense  of  this  presence  that  the  acute- 
ness  of  religion  consists.  I  am  religious  in  so  far 
as  the  whole  tone  and  temper  of  my  living  reflects 
a  belief  as  to  what  the  universe  thinks  of  such 
as  me. 

§21.   The    examples    that    follow    are    selected 


THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE  67 

because  their  differences  in  personal  flavor  serve 
Examples  of     to  throw  into  relief  their  common  re- 

Religious  .     . 

BeUef.  ligious  character.     Theodore  Parker,  in 

describing  his  own  boyhood,  writes  as  follows : 

"  I  can  hardly  think  without  a  shudder  of  the  terrible 
effect  the  doctrine  of  eternal  damnation  had  on  me. 
How  many,  many  hours  have  I  wept  with  terror  as  I 
lay  on  my  bed,  till,  between  praying  and  weeping,  sleep 
gave  me  repose.  But  before  I  was  nine  years  old  this 
fear  went  away,  and  I  saw  clearer  light  in  the  goodness 
of  God.  But  for  years,  say  from  seven  till  ten,  I  said 
my  prayers  with  much  devotion,  I  think,  and  then  con- 
tinued to  repeat,  'Lord,  forgive  my  sins,'  till  sleep  came 
on  me."* 

Compare  with  this  Stevenson's  Christmas  letter  to 
his  mother,  in  which  he  says: 

"The  whole  necessary  morality  is  kindness;  and  it 
should  spring,  of  itself,  from  the  one  fundamental  doc- 
trine. Faith.  If  you  are  sure  that  God,  in  the  long  run, 
means  kindness  by  you,  you  should  be  happy;  and  if 
happy,  surely  you  should  be  kind.'" 

Here  is  destiny  frowning  and  destiny  smiling, 
but  in  each  case  so  real,  so  present,  as  to  be  imme- 
diately responded  to  with  helpless  terror  and  with 
grateful  warm-heartedness. 

The  author  of  the  "  Imitatio  Christi "  speaks 
thus  of  the  daily  living  of  the  Christian : 

'  Chadwick:  Theodore  Parker,  p.  18. 
»  Stevenson:  Letters,  Vol.  I,  p.  229. 


68  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

"  The  life  of  a  Christian  who  has  dedicated  himself  to 
the  service  of  God  should  abound  with  eminent  virtues 
of  all  kinds,  that  he  may  be  really  the  same  person  which 
he  is  by  outward  appearance  and  profession.  Indeed, 
he  ought  not  only  to  be  the  same,  but  much  more,  in  his 
inward  disposition  of  soul;  because  he  professes  to  serve 
a  God  who  sees  the  inward  parts,  a  searcher  of  the  heart 
and  reins,  a  God  and  Father  of  spirits:  and  therefore, 
since  we  are  always  in  His  sight,  we  should  be  exceed- 
ingly careful  to  avoid  all  impurity,  all  that  may  give 
offence  to  Him  whose  eyes  cannot  behold  iniquity.  We 
should,  in  a  word,  so  far  as  mortal  and  frail  nature  can, 
imitate  the  blessed  angels  in  all  manner  of  holiness, 
since  we,  as  well  as  they,  are  always  in  His  presence. 
.  .  .  And  good  men  have  always  this  notion  of  the 
thing.  For  they  depend  upon  God  for  the  success  of 
all  they  do,  even  of  their  best  and  wisest  undertakings."  '" 

Such  is  to  be  the  practical  acknowledgment  of  God 
in  the  routine  of  life.  The  more  direct  response 
to  this  presence  appears  abundantly  in  St.  Augus- 
tine's conversation  and  reminiscence  with  God. 

"How  evil  have  not  my  deeds  been;  or  if  not  my 
deeds  my  words;  or  if  not  my  words  my  will?  But 
Thou,  O  Lord,  art  good  and  merciful,  and  Thy  right 
hand  had  respect  unto  the  profoundness  of  my  death, 
and  removed  from  the  bottom  of  my  heart  that  abyss  of 
corruption.  And  this  was  the  result,  that  I  willed  not  to 
do  what  I  willed,  and  willed  to  do  what  thou  willedst. 
.  .  .  How  sweet  did  it  suddenly  become  to  me  to  be 
without  the  delights  of  trifles!    And  what  at  one  time  I 

"Thomas  k  Kempis:  Imitation  of  Christ,  Chap.  XIX. 
Translation  by  Stanhope,  p.  44. 


THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE  69 

feared  to  lose,  it  was  now  a  joy  to  me  to  put  away.  For 
Thou  didst  cast  them  away  from  me,  Thou  true  and 
highest  sweetness.  Thou  didst  cast  them  away,  and 
instead  of  them  didst  enter  in  Thyself — sweeter  than 
all  pleasure,  though  not  to  flesh  and  blood;  brighter 
than  all  light,  but  more  veiled  than  all  mysteries;  more 
exalted  than  all  honor,  but  not  to  the  exalted  in  their 
own  conceits.  Now  was  my  soul  free  from  the  gnawing 
cares  of  seeking  and  getting.  .  .  ,  And  I  babbled 
unto  Thee  my  brightness,  my  riches,  and  my  health, 
the  Lord  my  God."  1' 

In  these  two  passages  we  meet  with  religious  con- 
duct and  with  the  supreme  religious  experience, 
the  direct  worship  of  God.  In  each  case  the  heart 
of  the  matter  is  an  individual's  indubitable  con- 
viction of  the  world's  favorable  concern  for  him. 
The  deeper  order  of  things  constitutes  the  real  and 
the  profoundly  congenial  community  in  w^liich  he 
lives. 

§  22.  Let  us  now  apply  this  general  account  of 

the  religious  experience  to  certain  typical  religious 

phenomena:  conversion;  piety;  and  re- 

ReUgious         lig-ious    instruments,    symbolisms,    and 

Phenomena:  °  7^7 

Conversion,  modcs  of  conveywiice.  Although  recent 
study  of  the  phenomenon  of  conversion  has 
brought  to  light  a  considerable  amount  of  interest- 

"St.  Augustine:     Confessions,  Book  I,  Chap.  I.     Transla- 
tion in  Schaff:  Nicene  and  Post-Nicene  Fathers,  Vol.  I,  p.  120. 


70  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

iiig  material,  there  is  some  danger  of  misconceiv- 
ing its  importance.  The  pyschology  of  conversion 
is  primarily  the  psychology  of  crisis  or  radical 
alteration,  rather  than  the  psychology  of  religion. 
For  the  majority  of  religious  men  and  women  con- 
version is  an  insignificant  event,  and  in  very  many 
cases  it  never  occurs  at  all.  Religion  is  more 
purely  present  where  it  is  normal  and  monotonous. 
But  this  phenomenon  is  nevertheless  highly  sig- 
nificant in  that  religion  and  irreligion  are  placed 
in  close  juxtaposition,  and  the  contribution  of  re- 
ligion at  its  inception  thereby  emphasized.  In 
general  it  is  found  that  conversion  takes  place  dur- 
ing the  period  of  adolescence.  But  this  is  the  time 
of  the  most  sudden  expansion  of  the  environment 
of  life;  a  time  when  there  is  the  awakening  con- 
sciousness of  many  a  new  presence.  This  is  some- 
times expressed  by  saying  that  it  is  a  period  of 
acute  self -consciousness.  Life  is  conscious  of  itself 
as  over  against  its  inheritance ;  the  whole  setting 
of  life  sweeps  into  view.  Some  solution  of  the 
life  problem,  some  coming  to  terms  with  the  uni- 
verse, is  the  normal  issue  of  it.  Beligious  con- 
version signifies,  then,  that  in  this  fundamental 
adjustment  a  man  defines  and  accepts  for  his  life 
a  certain  attitude  on  the  part  of  the  universe.     The 


THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE  71 

examples  cited  by  the  psychologists,  as  well  as  the 
generalizations  which  they  derive,  bear  out  this 
interpretation. 

"  General  Booth,  the  founder  of  the  Salvation  Army, 
considers  that  the  first  vital  step  in  saving  outcasts  con- 
sists in  making  them  feel  that  some  decent  human  being 
cares  enough  for  them  to  take  an  interest  in  the  question 
whether  they  are  to  rise  or  sink."'^ 

The  new  state  is  here  one  of  courage  and  hope 
stimulated  by  the  glow  of  friendly  interest.  The 
convert  is  no  longer  "  out  in  the  cold."  He  is 
told  that  the  world  wishes  him  well,  and  this  is 
brought  home  to  him  through  representations  of  the 
tenderness  of  Christ,  and  through  the  direct  min- 
isterings  of  those  who  mediate  it.  But  somehow 
the  convert  must  be  persuaded  to  realize  all  this. 
He  must  believe  it  before  it  can  mean  anything 
to  him.  He  is  therefore  urged  to  pray — a  pro- 
ceeding that  is  at  first  ridiculous  to  him,  since 
it  involves  taking  for  granted  what  he  disbelieves. 
But  therein  lies  the  critical  point.  It  is  peculiar 
to  the  object  in  this  case  that  it  can  exist  only 
for  one  who  already  believes  in  it.  The  psychol- 
ogists call  this  the  element  of  "  self -surrender." 
To  be  converted  a  man  must  somehow  suffer  his 

"  James:  Varieties  of  Religious  Experience,  p.  203. 


72  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

surroundings  to  put  into  him  a  new  heart,  which 
may  thereupon  confirm  its  object.  Such  belief  is 
tremendously  tenacious  because  it  so  largely  cre- 
ates its  own  evidence.  Once  believe  that  "  God, 
in  the  long  run,  means  kindness  by  you,"  and  you 
are  likely  to  stand  by  it  to  the  end — the  more  so 
in  this  case  because  the  external  evidence  either  way 
is  to  the  average  man  so  insufficient.  Such  a  belief 
as  this  is  inspired  in  the  convert,  not  by  reasoning, 
but  by  all  the  powers  of  suggestion  that  personality 
and  social  contagion  can  aiford. 

§  23.  The  psychologists  describe  piety  as  a  sense 
of  unity.  One  feels  after  reading  their  accounts 
Piety.  that  they  are  too  abstract.     For  there 

are  many  kinds  of  unity,  characteristic  of  widely 
varying  moods  and  states.  Any  state  of  rapt  at- 
tention is  a  state  of  unity,  and  this  occurs  in  the 
most  secular  and  humdrum  moments  of  life.  Nor 
does  it  help  matters  to  say  that  in  the  case  of  relig- 
ion this  unity  must  have  been  preceded  by  a  state 
of  division;  for  w^e  cannot  properly  characterize 
any  state  of  mind  in  terms  of  another  state  unless 
the  latter  be  retained  in  the  former.  And  that 
which  is  characteristic  of  the  religious  sense  of 
unity  would  seem  to  be  just  such  an  overcoming  of 
difference.     There  is  a  recognition  of  two  distinct 


THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE  73 

attitudes,  which  may  be  more  or  less  in  sjTiipathy 
with  one  another,  but  which  are  both  present  even 
in  their  fullest  harmony.  Were  I  to  be  taken  out 
of  myself  so  completely  as  to  forget  myself,  I 
should  inevitably  lose  that  sense  of  sympathy  from 
which  arises  the  peculiar  exultation  of  religious 
faith,  a  heightened  experience  of  the  same  type 
with  the  freedom  and  spontaneity  that  I  experi- 
ence in  the  presence  of  those  with  whom  I  feel 
most  in  accord.  The  further  graces  and  powers  of 
religion  readily  submit  to  a  similar  description. 
My  sense  of  positive  sympathy  expresses  itself  in  an 
attitude  of  well-wishing;  living  in  an  atmosphere 
of  kindness  I  instinctively  endeavor  to  propagate 
it.  My  buoyancy  is  distinctly  of  that  quality  which 
to  a  lesser  degree  is  due  to  any  sense  of  social 
security;  my  power  is  that  of  one  who  works  in 
an  environment  that  reenforces  him,  I  experience 
the  objective  or  even  cosmical  character  of  my  en- 
terprises. They  have  a  momentum  which  makes 
me  their  instrument  rather  than  their  perpetrator. 
A  paradoxical  relation  between  religion  and  moral- 
ity has  always  interested  observers  of  custom  and 
history.  Religion  is  apparently  as  capable  of  the 
most  fiendish  malevolence  as  of  the  most  saintly 
gentleness.     Fielding  writes  that. 


74  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

"  When  religion  is  brought  out  or  into  daily  life  and  used 
as  a  guide  or  a  weapon  in  the  world  it  has  no  effect  either  for 
good  or  evil.  Its  effect  is  simply  in  strengthening  the  heart, 
in  blinding  the  eyes,  in  deafening  the  ears.  It  is  an  inten- 
sive force,  an  intoxicant.  It  doubles  or  trebles  a  man's 
powers.  It  is  an  impulsive  force  sending  him  headlong 
down  the  path  of  emotion,  whether  that  path  lead  to  glory 
or  to  infamy.    It  is  a  tremendous  stimulant,  that  is  all."  " 

Religion  does  not  originate  life  purposes  or  define 
their  meaning,  but  stimulates  them  by  the  same 
means  that  works  in  all  corporate  and  social  ac- 
tivity. To  work  with  the  universe  is  the  most 
tremendous  incentive  that  can  appeal  to  the  indi- 
vidual will.  Hence  in  highly  ethical  religions  the 
power  for  good  exceeds  that  of  any  other  social  and 
spiritual  agency.  Such  religion  makes  present, 
actual,  and  real,  that  good  on  the  whole  which  the 
individual  otherwise  tends  to  distinguish  from 
that  which  is  good  for  him.  In  daily  life  the  mor- 
ally valid  and  the  practically  urgent  are  commonly 
arrayed  against  one  another;  but  the  ethical  relig- 
ion makes  the  valid  urgent. 

§  24.  The  instruments  of  religion  are  legion, 
and  it  is  in  Ox"der  here  only  to  mention  certain 
ReUgious         prominent  cases  in  which  their  selection 

Instruments, 

SymboUsm,      would  sccm  to  havc  direct  reference  to 

and  Modes  of  .  •  ij 

Conveyance,     the    provocatiou    and    perpetuation    of 
"  Fielding:  op.  cit.,  p.  152. 


THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE  75 

such  a  sense  of  attitude  as  we  have  been  describing. 
This  is  true  in  a  general  way  of  all  symbolism. 
There  is  no  essential  difference  between  the  relig- 
ious symbol  and  such  symbols  as  serve  to  remind 
us  of  human  relationships.  In  both  cases  the  per- 
ceptual absence  of  will  is  compensated  for  by  the 
presence  of  some  object  associated  with  that  will. 
The  function  of  this  object  is  due  to  its  power  to 
revive  and  perpetuate  a  certain  special  social  at- 
mosphere. But  the  most  important  vehicle  of  re- 
ligion has  always  been  personality.  It  is,  after  all, 
to  priests,  j)rophets,  and  believers  that  religious 
cults  have  owed  their  long  life.  The  traits  that 
mark  the  prophet  are  both  curious  and  sublime. 
He  is  most  remarkable  for  the  confidence  with 
which  he  speaks  for  the  universe.  Whether  it  be 
due  to  lack  of  a  sense  of  humor  or  to  a  profound 
conviction  of  truth,  is  indifferent  to  our  pur^jose. 
The  power  of  such  men  is  undoubtedly  in  their 
suggestion  of  a  force  greater  than  they,  whose  de- 
sig-ns  they  bring  directly  and  socially  to  the  atten- 
tion of  men.  The  prophet  in  his  prophesying  is 
indeed  not  altogether  distinguished  from  God,  and 
it  is  through  the  mediation  of  a  directly  percep- 
tible human  attitude  that  a  divine  attitude  gets 
itself  fixed    in   the   imagination   of  the  believer. 


76  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

What  is  true  of  the  proj)het  is  equally  true  of  the 
preacher  whose  function  it  is  not  to  represent  God 
in  his  own  person,  but  to  depict  him  with  his 
tongue.  It  is  generally  recognized  that  the 
preacher  is  neither  a  moralizer  nor  a  theologian. 
But  it  is  less  perfectly  understood  that  it  is  his 
function  to  suggest  the  presence  of  God.  His 
proper  language  is  that  of  the  imagination,  and 
the  picture  which  he  portrays  is  that  of  a  recipro- 
cal social  relationship  between  man  and  the  Su- 
preme Master  of  the  situation  of  life.  He  will  not 
define  God  or  prove  God,  but  introduce  Him  and 
talk  about  Him.  And  at  the  same  time  the  asso- 
ciation of  prayer  and  worship  with  his  sermon,  and 
the  atmosphere  created  by  the  meeting  together  of 
a  body  of  disciples,  will  act  as  the  confirmation  of 
his  suggestions  of  such  a  living  presence. 

The  conveyance  of  any  single  religious  cult  from 
generation  to  generation  affords  a  signal  illustra- 
tion of  the  importance  in  religion  of  the  recogni- 
tion of  attitude.  Religions  manage  somehow  to 
survive  any  amount  of  transformation  of  creed 
and  ritual.  It  is  not  what  is  done,  or  what  is 
thought,  that  identifies  the  faith  of  the  first  Chris- 
tians with  that  of  the  last,  but  a  certain  reckoning 
with  the  disposition  of  God.     The  successive  gen- 


THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE  77 

erations  of  Christians  are  introduced  into  the  spirit- 
ual world  of  their  fathers,  with  its  furnishing  of 
hopes  and  fears  remaining  substantially  the  same ; 
and  their  Christianity  consists  in  their  continuing 
to  live  in  it  with  only  a  slight  and  gradual  renova- 
tion. To  any  given  individual  God  is  more  or 
less  completely  represented  by  his  elders  in  the 
faith  in  their  exhortations  and  ministerings ;  and 
through  them  he  fixes  as  the  centre  of  his  system 
an  image  of  God  his  accuser  or  redeemer. 

§  25.  The  complete  verification  of  this  interpre- 
tation of  the  religious  experience  would  require  the 
Historical        application  of  it  to  the  different  histori- 

Types  of  tit  it  •       x* 

ReUgion.  cal  cults.  In  general  the  examination 
Re^ons.  of  such  instances  is  entirely  beyond  the 
scope  of  this  chapter;  but  a  brief  consideration 
may  be  given  to  those  which  seem  to  afford  reason- 
able grounds  for  objection. 

First,  it  may  be  said  that  in  primitive  religions, 
notably  in  fetichism,  tabooism,  and  totemism,  there 
is  no  recognition  of  a  cosmical  unity.  It  is  quite 
evident  that  there  is  no  conception  of  a  universe. 
But  it  is  equally  evident  that  the  natural  and  his- 
torical environment  in  its  generality  has  a  very 
specific  practical  significance  for  the  primitive 
believer.     It  is  often  said  with  truth  that  these 


78  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

earliest  religions  are  more  profoundly  pantheistic 
than  polytheistic.  Man  recognizes  an  all-pervad- 
ing interest  that  is  capable  of  being  directed  to 
himself.  The  selection  of  a  deity  is  not  due  to 
any  special  qualification  for  deification  possessed 
by  the  individual  object  itself,  but  to  the  tacit  pre- 
sumption that,  as  Thales  said,  "  all  things  are  full 
of  gods."  The  disposition  of  residual  reality  mani- 
fests to  the  believer  no  consistency  or  unity,  but  it 
is  nevertheless  the  most  constant  object  of  his  will. 
He  lives  in  the  midst  of  a  capriciousness  which  he 
must  appease  if  he  is  to  establish  himself  at  all. 

§  26.  Secondly,  in  the  case  of  Buddhism  we  are 
Buddhism.  Said  to  meet  with  a  religion  that  is  es- 
sentially atheistic. 

"Whether  Buddhas  arise,  O  priests,  or  whether 
Buddhas  do  not  arise,  it  remains  a  fact  and  the  fixed 
and  necessary  constitution  of  being,  that  all  its  con- 
stituents are  transitory."'* 

The  secret  of  life  lies  in  the  application  of  this 

truth : 

"  0  builder !  I've  discovered  thee ! 
This  fabric  thou  shalt  ne'er  rebuild! 
Thy  rafters  all  are  broken  now, 
And  pointed  roof  demolished  lies! 
This  mind  has  demolition  reached. 
And  seen  the  last   of   all  desire!  "" 

"Warren:  Buddhism  in  Translations,  p.  14. 
"  Ibid.,  p.  S3. 


THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE  79 

The  case  of  Buddha  himself  and  of  the  exponents 
of  his  purely  esoteric  doctrine,  belong  to  the  re- 
flective type  which  will  presently  be  given  special 
consideration.  But  with  the  ordinary  believer, 
even  where  an  extraneous  but  almost  inevitable 
polytheism  is  least  in  evidence,  the  religious  ex- 
perience consists  in  substantially  the  same  elements 
that  appear  in  theistic  religions.  The  individual 
is  here  living  appropriately  to  the  ultimate  nature 
of  things,  with  the  ceaseless  periods  of  time  in  full 
view.  That  which  is  brought  home  to  him  is  the 
illusoriness  and  hollowness  of  things  when  taken 
in  the  spirit  of  active  endeavor.  The  only  pro- 
found and  abiding  good  is  nothingness.  While 
nature  and  society  conspire  to  mock  him,  Nirvana 
invites  him  to  its  peace.  The  religious  course 
of  his  life  consists  in  the  use  of  such  means  as 
can  win  him  this  end.  From  the  stand-point  of 
the  universe  he  has  the  sympathy  only  of  that 
wisdom  whose  essence  is  self-destruction.  And 
this  truth  is  mediated  by  the  imagination  of 
divine  sympathy,  for  the  Blessed  One  remains 
as  the  perpetual  incarnation  of  his  owti  blessed- 
ness. 

§  27.  Finally  there  remains  the  consideration  of 
the  bearing  of  this  interpretation  upon  the  more 


80  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

refined  and  disciplined  religions.  The  religion 
of  the  critically  enlightened  man  is  less  naive 
Critical  ^^^    credulous    in   its    imagery.     God 

Religion,  tends  to  vanish  into  an  ideal  or  a  uni- 
versal, into  some  object  of  theoretical  defini- 
tion. Here  we  are  on  that  borderland  where  an 
assignment  of  individual  cases  can  never  be 
made  with  any  certainty  of  correctness.  We 
can  generalize  only  by  describing  the  conditions 
that  such  cases  must  fulfil  if  they  are  prop- 
erly to  be  denominated  religious.  And  there  can 
be  no  question  of  the  justice  of  deriving  such 
a  description  from  the  reports  of  historical  and  in- 
stitutional religions.  An  idealistic  philosophy 
will,  then,  be  a  religion  just  in  so  far  as  it  is  ren- 
dered practically  vivid  by  the  imagination.  Such 
imagination  must  create  and  sustain  a  social  rela- 
tionship. The  qviestion  of  the  legitimacy  of  this 
imagination  is  another  matter.  It  raises  the  issue 
concerning  the  judgment  of  truth  implied  in  re- 
ligion, and  this  is  the  topic  of  the  next  chapter. 
At  any  rate  the  religious  experience  may  he  real- 
ized by  virtue  of  the  metaphorical  or  poetical  rep- 
resentation of  a  situation  as  one  of  intercommuni- 
cation between  persons,  where  reflective  definition 
at  tlio  same  time  denies  it.    The  human  worsliipper 


THE  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE  81 

may  supply  the  personality  of  God  from  himself, 
viewing  himself  as  from  the  divine  stand-point. 
But  whatever  faculty  supplies  this  indispensable 
social  quality  of  religion,  he  who  defines  God  as 
the  ultimate  goodness  or  the  ultimate  truth,  has 
certainly  not  yet  worshipped  Him.  He  begins  to 
be  religious  only  when  such  an  ideal  determines 
the  atmosphere  of  his  daily  living ;  when  he  regards 
the  immanence  of  such  an  ideal  in  nature  and  his- 
tory as  the  object  of  his  will ;  and  when  he  responds 
to  its  presence  in  the  spirit  of  his  conduct  and  his 
contemplation. 


CHAPTER   IV 

THE    PHILOSOPHICAL    IMPLICATIONS    OF    RELIGION 

§  28.  It  has  been  maintained  that  religion  is 
closely  analogous  to  one's  belief  in  the  disposition 
Resume  of      toward  one's  self  of  men  or  eommuni- 

Psychology 

of  ReUgion.  tics.  In  the  case  of  religion  this  dispo- 
sition is  attributed  to  the  more  or  less  vaguely  con- 
ceived residual  environment  that  is  recognized  as 
lying  outside  of  the  more  familiar  natural  and 
social  relations.  After  the  rise  of  science  this 
residual  environment  tends  to  be  conceived  as  a 
unity  which  is  ultimate  or  fundamental,  but  for 
the  religious  consciousness  it  is  more  commonly 
regarded  as  a  general  source  of  influence  practically 
worthy  of  consideration.  Such  a  belief,  like  all 
belief,  is  vitally  manifested,  with  such  emphasis 
upon  action,  feeling,  or  intellection  as  tempera- 
ment and  mood  may  determine. 

§  29.  But  if  the  psychology  of  belief  is  the 
proper  starting-point  for  a  description  of  the  re- 
Reiigion         ligious  experience,   it   is  none  the  less 

Means  to 

be  True.  suggcstive  of  the  fact  that  religion,  just 


RELIGION   AND   PHILOSOPHY  83 

because  it  is  belief,  is  not  wholly  a  matter  for  psy- 
chology. For  religion  means  to  be  true,  and  thus 
submits  itself  to  valuation  as  a  case  of  knowledge. 
The  psychological  study  of  religion  is  misleading 
when  accepted  as  a  substitute  for  philosophical 
criticism.  The  religious  man  takes  his  religion 
not  as  a  narcotic,  but  as  an  enlightenment.  Its 
subjective  worth  is  due  at  any  rate  in  part  to  the 
supposition  of  its  objective  worth.  As  in  any  case 
of  insight,  that  which  warms  the  heart  must  have 
satisfied  the  mind.  The  religious  experience  pur- 
ports to  be  the  part  of  wisdom,  and  to  afford  only 
such  happiness  as  increasing  wisdom  would  con- 
firm. And  the  charm  of  truth  cannot  survive  its 
truthfulness.  Hence,  though  religion  may  be  de- 
scribed, it  cannot  be  justified,  from  the  stand-point 
of  therapeutics.  Were  such  the  case  it  would  be 
the  real  problem  of  religious  leaders  to  find  a  drug 
capable  of  giving  a  constantly  pleasant  tone  to  their 
patient's  experience.^  There  would  be  no  differ- 
ence between  priests  and  physicians  who  make  a  spe- 
cialty of  nervous  diseases,  except  that  the  former 
would  aim  at  a  more  fundamental  and  perpetual 

^  As  Plato  interprets  the  scepticism  of  Protagoras  to  mean 
that  one  state  of  mind  cannot  be  more  true  than  another, 
but  only  better  or  worse.     Cf.  Thecetetus,  167. 


84  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

suggestion  of  serenity.  Now  no  man  wants  to  be 
even  a  blessed  fool.  He  does  not  want  to  dwell 
constantly  in  a  fictitious  world,  even  if  it  be  after 
his  own  heart.  He  may  from  the  cynical  point  of 
view  actually  do  so,  but  if  he  be  religious  he  thinks 
it  is  reality,  and  is  satisfied  only  in  so  far  as  he 
thinks  so.  He  regards  the  man  who  has  said  in 
his  heart  that  there  is  no  God  as  the  fool,  and  not 
because  he  may  have  to  suffer  for  it,  but  because 
he  is  cognitively  blind  to  the  real  nature  of  things. 
Piety,  on  the  other  hand,  he  regards  as  the  standard 
experience,  the  most  veracious  life.  Hence,  it  is 
not  an  accident  that  religion  has  had  its  creeds  and 
its  controversies,  its  wars  with  science  and  its  ap- 
peals to  philosophy.  The  history  of  these  affairs 
shows  that  religion  commonly  fails  to  understand 
the  scope  of  its  own  demand  for  truth;  but  they 
have  issued  from  the  deep  conviction  that  one's 
religion  is,  implicitly,  at  least,  in  the  field  of  truth ; 
that  there  are  theoretical  judgments  whose  truth 
would  justify  or  contradict  it. 

This  general  fact  being  admitted,  there  remains 
the  task  to  which  the  present  discussion  addresses 
itself,  that  of  defining  the  kind  of  theoretical  judg- 
ment implied  in  religion,  and  the  relation  to  this 
central  cognitive  stem  of  its  efflorescences  of  myth, 


RELIGION   AND  PHILOSOPHY  85 

theology,  and  ritual.  It  is  impossible  to  separate 
the  stem  and  the  efflorescence,  or  to  determine  the 
precise  spot  at  which  destruction  of  the  tissue 
would  prove  fatal  to  the  plant,  but  it  is  possible  to 
obtain  some  idea  of  the  relative  vitality  of  the 
parts. 

§  30.  The  difficulty  of  reaching  a  definite  state- 
ment in  this  matter  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  truth 
Religion  in  which  any  religious  experience  cen- 

Means  to  be       ,  .  , .      t  i  .  •       j.  •  i? 

Practically  ^res  IS  a  practical  and  not  a  scientiiic 
GoTis  a  Dis-  ^^^^^^-  ^  practical  truth  does  not  com- 
position from  j^^j^  •i-ggjf  ^Q  single  scientific  state- 

which  Conse-  «^  " 

quences  May    jyiQ^it    and  cau  of tcu  survive  the  over- 

Rationally 

be  Expected,  tlirow  of  that  Scientific  statement  in 
which  at  any  given  time  it  has  found  expression. 
In  other  words,  an  indefinite  number  of  scientific 
truths  are  compatible  with  a  single  practical  truth. 
An  instance  of  this  is  the  consistency  with  my  ex- 
pectation of  the  alternation  of  day  and  night,  of 
either  the  Ptolemaic  or  Copernican  formulation  of 
the  solar  system.  Now  expectation  that  the  sun 
will  rise  to-morrow  is  an  excellent  analogue  of  my 
religious  belief.  Celestial  mechanics  is  as  relevant 
to  the  one  as  metaphysics  to  the  other.  !N"either  is 
overthrown  until  a  central  practical  judgment  is 
discredited,  and  either  could  remain  true  through 


86  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

a  very  considerable  alteration  of  logical  definition ; 
but  neither  is  on  this  account  exempt  from  theoreti- 
cal responsibility.  In  so  far  as  religion  deliber- 
ately enters  the  field  of  science,  and  defines  its 
formularies  with  the  historical  or  metaphysical 
method,  this  difficulty  does  not,  of  course,  exist. 
Grant  that  the  years  of  Methuselah's  life,  or  the  pre- 
cise place  and  manner  of  the  temptation  of  Jesus, 
or  the  definition  of  Christ  in  the  terms  of  the 
Athanasian  Creed,  are  constitutive  of  Christianity, 
and  the  survival  of  that  religion  will  be  determined 
by  the  solution  of  ordinary  problems  of  historical 
or  metaphysical  research.  But  the  Christian  will 
very  properly  claim  that  his  religion  is  only  exter- 
nally and  accidentally  related  to  such  propositions, 
since  they  are  never  or  very  rarely  intended  in  his 
experience.  As  religious  he  is  occupied  with 
Christ  as  his  saviour  or  with  God  as  his  protector 
and  judge.  The  history  of  Jesus  or  the  meta- 
physics of  God  essentially  concern  him  only  in  so 
far  as  they  may  or  may  not  invalidate  this  relation- 
ship. He  caros  only  for  the  power  and  disposition 
of  the  divine,  and  these  are  affected  by  history  and 
metaphysics  only  in  so  far  as  he  has  definitely  put 
them  to  such  proof. 

For  my  religion  is  my  sense  of  a  practical  situa- 


RELIGION  AND  PHILOSOPHY  87 

tion,  and  only  when  that  has  been  proved  to  be 
folly  has  my  religion  become  untrue.  My  God  is 
my  practical  faith,  my  plan  of  salvation.  My  re- 
ligion is  overthrown  if  I  am  convinced  that  I  have 
misconceived  the  situation  and  mistaken  what  I 
should  do  to  be  saved.  The  conception  of  God  is 
very  simple  practically,  and  very  complex  theo- 
retically, a  fact  that  confirms  its  practical  genesis. 
My  conception  of  God  contains  an  idea  of  my  own 
interests,  an  idea  of  the  disposition  of  the  universe 
toward  my  interests,  and  some  working  plan  for 
the  reconciliation  of  these  two  terms.  These  three 
elements  form  a  practical  unity,  but  each  is  capable 
of  emphasis,  and  a  religion  may  be  transformed 
through  the  modification  of  any  one  of  them.  It 
appears,  then,  as  has  always  been  somewhat  vaguely 
recognized,  that  the  truth  of  religion  is  ethical 
as  well  as  metaphysical  or  scientific.  My  religion 
will  be  altered  by  a  change  in  my  conception  of 
what  constitutes  my  real  interest,  a  change  in  my 
conception  of  the  fundamental  causes  of  reality, 
or  a  change  in  my  conception  of  the  manner  in 
which  my  will  may  or  may  not  affect  these  causes. 
God  is  neither  an  entity  nor  an  ideal,  but  always 
a  relation  of  entity  to  ideal :  reality  regarded  from 
the  stand-ijoint  of  its  favorahleness  or  unfavorable- 


88  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

ness  to  human  life,  and  prescribing  for  the  latter 
the  propriety  of  a  certain  attitude. 

§  31.  The  range  of  historical  examples  is  limit- 
Historicai        less,  biit  Certain  of  these  are  especially 

Examples  of  i       ,  i  i        •  i  i  •         • 

Religious  calculated  to  emphasize  the  application 
Error.  of  a  Criterion  to  religion.     Such  is  the 

of  Baal  ^'°^  case  with  Elijah's  encounter  with  the 
prophets  of  Baal,  as  narrated  in  the  Old  Testa- 
ment. 

"  And  Elijah  came  near  unto  all  the  people,  and  said, 
How  long  halt  ye  between  two  opinions?  If  Yahweh 
be  God,  follow  him :  but  if  Baal,  then  follow  him.  .  .  . 
And  call  ye  on  the  name  of  your  god,  and  I  will  call  on 
the  name  of  Yahweh:  and  the  God  that  answereth  by 
fire,  let  him  be  God.  .  .  .  And  Elijah  said  imto  the 
prophets  of  Baal,  Choose  you  one  bullock  for  yourselves, 
and  dress  it  first;  for  ye  are  many;  and  call  on  the  name 
of  your  god,  but  put  no  fire  under.  And  they  took  the 
bullock  which  was  given  them,  and  they  dressed  it,  and 
called  on  the  name  of  Baal  from  morning  even  until 
noon,  saying,  O  Baal,  hear  us.  But  there  was  no  voice, 
nor  any  that  answered.  .  .  .  And  it  came  to  pass 
at  noon,  that  Elijah  mocked  them,  and  said,  Cry  aloud: 
for  he  is  a  god;  either  he  is  musing,  or  he  is  gone  aside, 
or  he  is  in  a  journey,  or  peradventure  he  sleepeth,  and 
must  be  awaked.  And  they  cried  aloud,  and  cut  them- 
selves after  their  manner  with  knives  and  lances,  till  the 
blood  gushed  out  upon  them.  .  .  .  But  there  was 
neither  voice,  nor  any  to  answer,  nor  any  that  regarded."  ^ 

^  Quoted  with  some  omissions  from  /  Kinga,  18:  21-29. 
The  Hebrew  term  Yahweh,  the  name  of  the  national  deity, 
has  been  substituted  for  the  English  translation,  "the  Lord." 


RELIGlOxN  AND  PHILOSOPHY  89 

The  religion  of  the  followers  of  Baal  here  con- 
sists in  a  belief  in  the  practical  virtue  of  a  mode 
of  address  and  form  of  ritual  associated  with  the 
traditions  and  customs  of  a  certain  social  group. 
The  prophets  of  this  cult  agree  to  regard  the  ex- 
periment proposed  by  Elijah  as  a  crucial  test,  and 
that  which  is  disproved  from  its  failure  is  a  plan 
of  action.  These  prophets  relied  upon  the  pres- 
ence of  a  certain  motivity,  from  which  a  defi- 
nite response  could  be  evoked  by  an  appeal  which 
they  w^ere  peculiarly  able  to  make;  but  though 
"  they  j)rophesied  until  the  time  of  the  offering 
of  the  evening  oblation,"  there  was  none  that 
regarded. 

§  32.  An  equally  familiar  and  more  instructive 
example  is  the  refutation  of  the  Greek  national 
Greek  rcligiou  by  Lucretius.     The  conception 

ReUgion.  ^£  ^Hq  which  Lucrctius  finds  unwar- 
ranted is  best  depicted  in  Homer.  There  we  hear 
of  a  society  composed  of  gods  and  men.  Though 
the  gods,  on  the  one  hand,  have  their  own  history, 
their  affairs  are  never  sharply  sundered  from  those 
of  men,  who,  on  the  other  hand,  must  constantly 
reckon  with  them,  gauge  their  attitude,  and  seek 
their  favor  by  paying  tribute  to  their  individual 
humors  and  preferences.     In  the  Xinth  Book  of 


90  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

the  "  Iliad/'  Plia'iiix  addresses  himself  to  the  re- 
calcitrant Achilles  as  follows : 

"It  fits  not  one  that  moves 
The  hearts  of  all,   to   live  unniov'd,  and  succor  hates   for 

loves. 
The  Gods  themselves  are  flexible;   whose  virtues,    honors, 

pow'rs, 
Are  more  than  thine,  yet  they  will  bend  their  breasts  as 

we  bend  ours. 
Perfumes,  benign  devotions,  savors  of  offerings  burn'd, 
And  holy  rites,  the  engines  are  with  which  their  hearts 

are  turu'd. 
By  men  that  pray  to  them"' 

Here  is  a  general  recognition  of  that  which 
makes  sacrifice  rational.  It  is  because  he  conceives 
this  presupposition  to  be  mistaken,  that  Lucretius 
declares  the  practices  and  fears  which  are  founded 
upon  it  to  be  folly.  It  is  the  same  with  all  that  is 
practically  based  upon  the  expectation  of  a  life 
beyond  the  grave.  The  correction  of  the  popular 
religion  is  due  in  his  opinion  to  that  true  view  of 
the  world  taught  by  Epicurus,  w'hose  memory 
Lucretius  thus  invokes  at  the  opening  of  the  Third 
Book  of  the  "  De  Rermn  Natura  " : 

"Thee,  who  first  wast  able  amid  such  thick  darkness 
to  raise  on  high  si  bright  a  beacon  and  shed  a  light  on 
the  true  interests  of  Hfe,  thee  I  follow,  glory  of  the  (Ireek 
race,  and  plant  now  my  footsteps  firmly  fixed  in  thy 
imprinted  marks.     .     .     .     For  soon  as  thy  philosophy 

'  Iliad,  Book  IX,  lines  1G7  nq.     Translation  by  Chapman. 


RELIGION  AND  PHILOSOPHY  91 

issuing  from  a  godlike  intellect  has  begun  with  loud 
voice  to  proclaim  the  nature  of  things,  the  terrors  of  the 
mind  are  dispelled,  the  walls  of  the  world  part  asunder, 
I  see  things  in  operation  throughout  the  whole  void:  the 
divinity  of  the  gods  is  revealed  and  their  tranquil  abodes 
which  neither  winds  do  shake  nor  clouds  drench  with 
rains  nor  snow  congealed  by  sharp  frost  harms  with 
hoary  fall:  an  ever  cloudless  ether  o'ercanopies  them, 
and  they  laugh  with  light  shed  largely  round.  Nature 
too  supplies  all  their  wants  and  nothing  ever  impairs 
their  peace  of  mind.  But  on  the  other  hand  the  Acheru- 
sian  quarters*  are  nowhere  to  be  seen,  though  earth  is 
no  bar  to  all  things  being  descried,  which  are  in  opera- 
tion underneath  our  feet  throughout  the  void." ' 

In  another  passage,  after  describing  the  Phry- 
gian worship  of  Cybele,  he  comments  as  follows: 

"  All  which,  well  and  beautifully  as  it  is  set  forth  and 
told,  is  yet  widely  removed  from  true  reason.  For  the 
nature  of  gods  must  ever  in  itself  of  necessity  enjoy 
immortality  together  with  supreme  repose,  far  removed 
and  withdrawn  from  our  concerns;  since  exempt  from 
every  pain,  exempt  from  all  dangers,  strong  in  its  own 
resources,  not  wanting  aught  of  us,  it  is  neither  gained 
by  favors  nor  moved  by  anger.  .  .  .  The  earth 
however  is  at  all  time  without  feeling,  and  because  it 
receives  into  it  the  first-beginnings  of  many  things,  it 
brings  them  forth  in  many  ways  into  the  hght  of  the 
sun.'" 

If  the  teaching  of  Epicurus  be  true  it  is  evident 

*  The  supposed  abode  of  departed  spirits. 

*  Lucretius:  De  Rerurn  Natura,  Book  III,  lines  1  sq.  Trans- 
lated by  Munro. 

«  Ibid.,  Book  II,  lines  644  sq. 


92  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

that  those  who  offered  hecatombs  with  the  idea  that 
they  were  thereby  mitigating  anger,  or  securing 
special  dispensation,  were  playing  the  fool.  They 
were  appealing  to  a  fictitious  motivity,  one  not 
grounded  in  "  the  nature  of  things."  To  one  for 
whom  the  walls  of  the  world  had  parted  asunder, 
such  a  procedure  was  no  longer  possible;  though 
he  might  choose  to  "  call  the  sea  Neptune  "  and 
reverence  the  earth  as  "  mother  of  the  gods."  '^ 

§  33.  The  history  of  religion  contains  no  more 
impressive  and  dramatic  chapter  than  that  which 
Judaism  and  ^^cords  the  development  of  the  religion 
Christianity.  q£  ^^e  Jcws.  Passiug  over  its  obscure 
beginnings  in  the  primitive  Semitic  cult,  we  find 
this  religion  first  clearly  defined  as  tribal  self- 
interest  sanctioned  by  Yahweh.^     God's  interest 

'  It  would  be  interesting  to  compare  the  equally  famous 
criticism  of  Greek  religion  in  Plato's  Republic,  Book  II, 
377  sq. 

*  Cf.  W.  Robertson  Smith's  admirable  account  of  the 
Semitic  religions: 

"What  is  requisite  to  religion  is  a  practical  acquaintance 
with  the  rules  on  which  the  deity  acts  and  on  which  he  ex- 
pects his  worshippers  to  frame  their  conduct — what  in 
II  Kings,  17:26  is  called  the  'manner,'  or  rather  the 
'customary  law'  (miyhpat) ,  of  the  god  of  the  land.  This 
is  true  even  of  the  religion  of  Israel.  When  the  prophets 
speak  of  the  knowledge  of  God,  they  always  mean  a  practical 
knowledge  of  tlie  laws  and  principles  of  His  government  in 
Israel,  and  a  summary  expression  for  religion  as  a  whole  is 
'tlie  knowledge  and  fear  of  Jehovah,'  i.  e.,  the  knowledge 


KELICilON  AND  PHILOSOPHY  93 

in  his  chosen  people  determines  the  prosperity  of 
him  who  practises  tlie  social  virtues. 

"  The  name  of  Yahweh  is  a  strong  tower :  the  righteous 
runneth  into  it,  and  is  safe." 

"  He  that  is  steadfast  in  righteousness  shall  attain 
unto  Ufa." 

"To  do  justice  and  judgment  is  more  acceptable  to 
Yahweh  than  sacrifice."  * 

But  in  time  it  is  evident  to  the  believer  that 
his  experience  does  not  bear  out  this  expectation. 
Neither  as  a  Jew  nor  as  a  righteous  man  does  he 
prosper  more  than  his  neighbor.  He  comes,  there- 
fore, to  distrust  the  virtue  of  his  wisdom. 

"Then  I  saw  that  wisdom  excelleth  folly,  as  far  as 
light  excelleth  darkness.  The  wise  man's  eyes  are  in 
his  head,  and  the  fool  walketh  in  darkness:  and  yet  I 
perceived  that  one  event  happeneth  to  them  all.  Then 
said  I  in  my  heart.  As  it  happeneth  to  the  fool,  so  will  it 
happen  even  to  me;  and  why  was  I  then  more  wise? 
Then  1  said  in  my  heart,  that  this  also  was  vanity.  For 
of  the  wise  man,  even  as  of  the  fool,  there  is  no  remem- 
brance forever;  seeing  that  in  the  days  to  come  all  will 
have  been  already  forgotten.  And  how  doth  the  wise 
man  die  even  as  the  fool!  So  I  hated  life;  because  the 
work  that  is  wrought  under  the  sun  was  grievous  unto 
me:  for  all  is  vanity  and  a  striving  after  wind."  "* 

It  is  evident  that  he  who  expects  the  favor  of  for- 

of  what  Jehovah  prescribes,  combined  with  a  reverent  obe- 
dience."    The  Religion  of  the  Semites,  p.  23. 

^Proverbs,  18:10;  11:19;  21:3. 

'"  Ecclesiastes,  2: 13  sq. 


94  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

tune  in  return  for  his  observance  of  precept  is  mis- 
taken. The  "  work  that  is  wrought  under  the 
sun"  makes  no  special  provision  for  him  during 
his  lifetime.  Unless  the  cry  of  vanity  is  to  be  the 
last  word  there  must  be  a  reinterpretation  of  the 
promise  of  God.  This  appears  in  the  new  ideal 
of  patient  submission,  and  the  chastened  faith  that 
expects  only  the  love  of  God.  And  those  whom 
God  loves  He  will  not  forsake.  They  will  come  to 
their  own,  if  not  here,  then  beyond,  according  to 
His  inscrutable  but  unswerving  plan. 

"The  sacrifices  of  God  are  a  broken  spirit:  a  broken 
and  a  contrite  heart,  O  God,  thou  wilt  not  despise." 

"  For  thus  saith  the  hijj;h  and  lofty  One  that  inhabitcth 
eternity,  whose  name  is  Hoiy:  I  dwell  in  the  high  and 
holy  place,  with  him  also  that  is  of  a  contrite  and  humble 
spirit,  to  revive  the  spirit  of  the  humble,  and  to  revive 
the  heart  of  the  contrite  ones."  " 

In  this  faith  Judaism  merges  into  Christian- 
ity.'^ In  the  whole  course  of  this  evolution  God 
is  regarded  as  the  friend  of  his  people,  but  his 
peoi)le  learn  to  find  a  new  significance  in  his 
friendship.  That  which  is  altered  is  the  conduct 
which  that  friendship  requires  and  the  expecta- 

"  Psalms,  51:17;  Isaiah,  57:15. 

"  In  this  discussion  of  Judaism  I  am  much  indebted  to 
Matthew  Arnold's  Literature  and  Dogma,  especially  Chap- 
ters I  and  II. 


RELIGION   AND  PHILOSOPHY  95 

tion  which  it  determines.  The  practical  ideal 
which  the  relationship  sanctions,  changes  gradually 
from  that  of  prudence  to  that  of  goodness  for  its 
own  sake.  God^  once  an  instrument  relevant  to 
human  temporal  welfare,  has  come  to  be  an  object 
of  disinterested  service. 

No  such  transformation  as  this  was  absolutely 
realized  during  the  period  covered  by  the  writings 
of  the  Old  Testament,  nor  has  it  even  yet  been 
realized  in  the  development  of  Christianity.  But 
the  evolution  of  both  Judaism  and  Christianity 
has  taken  this  direction.  The  criterion  of  this 
evolution  is  manifestly  both  ethical  and  metaphys- 
ical. A  Christian  avows  that  he  rates  purity  of 
character  above  worldly  prosperity,  so  that  the 
former  cannot  properly  be  prized  for  the  sake 
of  the  latter.  Furthermore,  he  shares  more  or 
less  unconsciously  such  philosophical  and  scien- 
tific opinions  as  deny  truth  to  the  conception  of 
special  interferences  and  dispensations  from  a  su- 
pernatural agency.  Therefore  he  looks  for  no  fire 
from  heaven  to  consume  his  sacrifice.  But  his 
religion  is  nevertheless  a  practical  expectation. 
He  believes  that  God  is  good,  and  that  God  loves 
him  and  sustains  him.  He  believes  that  there 
obtains  between  himself,  in  so  far  as  good,  and  the 


96  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

universe  suh  specie  eternitatis,  a  real  sjTiipathy  and 
reciprocal  reenforcement.  lie  believes  that  he 
secures  through  the  profoundly  potent  forces  of 
the  universe  that  which  he  regards  as  of  most  worth ; 
and  that  somewhat  is  added  to  these  forces  by  vir- 
tue of  his  consecration.  The  God  of  the  Christians 
cannot  be  defined  short  of  some  such  account  as 
this,  inclusive  of  an  ideal^  an  attitude,  and  an  ex- 
pectation. In  other  words  the  God  of  the  Chris- 
tians is  to  be  known  only  in  terms  of  the  Christ- 
like outlook  upon  life,  in  which  the  disciple  is 
taught  to  emulate  the  master.  When  moral  and 
intellectual  development  shall  have  discredited 
either  its  scale  of  values,  or  its  conviction  that 
cosmical  events  are  in  the  end  determined  in  ac- 
cordance with  that  scale  of  values,  then  Christian- 
ity must  either  be  transformed,  or  be  untenable  for 
the  wise  man.  If  we  have  conceived  the  essence 
of  Christianity  too  broadly  or  vaguely,  it  does  not 
much  matter  for  our  present  purposes.  Its  es- 
sence is,  at  any  rate,  some  such  inwardness  of  life 
resolving  ideality  and  reality  into  one,  and  draw- 
ing upon  objective  truth  only  to  the  extent  required 
for  the  confirming  of  that  relation. 

§  34.  We  conclude,  then,  our  attempt  to  empha- 
size the  cognitive  factor  in  religion,  with  the  thesis 


RELIGION  AND  PHILOSOPHY  97 

The  Cognitive  that  Gverj  religion  centres  in  a  practical 
Religion.  sGcrct  of  tliG  univsrse.  To  be  religious 
is  to  believe  that  a  certain  correlation  of  forces, 
moral  and  factual,  is  in  reality  operative,  and  that 
it  determines  the  propriety  and  effectiveness  of 
a  certain  type  of  living.  Whatever  demonstrates 
the  futility,  vanity,  or  self-deception  of  this  living, 
discredits  the  religion.  And,  per  contra,  except  as 
they  define  or  refute  such  practical  truth,  religion 
is  not  essentially  concerned  with  theoretical  judg- 
ments. 

§  35.  But  neither  religion  nor  any  other  human 
interest  consists  in  essentials.  Such  a  practical 
The  Place  of  convictiou  as  that  which  has  been  de- 
in  Religion,  fined  inevitably  flowers  into  a  marvel- 
ous complexity,  and  taps  for  its  nourishment  every 
spontaneity  of  human  nature.  If  it  be  said  that 
only  the  practical  conviction  is  essential,  this 
is  not  the  same  as  to  say  that  all  else  is  super- 
fluous. There  may  be  no  single  utterance  that  my 
religion  could  not  have  spared,  and  yet  were  I  to 
be  altogether  dumb  my  religion  would,  indeed, 
be  as  nothing.  For  if  I  believe,  I  accept  a  pres- 
ence in  my  world,  which  as  I  live  will  figure  in 
my  dreams,  or  in  my  thoughts,  or  in  my  habits. 


98  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

And  each  of  these  expressions  of  myself  will  have 
a  truth  if  it  do  but  bear  out  my  practical  accept- 
ance of  that  presence.  The  language  of  religion, 
like  that  of  daily  life,  is  not  the  language  of  sci- 
ence except  it  take  it  upon  itself  to  be  so.  There 
is  scarcely  a  sentence  which  I  utter  in  my  daily 
intercourse  with  men  which  is  not  guilty  of  trans- 
gressions against  the  canons  of  accurate  and  defi- 
nite thinking.  Yet  if  I  deceive  neither  myself  nor 
another,  I  am  held  to  be  truthful,  even  though  my 
language  deal  with  chance  and  accident,  material 
purposes  and  spiritual  causes,  and  though  I  vow 
that  the  sun  smiles  or  the  moon  lets  down  her  hair 
into  the  sea.  Science  is  a  special  interest  in  the 
discovery  of  unequivocal  and  fixed  conceptions,  and 
employs  its  terms  with  an  unalterable  connotation. 
But  no  such  algebra  of  thought  is  indispensable 
to  life  or  conversation,  and  its  lack  is  no  proof  of 
error.  Such  is  the  case  also  with  that  eminently 
living  affair,  religion.  I  may  if  I  choose,  and  I 
will  if  my  reasoning  powers  be  at  all  awakened, 
be  a  theologian.  But  theology,  like  science,  is  a 
special  intellectual  spontaneity.  St.  Thomas,  the 
master  theologian,  did  not  glide  unwittingly  from 
prayer  into  the  qucestiones  of  the  "  Summa  Theo- 
logiie,"  bill  turned  t(j  them  as  to  a  fresh  adventure. 


RELIGION  AND  PHILOSOPHY  99 

Theology  is  inevitable,  because  humanly  speaking 
adventure  is  inevitable.  For  man,  with  his  intel- 
lectual spontaneity,  every  object  is  a  problem ;  and 
did  he  not  seek  sooner  or  later  to  define  salvation, 
there  would  be  good  reason  to  believe  that  he  did 
not  practically  reckon  with  any.  But  this  is  simi- 
larly and  independently  true  of  the  imagination, 
the  most  familiar  means  with  which  man  clothes 
and  vivifies  his  convictions,  the  exuberance  with 
which  he  plays  about  them  and  delights  to  confess 
them.  The  imagination  of  religion,  contributing 
w^hat  Matthew  Arnold  called  its  "  poetry  and  elo- 
quence," does  not  submit  itself  to  such  canons  as 
are  binding  upon  theology  or  science,  but  exists 
and  flourishes  in  its  own  right. 

The  indispensableness  to  religion  of  the  imagina- 
tion is  due  to  that  faculty's  power  of  realizing  what 
is  not  perceptually  present.  Religion  is  not  inter- 
ested in  the  apparent,  but  in  the  secret  essence  or 
the  transcendent  universal.  And  yet  this  interest 
is  a  practical  one.  Imagination  may  introduce 
one  into  the  vivid  presence  of  the  secret  or  the 
transcendent.  It  is  evident  that  the  religious  im- 
agination here  coincides  with  poetry.  For  it  is 
at  least  one  of  the  interests  of  poetry  to  cultivate 
and  satisfy  a  sense  for  the  universal ;  to  obtain  an 


100  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

immediate  experience  or  appreciation  that  shall 
have  the  vividness  without  the  particularism  of 
ordinary  perception.  And  where  a  poet  elects  so 
to  view  the  world,  we  allow  him  as  a  poet  the 
privilege,  and  judge  him  by  the  standards  to  which 
he  submits  himself.  That  upon  which  we  pass 
judgment  is  the  fitness  of  his  expression.  This 
expression  is  not,  except  in  the  case  of  the  theo- 
retical mystic,  regarded  as  constituting  the  most 
valid  form  of  the  idea,  but  is  appreciated  expressly 
for  its  fulfilment  of  the  condition  of  immediacy. 
The  same  sort  of  critical  attitude  is  in  order  with 
the  fruits  of  the  religious  imagination.  These 
may  or  may  not  fulfil  enough  of  the  require- 
ments of  that  art  to  be  properly  denominated 
poetry;  but  like- poetry  they  are  the  translation  of 
ideas  into  a  specific  lang-uage.  They  must  not, 
therefore,  be  judged  as  though  they  claimed  to 
excel  in  point  of  validity,  but  only  in  point  of  con- 
sistency with  the  context  of  that  language.  And 
the  language  of  religion  is  the  language  of  the 
practical  life.  Such  translation  is  as  essential  to 
an  idea  that  is  to  enter  into  the  religious  experi- 
ence, as  translation  into  terms  of  immediacy  is 
essential  to  an  idea  that  is  to  enter  into  the  appre- 
ciative consciousness  of  the  poet.     No  object  can 


RELIGION  AND  PHILOSOPHY  101 

find  a  place  in  my  religion  until  it  is  conjoined 
Avith  my  purposes  and  hopes ;  until  it  is  taken  for 
granted  and  acted  upon,  like  the  love  of  my  friends, 
or  the  courses  of  the  stars,  or  the  stretches  of 
the  sea. 

§  36.  The  religious  imagination,  then,  is  to  be 
understood  and  justified  as  that  which  brings  the 
The  Special  objects  of  religion  within  the  range  of 
fhTRe%io°us  living.  The  central  religious  object,  as 
Imagination,    j^^g  ^^^^  ^^^^^  ^^  ^^  attitude  of  the  re- 

siduum  or  totality  of  things.  To  be  religious  one 
must  have  a  sense  for  the  presence  of  an  attitude, 
like  his  sense  for  the  presence  of  his  human  fel- 
lows, with  all  the  added  appreciation  that  is  proper 
in  the  case  of  an  object  that  is  unique  in  its  mys- 
tery or  in  its  majesty.  It  follows  that  the  religious 
imagination  fulfils  its  function  in  so  far  as  it  pro- 
vides the  object  of  religion  with  properties  similar 
to  those  which  lend  vividness  and  reality  to  the 
normal  social  relations. 

The  presence  of  one's  fellows  is  in  part  the  per- 
ceptual experience  of  their  bodies.  To  this  there 
corresponds  in  religion  some  extraordinary  or  sub- 
tle appearance.  The  gods  may  in  visions  or 
dreams  be  met  with  in  their  own  proper  embodi- 
ments; or,  as  is  more  common,  they  may  be  re- 


102  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

garded  as  present  for  practical  purposes:  in  some 

inanimate  object,  as  in  the  case  of  the  fetish )  in 

some  animal  species,  as  in  the  case  of  the  totem; 

in  some  place,  as  in  the  case  of  the  shrine ;  or  even 

in  some  human  being,  as  in  the  case  of  the  inspired 

prophet  and  miracle  worker.     In  more  refined  and 

highly  developed  religions  the  medium  of  God's 

presence  is  less  specific.     He  is  perceived  with 

"  — a  sense  sublime 
Of  something  far  more  deeply  interfused, 
Whose  dwelling  is  the  light  of  setting  sims. 
And  the  round  ocean  and  the  living  air. 
And  the  blue  sky,  and  in  the  mind  of  man." 

God  is  here  found  in  an  interpretation  of  the  com- 
mon and  the  natural,  rather  than  in  any  individual 
and  peculiar  embodiment.  And  here  the  poet's 
appreciation,  if  not  his  art,  is  peculiarly  indis- 
pensable. 

But,  furthermore,  his  fellows  are  inmates  of 
"  the  household  of  man  "  in  that  he  knows  their 
history.  They  belong  to  the  temporal  context  of 
actions  and  events.  Similarly,  the  gods  must  be 
historical.  The  sacred  traditions  or  books  of  re- 
ligion are  largely  occupied  with  this  history.  The 
more  individual  and  anthropomorphic  the  gods, 
the  more  local  and  episodic  will  be  the  account  of 
their  affairs.      In  the  higher  religions  the  acts  of 


RELIGION   AND  PHILOSOPHY  103 

God  are  few  and  momentous,  such  as  creation  or 
special  providence ;  or  they  are  identical  with  the 
events  of  nature  and  human  history  when  these 
are  construed  as  divine.  To  find  God  in  this  lat- 
ter way  requires  an  interpretation  of  the  course 
of  events  in  terms  of  some  moral  consistency,  a 
faith  that  sees  some  purpose  in  their  evident  des- 
tination. 

There  is  still  another  and  a  more  significant 
way  in  which  men  recognize  one  another :  the  way 
of  address  and  conversation.  And  men  have  in- 
variably held  a  similar  intercourse  with  their  gods. 
To  this  category  belong  communion  and  prayer, 
with  all  their  varieties  of  expression.  I  have  no 
god  until  I  address  him.  This  will  be  the  most 
direct  evidence  of  what  is  at  least  from  my  point 
of  view  a  social  relation.  There  can  be  no  general 
definition  of  the  form  which  this  address  will  take. 
There  may  be  as  many  special  languages,  as  many 
attitudes,  and  as  much  playfulness  and  subtlety 
of  symbolism  as  in  human  intercourse.  But,  on 
the  other  hand,  there  are  certain  utterances  that 
are  peculiarly  appropriate  to  religion.  In  so  far 
as  he  regards  his  object  as  endowed  with  both 
power  and  goodness  the  worshipper  will  use  the  lan- 
guage of  adoration;  and  the  sense  of  his  depend- 


104  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

ence    will    speak    in    terms    of   consecration    and 

thanksgiving, 

"O  God,  thou  art  my  God;  early  will  I  seek  thee: 
My  soul  thirsteth  for  thee,  my  flesh  longeth  for  thee. 
In  a  dry  and  weary  land,  where  no  water  is. 
So  have  1  looked  upon  thee  in  the  sanctuary. 
To  see  thy  power  and  thy  glorj\ 
For  thy  loving-kindness  is  better  than  life; 
My  lips  shall  praise  thee." 

These  are  expressions  of  a  hopeful  faith;  but, 

on  the  other  hand,  God  may  be  addressed  in  terms 

of  hatred  and  distrust. 

"  Who  is  most  wretched  in  this  dolorous  place? 
I  think  myself;  yet  I  would  rather  be 
My  miserable  self  than  He,  than  He 
Who  formed  such  creatures  to  his  own  disgrace. 

"  The  vilest  thing  must  be  less  vile  than  Thou 
From  whom  it  had  its  being,  God  and  Lord! 
Creator  of  all  woe  and  sin!  abhorred, 
Malignant  and  implacable."  " 

In  either  case  there  may  be  an  indefinite  degree 
of  hyperbole.  The  language  of  love  and  hate,  of 
confidence  and  despair,  is  not  the  language  of  de- 
scription. In  this  train  of  the  religious  conscious- 
ness there  is  occasion  for  whatever  eloquence  man 
can  feel,  and  whatever  rhetorical  luxuriance  he 
can  utter. 

"  James  Thomson:  The  City  of  Dreadful  Night.     Quoted 
by  James,  in  The  Will  to  Believe,  etc.,  p.  45. 


RELIGION  AND  PHILOSOPHY  105 

§  37.  Such  considerations  as  these  serve  to  ac- 
count for  the  exercise  and  certain  of  the  fruits  of 
The  Relation    the  rcligious  imagination,   and  to  des- 

between 

Imagination     iguatc  the  general  criterion  governing 

and  Truth  in       .  .  .  •       i    , 

Religion.  its  propriety.  ±)ut  hoiv  IS  one  to  deter- 
mine the  boundary  between  the  imaginative  and 
the  cognitive^  It  is  commonly  agreed  that  what 
religion  says  and  does  is  not  all  intended  literally. 
But  when  is  expression  of  religion  only  poetry  and 
eloquence,  and  when  is  it  matter  of  conviction? 
If  we  revert  again  to  the  cognitive  aspect  of  re- 
ligion, it  is  evident  that  there  is  but  one  test  to 
apply :  whatever  either  fortifies  or  misleads  the  will 
is  literal  conviction.  This  test  cannot  be  applied 
absolutely,  because  it  can  properly  be  applied  only 
to  the  intention  of  an  individual  experience. 
However  I  may  express  my  religion,  that  which  I 
express,  is,  we  have  seen,  an  expectation.  The 
degree  to  which  I  literally  mean  what  I  say  is 
then  the  degree  to  which  it  determines  my  expec- 
tations. Whatever  adds  no  item  to  these  expecta- 
tions, but  only  recognizes  and  vitalizes  them,  is 
pure  imagination.  But  it  follows  that  it  is  en- 
tirely impossible  from  direct  inspection  to  define 
any  given  expression  of  religious  experience  as 
myth,  or  to  define  the  degree  to  which  it  is  myth. 


106  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

It  submits  to  such  distinctions  only  when  viewed 
from  the  stand-point  of  the  concrete  religious  ex- 
perience which  it  expresses.  Any  such  given  ex- 
pression could  easily  be  all  imagination  to  one, 
and  all  conviction  to  another.  Consider  the  pas- 
sage which  follows : 

"And  I  saw  the  heaven  opened;  and  behold,  a  white 
horse,  and  he  that  sat  thereon,  called  Faithful  and  True; 
and  in  righteousness  he  doth  judge  and  make  war.  And 
his  eyes  are  a  flame  of  fire,  and  upon  his  head  are  many 
diadems;  and  he  hath  a  name  written,  which  no  one 
knoweth  but  he  himself.  And  he  is  arrayed  in  a  garment 
sprinkled  with  blood  :  and  his  name  is  called  The  Word 
of  God.'"* 

Is  this  all  rhapsody,  or  is  it  in  part  true  report  ? 
There  is  evidently  no  answer  to  the  question  so 
conceived.  But  if  it  were  to  express  my  own  re- 
ligious feeling  it  would  have  some  specific  propor- 
tion of  literal  and  metaphorical  significance,  ac- 
cording to  the  degree  to  which  its  detail  contributes 
different  practical  values  to  me.  It  might  then  be 
my  guide-book  to  the  heavens,  or  only  my  testimony 
to  the  dignity  and  mystery  of  the  function  of 
Christ. 

The  development  of  religion  bears  in  a  very  im- 
portant way  upon  this  last  problem.     The  factor 

^*  Revelation,  19:11-13. 


I 


RELIGION   AND  PHILOSOPHY  107 

of  imagination  has  undoubtedly  come  to  have  a 
more  clearly  recognized  role  in  religion.  There 
can  be  no  doubt  that  what  we  now  call  myths  were 
once  beliefs,  and  that  what  we  now  call  poetry  was 
once  history.  If  we  go  back  sufficiently  far  we 
come  to  a  time  when  the  literal  and  the  meta- 
phorical were  scarcely  distinguishable,  and  this 
because  science  had  not  emerged  from  the  early 
animistic  extension  of  social  relations.  Men 
meant  to  address  their  gods  as  they  addressed  their 
fellows,  and  expected  them  to  hear  and  respond,  as 
they  looked  for  such  reactions  within  the  narrower 
circle  of  ordinary  intercourse.  The  advance  of 
science  has  brought  into  vogue  a  description  of 
nature  that  inhibits  such  expectations.  The  re- 
sult has  been  that  men^  continuing  to  use  the  same 
terms,  essentially  expressive  as  they  are  of  a  prac- 
tical relationship,  have  come  to  regard  them  as 
only  a  general  expression  of  their  attitude.  The 
differences  of  content  that  are  in  excess  of  factors 
of  expectation  remain  as  poetry  and  myth.  On 
the  other  hand,  it  is  equally  possible,  if  not  equally 
common,  for  that  which  was  once  imagined  to 
come  to  be  believed.  Such  a  transformation  is, 
perhaps,  normally  the  case  when  the  inspired  utter- 
ance  passes    from    its    author    to    the   cult.     The 


108  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

prophets  and  sweet  singers  are  likely  to  possess  an 
exuberance  of  imagination  not  appreciated  by  their 
followers;  and  for  this  reason  almost  certainly 
misunderstood.  For  these  reasons  it  is  manifestly 
absurd  to  fasten  the  name  of  myth  or  the  name  of 
creed  upon  any  religious  utterance  whatsoever, 
unless  it  be  so  regarded  from  the  stand-point  of  the 
personal  religion  which  it  originally  expressed,  or 
unless  one  means  by  so  doing  to  define  it  as  an 
expression  of  his  own  religion.  He  who  defines 
"  the  myth  of  creation,"  or  "  the  poetical  story  of 
Samson,"  as  parts  of  the  pre-Christian  Judaic  re- 
ligion, exhibits  a  total  loss  of  historical  sense.  The 
distinction  between  cognition  and  fancy  does  not 
exist  among  objects,  but  only  in  the  intending  ex- 
perience ;  hence,  for  me  to  attach  my  own  distinc- 
tion to  any  individual  case  of  belief,  viewed  apart 
from  the  believer,  is  an  utterly  confusing  projec- 
tion of  my  own  personality  into  the  field  of  my 
study. 

§  38.  Only  after  such  considerations  as  these 
are  we  qualified  to  attack  that  much-vexed  question 
The  Phiioso-    as  to  whether  religion  deals  invariably 

phy  Implied  .  - 

in  Religion      With   a   pcrsonal  god.     it  IS  oiten  as- 

and  in  ,      .  , .  .  <•      i  • 

Religions.  sunicd  m  cliscussion  of  this  question 
that  "  personal  god,"  as  m'cII  as  "  god,"  is  a  dis- 


RELIGION  AND  PHILOSOPHY  109 

tinct  and  familiar  kind  of  entity,  like  a  dragon  or 
centaur ;  its  existence  alone  being  problematical. 
This  is  doubly  false  to  the  religious  employment 
of  such  an  object.  If  it  be  true  that  in  religion 
we  mean  by  God  a  practical  interpretation  of  the 
world,  wliatsoever  he  its  nature,  then  the  personal- 
ity of  God  must  be  a  derivative  of  the  attitude,  and 
not  of  the  nature  of  the  world.  Given  the  prac- 
tical outlook  upon  life,  there  is  no  definable  world 
that  cannot  be  construed  under  the  form  of  God. 
My  god  is  my  world  practically  recognized  in  re- 
spect of  its  fundamental  or  ultimate  attitude  to  my 
ideals.  In  the  sense,  then,  conveyed  by  this  term 
attitude  my  god  will  invariably  possess  the  char- 
acters of  personality.  But  the  degree  to  which 
these  characters  will  coincide  with  the  characters 
which  I  assign  to  human  persons,  or  the  terms  of 
any  logical  conception  of  personality,  cannot  be 
absolutely  defined.  Anthropomorphisms  may  be 
imagination  or  they  may  be  literal  conviction. 
This  will  depend,  as  above  maintained,  upon  the 
degree  to  which  they  determine  my  expectations. 
Suppose  the  world  to  be  theoretically  conceived  as 
governed  by  laws  that  are  indifferent  to  all  human 
interests.  The  practical  expression  of  this  concep- 
tion appears  in  the  naturalism  of  Lucretius,  or 


110  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

Diogenes,  or  Omar  Khayyam.  Living  in  the 
vivid  presence  of  an  indifferent  world,  I  may  pict- 
ure my  gods  as  leading  their  own  lives  in  some 
remote  realm  which  is  inaccessible  to  my  petitions, 
or  as  regarding  me  with  sinister  and  contemptuous 
cruelty.  In  the  latter  case  I  may  shrink  and 
cower,  or  return  them  contempt  for  contemj^t.  I 
mean  this  literally  only  if  I  look  for  consequences 
following  directly  from  the  emotional  coloring 
which  I  have  bestowed  upon  them.  It  may  well 
be  that  I  mean  merely  to  regard  myself  suh  specie 
eternitatis,  in  which  case  I  am  personifying  in  the 
sense  of  free  imagination.  In  the  religion  of  en- 
lightenment the  divine  attitude  tends  to  belong  to 
the  poetry  and  eloquence  of  religion  rather  than  to 
its  cognitive  intent.  This  is  true  even  of  optimistic 
and  idealistic  religion.  The  love  and  providence 
of  God  are  less  commonly  supposed  to  warrant  an 
expectation  of  special  and  arbitrary  favors,  and 
have  come  more  and  more  to  mean  the  piay  of  my 
own  feeling  about  the  general  central  conviction 
of  the  favorableness  of  the  cosmos  to  my  deeper  or 
moral  concerns.  But  the  factor  of  personality  can- 
not possibly  be  entirely  eliminated,  for  the  religious 
consciousness  creates  a  social  relationship  between 
man  and  the  universe.     Such  an  interpretation  of 


RELIGION  AND  PHILOSOPHY  m 

life  is  not  a  case  of  the  pathetic  fallacy,  unless  it 
incorrectly  reckons  with  the  inner  feeling  which  it 
attributes  to  the  universe.  It  is  an  obvious  prac- 
tical truth  that  the  total  or  residual  environment 
is  significant  for  life.  Grant  this  and  you  make 
rational  a  recognition  of  that  significance,  or  a 
more  or  less  constant  sense  of  coincidence  or  con- 
flict w^itli  cosmical  forces.  Permit  this  conscious- 
ness to  stand,  and  you  make  some  expression  of  it 
inevitable.  Such  an  expression  may,  furthermore, 
with  perfect  propriety  and  in  fulfilment  of  human 
nature,  set  forth  and  transfigure  this  central  belief 
until  it  may  enter  into  the  context  of  immediacy. 
Thus  any  conception  of  the  universe  whatso- 
ever may  afford  a  basis  for  religion.  But  there  is 
no  religion  that  does  not  virtually  make  a  more 
definite  claim  upon  the  nature  of  things,  and  this 
entirely  independently  of  its  theology,  or  explicit 
attempt  to  define  itself.  Every  religion,  even  in 
the  very  living  of  it,  is  naturalistic,  or  dualistic, 
or  pluralistic,  or  optimistic,  or  idealistic,  or  pessi- 
mistic. And  there  is  in  the  realm  of  truth  that 
which  justifies  or  refutes  these  definite  practical 
ways  of  construing  the  universe.  But  no  historical 
religion  is  ever  so  vague  even  as  this  in  its  phil- 
osophical implications.     Indeed,  we  shall  always 


112  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

be  brought  eventually  to  the  inner  meaning  of  some 
individual  religious  experience,  where  no  general 
criticism  can  be  certainly  valid. 

There  is,  then,  a  place  in  religion  for  that  which 
is  not  directly  answerable  to  philosophical  or  sci- 
entific standards.  But  there  is  always,  on  the 
other  hand,  an  element  of  hope  which  conceives 
the  nature  of  the  world,  and  means  to  be  grounded 
in  reality.  In  respect  of  that  element,  philosophy 
is  indispensable  to  religion.  The  meaning  of  re- 
ligion is,  in  fact,  the  central  problem  of  philosophy. 
There  is  a  virtue  in  religion  like  that  which  Emer- 
son ascribes  to  poetry.  "  The  poet  is  in  the  right 
attitude;  he  is  believing;  the  philosopher,  after 
some  struggle,  having  only  reasons  for  believing." 
But  whatever  "may  be  said  to  the  disparagement 
of  its  dialectic,  philosophy  is  the  justification  of 
religion,  and  the  criticism  of  religions.  To  it 
must  be  assigned  the  task  of  so  refining  positive 
religion  as  to  contribute  to  the  perpetual  establish- 
ment of  true  religion.  And  to  philosophy,  with 
religion,  belongs  the  task  of  holding  fast  to  the 
idea  of  the  universe.  There  is  no  religion  except 
before  you  begin,  or  after  you  have  rested  from, 
your  philosophical  speculation.  But  in  the  uni- 
verse these  iiitorests  have  a  common  object.     As 


RELIGION  AND  PHILOSOPHY  113 

philosophy  is  the  articulation  and  vindication  of 
religion,  so  is  religion  the  realization  of  philoso- 
phy. In  philosophy  thought  is  brought  up  to  the 
elevation  of  life^  and  in  religion  philosophy,  as  the 
sum  of  wisdom,  enters  into  life. 


CHAPTER    V 

NATURAL    SCIENCE    AND    PHILOSOPHY 

§  39.  In  the  case  of  natural  science  we  meet 
not  only  with  a  special  human  interest,  but  with  a 
The  True        tlicoretical     discipline.     We     are     con- 

Relations  of 

Philosophy      f rontcd,  therefore,  with  a  new  question : 

and  Science. 

Misconcep-      that  of  the  relation  within  the  hodj  of 

tions  and  An-    ,  ,  -     ,  „  p     • , 

tagonisms.  human  knowledge  oi  two  oi  its  con- 
stituent members.  Owing  to  the  militant  temper 
of  the  representatives  of  both  science  and  philos- 
ophy, this  has  long  since  ceased  to  be  an  academic 
question,  and  has  frequently  been  met  in  the  spirit 
of  rivalry  and  partisanship.  But  the  true  order 
of  knowledge  is  only  temporarily  distorted  by  the 
brilliant  success  of  a  special  type  of  investigation ; 
and  the  conquests  of  science  are  now  so  old  a  story 
that  critical  thought  shows  a  disposition  to  judge 
of  the  issue  with  sobriety  and  logical  highminded- 
ness. 

In  the  seventeenth  century  a  newly  emancipated 
and   too  sanguine   reason   proposed   to   know   the 
whole  of  nature  at  once  in  terms  of  mathematics 
114 


NATURAL  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY       II5 

and  mechanics.  Thus  the  system  of  the  English- 
man Hobbes  was  science  swelled  to  world-propor- 
tions, simple,  compact,  conclusive,  and  all-compre- 
hensive. Philosophy  proposed  to  do  the  work  of 
science,  but  in  its  own  grand  manner.  The  last 
twenty  years  of  Hobbes's  life,  spent  in  repeated 
discomfiture  at  the  hands  of  Seth  Ward,  Wallis, 
Boyle,  and  other  scientific  experts  of  the  new 
Royal  Society,  certified  conclusively  to  the  failure 
of  this  enterprise,  and  the  experimental  specialist 
thereupon  took  exclusive  possession  of  the  field  of 
natural  law.  But  the  idealist,  on  the  other  hand, 
reconstructed  nature  to  meet  the  demands  of  phil- 
osophical knowledge  and  religious  faith.  There 
issued,  together  with  little  mutual  understanding 
and  less  sympathy,  on  the  one  hand  positivism,  or 
exclusive  experimentalism,  and  on  the  other  hand 
a  rabid  and  unsympathetic  transcendentalism. 
Hume,  who  consigned  to  the  flames  all  thought 
save  "  abstract  reasoning  concerning  quantity  or 
number,"  and  "  experimental  reasoning  concern- 
ing matter  of  fact  and  existence  " ;  Comte,  who 
assigned  metaphysics  to  an  immature  stage  in  the 
development  of  human  intelligence;  and  Tyndall, 
who  reduced  the  religious  consciousness  to  an  emo- 
tional experience  of  mystery,  are  typical  of  the  one 


116  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

attitude.  The  other  is  well  exhibited  in  Sehell- 
ing's  reference  to  "  the  blind  and  thoughtless  mode 
of  investigating  nature  which  has  become  generally 
established  since  the  corruption  of  philosophy  by 
Bacon,  and  of  physics  by  Boyle."  Dogmatic  ex- 
perimentalism  and  dogmatic  idealism  signify  more 
or  less  consistently  the  abstract  isolation  of  the 
scientific  and  philosophical  motives. 

There  is  already  a  touch  of  quaintness  in  both 
of  these  attitudes.  We  of  the  present  are  in  the 
habit  of  acknowledging  the  autonomy  of  science, 
and  the  unimpeachable  validity  of  the  results  of 
experimental  research  in  so  far  as  they  are  sanc- 
tioned by  the  consensus  of  experts.  But  at  the 
same  time  we  recognize  the  definit^ness  of  the  task 
of  science,  and  the  validity  of  such  reservations  as 
may  be  made  from  a  higher  critical  point  of  view. 
Science  is  to  be  transcended  in  so  far  as  it  is  under- 
stood as  a  whole.  Philosophy  is  critically  empiri- 
cal ;  empirical,  because  it  regards  all  bona  fide  de- 
scriptions of  experience  as  knowledge ;  critical, 
because  attentive  to  the  conditions  of  both  general 
and  special  knowledge.  And  in  terms  of  a  critical 
empiricism  so  defined,  it  is  one  of  the  problems 
of  philosophy  to  define  and  appraise  the  generating 
problem  of  science,  and  so  to  determine  the  value 


NATURAL  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY       II7 

assignable  to  natural  laws  in  the  whole  system  of 
knowledge. 

§  40.  If  this  be  the  true  function  of  philosophy 
with  reference  to  science,  several  current  notions 
The  Spheres  of  of  the  relations  of  the  spheres  of  these 

Philosophy 

and  Science,  disciplines  may  be  disproved.  In  the 
first  place,  philosophy  will  not  be  all  the  sciences 
regarded  as  one  science.  Science  tends  to  unify 
without  any  higher  criticism.  The  various  sci- 
ences already  regard  the  one  nature  as  their  com- 
mon object,  and  the  one  system  of  interdependent 
laws  as  their  common  achievement.  The  philoso- 
pher who  tries  to  be  all  science  at  once  fails  igno- 
miniously  because  he  tries  to  replace  the  work  of 
a  specialist  with  the  work  of  a  dilettante ;  and  if 
philosophy  be  identical  with  that  body  of  truth 
accumulated  and  organized  by  the  cooperative  ac- 
tivity of  scientific  men,  then  philosophy  is  a  name 
and  there  is  no  occasion  for  the  existence  of  the 
philosopher  as  such.  Secondly,  philosophy  will 
not  be  the  assembling  of  the  sciences;  for  such 
would  be  a  merely  clerical  work,  and  the  philoso- 
pher would  much  better  be  regarded  as  non-existent 
than  as  a  book-keeper.  !N^or,  thirdly,  is  philosophy 
an  auxiliary  discipline  that  may  be  called  upon  in 
emergencies  for  the  solution  of  some  bafHing  prob- 


118  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

k'lu  of  science.  A  problem  defined  by  science 
must  be  solved  in  the  scientific  manner.  Science 
will  accept  no  aid  from  the  gods  when  engaged  in 
her  own  campaign,  but  will  fight  it  out  according 
to  her  own  principles  of  warfare.  And  as  long 
as  science  moves  in  her  own  plane,  she  can  acknowl- 
edge no  permanent  barriers.  There  is  then  no  need 
of  any  superscientific  research  that  shall  replace, 
or  piece  together,  or  extend  the  work  of  science. 
But  the  savant  is  not  on  this  account  in  possession 
of  the  entire  field  of  knowledge.  It  is  true  that 
he  is  not  infrequently  moved  to  such  a  conviction 
when  he  takes  us  about  to  view  his  estates. 
Together  we  ascend  up  into  heaven,  or  make  our 
beds  in  sheol,  or  take  the  wings  of  the  morning 
and  dwell  in  the  uttermost  parts  of  the  sea — and 
look  in  vain  for  anything  that  is  not  work  done, 
or  work  projected,  by  natural  science.  Persuade 
him,  however,  to  define  his  estates,  and  he  has  cir- 
cumscribed them.  In  his  definition  he  must  em- 
ploy conceptions  more  fundamental  than  the  work- 
ing conceptions  that  he  employs  within  his  field 
of  study.  Indeed,  in  viewing  his  task  as  definite 
and  specific  he  has  undertaken  the  solution  of  tlic 
problem  of  philosophy.  The  logical  self-conscious- 
ness hi>^  been  awakened,  and  there  is  no  honorable 


NATURAL  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY       119 

way  of  putting  it  to  sleep  again.  This  is  precisely 
what  takes  place  in  any  account  of  the  generating 
problem  of  science.  To  define  science  is  to  define 
at  least  one  realm  that  is  other  than  science,  the 
realm  of  active  intellectual  endeavor  with  its  own 
proper  categories.  One  cannot  reflect  upon  sci- 
ence and  assign  it  an  end,  and  a  method  proper 
to  that  end,  without  bringing  into  the  field  of 
knowledge  a  broader  field  of  experience  than  the 
field  proper  to  science,  broader  at  any  rate  by  the 
presence  in  it  of  the  scientific  activity  itself. 

Here,  then,  is  the  field  proper  to  philosophy. 
The  scientist  qua  scientist  is  intent  upon  his  own 
determinate  enterprise.  The  philosopher  comes 
into  being  as  one  who  is  interested  in  observing 
what  it  is  that  the  scientist  is  so  intently  doing. 
In  taking  this  interest  he  has  accepted  as  a  field 
for  investigation  that  which  he  would  designate 
as  the  totality  of  interests  or  the  inclusive  experi- 
ence. He  can  carry  out  his  intention  of  defining 
the  scientific  attitude  only  by  standing  outside  it, 
and  determining  it  by  means  of  nothing  less  than 
an  exhaustive  searching  out  of  all  attitudes.  Phi- 
losophy is,  to  be  sure,  itself  a  definite  activity  and 
an  attitude,  but  an  attitude  required  by  definition 
to  be  conscious  of  itself,  and,  if  you  please,  con- 


120  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

scions  of  its  own  consciousness,  nntil  its  attitude 
shall  have  embraced  in  its  object  the  very  prin- 
ciple of  attitudes.  Philosophy  defines  itself  and 
all  other  human  tasks  and  interests.  ]^one  have 
furnished  a  clearer  justification  of  philosophy  than 
those  men  of  scientific  predilections  who  have 
claimed  the  title  of  agnostics.  A  good  instance  is 
furnished  by  a  contemporary  physicist,  who  has 
chosen  to  call  his  reflections  "  antimetaphysical." 

"  Physical  science  does  not  pretend  to  be  a  complete 
view  of  the  world;  it  simply  claims  that  it  is  working 
toward  such  a  complete  view  in  the  future.  The  highest 
philosophy  of  the  scientific  investigator  is  precisely  this 
toleration  of  an  incomplete  conception  of  the  world  and 
the  preference  for  it,  rather  than  an  apparently  perfect, 
but  inadequate  conception."' 

It  is  apparent  that  if  one  were  to  challenge 
such  a  statement,  the  issue  raised  would  at  once 
be  philosophical  and  not  scientific.  The  problem 
here  stated  and  answered,  requires  for  its  solu- 
tion the  widest  inclusiveness  of  view,  and  a  pe- 
culiar interest  in  critical  reflection  and  logical 
coordination. 

§  41.  One  may  be  prepared  for  a  knowledge  of 

'  Ernst  Mach:  Science  of  Mechanics.  Translation  by  McCor- 
mack,  p.  464.  No  one  has  made  more  important  contribu- 
tions than  Professor  Mach  to  a.  certain  definite  modern 
pliilosopliical  movement.     Cf.  §  207. 


NATURAL  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY       121 

the  economic  and  social  significance  of  the  railway 
The  Procedure  cvcn  if  onc   (locs  not  know  a  throttle 

of  a  Philoso-  .  •  i     i  i 

phy  of  Science.  I rom  a  piston-rod,  provided  one  has 
broad  and  well-balanced  knowledge  of  the  inter- 
play of  human  social  interests.  One's  proficiency 
here  requires  one  to  stand  off  from  society,  and  to 
obtain  a  perspective  that  shall  be  as  little  distorted 
as  possible.  The  reflection  of  the  philosopher  of 
science  requires  a  similar  quality  of  perspective. 
All  knowledges,  together  with  the  knowing  of  them, 
must  be  his  object  yonder,  standing  apart  in  its 
wholeness  and  symmetry.  Philosophy  is  the  least 
dogmatic,  the  most  empirical,  of  all  disciplines, 
since  it  is  the  only  investigation  that  can  permit 
itself  to  be  forgetful  of  nothing. 

But  the  most  comprehensive  view  may  be  the 
most  distorted  and  false.  The  true  order  of  knowl- 
edge is  the  difiicult  task  of  logical  analysis,  requir- 
ing as  its  chief  essential  some  determination  of 
the  scope  of  the  working  conceptions  of  the  differ- 
ent independent  branches  of  knowledge.  In  the 
case  of  natural  science  this  would  mean  an  exam- 
ination of  the  method  and  results  characteristic  of 
this  field,  for  the  sake  of  defining  the  kind  of 
truth  which  attaches  to  the  laws  which  are  being 
gradually  formulated.     But  one  must  immediately 


122  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

reach  either  the  one  or  the  other  of  two  very  gen- 
eral conclusions.  If  the  laws  of  natural  science 
cover  all  possible  knowledge  of  reality,  then  there 
is  left  to  philosophy  only  the  logical  function  of 
justifying  this  statement.  Logic  and  natural  sci- 
ence will  then  constitute  the  sum  of  knowledge. 
If,  on  the  other  hand^  it  be  found  that  the  aim  of 
natural  science  is  such  as  to  exclude  certain  as- 
pects of  reality,  then  philosophy  will  not  be  re- 
stricted to  logical  criticism,  but  will  have  a  cog- 
nitive field  of  its  own.  The  great  majority  of 
philosophers  have  assumed  the  latter  of  these  alter- 
natives to  be  true,  w'hile  most  aggressive  scientists 
have  intended  the  former  in  their  somewhat  blind 
attacks  upon  "  metaphysics."  Although  the  se- 
lection of  either  of  these  alternatives  involves  us 
in  the  defence  of  a  specific  answer  to  a  philosophi- 
cal question,  the  issue  is  inevitable  in  any  intro- 
duction to  philosophy  because  of  its  bearing  upon 
the  extent  of  the  field  of  that  study.  Further- 
more there  can  be  no  better  exposition  of  the  mean- 
ing of  philosophy  of  science  than  an  illustration 
of  its  exercise.  The  following,  then,  is  to  be  re- 
garded as  on  the  one  hand  a  tentative  refutation 
of  positivism,  or  the  claim  of  natural  science  to  he 
coextensive    ivilh    knowahle   reality;   and    on  the 


NATURAL  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY       ]23 

other  hand  a  progTamme  for  the  procedure  of  phi- 
losophy with  reference  to  natural  science. 

§  42.  Science  issues  through  imperceptible 
stages  from  organic  habits  and  instincts  which 
The  Origin  of    sigTiifj  the  posscssion  by  living  creat- 

the  Scientific 

Interest.  urcs  of  a  powcr  to  meet  the  environ- 

ment on  its  own  terms.  Every  organism  pos- 
sesses such  a  working  knowledge  of  nature,  and 
among  men  the  first  science  consists  in  those  habit- 
ual adjustments  common  to  men  and  infra-human 
organisms.  Man  is  already  practising  science 
before  he  recognizes  it.  As  skill  it  distinguishes 
itself  early  in  his  history  from  lore,  or  untested 
tradition.  Skill  is  familiarity  with  general  kinds 
of  events,  together  with  ability  to  identify  an  in- 
dividual with  reference  to  a  kind,  and  so  be  pre- 
pared for  the  outcome.  Thus  man  is  inwardly 
prepared  for  the  alternation  of  day  and  night,  and 
the  periods  of  the  seasons.  He  practically  antici- 
pates the  procession  of  natural  events  in  the  count- 
less emergencies  of  his  daily  life.  But  science  in 
the  stricter  sense  begins  when  skill  becomes  free 
and  social. 

§  43.  Skill  may  be  said  to  be  free  when  the  es- 
sential terms  of  the  action  have  been  abstracted 
from  the  circumstances  attending  them  in  individ- 


124  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

iial  experiences,  and  are  retained  as  ideal  plans  ai> 
skiUasFree.  plicable  to  any  practical  occasion.  The 
monkey  who  swings  with  a  trapeze  from  his  perch 
on  the  side  of  the  cage,  counts  upon  swinging  back 
again  without  any  further  effort  on  his  own  part. 
His  act  and  its  successful  issue  signify  his  practi- 
cal familiarity  with  the  natural  motions  of  bodies. 
We  can  conceive  such  a  performance  to  be  accom- 
panied by  an  ahnost  entire  failure  to  grasp  its  es- 
sentials. It  would  then  be  necessary  for  nearly 
the  whole  situation  to  be  repeated  in  order  to  induce 
in  the  monkey  the  same  action  and  expectation. 
He  would  require  a  similar  form,  color,  and  dis- 
tance. But  he  might,  on  the  other  hand,  regard 
as  practically  identical  all  suspended  and  freely 
swinging  bodies  capable  of  affording  him  support, 
and  quite  independently  of  their  shape,  size,  time, 
or  place.  In  this  latter  case  his  skill  would  be 
applicable  to  the  widest  possible  number  of  cases 
that  could  present  themselves.  Having  a  discern- 
ing eye  for  essentials,  he  would  lose  no  chance  of 
a  swing  through  looking  for  more  than  the  bare 
necessities.  Wher  the  physicist  describes  the  pen- 
dulum in  terms  of  a  formula  such  as  ^  =  27rV^ 
he  exhibits  a  similar  discernment.  lie  has  found 
that  the  time  occupied  by  an  oscillation  of  an}-^  pen- 


NATURAL  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY       125 

tluliim  may  be  calculated  exclusively  in  terms  of  its 
length  and  the  acceleration  due  to  gravity.  The 
monkey's  higher  proficiency  and  the  formula  alike 
represent  a  knowledge  that  is  free  in  the  sense  that 
it  is  contained  in  terms  that  require  no  single  fixed 
context  in  immediacy.  The  knowledge  is  valid 
wherever  these  essential  terms  are  present ;  and 
calculations  may  be  based  upon  these  essential 
terms,  while  attendant  circumstances  vary  ad  infi- 
nitum. Such  knowledge  is  said  to  be  general  or 
universal. 

There  is  another  element  of  freedom,  however, 
which  so  far  has  not  been  attributed  to  the  monkey's 
knowledge,  but  which  is  evidently  present  in  that 
of  the  physicist.  The  former  has  a  practical 
ability  to  deal  with  a  pendulum  when  he  sees  it. 
The  latter,  on  the  other  hand,  knows  about  a  pen- 
dulum whether  one  be  present  or  not.  His  knowl- 
edge is  so  retained  as  always  to  be  available,  even 
though  it  be  not  always  applicable.  His  knowl- 
edge is  not  merely  skill  in  treating  a  situation,  but 
the  possession  of  resources  which  he  may  employ 
at  whatever  time,  and  in  whatever  manner,  may 
suit  his  interests.  Knowing  what  he  does  about 
the  pendulum,  he  may  act  from  the  idea  of  such 
a  contrivance,   and  with  the  aid  of  it  construct 


126  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

some  more  complex  mechanism.  His  formulas  are 
his  instruments,  which  he  may  use  on  any  occasion. 
Suppose  that  a  situation  with  factors  a,  b,  and  c 
requires  factor  d  in  order  to  become  M,  as  desired. 
Such  a  situation  might  easily  be  hopeless  for  an 
organism  reacting  directly  to  the  stimulus  ahc,  and 
yet  be  easily  met  by  a  free  knowledge  of  cl.  One 
who  knows  that  I,  m,  and  n  will  produce  d,  may  by 
these  means  provide  the  missing  factor,  complete 
the  sum  of  required  conditions,  abed,  and  so  obtain 
the  end  M.  Such  indirection  might  be  used  to 
obtain  any  required  factor  of  the  end,  or  of  any 
near  or  remote  means  to  the  end.  There  is,  in 
fact,  no  limit  to  the  complexity  of  action  made 
possible  upon  this  basis;  for  since  it  is  available 
in  idea,  the  whole  range  of  such  knowledge  may 
be  brought  to  bear  upon  any  individual  problem. 
§  44.  But  knowledge  of  this  free  type  becomes 
at  the  same  time  social  or  institutional.  It  con- 
skiii  as  Social,  sists  no  longer  in  a  skilful  adaptation 
of  the  individual  organism,  but  in  a  system  of 
terms  common  to  all  intelligence,  and  preserved 
in  those  books  and  other  monuments  which  serve 
as  the  articulate  memory  of  the  race.  A  knowl- 
edge that  is  social  must  be  composed  of  unequivo- 
cal conceptions  and  fixed  symbols.     The  mathe- 


NATURAL  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY       127 

matical  laws  of  the  exact  sciences  represent  the 
most  successful  attainment  of  this  end  so  far  as 
form  is  concerned.  Furthermore,  the  amount  of 
knowledge  may  now  be  increased  from  generation 
to  generation  through  the  service  of  those  who  make 
a  vocation  of  its  pursuit.  Natural  science  is  thus 
a  cumulative  racial  proficiency,  which  any  indi- 
vidual may  bring  to  bear  upon  any  emergency  of 
his  life. 

§  45.  Such  proficiency  as  science  affords  is  in 
every  case  the  anticipation  of  experience.  This 
c  •       f„,       has  a  twofold  value  for  mankind,  that 

DCience  tor  ' 

Accommoda-    ^£  dccommodation,  and  that  of  construc- 
tion and  Con- 
struction.        ^^^^^     Primitively,  where  mere  survival 

is  the  function  of  the  organism  as  a  whole,  the 
value  of  accommodation  is  relatively  fundamental. 
The  knowledge  of  what  may  be  expected  enables 
the  organism  to  save  itself  by  means  of  its  own 
counter-arrangement  of  natural  processes.  Con- 
struction is  here  for  the  sake  of  accommodation. 
But  with  the  growth  of  civilization  construction 
becomes  a  positive  interest,  and  man  tends  to  save 
himself  for  definite  ends.  Accommodation  comes 
to  take  place  for  the  sake  of  construction.  Science 
then  supplies  the  individual  with  the  ways  and 
means  wherewith  to  execute  life  purposes  which 


128  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

themselves  tend  to  assume  an  absolnte  value  that 
cannot  be  justified  merely  on  the  ground  of  science. 
§  46.  If  natural  science  be  animated  by  any 
special  cognitive  interest,  this  motive  should  ap- 
Method  and     pear  in  the  development  of  its  method 

Fundamental  t     r        i  i  •  t  c     i 

Conceptions  ^ud  lundamcntal  conceptions,  ii  that 
scienc^.  interest  has  been  truly  defined,  it  should 

Jc'iiptive  -^^^^  enable  us  to  understand  the  pro- 

Method,  gressive  and  permanent  in  scientific  in- 

vestigation as  directly  related  to  it.  For  the  aim 
of  any  discipline  exercises  a  gradual  selection  from 
among  possible  methods,  and  gives  to  its  laws  their 
determinate  and  final  form. 

The  descriptive  method  is  at  the  present  day 
fully  established.  A  leading  moral  of  the  history 
of  science  is  the  superior  usefulness  of  an  exact 
account  of  the  workings  of  nature  to  an  explana- 
tion in  terms  of  some  qualitative  potency.  Expla- 
nation has  been  postponed  by  enlightened  science 
until  after  a  more  careful  observation  of  actual 
processes  shall  have  been  made;  and  at  length  it 
has  been  admitted  that  there  is  no  need  of  any 
explanation  but  perfect  description.  Now  the 
practical  use  of  science  defined  above,  requires  no 
knowledge  beyond  the  actual  order  of  events.  For 
such  a  purpose  sufficient  reason  signifies  only  suffi- 


NATURAL  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY       129 

cient  conditions.  All  other  considerations  are  ir- 
relevant, and  it  is  proper  to  ignore  them.  Such 
has  actually  been  the  fate  of  the  so-called  meta- 
physical solution  of  special  problems  of  nature. 
The  case  of  Kepler  is  the  classic  instance.  This 
great  scientist  supplemented  his  laws  of  planetary 
motion  with  the  following  speculation  concerning 
the  agencies  at  work: 

"  We  must  suppose  one  of  two  things :  either  that  the 
moving  spirits,  in  proportion  as  they  are  more  removed 
from  the  sun,  are  more  feeble ;  or  that  there  is  one  moving 
spirit  in  the  centre  of  all  the  orbits,  namely,  in  the  sun, 
which  urges  each  body  the  more  vehemently  in  propor- 
tion as  it  is  nearer ;  but  in  more  distant  spaces  languishes  in 
consequence  of  the  remoteness  and  attenuation  of  its 
virtue."^ 

The  following  passage  from  Hegel  affords  an 
interesting  analogy: 

"The  moon  is  the  waterless  crystal  which  seeks  to 
complete  itself  by  means  of  our  sea,  to  quench  the  thirst 
of  its  arid  rigidity,  and  therefore  produces  ebb  and 
flow."' 

No  scientist  has  ever  sought  to  refute  either  of 
these  theories.     They  have  merely  been  neglected. 

'  Whewell:  History  of  the  Inductive  Sciences,  Vol.  I,  p.  289. 
Quoted  from  Kepler:  Mysterium  Cosmographicum. 

^  Quoted  by  Sidgwick  in  his  Philosophy,  its  Scope  and 
Relations,  p.  89. 


130  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

They  were  advanced  in  obedience  to  a  demand  for 
the  ultimate  explanation  of  the  phenomena  in  ques- 
tion, and  were  obtained  by  applying  such  general 
conceptions  as  were  most  satisfying  to  the  reasons 
of  their  respective  authors.  But  they  contributed 
nothing  whatsoever  to  a  practical  familiarity  with 
the  natural  course  of  events,  in  this  case  the  times 
and  places  of  the  planets  and  the  tides.  Hence 
they  have  not  been  used  in  the  building  of  science. 
In  our  own  day  investigators  have  become  con- 
scious of  their  motive,  and  do  not  wait  for  histori- 
cal selection  to  exclude  powers  and  reasons  from 
their  province.  They  deliberately  seek  to  formu- 
late exact  descriptions.  To  this  end  they  employ 
symbols  that  shall  serve  to  identify  the  terms 
of  nature,  and  formulas  that  shall  define  their 
systematic  relationship.  These  systems  must  be 
exact,  or  deductions  cannot  be  made  from  them. 
Hence  they  tend  ultimately  to  assume  a  mathe- 
matical form  of  expression. 

§  47.  But  science  tends  to  employ  for  these  sys- 
tems only  such  conceptions  as  relate  to  prediction; 
Space,  Time,  ^'^^  ^^  these  the  most  fundamental  are 
and  Prediction.  5^^ eg   and   time.     The  first  science  to 

establish  its  method  was  the  science  of  astronomy, 
where  measurement  and  computation  in  terms  of 


NATURAL  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY       131 

space  and  time  were  the  most  obvious  means  of 
description;  and  the  general  application  of  the 
method  of  astronomy  by  Galileo  and  !Newton,  or 
the  development  of  mechanics,  is  the  most  impor- 
tant factor  in  the  establishment  of  modern  sci- 
ence upon  a  permanent  working  basis.  The  per- 
sistence of  the  term  cause,  testifies  to  the  fact  that 
science  is  primarily  concerned  with  the  determina- 
tion of  events.  Its  definitions  of  objects  are 
means  of  identification,  while  its  laws  are  dynami- 
cal, i.  €.,  have  reference  to  the  conditions  under 
which  these  objects  arise.  Thus  the  chemist  may 
know  less  about  the  properties  of  water  than 
the  poet ;  but  he  is  preeminently  skilled  in  its  pro- 
duction from  elements,  and  understands  similarly 
the  compounds  into  which  it  may  enter.  Now  the 
general  conditions  of  all  anticipation,  whereby  it 
becomes  exact  and  verifiable,  are  spacial  and  tem- 
poral. A  predictable  event  must  be  assigned  to 
what  is  here  now,  or  there  now;  or  what  is  here 
then,  or  there  then.  An  experimentally  verifiable 
system  must  contain  space-time  variables,  for  which 
can  be  substituted  the  here  and  now  of  the  experi- 
menter's immediate  experience.  Hence  science 
deals  primarily  with  calculable  places  and  mo- 
ments.    The  mechanical  theory  of  nature  owes  its 


132  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

success  to  a  union  of  space  and  time  through  its 
conceptions  of  matter  and  motion.'^  And  the  pro- 
jected theory  of  energetics  must  satisfy  the  same 
conditions. 

§  48.  But,  furthermore,  science  has,  as  we  have 
seen,  an  interest  in  freeing  its  descriptions  from 
The  ouantita-  ^^^  pcculiar  angle  and  relativity  of  an 
tive  Method,  individual's  experience,  for  the  sake  of 
affording  him  knowledge  of  that  with  which  he 
must  meet.  Science  enlightens  the  will  by  ac- 
quainting it  with  that  which  takes  place  in  spite 
of  it,  and  for  which  it  must  hold  itself  in  readi- 
ness. To  this  end  the  individual  benefits  himself 
in  so  far  as  he  eliminates  himself  from  the  objects 
which  he  investigates.  His  knowledge  is  useful 
in  so  far  as  it  is  valid  for  his  own  indefinitely 
varying  stand-points,  and  those  of  other  wills  rec- 
ognized by  him  in  his  practical  relations.     But  in 

*  The  reader  is  referred  to  Mr.  Bertrand  Russell's  chapters 
on  matter  and  motion  in  his  Principles  of  Mathematics, 
Vol.  I.  Material  particles  he  defines  as  "many-one  rela- 
tions of  all  times  to  some  places,  or  of  all  terms  of  a  con- 
tinuous one-dimensional  series  t  to  some  terms  of  a  con- 
tinuous three-dimensional  series  s."  Similarly,  "  when 
different  times,  throughout  any  period  however  short,  are 
correlated  with  different  places,  there  is  motion;  when 
different  times,  throughout  some  period  however  short, 
are  all  correlated  with  the  same  place,  there  is  rest."  Op, 
cit.,  p.  473. 


NATURAL  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY       133 

attempting  to  describe  objects  in  terms  other  than 
those  of  a  specific  experience,  science  is  compelled 
to  describe  them  in  terms  of  one  another.  For  this 
purpose  the  quantitative  method  is  peculiarly  ser- 
viceable. With  its  aid  objects  permit  themselves 
to  be  described  as  multiples  of  one  another,  and  as 
occupying  positions  in  relation  to  one  another. 
When  all  objects  are  described  strictly  in  terms  of 
one  another,  they  are  expressed  in  terms  of  arbi- 
trary units,  and  located  in  terms  of  arbitrary 
spacial  or  temporal  axes  of  reference.  Thus 
there  arises  the  universe  of  the  scientific  imagina- 
tion, a  vast  complexity  of  material  displacements 
and  transformations,  without  color,  music,  pleas- 
ure, or  any  of  all  that  rich  variety  of  qualities 
that  the  least  of  human  experiences  contains.  It 
does  not  completely  rationalize  or  even  completely 
describe  such  experiences,  but  fonuulates  their  suc- 
cession. To  this  end  they  are  reduced  to  terms 
that  correspond  to  no  specific  experience,  and  for 
this  very  reason  may  be  translated  again  into  all 
definable  hypothetical  experiences.  The  solar  sys- 
tem for  astronomy  is  not  a  bird's-eye  view  of 
elliptical  orbits,  with  the  planets  and  satellites  in 
definite  phases,  l^or  is  it  this  group  of  objects 
from  any  such  point  of  view,  or  from  any  number 


134  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

of  such  points  of  view ;  but  a  formulation  of  their 
motions  that  will  serve  as  the  key  to  an  infinite 
number  of  their  appearances.  Or,  consider  the 
picture  of  the  ichthysauria  romping  in  the  meso- 
zoic  sea,  that  commonly  accompanies  a  text-book 
of  geology.  Any  such  picture,  and  all  such  pict- 
ures, with  their  coloring  and  their  temporal  and 
spacial  perspective,  are  imaginary.  No  such  spe- 
cial and  exclusive  manifolds  can  be  defined  as  hav- 
ing been  then  and  there  realized.  But  we  have  a 
geological  knowledge  of  this  period,  that  fulfils  the 
formal  demands  of  natural  science,  in  so  far  as  we 
can  construct  this  and  countless  other  specific  ex- 
periences with  reference  to  it. 

§  49.  Science,  then,  is  to  be  understood  as 
springing  from  the  practical  necessity  of  antici- 
The  General     pating  the   environment.     This   antici- 

Development 

of  Science.  patiou  appears  first  as  congenital  or 
acquired  reactions  on  the  part  of  the  organism. 
Such  reactions  imply  a  fixed  coordination  or  sys- 
tem in  the  environment  whereby  a  given  circum- 
stance determines  other  circumstances ;  and  science 
proper  arises  as  the  formulation  of  such  systems. 
The  requirement  that  they  shall  apply  to  the 
phenomena  that  confront  the  will,  determines  their 
spacial,   temporal,    and    quantitative   form.      Tlic 


NATURAL  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY       135 

progress  of  science  is  marked  by  the  growth  of 
these  conceptions  in  the  direction  of  comprehen 
siveness  on  the  one  hand,  and  of  refinement  and 
delicacy  on  the  other.  Man  lives  in  an  environ- 
ment that  is  growing  at  the  same  time  richer  and 
more  extended,  but  with  a  compensatory  simplifi- 
cation in  the  ever  closer  systematization  of  scien- 
tific conceptions  imder  the  form  of  the  order  of 
nature. 

§  50.  At  the  opening  of  this  chapter  it  was 
maintained  that  it  is  a  function  of  philosophy  to 
The  Determi-  Criticise  scicuce  through  its  generating 
Lhnits  of  Nat-  pi"oblem,  or  its  self-imposed  task  viewed 
urai  Science,  ^g  determining  its  province  and  selecting 
its  categories.  The  above  account  of  the  origin 
and  method  of  science  must  suffice  as  a  definition 
of  its  generating  problem,  and  afford  the  basis  of 
our  answer  to  the  question  of  its  limits.  Enough 
has  been  said  to  make  it  clear  that  philosophy  is 
not  in  the  field  of  science,  and  is  therefore  not 
entitled  to  contest  its  result  in  detail  or  even  to 
take  sides  within  the  province  of  its  special  prob- 
lems. Furthermore,  philosophy  should  not  aim  to 
restrain  science  by  the  imposition  of  external  bar- 
riers. Whatever  may  be  said  of  the  sufficiency  of 
its  categories  in  any  region  of  the  world,  that  body 


136  THE  APPROACH  TO  PIHLOSOPHY 

of  truth  of  which  mathematics,  mechanics,  and 
physics  are  the  foundations^  must  be  regarded  as 
a  whole  that  tends  to  be  all-comprehensive  in  its 
own  terms.  There  remains  for  philosophy,  then, 
the  critical  examination  of  these  terms,  and  the 
appraisal  as  a  whole  of  the  truth  that  they  may 
express. 

§  51.  The  impossibility  of  embracing  the  whole 
of  knowledge  within  natural  science  is  due  to  the 
Natural  fact  that  the  latter  is  abstract.     This 

Science  is 

Abstract.  follows  from  the  fact  that  natural  sci- 
ence is  governed  by  a  selective  interest.  The  for- 
mulation of  definitions  and  laws  in  exclusively 
mechanical  terms  is  not  due  to  the  exhaustive  or 
even  preeminent  reality  of  these  properties,  but  to 
their  peculiar  serviceableness  in  a  verifiable  de- 
scription of  events.  ^Natural  science  does  not 
afiirm  that  reality  is  essentially  constituted  of  mat- 
ter, or  essentially  characterized  by  motion;  but  is 
interested  in  the  mechanical  aspect  of  reality,  and 
describes  it  quite  regardless  of  other  evident  as- 
pects and  without  meaning  to  prejudice  them. 
It  is  unfortunately  true  that  the  scientist  has  rarely 
been  clear  in  his  own  mind  on  this  point.  It  is 
only  recently  that  he  has  partially  freed  himself 
from  the  habit  of  construing  liis  terms  as  final  and 


NATURAL  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY       137 

exhaustive.^  This  he  was  able  to  do  even  to  his 
own  satisfaction,  only  by  allowing  loose  rein  to  the 
imagination.  Consider  the  example  of  the  atomic 
theory.  In  order  to  describe  such  occurrences  as 
chemical  combination,  or  changes  in  volume  and 
density,  the  scientist  has  employed  as  a  unit  the 
least  particle,  physically  indivisible  and  qualita- 
tively homogeneous.  Look  for  the  atom  in  the 
body  of  science,  and  you  will  find  it  in  physical 
laws  governing  expansion  and  contraction,  and  in 
chemical  formulas.  There  the  real  responsibility 
of  science  ends.  But  whether  through  the  need  of 
popular  exposition,  or  the  undisciplined  imagina- 
tion of  the  investigator  himself,  atoms  have  figured 
in  the  history  of  thought  as  round  corpusctes  of  a 
grayish  hue  scurrying  hither  and  thither,  and 
armed  with  special  appliances  wherewith  to  lock 
in  molecular  embrace.  Although  this  is  nonsense, 
we  need  not  on  that  account  conclude  that  there 

"  That  the  scientist  still  permits  himself  to  teach  the 
people  a  loose  exoteric  theory  of  reality,  is  proven  by  Pro- 
fessor Ward's  citation  of  instances  in  his  Naturalism  and 
Agnosticism.  So  eminent  a  physicist  as  Lord  Kelvin  is 
quoted  as  follows  :  "  You  can  imagine  particles  of  some- 
thing, the  thing  whose  motion  constitutes  light.  This 
thing  we  call  the  luminiferous  ether.  That  is  the  only 
substance  we  are  confident  of  in  dynamics.  One  thing  we 
are  sure  of,  and  that  is  the  reality  and  substantiality  of  the 
luminiferous  ether."     Vol.  I,  p.  113. 


138  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

are  no  atoms.  There  are  atoms  in  precisely  the 
sense  intended  by  scientific  law,  in  that  the  formu- 
las computed  with  the  aid  of  this  concept  are  true 
of  certain  natural  processes.  The  conception  of 
ether  furnishes  a  similar  case.  Science  is  not  re- 
sponsible for  the  notion  of  a  quivering  gelatinous 
substance  pervading  space,  but  only  for  certain 
laws  that,  e.  g.,  describe  the  velocity  of  light  in 
terms  of  the  vibration.  It  is  true  that  there  is 
such  a  thing  as  ether,  not  as  gratuitously  rounded 
out  by  the  imagination,  with  various  attributes  of 
immediate  experience,  but  just  in  so  far  as  this 
concept  is  employed  in  verified  descriptions  of 
radiation,  magnetism,  or  electricity.  Strictly 
speaking  science  asserts  nothing  about  the  existence 
of  ether,  but  only  about  the  behavior,  e.  g.,  of  light. 
If  true  descriptions  of  this  and  other  phenomena 
are  reached  by  employing  units  of  wave  propaga- 
tion in  an  elastic  medium,  then  ether  is  proved  to 
exist  in  precisely  the  same  sense  that  linear  feet 
are  proved  to  exist,  if  it  be  admitted  that  there 
are  90,000,000  x  5,280  of  them  between  the  earth 
and  the  sun.  And  to  imagine  in  the  one  case  a 
jelly  with  all  the  qualities  of  texture,  color,  and 
the  like,  that  an  individual  object  of  sense  would 
possess,  is  much  tlie  same  as  in  the  other  to  imag- 


NATURAL  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY       139 

ine  the  heavens  filled  with  foot-rules  and  tape- 
measures.  There  is  but  one  safe  procedure  in 
dealing  with  scientific  concepts :  to  regard  them  as 
true  so  far  as  they  describe,  and  no  whit  further. 
To  supplement  the  strict  meaning  which  has  been 
A^erified  and  is  contained  in  the  formularies  of 
science,  with  such  vague  predicates  as  will  suffice 
to  make  entities  of  them,  is  mere  ineptness  and 
confusion  of  thought.  And  it  is  only  such  a  sup- 
plementation that  obscures  their  abstractness.  For 
a  mechanical  description  of  things,  true  as  it  doubt- 
less is,  is  even  more  indubitably  incomplete. 

§  52.  But  though  the  abstractness  involved  in 
scientific  description  is  open  and  deliberate,  we 
The  Meaning    must  come  to   a   more   precise   under- 

of  Abstract- 
ness in  Truth,  standing  of  it,  if  we  are  to  draw  any 

conclusion  as  to  what  it  involves.  In  his  "  Prin- 
ciples of  Human  Knowledge,"  the  English  phi- 
losopher Bishop  Berkeley  raises  the  question  as  to 
the  universal  validity  of  mathematical  demonstra- 
tions. If  we  prove  from  the  image  or  figure  of  an 
isosceles  right  triangle  that  the  sum  of  its  angles 
is  equal  to  two  right  angles,  how  can  we  know 
that  this  proposition  holds  of  all  triangles  ? 

"To  which  I  answer,  that,  though  the  idea  I  have  in 
view  whilst  I  make  the  demonstration  be,  for  instance, 


140  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

that  of  an  isosceles  rectangular  triangle  whose  sides  are 
of  a  determinate  length,  I  may  nevertheless  be  certain 
it  extends  to  all  other  rectilinear  triangles,  of  what  sort 
or  bigness  soever.  And  that  because  neither  the  right 
angle,  nor  the  equality,  nor  determinate  length  of  the 
sides  are  at  all  concerned  in  the  demonstration.  It  is 
true  the  diagram  I  have  in  view  includes  all  these  par- 
ticulars; but  then  there  is  not  the  least  mention  made  of 
them  in  the  proof  of  the  proposition."' 

Of  the  total  conditions  present  in  the  concrete 
picture  of  a  triangle,  one  may  in  one's  calculations 
neglect  as  many  as  one  sees  fit,  and  work  with  the 
remainder.  Then,  if  one  has  clearly  distinguished 
the  conditions  used,  one  may  confidently  assert 
that  whatever  has  been  found  true  of  them  holds 
regardless  of  the  neglected  conditions.  These  may 
be  missing  or  replaced  by  others,  provided  the 
selected  or  (for  any  given  investigation)  essential 
conditions  are  not  affected.  That  which  is  true 
once  is  true  always,  provided  time  is  not  one  of 
its  conditions;  that  which  is  true  in  one  place  is 
true  everyAvhere,  provided  location  is  not  one  of  its 
conditions.  But,  given  any  concrete  situation,  the 
more  numerous  the  conditions  one  ignores  in  one's 
calculations,  the  less  adequate  are  one's  calcula- 
tions to  that  situation.     The  number  of  its  inhabi- 

'  Berkeley:    Principles    of    Human    Knowledge,  Introduc- 
tion.    Edition  of  Eraser,  p.  248. 


NATURAL  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY       141 

tants,  and  any  mathematical  operation  made  with 
that  number,  is  true,  but  only  very  abstractly  true 
of  a  nation.  A  similar  though  less  radical  ab- 
stractness  appertains  to  natural  science.  Simple 
qualities  of  sound  or  color,  and  distinctions  of 
beauty  or  moral  worth,  together  with  many  other 
ingredients  of  actual  experience  attributed  therein 
to  the  objects  of  nature,  are  ig-nored  in  the  me- 
chanical scheme.  There  is  a  substitution  of  cer- 
tain mechanical  arrangements  in  the  case  of  the 
first  group  of  properties,  the  simple  qualities  of 
sense,  so  that  they  may  be  assimilated  to  the  gen- 
eral scheme  of  events,  and  their  occurrence  pre- 
dicted. But  their  intrinsic  qualitative  character 
is  not  reckoned  with,  even  in  psychology,  where 
the  physiological  method  finally  replaces  them  with 
brain  states.  Over  and  above  these  neglected 
properties  of  things  there  remain  the  purposive 
activities  of  thought.  It  is  equally  preposterous 
to  deny  them  and  to  describe  them  in  mechani- 
cal terms.  It  is  plain,  then,  that  natural  science 
calculates  upon  the  basis  of  only  a  fraction  of  the 
conditions  that  present  themselves  in  actual  experi- 
ence. Its  conclusions,  therefore,  though  true  so 
far  as  they  go,  and  they  may  be  abstractly  true  of 
everything,  are  completely  true  of  nothing. 


142  I^HE  Al^PROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

§  53.  Such,  ill  brief,  is  the  general  charge  of 
inadequacy  which  may  be  urged  against  natural 
But  Scientific    scicuce,  uot  in  the  spirit  of  detraction. 

Truth  is  Valid 

for  Reality,  but  for  the  Sake  of  a  more  sound  belief 
concerning  reality.  The  philosopher  falls  into 
error  no  less  radical  than  that  of  the  dogmatic 
scientist,  when  he  charges  the  scientist  with  un- 
truth, and  attaches  to  his  concepts  the  predicate  of 
unreality.  The  fact  that  the  concepts  of  science 
are  selected,  and  only  inadequately  true  of  reality, 
should  not  be  taken  to  mean  that  they  are  sportive 
or  arbitrary.  They  are  not  "  devices  "  or  abbre- 
viations, in  any  sense  that  does  not  attach  to  such 
symbolism  as  all  thought  involves.  Nor  are  they 
merely  "  hypothetical,"  though  like  all  thought 
they  are  subject  to  correction.'^  The  scientist  does 
not  merely  assert  that  the  equation  for  energy  is 
true  if  nature's  capacity  for  work  be  measurable, 
but  that  such  is  actually  the  case.  The  statistician 
does  not  arrive  at  results  contingent  upon  the  sup- 
position that  men  are  numerable,  but  declares  his 
sums  and  averages  to  be  categorically  true.  Simi- 
larly scientific  la"s^s  are  true;  only,  to  be  sure,  so 

^  The  reader  who  cares  to  pursue  this  topic  further  is 
referred  to  the  writer's  discussion  of  "Professor  Ward's 
Philosophy  of  Science"  in  the  Journal  of  Philosophy  Psy- 
chology and  Scientific  Methods,  Vol.  I,  No.  13. 


NATURAL  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY       143 

far  as  they  go,  but  with  no  condition  save  the  con- 
dition that  attaches  to  all  knowledge,  viz.,  that  it 
shall  not  need  correction.  The  philosophy  of  sci- 
ence, therefore,  is  not  the  adversary  of  science,  but 
supervenes  upon  science  in  the  interests  of  the  ideal 
of  final  truth.  No  philosophy  of  science  is  sound 
which  does  not  primarily  seek  by  an  analysis  of 
scientific  concepts  to  understand  science  on  its  own 
grounds.  Philosophy  may  understand  science  bet- 
ter than  science  understands  itself,  but  only  by 
holding  fast  to  the  conviction  of  its  truth,  and  in- 
cluding it  within  whatever  account  of  reality  it 
may  be  able  to  formulate. 

§  54.  Though  philosophy  be  the  most  ancient 
and  most  exalted  of  human  disciplines,  it  is  not 
Relative  infrequently    charged    with    being    the 

Practical 

Value  of         most  Unprofitable.    Science  has  amassed 

Science  and 

Philosophy,  a  fortune  of  information,  which  has 
facilitated  life  and  advanced  civilization.  Is  not 
philosophy,  on  the  other  hand,  all  programme  and 
idle  questioning?  In  the  first  place,  no  question- 
ing is  idle  that  is  logically  possible.  It  is  true 
that  philosophy  shows  her  skill  rather  in  the  ask- 
ing than  in  the  answering  of  questions.  But  the 
formal  pertinence  of  a  question  is  of  the  greatest 
significance.     I^o  valid  though  unanswered  ques- 


144  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

tion  can  have  a  purely  negative  value,  and  especially 
as  respects  the  consistency  or  completeness  of  truth. 
But,  in  the  second  place,  philosophy  with  all  its 
limitations  serves  mankind  as  indispensably  as 
science.  If  science  supplies  the  individual  with 
means  of  self-preservation,  and  the  instruments  of 
achievement,  philosophy  supplies  the  ideals,  or  the 
objects  of  deliberate  construction.  Such  reflection 
as  justifies  the  adoption  of  a  fundamental  life  pur- 
pose is  always  philosophical.  For  every  judgment 
respecting  final  worth  is  a  judgment  sub  specie 
eternitatia.  And  the  urgency  of  life  requires  the 
individual  to  pass  such  judgments.  It  is  true  that 
however  persistently  reflective  he  may  be  in  the 
matter,  his  conclusion  will  be  premature  in  con- 
sideration of  the  amount  of  evidence  logically  de- 
manded for  such  a  judgment.  But  he  must  be  as 
wise  as  he  can,  or  he  will  be  as  foolish  as  conven- 
tionality and  blind  imjDulse  may  impel  him  to  be. 
Philosophy  determines  for  society  what  every  in- 
dividual must  practically  determine  upon  for  him- 
self, the  most  reasonable  plan  of  reality  as  a  whole 
which  the  data  and  reflection  of  an  epoch  can 
afford.  It  is  philosophy's  service  to  mankind  to 
compensate  for  the  enthusiasm  and  concentration 
of  the  specialist,  a  service  needed  in  every  "  pres- 


NATURAL  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY       145 

ent  day."  Apart  from  tlie  philosopher,  public 
opinion  is  the  victim  of  sensationalism,  and  indi- 
vidual opinion  is  further  warped  by  accidental 
propinquity.  It  is  the  function  of  philosophy  to 
interpret  knowledge  for  the  sake  of  a  sober  and 
wise  belief.  The  philosopher  is  the  true  prophet, 
appearing  before  men  in  behalf  of  that  which  is 
finally  the  truth.  He  is  the  spokesman  of  the 
most  considerate  and  comprehensive  reflection  pos- 
sible at  any  stage  in  the  development  of  human 
thought.  Owing  to  a  radical  misconception  of 
function,  the  man  of  science  has  in  these  later  days 
begun  to  regard  himself  as  the  wise  man,  and  to 
teach  the  people.  Popular  materialism  is  the 
logical  outcome  of  this  determination  of  belief  by 
natural  science.  It  may  be  that  this  is  due  as 
much  to  the  indifference  of  the  philosopher  as  to 
the  forwardness  of  the  scientist,  but  in  any  case 
the  result  is  worse  than  conservative  loyalty  to  re- 
ligious tradition.  For  religion  is  corrected  surely 
though  slowly  by  the  whole  order  of  advancing 
truth.  Its  very  inflexibility  makes  it  proof 
against  an  over-emphasis  upon  new  truth.  It  has 
generally  turned  out  in  time  that  the  obstinate 
man  of  religion  was  more  nearly  right  than  the 
adaptable  intellectual  man  of  fashion.     But  phi- 


146  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

losopliy,  as  a  critique  of  science  for  the  sake  of 
faith,  should  provide  the  individual  religious  be- 
liever with  intellectual  enlightenment  and  gentle- 
ness. The  quality,  orderliness,  and  inclusiveness 
of  knowledge,  finally  determine  its  value ;  and  the 
philosopher,  premature  as  his  synthesis  may  some 
day  prove  to  be,  is  the  wisest  man  of  his  own  gen- 
eration. From  him  the  man  of  faith  should  obtain 
such  discipline  of  judgment  as  shall  enable  him 
to  be  fearless  of  advancing  knowledge,  because  ac- 
quainted with  its  scope,  and  so  intellectually  can- 
did with  all  his  visions  and  his  inspirations. 


PART   II 

THE    SPECIAL    PROBLEMS    OF 
PHILOSOPHY 


CHAPTEK    VI 

METAPHYSICS    AND    EPISTEMOLOGY 

§  55.  The  stand-point  and  purpose  of  the  phi- 
losopher define  his  task,  but  they  do  not  necessarily 
The  impossi-    prearrange  the  division  of  it.     That  the 

bility  of  an  ,     .  ,  ,  . 

Absolute  task  IS  a  complex  one,  embracing  many 

Division  of  the         it,  ^  ^  i  •    i  ,1 

Problem  of  Subordinate  problems  which  must  be 
Philosophy,  treated  seriatim,  is  attested  both  by  the 
breadth  of  its  scope  and  the  variety  of  the  inter- 
ests from  which  it  may  be  approached.  But  this 
complexity  is  qualified  by  the  peculiar  importance 
which  here  attaches  to  unity.  That  which  lends 
philosophical  quality  to  any  reflection  is  a  stead- 
fast adherence  to  the  ideals  of  inclusiveness  and 
consistency.  Hence,  though  the  philosopher  must 
of  necessity  occupy  himself  with  subordinate  prob- 
lems, these  cannot  be  completely  isolated  from  one 
another,  and  solved  successively.  Perspective  is 
his  most  indispensable  requisite,  and  he  has  solved 
no  problem  finally  until  he  has  provided  for  the 
solution  of  all.  His  own  peculiar  conceptions  are 
149 


150  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

those  which  order  experience,  and  reconcile  such 
aspects  of  it  as  other  interests  have  distinguished. 
Hence  the  compatibility  of  any  idea  with  all  other 
ideas  is  the  prime  test  of  its  philosophical  suffi- 
ciency. On  these  grounds  it  may  confidently  be 
asserted  that  the  work  of  philosophy  cannot  be 
assigned  by  the  piece  to  different  specialists,  and 
then  assembled.  There  are  no  special  philosoph- 
ical problems  which  can  be  finally  solved  upon 
their  own  merits.  Indeed,  such  problems  could 
never  even  be  named,  for  in  their  discreteness  they 
would  cease  to  be  philosophical. 

The  case  of  metaphysics  and  epistemologij 
affords  an  excellent  illustration.  The  former  of 
these  is  commonly  defined  as  the  theory  of  real- 
ity or  of  first  principles,  the  latter  as  the  theory 
of  knowledge.  But  the  most  distinctive  philosoph- 
ical movement  of  the  nineteenth  century  issues 
from  the  idea  that  knowing  and  being  are  iden- 
tical.^ The  prime  reality  is  defined  as  a  knowing 
mind,  and  the  terms  of  reality  are  interpreted  as 
terms  of  a  cognitive  process.  Ideas  and  logical 
principles  constitute  the  world.  It  is  evident  that 
in  this  Hegelian  philosophy  epistemology  embraces 

'  The    post-Kantian    movement    in    Germany — especially 
in  so  far  as  influenced  by  Hegel.     See  Chap.  XII. 


METAPHYSICS  AND  EPTSTEMOLOGY         I51 

metaphysics.  In  defining  the  relations  of  knowl- 
edge to  its  object,  one  has  already  defined  one's 
fundamental  philosophical  conception,  while  logic, 
as  the  science  of  the  universal  necessities  of 
thought,  will  embrace  the  first  principles  of  real- 
ity. Now,  were  one  to  divide  and  arrange  the  prob- 
lems of  philosophy  upon  this  basis,  it  is  evident 
that  one  would  not  have  deduced  the  arrangement 
from  the  general  problem  of  philosophy,  but  from 
a  single  attempted  solution  of  that  problem.  It 
might  serve  as  an  exposition  of  Hegel,  but  not  as 
a  general  philosophical  programme. 

Another  case  in  point  is  provided  by  the  present- 
day  interest  in  Avhat  is  called  ''  pragmatism."  ^ 
This  doctrine  is  historically  connected  with  Kant's 
principle  of  the  "  primacy  of  the  practical  rea- 
son," in  which  he  maintained  that  the  conscious- 
ness of  duty  is  a  profounder  though  less  scientific 
insight  than  the  knowledge  of  objects.  The  cur- 
rent doctrine  maintains  that  thought  with  its  fruits 
is  an  expression  of  interest,  and  that  the  will  which 
evinces  and  realizes  such  an  interest  is  more  orig- 
inal and  significant  than  that  which  the  thinking 
defines.  Such  a  view  attaches  a  peculiar  impor- 
tance to  the  springs  of  conduct,  and  in  its  more 
*Cf.  §203. 


152  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

systematic  development  ^  has  regarded  ethics  as 
the  true  propsedeiitic  and  proof  of  philosophy.  But 
to  make  ethics  the  key-stone  of  the  arch,  is  to  de- 
fine a  special  philosophical  system ;  for  it  is  the 
very  problem  of  philosophy  to  dispose  the  parts  of 
knowledge  with  a  view  to  systematic  construction. 
The  relation  of  the  provinces  of  metaphysics,  epis- 
temology,  logic,  and  ethics  cannot,  then,  be  defined 
without  entering  these  provinces  and  answering 
the  questions  proper  to  them. 

§  56.  Since  the  above  terms  exist,  however, 
there  can  be  no  doubt  but  that  important  divisions 
The  Depend-   within  the  general  aim  of  philosophy 

ence  of  the 

Order  of  Phil-  have  actually  been  made.      The  inevi- 

osophical 

Problems        tablcuess  of  it  appears  in  the  variety  of 

upon  the  Ini-  i  •    i        i 

tiaiinterest.  the  sourccs  irom  which  that  aim  may 
spring.  The  point  of  departure  will  always  de- 
termine the  emphasis  and  the  application  which 
the  philosophy  receives.  If  philosophy  be  needed 
to  supplement  more  special  interests,  it  will  re- 
ceive a  particular  character  from  whatever  inter- 
est it  so  supplements.  lie  who  approaches  it  from 
a  definite  stand-point  will  find  in  it  primarily  an 
interpretation  of  that  stand-point. 

§  57.   There  are  two  sources  of  the  philosophical 
'£.  g.,  tlie  system  of  Fichte.     Cf.  §  177. 


METAPHYSICS  AND  EPISTEMOLOGY         153 

aim,  which  are  perennial  in  their  human  signifi- 
cance, lie,  firstly,  who  begins  with  the  demands 
Philosophy  as  of  life  and  its  ideals,  looks  to  philoso- 
tionofLife.  phj  for  a  reconciliation  of  these  with 
the  orderly  procedure  of  nature.  His  philosophy 
will  receive  its  form  from  its  illumination  of  life, 
and  it  will  be  an  ethical  or  religions  philosophy. 
Spinoza,  the  great  seventeenth-century  philosopher 
who  justified  mysticism  after  the  manner  of  mathe- 
matics,* displays  this  temper  in  his  philosophy : 

"After  experience  had  taught  me  that  all  the  usual 
surroundings  of  social  life  are  vain  and  futile;  seeing 
that  none  of  the  objects  of  my  fears  contained  in  them- 
selves anything  either  good  or  bad,  except  in  so  far  as 
the  mind  is  affected  by  them,  I  finally  resolved  to  in- 
quire whether  there  might  be  some  real  good  having 
power  to  communicate  itself,  which  would  affect  the 
mind  singly,  to  the  exclusion  of  all  else:  whether,  in  fact, 
there  might  be  anything  of  which  the  discovery  and 
attainment  would  enable  me  to  enjoy  continuous,  su- 
preme, and  unending  happiness.'" 

In  pursuance  of  this  aim,  though  he  deals  with 
the  problem  of  being  in  the  rigorous  logical  fash- 
ion of  his  day,  the  final  words  of  his  great  work 
are,  "  Of  Human  Freedom  "  : 

"Whereas  the  wise  man,  in  so  far  as  he  is  regarded  as 
such,  is  scarcely  at  all  disturbed  in  spirit,  but,  being 

*  See  Chap.  XI. 

'  Spinoza:  On  the  Improvement  of  the  Understanding. 
Translation  by  Elwes,  p.  3. 


154  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

conscious  of  himself,  and  of  God,  and  of  things,  by  a 
certain  eternal  necessity,  never  ceases  to  be,  but  always 
possesses  true  acquiescence  of  his  spirit.  If  the  way  which 
I  have  pointed  out  as  leading  to  this  result  seems  exceed- 
ingly hard,  it  may  nevertheless  be  discovered.  Needs 
must  it  be  hard,  since  it  is  so  seldom  found.  How  would 
it  be  possible  if  salvation  were  ready  to  our  hand,  and 
could  without  great  labor  be  found,  that  it  should  be  by 
almost  all  men  neglected?  But  all  things  excellent  are 
as  difficult  as  they  are  rare."" 

§  58.  On  the  other  hand,  one  who  looks  to  phi- 
losophy for  tlie  extension  and  correction  of  scien- 
Phiiosophyas  tific  knowledge  will  be  primarily  inter- 

the  Extension  .  ,.,,^.. 

of  Science.  cstcd  m  the  philosophical  definition  of 
ultimate  conceptions,  and  in  the  method  wherewith 
such  a  definition  is  obtained.  Thus  the  philosophy 
of  the  scientist  will  tend  to  be  logical  and  meta- 
physical. Sncli  is  the  case  with  Descartes  and 
Leibniz,  who  are  nevertheless  intimately  related  to 
Spinoza  in  the  historical  development  of  philos- 
ophy. 

"  Several  years  have  now  elapsed,"  says  the  former, 
"since  I  first  became  aware  that  I  had  accepted,  even 
from  my  youth,  many  false  opinions  for  true,  and  that 
consequently  what  I  afterward  based  on  such  principles 
was  highly  doubtful;  and  from  that  time  I  was  con- 
vinced of  the  necessity  of  undertaking  once  in  my  life  to 
rid  myself  of  all  the  opinions  I  had  adopted,  and  of  com- 

•  Spinoza:  Ethics,  Part  V,  Proposition  XLII.  Translation 
by  Elwes,  p.  270. 


METAPHYSICS  AND  EPISTEMOLOGY         155 

mencing  anew  the  work  of  building  from  the  foundation, 
if  I  desired  to  estabUsh  a  firm  and  abiding  superstructure 
in  the  sciences."' 

Leibniz's  mind  was  more  predominantly  logical 
even  than  Deseartes's.  He  sought  in  philosophy  a 
supreme  intellectual  synthesis,  a  science  of  the 
universe. 

"  Although,"  he  says  retrospectively,  "  I  am  one  of 
those  who  have  worked  much  at  mathematics,  I  have 
none  the  less  meditated  upon  philosophy  from  my  youth 
up;  for  it  always  seemed  to  me  that  there  was  a  possi- 
biUty  of  establishing  something  solid  in  philosophy  by 
clear  demonstrations.  ...  I  perceived,  after  much  medi- 
tation, that  it  is  impossible  to  find  the  principles  of  a 
real  unity  in  matter  alone,  or  in  that  which  is  only  pas- 
sive, since  it  is  nothing  but  a  collection  or  aggregation  of 
parts  ad  infinitum." ^ 

§  59.  Though  these  types  are  peculiarly  repre- 
sentative, they  are  by  no  means  exhaustive.  There 
The  Historical  ^^Q  as  many  possibilities  of  emphasis  as 

Differentia- 
tion of  the        there  are  incentives  to  philosophical  re- 

Philosophical 

Problem.  flectiou.  It  is  not  possible  to  exhaust 
the  aspects  of  experience  which  may  serve  as  bases 
from  which  such  thought  may  issue,  and  to  which, 
after  its  synthetic  insight,  it  may  return.  But  it 
is  evident  that  such  divisions  of  philosophy  rep- 

^  Descartes:  Meditations,  I.     Translation  by  Veitch,  p.  97. 
*  Leibniz:  New  System  of  the  Nature  of  Substances.    Trans- 
lation by  Latta,  pp.  299,  300. 


156  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

resent  in  their  order,  and  in  the  sharpness  with 
which  they  are  sundered,  the  intellectual  autobiog- 
raphy of  the  individual  philosopher.  There  is  hut 
one  method  by  which  that  which  is  peculiar  either 
to  the  individual,  or  to  the  special  position  which 
he  adopts,  may  be  eliminated.  Though  it  is  im- 
possible to  tabulate  the  empty  programme  of  phi- 
losophy, we  may  name  certain  special  problems  that 
have  appeared  in  its  history.  Since  this  history 
comprehends  the  activities  of  many  individuals,  a 
general  validity  attaches  to  it.  There  has  been, 
moreover,  a  certain  periodicity  in  the  emergence  of 
these  problems,  so  that  it  may  fairly  be  claimed  for 
them  that  they  indicate  inevitable  phases  in  the 
development  of  human  reflection  upon  experience. 
They  represent  a  normal  differentiation  of  interest 
which  the  individual  mind,  in  the  course  of  its 
own  thinking,  tends  to  follow.  It  is  true  that  it 
can  never  be  said  with  assurance  that  any  age  is 
utterly  blind  to  any  aspect  of  experience.  This  is 
obviously  the  case  with  the  practical  and  theoreti- 
cal interests  which  have  just  been  distinguished. 
There  is  no  age  that  does  not  have  some  practical 
consciousness  of  the  world  as  a  whole,  nor  any 
which  does  not  seek  more  or  less  earnestly  to  uni- 
versalize its  science.     But  though  it  compel  us  to 


METAPHYSICS  AND  EPISTEMOLOGY         157 

deal  abstractly  with  historical  epochs,  there  is 
abundant  compensation  in  the  possibility  which 
this  method  affords  of  finding  the  divisions  of 
philosophy  in  the  manifestation  of  the  living  phil- 
osophical spirit. 

§  60.  To  Thales,  one  of  the  Seven  Wise  Men  of 
Greece,  is  commonly  awarded  the  honor  of  being 
Metaphysics  the  founder  of  European  philosophy. 
FundaLfiTtai  ^^  ^^^  dcserve  this  distinction,  it  is  on 
Conception,  account  of  the  question  which  he  raised, 
and  not  on  account  of  the  answer  which  he  gave 
to  it.  Aristotle  informs  us  that  Thales  held 
"  water  "  to  be  "  the  material  cause  of  all  things."  '^ 
This  crude  theory  is  evidently  due  to  an  interest 
in  the  totality  of  things,  an  interest  which  is 
therefore  philosophical.  But  the  interest  of  this 
first  philosopher  has  a  more  definite  character. 
It  looks  toward  the  definition  in  terms  of  some 
single  conception,  of  the  constitution  of  the  world. 
As  a  child  might  conceivably  think  the  moon  to 
be  made  of  green  cheese,  so  philosophy  in  its  child- 
hood thinks  here  of  all  things  as  made  of  water. 
Water  was  a  well-known  substance,  possessing  well- 
known  predicates.  To  define  all  nature  in  terms 
of  it,  was  to  maintain  that  in  spite  of  superficial 
"  Burnet:  Early  Greek  Philosophy,  p.  42. 


158  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

differences,  all  things  have  these  predicates  in  com- 
mon. They  are  the  predicates  which  qualify  for 
reality,  and  compose  a  community  of  nature  from 
"which  all  the  individual  objects  and  events  of 
nature  arise.  The  successors  of  Thales  were  evi- 
dently dissatisfied  with  his  fundamental  concep- 
tion, because  of  its  lack  of  generality.  They 
seized  upon  vaguer  substances  like  air  and  fire,  for 
the  very  definiteness  of  the  nature  of  water  for- 
bids the  identification  of  other  substances  with  it. 
But  what  is  so  obviously  true  of  water  is  scarcely 
less  true  of  air  and  fire ;  and  it  appeared  at  length 
that  only  a  substance  possessing  the  most  general 
characters  of  body,  such  as  shape,  size,  and  mobil- 
ity, could  be  thought  as  truly  primeval  and  univer- 
sal. In  this  wise  a  conception  like  our  modern 
physical  conception  of  matter  came  at  length  into 
vogue.  Now  the  problem  of  which  these  were  all 
tentative  solutions  is,  in  general,  the  problem  of 
metaphysics;  although  this  term  belongs  to  a  later 
era,  arising  only  from  the  accidental  place  of  the 
discussion  of  first  principles  after  physics  in  the 
system  of  Aristotle.  The  attempt  to  secure  a  most 
fundamental  conception  ivhich  attaches  some  defi- 
nite meaning  to  the  reality  including  and  inform- 
ing every  particular  thing,  is  metaphysics. 


IMETAPHYSICS  AND  EPISTEMOLOGY         159 

§  61.  It  must  not  be  supposed  that  metaphysics 
is  dogmatically  committed  to  the  reduction  of  all 
Monism  and  reality  to  a  unity  of  nature.  It  is  quite 
piuraUsm.  consistent  with  its  purpose  that  the 
parts  of  reality  should  be  found  to  compose  a 
group,  or  an  indefinite  multitude  of  irreducibly 
different  entities.  But  it  is  clear  that  even  such 
an  account  of  things  deals  with  what  is  true  of  all 
reality,  and  even  in  acknowledging  the  variety  of 
its  constituents,  attributes  to  them  some  kind  of 
relationship.  The  degree  to  which  such  a  relation- 
ship is  regarded  as  intimate  and  essential,  deter- 
mines the  degree  to  which  any  metaphysical  sys- 
tem is  monistic, ^^  rather  than  'pluralistic.  But  the 
significance  of  this  difference  will  be  better  appre- 
ciated after  a  further  differentiation  of  the  meta- 
physical problem  has  been  noted. 

§  62.  It  has  already  been  suggested  that  the 
test  of  Thales's  conception  lay  in  the  possibility  of 
Ontology  and  deriving  nature  from  it.  A  world  prin- 
con«m  Being  ciple  must  be  fruitful.  I^ow  an  ab- 
and  Process,  g^^.^^^  distinction  has  prevailed  more  or 
less  persistently  in  metaphysics,  between  the  gen- 
eral definition  of  being,  called  ontology,  and  the 

"No  little   ambiguity  attaches  to    the    term   "monism" 
in  current  usage,  because  of  its  appropriation  by  those  who 


160  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

study  of  the  processes  wherewith  being  is  divided 
into  things  and  events.  This  latter  study  has  to 
do  primarily  with  the  details  of  experience  enu- 
merated and  systematized  by  the  natural  sciences. 
To  reconcile  these^  or  the  course  of  nature,  with 
the  fundamental  definition  of  being,  is  the  prob- 
lem of  cosmology.  Cosmology  is  the  construing  of 
the  prima  facie  reality  in  terms  of  the  essential 
reality.  It  is  the  proof  and  the  explanation  of 
ontology.  Since  the  most  familiar  part  of  the 
prima  facie  reality,  the  part  almost  exclusively  no- 
ticed by  the  naive  mind,  is  embraced  within  the 
field  of  the  physical  sciences,  the  term  cosmology 
has  come  more  definitely  to  signify  the  philosophy 
of  nature.  It  embraces  such  an  examination  of 
space,  time,  matter,  causality,  etc.,  as  seeks  to 
answer  the  most  general  questions  about  them,  and 
provide  for  them  in  the  world  thought  of  as  most 
profoundly  real.  Such  a  study  receives  its  philo- 
sophical character  from  its  affiliation  with  ontol- 
ogy, as  the  latter  would  find  its  application  in 
cosmology. 

§  63.  But  in  addition  to  the  consideration  of 

maintain  that  the  universe  is  unitary  and  homogeneous  in 
physical  terms  (cf.  §  108).  It  sliould  properly  be  used 
to  emphasize  the  unity  of  the  world  in  any  terms. 


METAPHYSICS  AND  EPISTEMOLOGY         IGl 

the  various  parts  of  nature,  cosmology  has  com- 
Mechanicai  monly  dealt  with  a  radical  and  far- 
"^"^Owmoicf-'  reaching  alternative  that  appeared  at 
*^'"-  the  very   dawn   of  metaphysics.     Dif- 

ferences may  ari&"&  within  a  world  constituted  of 
a  single  substance  or  a  small  group  of  ultimate 
substances,  by  changes  in  the  relative  position  and 
grouping  of  the  parts.  Hence  the  virtue  of  the 
conception  of  motion.  The  theory  which  explains 
all  differences  by  motions  of  the  parts  of  a  quali- 
tatively simple  world,  is  called  mechanism.  An- 
other source  of  change  familiar  to  naive  experi- 
ence is  will,  or  the  action  of  living  creatures. 
According  to  the  mechanical  theory,  changes  occur 
on  account  of  the  natural  motions  of  the  parts 
of  matter;  according  to  the  latter  or  teleological 
conception,  changes  are  made  hy  a  formative 
agency  directed  to  some  end.  Among  the  early 
Greek  philosophers,  Leucippus  was  an  exponent  of 
mechanism. 

"He  says  that  the  worlds  arise  when  many  bodies 
are  collected  together  into  the  mighty  void  from  Uie 
surrounding  space  and  rush  together.  They  come  into 
collision,  and  those  which  are  of  similar  shape  and  like 
form  become  entangled,  and  from  their  entanglement 
the  heavenly  bodies  arise." '^ 

"  Burnet:  Op.  cit.,  p.  358. 


162  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

Anaxagoras,  on  the  other  hand,  was  famed  for  his 
doctrine  of  the  Nous,  or  Intelligence,  to  whose  di- 
rection he  attributed  the  whole  process  of  the  world. 
The  following  is  translated  from  extant  fragments 
of  his  book,  "  Trepl  ^t/o-ew?"  : 

"  And  Nous  had  power  over  the  whole  revolution,  so 
that  it  began  to  revolve  in  the  beginning.  And  it  began 
to  revolve  first  from  a  small  beginning;  but  the  revolu- 
tion now  extends  over  a  larger  space,  and  will  extend 
over  a  larger  still.  And  all  the  things  that  are  mingled 
together  and  separated  off  and  distinguished  are  all 
known  by  the  Nous.  And  Nous  set  in  order  all  things 
that  were  to  be  and  that  were,  and  all  things  that  are 
not  now  and  that  are,  and  this  revolution  in  which  now 
revolve  the  stars  and  the  sun  and  the  moon,  and  the  air 
and  the  ether  that  are  separated  off."  " 

§  64.  It  is  clear,  furthermore,  that  the  doctrine 
of  Anaxagoras  not  only  names  a  distinct  kind  of 
DuaUsm.  causc,  but  also  ascribes  to  it  an  inde- 
pendence and  intrinsic  importance  that  do  not 
belong  to  motion.  Whereas  motion  is  a  property 
of  matter,  intelligence  is  an  originative  power 
Avorking  out  purposes  of  its  o\vn  choosing.  Hence 
we  have  here  to  do  with  a  new  ontology.  If  we 
construe  ultimate  being  in  terms  of  mind,  we  have 
a  definite  substitute  for  the  physical  theories  out- 
lined above.  Such  a  theory  is  scarcely  to  be  at- 
tributed to  any  Greek  philosopher  of  the  early 
"  Burnet:  Op.  cil.,  p.  284. 


METAPHYSICS  AND  EPISTEMOLOGY         163 

period ;  it  belongs  to  a  more  sophisticated  stage  in 
the  development  of  thought,  after  the  rise  of  the 
problem  of  epistemology.  But  Anaxagoras's  sharp 
distinction  between  the  material  of  the  world  on 
the  one  hand,  and  the  author  of  its  order  and  evo- 
lution on  the  other,  is  in  itself  worthy  of  notice. 
It  contains  the  germ  of  a  recurrent  philosophical 
dualism,  which  differs  from  pluralism  in  that  it 
finds  two  and  only  two  fundamental  divisions  of 
being,  the  physical,  material,  or  potential  on  the 
one  hand,  and  the  mental,  formal,  or  ideal  on  the 
other. 

§  65.  Finally,  the  alternative  possibilities  which 
these  cosmological  considerations  introduce,  bear 
The  New  directly  upon  the  general  question  of 
Mo^nfand  ^^^^  interdependence  of  the  parts  of  the 
piuraUsm.  -world,  a  qucstion  which  has  already 
appeared  as  pertinent  in  ontology.  Monism  and 
pluralism  now  obtain  a  new  meaning.  Where  the 
world  process  is  informed  with  some  singleness 
of  plan,  as  teleology  proposes,  the  parts  are  recip- 
rocally necessary,  and  inseparable  from  the  unity. 
Where,  on  the  other  hand,  the  processes  are  random 
and  reciprocally  fortuitous,  as  Leucippus  proposes, 
the  world  as  a  whole  is  an  aggregate  rather  than  a 
unity.     In  this  way  uniformity  in  kind  of  being 


164  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

may  prevail  in  a  world  the  relations  of  whose 
parts  are  due  to  chance,  while  diversity  in  kind  of 
being  may  prevail  in  a  world  knit  together  by  some 
thorough-going  plan  of  organization.  Thus  mon- 
ism and  pluralism  are  conceptions  as  proper  to  cos- 
mology as  to  ontology. 

But  enough  has  been  said  to  demonstrate  the 
interdependence  of  ontology  and  cosmology,  of  the 
theory  of  being  and  the  theory  of  differentiation 
and  process.  Such  problems  can  be  only  abstractly 
sundered,  and  the  distinctive  character  of  any 
metaphysical  system  will  usually  consist  in  some 
theory  determining  their  relation.  Philosophy 
returns  to  these  metaphysical  problems  with  its 
thought  enriched  and  its  method  complicated,  after 
becoming  thoroughly  alive  to  the  problems  of 
epistemology,  logic,  and  ethics. 

§  66.  Epistemology  is  the  theory  of  the  possihil- 
ity  of  knowledge,  and  issues  from  criticism  and 
Epistemology    sccpticism.     If  we  rcvcrt  again  to  the 

Seeks  to  Un- 
derstand the     history  of  Greek  philosophy,  we  find  a 

Possibility  of 

Knowledge.  first  period  of  enterprising  speculation 
giving  place  to  a  second  period  of  hesitancy  and 
doubt.  This  phase  of  thought  occurs  simulta- 
neously with  the  brilliantly  humanistic  age  of 
Pericles,  and  it  is  undoubtedly  true  that  energy  is 


METAPHYSICS  AND  EPISTEMOLOGY         165 

withdrawn  from  speculation  largely  for  the  sake 
of  expending  it  in  the  more  lively  and  engaging 
pursuits  of  politics  and  art.  But  there  are  patent 
reasons  within  the  sphere  of  philosophy  itself  for 
entailment  of  activity  and  taking  of  stock.  For 
three  centuries  men  have  taken  their  philosophical 
powers  for  granted,  and  used  them  without  ques- 
tioning them.  Repeated  attacks  upon  the  prob- 
lem of  reality  have  resulted  in  no  concensus  of 
opinion,  but  only  in  a  disagreement  among  the 
wise  men  themselves.  A  great  variety  of  mere 
theories  has  been  substituted  for  the  old  unanimity 
of  religious  tradition  and  practical  life.  It  is 
natural  under  these  circumstances  to  infer  that 
in  philosophy  man  has  overreached  himself.  He 
would  more  profitably  busy  himself  with  affairs 
that  belong  to  his  own  sphere,  and  find  a  basis  for 
life  in  his  immediate  relations  with  his  fellows. 
The  sophists,  learned  in  tradition,  and  skilled  in 
disputation,  but  for  the  most  jDart  entirely  lacking 
in  originality,  are  the  new  prophets.  As  teachers 
of  rhetoric  and  morals,  they  represent  the  prac- 
tical and  secular  spirit  of  their  age ;  while  in  their 
avoidance  of  speculation,  and  their  critical  justifi- 
cation of  that  course,  they  express  its  sceptical 
philosophy. 


166  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

§  67.  In  their  self-justification  certain  of  the 
sophists  attached  themselves  to  a  definite  doctrine 
Scepticism,  maintained  by  those  of  their  prede- 
and^^gnosti-  ccssors  and  contemporaries  who  were 
"^™"  atomists,    or    followers    of    that    same 

Leucippiis  whom  we  have  quoted.  This  doctrine 
was  the  result  of  an  attempt  to  construe  perception 
in  terms  of  the  motion  of  atoms.  Outer  objects 
were  said  to  give  off  fine  particles  which,  through 
the  mediation  of  the  sense  organs,  impinged  upon 
the  soul-atom.  But  it  was  evident  even  to  the  early- 
exponents  of  this  theory  that  according  to  such 
an  account,  each  perceiver  is  relegated  to  a  world 
peculiar  to  his  own  stand-point.  His  perception 
informs  him  concerning  his  own  states  as  affected 
by  things,  rather  than  concerning  the  things  them- 
selves. Upon  this  ground  the  great  sophist  Pro- 
tagoras is  said  to  have  based  his  dictum:  Hdvrcov 
'X^prj/jLarav  fMerpov  avOpwirof;, — "  Man  is  the  measure 
of  all  things."  This  is  the  classic  statement  of  the 
doctrine  of  relativity.  But  we  have  now  entered 
into  the  province  of  epistemology,  and  various 
alternatives  confront  us.  Reduce  thought  to  per- 
ception, define  perception  as  relative  to  each  indi- 
vidual, and  you  arrive  at  scepticism,  or  the  denial 
of  the  possibility  of  valid  Inowledge.     Plato  ex- 


METAPHYSICS  AND  EPISTEMOLOGY         167 

pounds  this  consequence  in  the  well-known  discus- 
sion of  Protagoras  that  occurs  in  the  "  Thesetetus." 

"I  am  charmed  with  his  doctrine,  that  what  appears 
is  to  each  one,  but  I  wonder  that  he  did  not  begin  his 
book  on  Truth  with  a  declaration  that  a  pig  or  a  dog- 
faced  baboon,  or  some  other  yet  stranger  monster  which 
has  sensation,  is  the  measure  of  all  things;  then  he  might 
have  shown  a  magnificent  contempt  for  our  opinion  of 
him  by  informing  us  at  the  outset  that  while  we  were 
reverencing  him  like  a  God  for  his  wisdom,  he  was  no 
better  than  a  tadpole,  not  to  speak  of  his  fellow-men — 
would  not  this  have  produced  an  overpowering  effect? 
For  if  truth  is  only  sensation,  and  no  man  can  discern 
another's  feelings  better  than  he,  or  has  any  superior 
right  to  determine  whether  his  opinion  is  true  or  false, 
but  each,  as  we  have  several  times  repeated,  is  to  himself 
the  sole  judge,  and  everything  that  he  judges  is  true  and 
right,  why,  my  friend,  should  Protagoras  be  preferred 
to  the  place  of  wisdom  and  instruction,  and  deserve  to  be 
well  paid,  and  we  poor  ignoramuses  have  to  go  to  him, 
if  each  one  is  the  measure  of  his  own  wisdom?  .  .  . 
The  attempt  to  supervise  or  refute  the  notions  or  opinions 
of  others  would  be  a  tedious  and  enormous  piece  of  folly, 
if  to  each  man  his  own  are  right;  and  this  must  be  the 
case  if  Protagoras's  Truth  is  the  real  truth,  and  the 
philosopher  is  not  merely  amusing  himself  by  giving 
oracles  out  of  the  shrine  of  his  book."  " 

This  is  the  full  swing  of  the  pendulum  from  dog- 
matism, or  the  uncritical  conviction  of  truth.  A 
modified  form  of  scepticism  has  been  developed  in 
these  later  days  imder  the  influence  of  natural  sci- 

"  Plato:  Theceteius,  161.  Translation  by  Jowett.  Ref- 
erences to  Plato  are  to  the  marginal  paging. 


168  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

ence,  and  is  called  agnosticism  or  positivism.  It 
accepts  the  Protagorean  doctrine  only  in  the  sense 
of  attributing  to  human  knowledge  as  a  whole  an 
incapacity  for  exceeding  the  range  of  perception. 
Beyond  this  realm  of  natural  science,  where 
theories  can  be  sensibly  verified,  lies  the  unknow- 
able realm,  more  real,  but  forever  inaccessible. 

§  68.  It  is  important  to  note  that  both  scepti- 
cism and  agnosticism  agree  in  regarding  percep- 
The  Source      tiou  OS  the  essentiol  factor  in  knowledge. 

and  Criterion      c^       c  i  i     i         • 

of  Knowledge  oo  lar  at  any  rate  as  our  knowledge  is 

According  to  ,       ,  .„         .  £  -i     - 

Empiricism      conccmed,  the  certmcation  oi  being  con- 

and  Rational-       •    ,        .  •       i  m-i  tt-  i     i 

jsnj  sists   m   perceivability.     knowledge  is 

Mysticism.       cocxtensive    with    actual    and    possible 

human  experience.  This  account  of  the  source 
and  criterion  of  knowledge  is  called  empiricism, 
in  distinction  from  the  counter-theory  of  ration- 
alism,. 

The  rationalistic  motive  was  a  quickening  in- 
fluence in  Greek  philosophy  long  before  it  became 
deliberate  and  conspicuous  in  Socrates  and  Plato. 
Parmenides,  founder  of  the  Eleatic  School,  has 
left  behind  him  ii  poem  divided  into  two  parts: 
"  The  Way  of  Ti-uth  "  and  "  The  Way  of  Opin- 
ion." ^*  In  the  first  of  these  he  expounds  his 
"  Burnet:  Early  Greek  Philuauphy,  pp.  184,  187. 


METAPHYSICS  AND  EPISTEMOLOGY         169 

esoteric  philosophy,  which  is  a  definition  of  being 
established  by  dialectical  reasoning.  He  finds  that 
being  must  be  single,  eternal,  and  changeless, 
because  otherwise  it  cannot  be  thought  and  defined 
without  contradiction.  The  method  which  Par- 
raenides  here  employs  presupposes  that  knowledge 
consists  in  understanding  rather  than  perception. 
Indeed,  he  regards  the  fact  that  the  world  of  the 
senses  is  manifold  and  mutable  as  of  little  conse- 
quence to  the  wise  man.  The  world  of  sense  is 
the  province  of  vulgar  opinion,  while  that  of  rea- 
son is  the  absolute  truth  revealed  only  to  the  phi- 
losopher. The  truth  has  no  concern  with  appear- 
ance, but  is  answerable  only  to  the  test  of 
rationality.  Tliat  world  is  real  which  one  is  able 
by  thinJcing  to  make  intelligihle.  The  world  is 
what  a  world  must  be  in  order  to  be  possible  at  all, 
and  the  philosopher  can  deduce  it  directly  from  the 
very  conditions  of  thought  which  it  must  satisfy. 
He  who  would  know  reality  may  disregard  what 
seems  to  be,  provided  he  can  by  reflective  analysis 
discover  certain  general  necessities  to  which  being 
must  conform.  This  is  rationalism  in  its  extreme 
form. 

The  rationalism  of  Socrates  was  more  moderate, 
as  it  was  more  fruitful  than  that  of  Parmenides. 


170  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

As  is  well  known,  Socrates  composed  no  philo- 
sophical books,  but  sought  to  inculcate  wisdom  in 
his  teaching  and  conversation.  His  method  of 
inculcating  wisdom  was  to  evoke  it  in  his  inter- 
locutor by  making  him  considerate  of  the  meaning 
of  his  speech.  Through  his  own  questions  he 
sought  to  arouse  the  questioning  spirit,  which 
should  weigh  the  import  of  words,  and  be  satis- 
fied with  nothing  short  of  a  definite  and  consistent 
judgment.  In  the  Platonic  dialogues  the  Socratic 
method  obtains  a  place  in  literature.  In  the 
"  Theaetetus,"  which  is,  perhaps,  the  greatest  of  all 
epistemological  treatises,  Socrates  is  represented  as 
likening  his  vocation  to  that  of  the  midwife. 

"Well,  my  art  of  midwifery  is  in  most  respects  like 
theirs,  but  differs  in  that  I  attend  men,  and  not  women, 
and  I  look  after  their  souls  when  they  are  in  labor,  and 
not  after  their  bodies:  and  the  triumph  of  my  art  is  in 
thoroughly  examining  whether  the  thought  which  the 
mind  of  the  young  man  brings  forth  is  a  false  idol  or  a 
noble  and  true  birth.  And,  like  the  midwives,  I  am 
barren,  and  the  reproach  which  is  often  made  against 
me,  that  I  ask  questions  of  others  and  have  not  the  wit 
to  answer  them  myself,  is  very  just;  the  reason  is  that 
the  god  compels  me  to  be  a  midwife,  but  does  not  allow 
me  to  bring  forth.  And  therefore  I  am  not  myself  at  all 
wise,  nor  have  I  anything  to  show  which  is  the  invention 
or  birth  of  my  own  soul,  but  those  who  converse  with 
me   profit.    ...    It   is  quite  clear   that   they  never 


METAPHYSICS  AND  EPISTEMOLOGY         171 

learned  anything  from  me;  the  many  fine  discoveries  to 
which  they  chng  are  of  their  own  making."** 

The  principle  underlying  this  method  is  the  insist- 
ence that  a  proposition,  to  be  true  of  reality,  must 
at  least  bespeak  a  mind  that  is  true  to  itself,  in- 
ternally luminous,  and  free  from  contradiction. 
That  which  is  to  me  nothing  that  I  can  express  in 
form  that  will  convey  precise  meaning  and  bear 
analysis,  is  so  far  nothing  at  all.  Being  is  not, 
as  the  empiricist  would  have  it,  ready  at  hand, 
ours  for  the  looking,  but  is  the  fruit  of  critical 
reflection.  Only  reason,  overcoming  the  relativity 
of  perception,  and  the  chaos  of  popular  opinion, 
can  lay  hold  on  the  universal  truth. 

A  very  interesting  tendency  to  clothe  the  articu- 
lations of  thought  with  the  immediacy  of  percep- 
tion is  exhibited  in  mysticism,  which  attributes  the 
highest  cognitive  power  to  an  experience  that  tran- 
scends thought,  an  ineffable  insight  that  is  the  oc- 
casional reward  of  thought  and  virtuous  living. 
This  theory  would  seem  to  owe  its  great  vigor  to 
the  fact  that  it  promises  to  unite  the  universality 
of  the  rational  object  with  the  vivid  presence  of 
the  empirical  object,  though  it  sacrifices  the  defi- 
nite content  of  both.     The  mystic,  empiricist,  and 

"  Plato:  Thecetetus,  150  B.     Translation  by  Jowett. 


172  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

rationalist  are  in  these  several  ways  led  to  revise 
their  metaphysics  upon  the  basis  of  their  episte- 
mology,  or  to  define  reality  in  terms  dictated  by 
the  means  of  knowing  it. 

§  69.  But  within  the  general  field  of  episte- 
molog)^  there  has  arisen  another  issue  of  even 
The  Relation    gi'eatcr  significance  in  its  bearing:  upon 

of  Knowledge  f  t>       1" 

to  its  Object     mctaphysics.     The    first    issue,    as    we 

According  to 

Realism,  and    havc  sccn,  has  reference  to  the  criterion 

the  Represent- 

ative  Theory,  of  knowledge,  to  the  possibility  of  ar- 
riving at  certainty  about  reality,  and  the  choice  of 
means  to  that  end.  A  second  question  arises,  con- 
cerning the  relation  between  the  knowledge  and  its 
object  or  that  which  is  known.  This  problem 
does  not  at  first  appear  as  an  epistemological  diffi- 
culty, but  is  due  to  the  emphasis  which  the  moral 
and  religious  interests  of  men  give  to  the  concep- 
tion of  the  self.  My  knowing  is  a  part  of  me,  a 
function  of  that  soul  whose  welfare  and  eternal 
happiness  I  am  seeking  to  secure.  Indeed,  my 
knowing  is,  so  the  wise  men  have  always  taught, 
the  greatest  of  my  prerogatives.  Wisdom  apper- 
tains to  the  philosopher,  as  folly  to  the  fool.  But 
though  my  knowledge  be  a  part  of  me,  and  in  me, 
the  same  cannot,  lightly  at  any  rate,  be  said  of 
what  T  know.     It  would  seem   that   I  must  dis- 


METAPHYSICS  AND  EPISTEMOLOGY         173 

tinguisli  between  the  knowledge,  which  is  my  act 
or  state,  an  event  in  my  life,  and  the  known,  which 
is  object,  and  belongs  to  the  context  of  the  outer 
world.  The  ohject  of  knowledge  would  then  be 
quite  independent  of  the  circumstance  that  I  Jcnow 
it.  This  theory  has  acquired  the  name  of  real- 
ism,^^  and  is  evidently  as  close  to  common  sense 
as  any  epistemological  doctrine  can  be  said  to  be. 
If  the  knowledge  consists  in  some  sign  or  symbol 
which  in  my  mind  stands  for  the  object,  but  is 

"Much  ambiguity  attaches  to  the  terms  "reaUsm"  and 
"idealism"  in  current  usage.  The  first  had  at  one  time  in 
the  history  of  philosophy  a  much  narrower  meaning  than 
that  which  it  now  possesses.  It  was  used  to  apply  to  those 
who,  after  Plato,  believed  in  the  independent  reality  of  ideas, 
universals,  or  general  natures.  Realists  in  this  sense  were 
opposed  to  nominalists  and  conceptualists.  Nominalism  main- 
tained the  exclusive  reality  of  individual  substances,  and  re- 
duced ideas  to  particular  signs  having,  like  the  name,  a  purely 
symbolical  or  descriptive  value.  Conceptualism  sought  to 
unite  realism  and  nominalism  through  the  conception  of 
mind,  or  an  individual  substance  whose  meanings  may  pos- 
sess universal  validity.  Though  this  dispute  was  of  funda- 
mental importance  throughout  the  mediaeval  period,  the 
issues  involved  have  now  been  restated.  Realism  in  the  old 
sense  will,  if  held,  come  within  the  scope  of  the  broader 
epistemological  realism  defined  above.  Nominalism  is  cov- 
ered by  empirical  tendencies,  and  conceptualism  by  modem 
idealism. 

The  term  idealism  is  sometimes  applied  to  Plato  on  ac- 
count of  his  designation  of  ideas  as  the  ultimate  realities. 
This  would  be  a  natural  use  of  the  term,  but  in  our  own 
day  it  has  become  inseparably  associated  with  the  doctrine 


174  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

quite  other  than  tlie  object,  realism  is  given  the 
form  known  as  the  representative  theory.  This 
theory  is  due  to  a  radical  distinction  between  the 
inner  world  of  consciousness  and  the  outer  world  of 
things,  whereby  in  knowledge  the  outer  object  re- 
quires a  substitute  that  is  qualified  to  belong  to 
the  inner  world.  Where,  on  the  other  hand,  no 
specific  and  exclusive  nature  is  attributed  to  the 
inner  world,  realism  may  flourish  without  the  rep- 
resentative theory.  In  such  a  case  the  object  would 
be  regarded  as  itself  capable  of  entering  into  any 
number  of  individual  experiences  or  of  remaining 
outside  them  all,  and  without  on  either  account  for- 
feiting its  identity.  This  view  was  taken  for 
granted  by  Plato,  but  is  elaborately  defended  in 
our  own  day.  During  the  intervening  period 
epistemology  has  been  largely  occupied  with  diffi- 
culties inherent  in  the  representative  theory,  and 

which  attributes  to  being  a  dependence  upon  the  activity 
of  mind.  It  is  of  the  utmost  importance  to  keep  these  two 
meanings  clear.  In  the  preferred  sense  Plato  is  a  realist, 
and  so  opposed  to  idealism. 

The  term  idealism  is  further  confused  on  account  of  its 
employment  in  literature  and  common  speech  to  denote 
the  control  of  ideals.  Although  this  is  a  kindred  meaning, 
the  student  of  philosophy  will  gain  little  or  no  help  from  it, 
and  will  avoid  confusion  if  he  distinguishes  the  term  in  its 
technical  use  and  permits  it  in  that  capacity  to  acquire  an 
independent  meaning. 


METAPHYSICS  AND  EPISTEMOLOGY         175 

from  that  discussion  there  has  emerged  the  theory 
of  idealism, ^'^  the  great  rival  theory  to  that  of 
realism. 

§  70.  The  representative  theory  contains  at 
least  one  obvious  difficulty.  If  the  thinker  be 
The  Relation   confined  to  his  ideas,  and  if  the  reality 

of  Knowledge 

to  its  Object     bc  at  the  same  time  beyond  these  ideas, 

According  to  .  «  . 

Idealism.  liow  Can  he  cvcr  verify  their  report  ? 
Indeed,  what  can  it  mean  that  an  idea  should  be 
true  of  that  which  belongs  to  a  wholly  different 
category  ?  How  under  such  circumstances  can 
that  which  is  a  part  of  the  idea  be  attributed 
with  any  certainty  to  the  object?  Once  grant 
that  you  know  only  your  ideas,  and  the  object 
reduces  to  an  unkno^vn  x,  which  you  retain  to 
account  for  the  outward  pointing  or  reference  of 
the  ideas,  but  which  is  not  missed  if  neglected. 
The  obvious  though  radical  theory  of  idealism  is 
almost  inevitably  the  next  step.  Why  assume 
that  there  is  any  object  other  than  the  state  of 
mind,  since  all  positive  content  belongs  to  that 
realm?  The  eighteenth  century  English  philos- 
opher, Bishop  Berkeley,  was  accused  by  his  con- 
temporaries of  wilful  eccentricity,  and  even  mad- 
ness, for  his  boldness  in  accepting  this  argument 
and  drawing  this  conclusion : 

"  ^dQuote,  p.  173. 


176  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

"The  table  I  write  on  I  say  exists;  that  is,  I  see  and 
feel  it:  and  if  I  were  out  of  my  study  I  should  say  it 
existed;  meaning  thereby  that  if  I  was  in  my  study  I 
might  perceive  it,  or  that  some  other  spirit  actually  does 
perceive  it.  There  was  an  odor — that  is,  it  was  smelt; 
there  was  a  sound — that  is,  it  was  heard;  a  color  or 
figure,  and  it  was  perceived  by  sight  or  touch.  This  is 
all  that  I  can  understand  by  these  and  the  like  expres- 
sions. For  as  to  what  is  said  of  the  absolute  existence 
of  unthinking  things,  without  any  relation  to  their  being 
perceived,  that  is  to  me  perfectly  unintelHgible.  Their 
esse  is  percipi ;  nor  is  it  possible  that  they  should  have 
any  existence  out  of  the  minds  or  thinking  thing  which 
perceives  them."** 

§  71.  In  this  paragraph  Berkeley  maintains 
that  it  is  essential  to  things,  or  at  any  rate  to  their 
Phenomenal-  qualities,  that  they  he  perceived.  This 
ism'  Ind'*"^ "  principlc  when  expressed  as  an  episte- 
Panpsychism.  n^ological  or  metaphysical  generaliza- 
tion, is  called  phenomenalism.  But  in  another 
phase  of  his  thought  Berkeley  emphasizes  the 
perceiver,  or  spirit.  The  theory  which  maintains 
that  the  only  real  substances  are  these  active  selves, 
with  their  powers  and  their  states,  has  been  called 
somewhat  vaguely  by  the  name  of  spiritualism.^'-^ 
Philosophically  it  shows  a  strong  tendency  to  de- 

"  Berkeley:  Principles  of  Human  Knowledge,  Part  I, 
Fraser's  edition,  p.  2.59. 

*'  To  be  distinguished  from  the  religious  sect  which  bears 
the  same  name. 


METAPHYSICS  AND  EPISTEMOLOGY         177 

velop  into  either  jmnpsychism  or  transcendental- 
ism. The  former  is  radically  empirical.  Its 
classic  representative  is  the  German  pessimist 
Schopenhauer,  who  defined  reality  in  terms  of  will 
because  that  term  signified  to  him  most  eloquently 
the  directly  felt  nature  of  the  self.  This  imme- 
diate revelation  of  the  true  inwardness  of  being 
serves  as  the  key  to  an  "  intuitive  interpretation  " 
of  the  gradations  of  nature,  and  will  finally  awaken 
a  sense  of  the  presence  of  the  universal  Will. 

§  72.  Transcendentalism,  or  absolute  idealism, 
on  the  other  hand,  emphasizes  the  rational  activity, 
Transcenden-  rather  than  the  bare  subjectivity,  of  the 
AbsoTute**'  ^^^f'  The  term  "  transcendental  "  has 
ideaUsm.  bccome  associatcd  with  this  type  of 
idealism  through  Kant,  whose  favorite  form  of 
argument,  the  "  transcendental  deduction,"  was  an 
analysis  of  experience  with  a  view  to  discovering 
the  categories,  or  formal  principles  of  thought, 
implied  in  its  meaning.  From  the  Kantian 
method  arose  the  conception  of  a  standard  or  abso- 
lute mind  for  the  standard  experience.  This  mind 
is  transcendental  not  in  the  sense  of  being  alien, 
but  in  the  sense  of  exceeding  the  human  mind  in 
the  direction  of  what  this  means  and  strives  to  be. 
It  is  the  ideal  or  normal  mind,  in  which  the  true 


17S  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

reality  is  contained,  with  all  the  chaos  of  finite 
experience  compounded  and  redeemed.  There  is 
no  heing  but  the  absolute,  the  one  all-inclusive 
spiritual  life,  in  whom  all  things  are  inherent,  and 
M'hose  perfection  is  the  virtual  implication  of  all 
purposive  activities. 

"  God's  life  .  .  .  sees  the  one  plan  fulfilled 
through  all  the  manifold  lives,  the  single  consciousness 
winning  its  purpose  by  Airtue  of  all  the  ideas,  of  all  the 
individual  selves,  and  of  all  the  lives.  No  finite  view  is 
wholly  illusory.  Every  finite  intent  taken  precisely  in 
its  wholeness  is  fulfilled  in  the  Absolute.  The  least  life 
is  not  neglected,  the  most  fleeting  act  is  a  recognized 
part  of  the  world's  meaning.  You  are  for  the  divine 
view  all  that  you  know  yourself  at  this  instant  to  be. 
But  you  are  also  infinitely  more.  The  preciousness  of 
your  present  purposes  to  yourself  is  only  a  hint  of  that 
preciousness  which  in  the  end  links  their  meaning  to  the 
entire  realm  of  Being.  "^° 

The  fruitfulness  of  the  philosopher's  reflective 
doubt  concerning  his  own  powers  is  now  evident. 
Problems  are  raised  which  are  not  merely  urgent 
in  themselves,  but  which  present  wholly  new  alter- 
natives to  the  metaphysician.  Rationalism  and 
empiricism,  realism  and  idealism,  are  doctrines 
which,  though  springing  from  the  cpistemological 
query  concerning  the  possibility  of  knowledge,  may 

^  Quoted  from  Professor  Josiah  Royce's  The  World  and 
the  Individual,  First  Series,  pp.  426-427. 


METAPHYSICS  AxND  EPISTEMOLOGY         179 

determine  an  entire  philosophical  system.  They 
bear  upon  every  question  of  metaphysics,  whether 
the  fundamental  conception  of  being,  or  the  prob- 
lems of  the  world's  unity,  origin,  and  significance 
for  human  life. 


CHAPTER    VII 

THE  NORMATIVE  SCIENCES  AND  THE  PROBLEMS  OF 
RELIGION 

§  73.  There  are  three  sets  of  problems  whose 
general  philosophical  importance  depends  upon  the 
The  Normative  pl^ce  which  metaplijsics  assigns  to  the 
Sciences.  human  critical  faculties.  Man  passes 
judgment  upon  that  which  claims  to  be  true,  beau- 
tiful, or  good,  thus  referring  to  ideals  and  stand- 
ards that  define  these  values.  Attempts  to  make 
these  ideals  explicit,  and  to  formulate  principles 
which  regulate  their  attainment,  have  resulted  in 
the  development  of  the  three  so-called  normative 
sciences:  logic,  cesthetics,  and  etJiics.  These  sci- 
ences are  said  to  owe  their  origin  to  the  Socratic 
method,  and  it  is  indeed  certain  that  their  prob- 
lem is  closely  related  to  the  general  rationalistic 
attitude.^  In  Plato's  dialogue,  "  Protagoras," 
one  may  observe  the  manner  of  the  inception 
of  both  etliics  and  logic.  The  question  at  issue 
between    Socrates    and    the    master    sophist    Pro- 

1  Cf.  §  68. 
180 


NORMATIVE  SCIENCES  AND  RELIGION      181 

tagoras,  is  concerning  the  possibility  of  teach- 
ing virtue.  Protagoras  conducts  his  side  of  the 
discussion  with  the  customary  rhetorical  flourish, 
expounding  in  set  speeches  the  tradition  and  usage 
in  which  such  a  possibility  is  accepted.  Socrates, 
on  the  other  hand,  conceives  the  issue  quite  differ- 
ently. One  can  neither  affirm  nor  deny  anything 
of  virtue  unless  one  knows  what  is  meant  by  it. 
Even  the  possession  of  sueh  a  meaning  was  scarcely 
recognized  by  Protagoras,  who  was  led  by  Soc- 
rates's  questions  to  attribute  to  the  various  vir- 
tues an  external  grouping  analogous  to  that  of  the 
parts  of  the  face.  But  Socrates  shows  that  since 
justice,  temperance,  courage,  and  the  like,  are  ad- 
mittedly similar  in  that  they  are  all  virtues,  they 
must  have  in  common  some  essence,  which  is  vir- 
tue in  general.  This  he  seeks  to  define  in  the 
terms,  virtue  is  Tcnowledge.  The  interest  which 
Socrates  here  shows  in  the  reduction  of  the  ordi- 
nary moral  judgments  to  a  system  centering  in 
some  single  fundamental  principle,  is  the  ethical 
interest.  But  this  is  at  the  same  time  a  particu- 
lar application  of  the  general  rationalistic  method 
of  definition,  and  of  the  general  rationalistic  pos- 
tulate that  one  knows  nothing  until  one  can  form 
unitary  and  determinate  conceptions.     The  recog- 


182  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

iiitiou  wbicL  Socrates  thus  gives  to  criteria  of 
knowledge  is  an  expression  of  the  logical  interest. 
In  a  certain  sense,  indeed,  the  whole  labor  of  Soc- 
rates was  in  the  cause  of  the  logical  interest.  For 
he  sought  to  demonstrate  that  belief  is  not  neces- 
sarily knowledge;  that  belief  may  or  may  not  be 
true.  In  order  that  it  shall  be  true,  and  con- 
stitute knowledge,  it  must  be  well-grounded,  and 
accompanied  by  an  understanding  of  its  object. 
Socrates  thus  set  the  problem  of  logic,  the  discov- 
ery, namely,  of  those  characters  by  virtue  of  the 
possession  of  which  belief  is  knowledge. 

§  74.  Logic  deals  with  the  ground  of  belief,  and 
thus  distinguishes  itself  from  the  psychological  ac- 
TheAflaiia-      couut  of  the  elements  of  the  believing 

tions 

of  Logic.  state.^  But  it  is  not  possible  sharply 
to  sunder  psychology  and  logic.  This  is  due  to 
the  fact  that  the  general  principles  which  make 
belief  true,  may  be  regarded  quite  independently 
of  this  fact.  They  then  become  the  most  general 
truth,  belonging  to  the  absolute,  archetypal  realm, 
or  to  the  mind  of  God.^  AVhen  the  general  prin- 
ciples of  certaiity  are  so  regarded,  logic  can  be 

^  The  Socratic  distinction  between  the  logical  and  the 
psychological  treatment  of  belief  finds  its  best  expression  in 
Plato's  (jorgias,  especially,  454,  455.     Cf.  also  §  29. 

'  Tims,  c.  g.  Hegel.     See  §  179.     Cf.  also  §§  199,  200. 


NORMATIVE  SCIENCES  AND  RELIGION      1S3 

distinguished  from  metaphysics  only  by  adding  to 
the  study  of  the  general  principles  themselves, 
the  study  of  the  special  conditions  (mainly  psy- 
chological) under  which  they  may  be  realized 
among  men.  In  the  history  of  human  thought  the 
name  of  logic  belongs  to  the  study  of  this  attain- 
ment of  truth,  as  the  terms  esthetics  and  ethics 
belong  to  the  studies  of  the  attainment  of  beauty 
and  goodness.'*  It  is  evident  that  logic  will 
have  a  peculiar  importance  for  the  rationalist. 
For  the  empiricist,  proposing  to  report  upon 
things  as  they  are  given,  will  tend  on  the  whole  to 
maintain  that  knowledge  has  no  properties  save 
those  which  are  given  to  it  by  its  special  subject- 
matter.  One  cannot,  in  short,  define  any  absolute 
relationship  between  the  normative  sciences  and 
the  other  branches  of  philosophy. 

§  75.  Logic  is  the  formulation,  as  independeiitly 
as  possible  of  special  subject-matter,  of  that  which 
Logic  Deals      conditions  truth  in  belief.     Since  logic 

with  the  Most  ,  i  i        •  x 

General  Con-  is  conccmcd  With  truth  ouly  m  so  lar 
Tru'tMn  BeUef.  as  it  is  predicated  of  belief,  and  since 
belief  in  so  far  as  true  is  knowledge,  logic  can  be 
defined  as  the  formulation  of  the  most  general 
principles  of  knowledge.  The  principles  so  for- 
*  Cf.  §  84. 


184  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

miilated  would  be  those  virtually  used  to  justify 
belief  or  to  disprove  the  imputation  of  error. 

§  76.  What  is  called  formal  logic  is  animated 
with  the  hope  of  extracting  these  formulations 
The  Parts  of  dircctlj  from  an  analysis  of  the  pro- 
Defi^ftion"^'*^  cedure  of  thought.     The  most  general 

Self-evidence,     ^       •      i  •       •    i  i  •    i      i  i 

Inference,  and  logical  prmciplcs  which  havc  appeared 
Observation.  ^^  ^^^  historical  development  of  formal 
logic  are  definition^  self-evidence^  inference,  and 
observation.  Each  of  these  has  been  given  special 
study,  and  each  has  given  rise  to  special  issues. 

Definition  has  to  do  with  the  formation  of  con- 
cepts, or  determinate  and  unequivocal  meanings. 
The  universality  of  such  concepts,  and  their  conse- 
quent relation  to  particular  things,  was,  as  we  have 
seen,  investigated  at  a  very  early  date,  and  gave 
rise  to  the  great  realistie-nouiinalistic  controversy.^ 
A  large  part  of  the  logical  discussion  in  the  Pla- 
tonic dialogues  is  an  outgrowth  of  the  earlier 
"  eristic,"  a  form  of  disputation  in  favor  with  the 
sophists,  and  consisting  in  the  adroit  use  of  am- 
biguity.^ It  is  natural  that  in  its  first  conscious 
self-criticism  thought  should  discover  the  need  of 
definite  terms.     The  perpetual  importance  of  defi- 

"  See  §  G9,  note. 

'  The  reader  will  find  a  good  illustration  of  eristic  in  Plato's 
Euthydcmus,  273. 


NORMATIVE  SCIENCES  AND  RELIGION      185 

nition  has  been  largely  due  to  the  great  prestige  in 
modern  philosophy  of  the  method  of  geometry, 
which  was  regarded  by  Descartes  and  Spinoza  as 
the  model  for  systems  of  necessary  truth. 

Self-evidence  is  the  principle  according  to  which 
conviction  of  truth  follows  directlii  from  an  under- 
standing of  meaning.  In  the  practice  of  his  in- 
tellectual midwifery,  Socrates  presupposed  that 
thought  is  capable  of  bringing  forth  its  own  cer- 
tainties. And  rationalism  has  at  all  times  re- 
garded truth  as  ultimately  accredited  by  internal 
marks  recognizable  by  reason.  Such  truth  ar- 
rived at  antecedent  to  acquaintance  with  instances 
is  called  a  priori,  as  distinguished  from  a  posteriori 
knowledge,  or  observation  after  the  fact.  There 
can  be  no  principles  of  self -evidence,  but  logicians 
have  always  been  more  or  less  concerned  with  the 
enumeration  of  alleged  self-evident  principles, 
notably  those  of  contradiction  and  identity.  A 
philosophical  interest  in  the  mathematical  method 
has  led  to  a  logical  study  of  axioms,  but  with  a 
view  rather  to  their  fruitfulness  than  their  intrin- 
sic truth.  Indeed,  the  interest  in  self-evident  truth 
has  always  been  subordinate  to  the  interest  in  sys- 
tematic truth,  and  the  discovery  of  first  principles 
most  commonly  serves  to  determine  the  relative 


186  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

priority  of  definite  concepts,  or  the  correct  point 
of  departure  for  a  series  of  inferences. 

The  greater  part  of  the  famous  Aristotelian 
logic  consists  in  a  study  of  inference,  or  the 
derivation  of  new  knowledge  from  old  knowledge. 
Aristotle  sought  to  set  down  and  classify  every 
method  of  advancing  from  premises.  The  most 
important  form  of  inference  which  he  defined  was 
the  syllogism,  a  scheme  of  reasoning  to  a  conclu- 
sion by  means  of  two  premises  having  one  term  in 
common.  From  the  premises  "  all  men  are  mor- 
tal "  and  "  Socrates  is  a  man/'  one  may  conclude 
that  "  Socrates  is  mortal."  This  is  an  instance 
not  only  of  the  syllogism  in  general,  but  of  its 
most  important  "  mood,"  the  subsumption  of  a 
particular  case  under  a  general  rule.  Since  the 
decline  of  Aristotle's  influence  in  philosophy  there 
has  been  a  notable  decrease  of  interest  in  the  dif- 
ferent forms  of  inference ;  though  its  fundamental 
importance  as  the  very  bone  and  sinew  of  reason- 
ing or  deductive  thinJcing  has  never  been  chal- 
lenged. Its  loss  of  preeminence  is  in  part  due  to 
the  groAvth  of  empiricism,  stimulated  by  the  writ- 
ings of  Lord  Bacon  in  the  seventeenth  century, 
and  fostered  by  the  subsequent  development  of  ex- 
perimental science. 


NORMATIVE  SCIENCES  AND  RELIGION      187 

Observation  is  the  fimdamental  logical  prin- 
ciple of  empiricism.  For  a  radical  empiricism, 
knowledge  would  consist  of  descriptive  generaliza- 
tions based  upon  the  summation  of  instances. 
That  branch  of  logic  which  deals  with  the  advance 
from  individual  instances  to  general  principles,  is 
called  inductive  logic.  It  has  resulted  in  the  an- 
nouncement of  canons  of  accuracy  and  freedom 
from  preconception,  and  in  the  methodological 
study  of  hypothesis,  experiment,  and  verification. 
Rules  for  observation  directed  to  the  end  of  discov- 
ering causes,  constitute  the  most  famous  part  of 
the  epoch-making  logic  of  J.  S.  Mills.'^ 

§  77.  There  are  two  significant  tendencies  in 
contemporary  logic.  Theories  of  the  judgment 
Present  havc  ariscu  in  the  course  of  an  attempt 

Theory"?  ^^  define  the  least  complexity  that  must 
the  Judgment.  ^^  present  in  order  that  thought  shall 
come  within  the  range  of  truth  and  error.  It  is 
evident  that  no  one  either  knows  or  is  in  error 
until  he  takes  some  attitude  which  lays  claim  to 
kmowledge.  Denoting  by  the  term  judgment  this 
minimmn  of  complexity  in  knowledge,  an  impor- 
tant question  arises  as  to  the  sense  in  which  the 

'  The  reader  can  find  these  rules,  and  the  detail  of  the 
traditional  formal  logic,  in  any  elementary  text-book,  such 
as,  e.  g.,  Jevons:  Elements  of  Logic. 


188  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

judgment  involves  the  subject,  predicate,  and 
copula  that  are  commonly  present  in  its  proposi- 
tional  form. 

§  78.  But  a  more  important  logical  develop- 
ment has  been  due  to  the  recent  analysis  of  definite 
Priority  of  accredited  systems  of  knowledge.  The 
oncepts.  study  of  the  fundamental  conceptions  of 
mathematics  and  mechanics,  together  with  an  ex- 
amination of  the  systematic  structure  of  these  sci- 
ences, furnishes  the  most  notable  cases.  There  are 
two  senses  in  which  such  studies  may  be  regarded 
as  logical.  In  the  first  place,  in  so  far  as  they 
bring  to  light  the  inner  coherence  of  any  body  of 
truth,  the  kind  of  evidence  upon  which  it  rests, 
and  the  type  of  formal  perfection  which  it  seeks, 
they  differ  from  formal  logic  only  in  that  they 
derive  their  criteria  from  cases,  rather  than  from 
the  direct  analysis  of  the  procedure  of  thought. 
And  since  formal  logic  must  itself  make  experi- 
ments, this  difference  is  not  a  radical  one.  The 
study  of  cases  tends  chiefly  to  enrich  methodology, 
or  the  knowledge  of  the  special  criteria  of  special 
sciences.  In  the  second  place,  such  studies  serve 
to  define  the  relatively  few  simple  truths  which 
are  common  to  the  relatively  many  complex  truths. 
A  study  of  the  foundations  of  arithmetic  reveals 


NORMATIVE  SCIENCES  AND  RELIGION      189 

more  elementary  conceptions,  such  as  class  and 
order,  that  must  be  employed  in  the  very  definition 
of  number  itself,  and  so  are  implied  in  every 
numerical  calculation.  It  appears  similarly  that 
the  axioms  of  geometry  are  special  axioms  which 
involve  the  acceptance  of  more  general  axioms  or 
indefinables.^  Logic  in  this  sense,  then,  is  the 
enumeration  of  conceptions  and  principles  in  the 
order  of  their  indispensableness  to  knowledge. 
And  while  it  must  be  observed  that  the  most  gen- 
eral conceptions  and  principles  of  knowledge  are 
not  necessarily  those  most  significant  for  the  exis- 
tent world,  nevertheless  the  careful  analysis  which 
such  an  enumeration  involves  is  scarcely  less  fruit- 
ful for  metaphysics  than  for  logic. 

§  79.  Esthetics  is  the  fonnulation,  as  inde- 
pendently as  possible  of  special  subject-matter. 
Aesthetics        of  that  whicli   conditions  beauty.     As 

Deals  with  the   ,       .  i  c  ,  •      i  ^      i* 

Most  General  logic  commouly  rciers  to  a  judgment  oi 
Beauty""^  °  truth,  SO  a?sthetics  at  any  rate  refers  to 
anfFo^mat-  ^  judgment  implied  in  appreciation, 
tic  Tendencies,  g^^^  ^j^-jg  -^  -g  generally  admitted  that 

truth  itself  is  by  no  means  limited  to  the  form  of 
the   judgment,   the   contrary  is  frequently  main- 

^  What  is  called  "the  algebra  of  logic"  seeks  to  obtain 
an  unequivocal  symbolic  expression  for  these  truths. 


190  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

tained  with  reference  to  beauty.  The  aphorism, 
De  gustibus  non  est  disputandum,  expresses  a  com- 
mon opinion  to  the  effect  that  beauty  is  not  a  prop- 
erty belonging  to  the  object  of  which  it  is  predi- 
cated, but  a  property  generated  by  the  appreciative 
consciousness.  According  to  this  opinion  there  can 
be  no  beauty  except  in  the  case  of  an  object's  pres- 
ence in  an  individual  experience.  Investigators 
must  of  necessity  refuse  to  leave  individual  caprice 
in  complete  possession  of  the  field,  but  they  have  in 
many  cases  occupied  themselves  entirely  with  the 
state  of  cestlietic  enjoyment  in  the  hope  of  discov- 
ering its  constant  factors.  The  opposing  tendency 
defines  certain  formal  characters  which  the  beau- 
tiful object  must  possess.  Evidently  the  latter 
school  will  attribute  a  more  profound  philosophi- 
cal importance  to  the  conception  of  beauty,  since 
for  them  it  is  a  principle  that  obtains  in  the  world 
of  being.  This  was  the  first  notable  contention, 
that  of  Plato.  But  even  with  the  emphasis  laid 
upon  the  subjective  aspect  of  the  aesthetic  experi- 
ence, great  metaphysical  importance  may  be  at- 
tached to  it,  where,  as  in  the  case  of  the  German 
Romanticists,  reality  is  deliberately  construed  as 
a  spiritual  life  which  is  to  be  appreciated  rather 
than  understood. 


NORMATIVE  SCIENCES  AND  RELIGION      191 

As  in  the  case  of  logic,  a  strong  impulse  has 
manifested  itself  in  esthetics  to  deal  with  groups 
of  objects  that  lie  within  its  province,  rather  than 
directly  with  its  concepts  and  principles.  The 
first  special  treatise  on  aesthetics,  the  "  Poetics  " 
of  Aristotle,  belongs  to  this  type  of  inquiry,  as 
does  all  criticism  of  art  in  so  far  as  it  aims  at  the 
formulation  of  general  principles. 

§  80.  Ethics,  the  oldest  and  most  popular  of  the 
normative  sciences,  is  the  formulation,  as  indeperi- 
Ethics  Deals  dcntly  as  possihle  of  special  suhject-mat- 
Qlaerai  coa-  ^^^•'  ^f  ^^^^  wMch  conditions  goodiicss 
Momi^  °^  ^f  (conduct.  Ethics  is  commonly  con- 
Goodness.  ccmed  Avith  goodness  only  in  so  far  as 
it  is  predicated  of  conduct,  or  of  character,  which 
is  a  more  or  less  permanent  disposition  to  conduct. 
Since  conduct,  in  so  far  as  good,  is  said  to  consti- 
tute moral  goodness,  ethics  may  be  defined  as  the 
formulation  of  the  general  principles  of  morality. 
The  principles  so  formulated  would  be  those  vir- 
tually employed  to  justify  conduct,  or  to  disprove 
the  imputation  of  immorality. 

§  81.  The  student  of  this  science  is  confronted 
with  a  very  considerable  diversity  of  method  and 
Conceptions      differentiation  of  problems.     The  ear- 

of  the  Good.  p  ^  '    •  £ 

Hedonism.       liest  and  most  profound  opposition  of 


192  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

doctrine  in  ethics  arose  from  the  differences  of  in- 
terpretation of  which  the  teaching  of  Socrates  is 
capable.  His  doctrine  is,  as  we  have  seen,  ver- 
bally expressed  in  the  proposition,  virtue  is  knowl- 
edge. Socrates  was  primarily  concerned  to  show 
that  there  is  no  real  living  without  an  understand- 
ing of  the  significance  of  life.  To  live  well  is  to 
know  the  end  of  life,  the  good  of  it  all,  and  to 
govern  action  with  reference  to  that  end.  Virtue 
is  therefore  the  practical  wisdom  that  enables  one 
to  live  consistently  with  his  real  intention.  But 
what  is  the  real  intention,  the  end  or  good  of  life  ? 
In  the  "  Protagoras,"  where  Plato  represents  Soc- 
rates as  expounding  his  position,  virtue  is  inter- 
preted to  mean  prudence,  or  foresight  of  pleasur- 
able and  painful  consequences.  He  who  knows, 
possesses  all  virtue  in  that  he  is  qualified  to  adapt 
himself  to  the  real  situation  and  to  gain  the  end 
of  pleasure.  All  men,  indeed,  seek  pleasure,  but 
only  virtuous  men  seek  it  wisely  and  well. 

"And  do  you,  Protagoras,  like  the  rest  of  the  world, 
call  some  pleasant  things  evil  and  some  painful  things 
good  ? — for  I  am  rather  disposed  to  say  that  things  are 
good  in  as  far  as  they  are  pleasant,  if  they  have  no  con- 
sequences of  another  sort,  and  in  as  far  as  they  are  painful 
they  are  bad."' 

•  Plato:  Protagoras,  351.     Translation  by  Jowett. 


NORMATIVE  SCIENCES  AND  RELIGION      193 

According  to  this  view  painful  things  are  good 
only  when  they  lead  eventually  to  pleasure,  and 
pleasant  things  evil  only  when  their  painful  con- 
sequences outweigh  their  pleasantness.  Hence 
moral  differences  reduce  to  differences  of  skill  in 
the  universal  quest  for  pleasure,  and  sensible  grati- 
fication is  the  ultimate  standard  of  moral  value. 
This  ancient  doctrine,  known  as  hedonism,  express- 
ing as  it  does  a  part  of  life  that  will  not  suffer 
itself  for  long  to  he  denied,  is  one  of  the  gi'cat 
perennial  tendencies  of  ethical  thought.  In  the 
course  of  many  centuries  it  has  passed  through  a 
number  of  phases,  varying  its  conception  of  pleas- 
ure from  the  tranquillity  of  the  wise  man  to  the 
sensuous  titillations  of  the  sybarite,  and  from  the 
individualism  of  the  latter  to  the  uuiversalism  of 
the  humanitarian.  But  in  every  case  it  shows  a 
respect  for  the  natural  man,  praising  morality  for 
its  disciplinary  and  instrumental  value  in  the  ser- 
vice of  such  human  wants  as  are  the  outgrowth  of 
the  animal  instinct  of  self-preservation. 

§  82.  But  if  a  man's  life  be  regarded  as  a  truer 
representation  of  his  ideals  than  is  his  spoken 
RationaUsm.  theory,  there  is  little  to  identify  Soc- 
rates with  the  hedonists.  At  the  conclusion  of  the 
defence  of  his  own  life,  which  Plato  puts  into  his 


194  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

mouth  in  the  well-known  "  Apology,"  lie  speaks 
thus : 

"  When  my  sons  are  grown  up,  I  would  ask  you,  O  my 
friends,  to  punish  them;  and  I  would  have  you  trouble 
them,  as  I  have  troubled  you,  if  they  seem  to  care  about 
riches,  or  anything,  more  than  about  virtue;  or  if  they 
pretend  to  be  something  when  they  are  really  nothing, — 
then  reprove  them,  as  I  have  reproved  you,  for  not  caring 
about  that  for  which  they  ought  to  care,  and  thinking 
that  they  are  something  when  they  are  really  nothing."'" 

It  is  plain  that  the  man  Socrates  cared  little  for 
the  pleasurable  or  painful  consequences  of  his  acts, 
provided  they  were  worthy  of  the  high  calling  of 
human  nature.  A  man's  virtue  would  now  seem 
to  possess  an  intrinsic  nobility.  If  knowledge  be 
virtue,  then  on  this  basis  it  must  be  because  knowl- 
edge is  itself  excellent.  Virtue  as  knowledge 
contributes  to  the  good  by  constituting  it.  We 
meet  here  with  the  rationalistic  strain  in  ethics. 
It  praises  conduct  for  the  inherent  worth  which  it 
may  possess  if  it  express  that  reason  which  the 
Stoics  called  "  the  ruling  part.^^  The  riches  of 
wisdom  consist  for  the  hedonist  in  their  purchase 
of  pleasure.  For  the  rationalist,  on  the  other 
hand,  wisdom  is  not  coin,  but  itself  the  very  sub- 
stance of  value. 

§  83.  Rationalism  has  undergone  modifications 
"Plato:  Apology,  41.     Translation  by  Jowett. 


NORMATIVE  SCIENCES  AND  RELIGION       lO") 

even  more  significant  than  those  of  hedonism, 
Euda^monism  and  involving  at  least  one  radically 
mgorism  Tnd  new  group  of  conceptions.  Among  the 
intuitionism.  Qj-ecks  rationalism  and  hedonism  alike 
are  eudcemonistic.  They  aim  to  portray  the  ful- 
ness of  life  that  makes  "  the  happy  man."  In  the 
ethics  of  Aristotle,  vs^hose  synthetic  mind  weaves 
together  these  different  strands,  the  Greek  ideal 
finds  its  most  complete  expression  as  "  the  high- 
minded  man,"  with  all  his  powers  and  trappings. 
But  the  great  spiritual  transformation  which  ac- 
companied the  decline  of  Greek  culture  and  the 
rise  of  Christianity,  brought  with  it  a  new  moral 
sensibility,  which  finds  in  man  no  virtue  of  him- 
self, but  only  through  the  grace  of  God. 

"And  the  virtues  themselves,"  says  St.  Augustine, 
"  if  they  bear  no  relation  to  God,  are  in  truth  vices  rather 
than  virtues;  for  although  they  are  regarded  by  many 
as  truly  moral  when  they  are  desired  as  ends  in  them- 
selves and  not  for  the  sake  of  something  else,  they  are, 
nevertheless,  inflated  and  arrogant,  and  therefore  not  to 
be  viewed  as  virtues  but  as  vices."" 

The  new  ideal  is  that  of  renunciation,  obedience, 

and  resignation.     Ethically  this  expresses  itself  in 

pietism.     Virtue  is  good  neither  in  itself  nor  on 

account  of  its  consequences,  but  because  it  is  con- 

"  Quoted  by  Paulsen  in  his  System  of  Ethics.  Transla- 
tion by  Thilly,  p.  69. 


196  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

f  ormable  to  the  will  of  God.  The  extreme  inward- 
ness of  this  ideal  is  characteristic  of  an  age  that 
despaired  of  attainment,  whether  of  pleasure  or 
knowledge.  To  all,  even  the  persecuted,  it  is  per- 
mitted to  obey,  and  so  gain  entrance  into  the 
kingdom  of  the  children  of  God.  But  as  every 
special  study  tends  to  rely  upon  its  own  concep- 
tions, pietism,  involving  as  it  does  a  relation  to 
God,  is  replaced  by  rigorisui  and  intuitionism. 
The  former  doctrine  defines  virtue  in  terms  of  the 
inner  attitude  which  it  expresses.  It  must  be  done 
in  the  spirit  of  dutifulness,  because  one  oughts  and 
through  sheer  respect  for  the  law  which  one's 
moral  nature  affirms.  Intuitionism  has  attempted 
to  deal  with  the  source  of  the  moral  law  by  defin- 
ing conscience  as  a  special  faculty  or  sense,  quali- 
fied to  pass  directly  upon  moral  questions,  and 
deserving  of  implicit  obediences.  It  is  character- 
istic of  this  whole  tendency  to  look  for  the  spring 
of  virtuous  living,  not  in  a  good  which  such  living 
obtains,  but  in  a  law  to  which  its  owes  obedience. 
§  84.  This  third  general  ethical  tendency  has 
thus  been  of  the  greatest  importance  in  emphasiz- 
Duty  and  ing  the  consciousncss  of  duty,  and  has 
Ethics°Tnd  brought  both  hedonism  and  rationalism 
Metaphysics.     ^^  ^  recognition  of  its  fundamental  im- 


NORMATIVE  SCIENCES  AND  RELIGION      197 

portance.  Ethics  must  deal  not  only  with  the 
moral  ideal,  but  also  with  the  ground  of  its  appeal 
to  the  individual,  and  his  obligation  to  pursue  it. 
In  connection  with  this  recognition  of  moral  re- 
sponsibility, the  problem  of  human  freedom  has 
come  to  be  regarded  in  the  light  of  an  inevitable 
point  of  contact  between  ethics  and  metaphysics. 
That  which  is  absolutely  binding  upon  the  human 
will  can  be  determined  only  in  view  of  some 
theory  of  its  ultimate  nature.  On  this  account 
the  rationalistic  and  hedonistic  motives  are  no 
longer  abstractly  sundered,  as  in  the  days  of  the 
Stoics  and  Epicureans,  but  tend  to  be  absorbed  in 
broader  philosophical  tendencies.  Hedonism  ap- 
pears as  the  sequel  to  naturalism ;  or,  more  rarely, 
as  part  of  a  theistic  system  whose  morality  is 
divine  legislation  enforced  by  an  appeal  to  motives 
of  pleasure  and  pain.  Rationalism,  on  the  other 
hand,  tends  to  be  absorbed  in  rationalistic  or  ideal- 
istic philosophies,  where  man's  rational  nature  is 
construed  as  his  bond  of  kinship  with  the  universe. 
Ethics  has  exhibited  from  the  beginning  a  ten- 
dency to  universalize  its  conceptions  and  take  the 
central  place  in  metaphysics.  Thus  with  Plato 
good  conduct  was  but  a  special  case  of  goodness, 
the    good    being    the    most    general    principle    of 


198  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

reality.^ ^  In  modern  times  Fichte  and  his  school 
have  founded  an  ethical  metaphysics  upon  the  con- 
ception of  duty.*^  In  these  cases  ethics  can  be  dis- 
tinguished from  metaphysics  only  by  adding  to 
the  study  of  the  good  or  of  duty,  a  study  of  the 
special  physical,  psychological,  and  social  condi- 
tions under  which  goodness  and  dutifulness  may 
obtain  in  human  life.  It  is  possible  to  attach  the 
name  of  ethics,  and  we  have  seen  the  same  to  be 
true  of  logic,  either  to  a  realm  of  ideal  truth  or 
to  that  realm  wherein  the  ideal  is  realized  in 
humanity. 

§  85.  A  systematic  study  of  ethics  requires  that 
the  virtues,  or  types  of  moral  practice,  shall  be 
The  Virtues,     interpreted  in  the  light  of  the  central 

Customs,  and 

Institutions,  conccptiou  of  good,  or  of  conscience. 
Justice,  temperance,  wisdom,  and  courage  were 
praised  by  the  Greeks.  Christianity  added  self- 
sacrifice,  humility,  purity,  and  henevolence.  These 
and  other  virtues  have  been  defined,  justified,  and 
co-ordinated  with  the  aid  of  a  standard  of  moral 
value  or  a  canon  of  duty. 

There  is  in  modern  ethics  a  pronounced  ten- 
dency, parallel  to  those  already  noted  in  logic  and 
aesthetics,  to  study  such  phenomena  belonging  to 
'2  Cf.  §  160.  '=  Cf.  §  177. 


NORMATIVE  SCIENCES  AND  RELIGION      199 

its  field  as  have  become  historically  established. 
A  very  considerable  investigation  of  custom,  insti- 
tutions, and  other  social  forces  has  led  to  a  con- 
tact of  ethics  with  anthropology  and  sociology 
scarcely  less  significant  than  that  with  metaphysics. 

§  86.  In  that  part  of  his  philosophy  in  which 
he  deals  with  faith,  the  great  German  philosopher 
The  Problems  Kant  mentions  God,  Freedom,  and  Im- 

of  Religion. 

The  Special      mortality  as  the  three  pre-eminent  re- 

Interests  of 

Faith.  ligious  interests.     Religion,  as  we  have 

seen,  sets  up  a  social  relationship  between  man 
and  that  massive  drift  of  things  which  determines 
his  destiny.  Of  the  two  terms  of  this  relation, 
God  signifies  the  latter,  while  freedom  and  immor- 
tality are  prerogatives  which  religion  bestows  upon 
the  former.  Man,  viewed  from  the  stand-point  of 
religion  as  an  object  of  special  interest  to  the  uni- 
verse, is  said  to  have  a  soul ;  and  by  virtue  of  this 
soul  he  is  said  to  be  free  and  immortal,  when 
thought  of  as  having  a  life  in  certain  senses  inde- 
pendent of  its  immediate  natural  environment. 
The  attempt  to  make  this  faith  theoretically  in- 
telligible has  led  to  the  philosophical  disciplines 
known  as  theology  and  psychology}'^ 

"  Concerning  the  dutj^  of   philosophy  to  religion  in  these 


200  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

§  87.  Theology,  as  a  branch  of  philosophy,  deals 
with  the  proof  and  the  nature  of  God.  Since 
Theology  "  ^^^  "  ^^  ^^*  primarily  a  theoretical 
Sl^ur^'anV''^  conccption,  the  proof  of  God  is  not 
Proof  of  God.  properly  a  philosophical  problem.  His- 
torically, this  task  has  been  assumed  as  a  legacy 
from  Christian  apologetics;  and  it  has  involved, 
at  any  rate  so  far  as  Euroj)ean  philosophy  is  con- 
cerned, the  definition  of  ultimate  being  in  such 
spiritual  terms  as  make  jKDssible  the  relation  with 
man  postulated  in  Christianity.  For  this  it  has 
been  regarded  as  sufficient  to  ascribe  to  the  world  an 
underlying  unity  capable  of  bearing  the  predicates 
of  perfection,  omnipotence,  and  omniscience.  Each 
proof  of  God  has  defined  him  pre-eminently  in 
terms  of  someone  of  these  his  attributes. 

§  88.  The  ontological  proof  of  God  held  the 
foremost  place  in  philosophy's  contribution  to 
The  Ontoiog-    Christianity  up  to  the  eighteenth  cen- 

ical  Proof  of 

God.  tury.     This  proof  infers  the  existence 

from  the  ideal  of  God,  and  so  approaches  the  nat- 
ure of  God  through  the  attribute  of  perfection. 
It  owes  the  form  in  which  it  was  accepted  in  the 
Middle    Ages    and    Renaissance    to    St.    Anselm, 

matters,  Cf.  Descartes:  Meditations,  Dedication.  Translar 
tion  by  Veitch,  p.  81. 


NORMATIVE  SCIENCES  AND  RELIGION      201 

Archbishop  of  Canterbury  at  the  close  of  the 
eleventh  century.  He  argued  from  the  idea  of  a 
most  perfect  being  to  its  existence,  on  the  ground 
that  non-existence,  or  existence  only  in  idea,  would 
contradict  its  perfection.  It  is  evident  that  the 
force  of  this  argument  depends  upon  the  necessity 
of  the  idea  of  God.  The  argument  was  accepted 
in  Scholastic  Philosophy^  ^  largely  because  of  the 
virtual  acceptance  of  this  necessity.  Mediceval 
thought  was  under  the  dominance  of  the  philosoph- 
ical ideas  of  Plato  and  Aristotle,  and  through  them 
rationalism  had  come  to  be  the  unquestioned  start- 
ing-point for  all  thought.  For  Plato  reality  and 
rationality  meant  one  and  the  same  thing,  so  that 
the  ultimate  reality  was  the  highest  principle  of 
rationality,  which  he  conceived  to  be  the  idea  of 
the  good.  In  the  case  of  Aristotle  the  ideal 
of  rationality  was  conceived  to  determine  the 
course  of  the  cosmical  evolution  as  its  immanent 
final  cause.  But  in  itself  it  was  beyond  the  world, 
or  transcendent.  For  Plato  perfection  itself  is 
reality,  whereas  for  Aristotle  perfection  determines 
the  hierarchical  order  of  natural  substances.  The 
latter  theory,  more  suitable  to  the  uses  of  Chris- 

^*  The  school-philosophy  that  flourished  from  the  eleventh 
to  the  fifteenth  century,  under  the  authority  of  the  church. 


202  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHU^OSOPHY 

tianity,  because  it  distingiiislied  between  God  and 
the  world,  was  incorporated  into  the  great  school 
systems.  But  both  theories  contain  the  essence  of 
the  ontological  proof  of  God.  In  thought  one  seeks 
the  perfect  truth,  and  posits  it  as  at  once  the  cul- 
mination of  insight  and  the  meaning  of  life.  The 
ideal  of  God  is  therefore  a  necessary  idea,  because 
implied  in  all  the  effort  of  thought  as  the  object 
capable  of  finally  satisfying  it.  St.  Anselm  adds 
little  to  the  force  of  this  argument,  and  does  much 
to  obscure  its  real  significance. 

In  stating  the  ontological  argument  the  term 
perfection  has  been  expressly  emphasized,  because 
it  may  be  taken  to  embrace  both  truth  and  good- 
ness. Owing  to  a  habit  of  thought,  due  in  the 
main  to  Plato,  it  was  long  customary  to  regard 
degrees  of  truth  and  goodness  as  interchangeable, 
and  as  equivalent  to  degrees  of  reality.  The  ens 
realissimum  was  in  its  completeness  the  highest 
object  both  of  the  faculty  of  cognition  and  of  the 
moral  will.  But  even  in  the  scholastic  period 
these  two  different  aspects  of  the  ideal  were  clearly 
recognized,  and  led  to  sharply  divergent  tenden- 
cies. More  recently  they  have  been  divided  and 
embodied  in  separate  arguments.  The  epistemo- 
logical  argument  defines  God  in  terms  of  that  ahso- 


NORMATIVE  SCIENCES  AND  RELIGION      203 

lute  truth  which  is  referred  to  in  every  judgment. 
Under  the  influence  of  idealism  this  absolute  truth 
has  taken  the  form  of  a  universal  mind,  or  all- 
embracing  standard  experience,  called  more  briefly 
the  absolute.  The  ethical  argument,  on  the  other 
hand,  conceives  God  as  the  iierfect  goodness  im- 
plied in  the  moral  struggle,  or  the  power  through 
which  goodness  is  made  to  triumph  in  the  universe 
to  the  justification  of  moral  faith.  "\^niile  the 
former  of  these  arguments  identifies  God  with 
being,  the  latter  defines  God  in  terms  of  the  intent 
or  outcome  of  being.  Thus,  while  the  epistemo- 
logical  argument  does  not  distinguish  God  and  the 
world,  the  latter  does  so,  assuming  that  independent 
reality  can  be  attributed  to  the  stages  of  a  process 
and  to  the  purpose  that  dominates  it. 

§  89.  The  cosmological  proof  of  God  approaches 
him  through  the  attribute  of  creative  omnipotence. 
The  Cosmo-     The   commou    principle   of   causal    ex- 

logical  Proof 

of  God.  planation  refers  the  origin  of  natural 

events  to  similar  antecedent  events.  But  there 
must  be  some  /i7'st  cause  from  which  the  whole 
series  is  derived,  a  cause  which  is  ultimate,  suffi- 
cient to  itself,  and  the  responsible  author  of  the 
world.  Because  God's  function  as  creator  M'as  a 
part  of  the  Christian  teaching,  and  because  expla- 


204  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

nation  by  causes  is  habitual  with  common  sense, 
this  argument  has  had  great  vogue.  But  in  phi- 
losophy it  has  declined  in  importance,  chiefly  be- 
cause it  has  been  absorbed  in  arguments  which  deal 
with  the  hind  of  causality  proper  to  a  first  cause 
or  world-ground.  The  argument  that  follows  is 
a  case  in  point. 

§  90.  The  teleological  proof  argues  that  the 
world  can  owe  its  origin  only  to  an  intelligent  first 
The  Teieoiogi-  cttuse.     The  evidence  for  this  is  fur- 

cal  Proof  of 

God.  nished  by  the  cunning  contrivances  and 

beneficent  adaptations  of  nature.  These  could  not 
have  come  about  through  chance  or  the  working 
of  mechanical  forces,  but  only  through  the  fore- 
sight of  a  rational  will.  This  argument  originally 
infers  God  from  the  character  of  nature  and  his- 
tory; and  the  extension  of  mechanical  principles 
to  organic  and  social  phenomena,  especially  as 
stimulated  by  Darwin's  principle  of  natural  selec- 
tion, has  tended  greatly  to  diminish  its  importance. 
When,  on  the  other  hand,  for  nature  and  history 
there  are  substituted  the  intellectual  and  moral 
activities  themselves,  and  the  inference  is  made  to 
the  ideal  which  they  imply,  the  teleological  argu- 
ment merges  into  the  ontological.  But  the  old- 
fashioned  statement  of  it  remains  in  the  form  of 


NORMATIVE  SCIENCES  AND  RELIGION      205 

religious  faith,  and  in  this  capacity  it  has  had  the 
approval  even  of  Hume  and  Kant,  the  philosophers 
who  have  contributed  most  forcibly  to  its  over- 
throw as  a  demonstration  of  God.  They  agree 
that  the  acknowledgment  of  God  in  nature  and 
history  is  the  sequel  to  a  theistic  belief,  and  an  in- 
evitable attitude  on  the  part  of  the  religious  con- 
sciousness. 

§  91.  Another  group  of  ideas  belonging  to  philo- 
sophical theology  consists  of  three  generalizations 
God  and  respecting  God's  relation  to  the  world, 
the  World.      known  as  theism,  pantheism,  and  deism. 

Theism  and  '  '^  ' 

Pantheism.  Although,  theoretically,  these  are  corol- 
laries of  the  different  arguments  for  God,  two  of 
them,  theism  and  pantheism,  owe  their  importance 
to  their  rivalry  as  religious  tendencies.  Theism 
emphasizes  that  attitude  to  God  which  recognizes 
in  him  an  historical  personage,  in  some  sense  dis- 
tinct from  both  the  world  and  man,  which  are  his 
works  and  yet  stand  in  an  external  relationship 
to  him.  It  expresses  the  spirit  of  ethical  and 
monotheistic  religion,  and  is  therefore  the  natural 
belief  of  the  Christian.  Pantheism  appears  in 
primitive  religion  as  an  animistic  or  polytheistic 
sense  of  the  presence  of  a  divine  principle  diffused 
throughout  nature.     But  it  figures  most  notably 


206  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

in  the  history  of  religions,  in  the  highly  reflective 
Brahmanism  of  India.  In  sharp  opposition  to 
Christianity,  this  religion  preaches  the  indivisible 
unity  of  the  world  and  the  illusoriness  of  the  in- 
dividual's sense  of  his  own  independent  reality. 
In  spite  of  the  fact  that  such  a  doctrine  is  alien 
to  the  spirit  of  Christianity,  it  enters  into  Chris- 
tian theology  through  the  influence  of  philosophy. 
The  theoretical  idea  of  God  tends,  as  we  have  seen, 
to  the  identification  of  him  with  the  world  as  its 
most  real  principle.  Or  it  bestows  upon  him  a 
nature  so  logical  and  formal,  and  so  far  removed 
from  the  characters  of  humanity,  as  to  forbid  his 
entering  into  personal  or  social  relations.  Such 
reflections  concerning  God  find  their  religious  ex- 
pression in  a  mystical  sense  of  unity,  which  has  in 
many  cases  either  entirely  replaced  or  profoundly 
modified  the  theistic  strain  in  Christianity.  In 
current  philosophy  pantheism  appears  in  the  epis- 
temological  argument  which  identifies  God  with 
being;  while  the  chief  bulwark  of  theism  is  the 
ethical  argument,  with  its  provision  for  a  distinc- 
tion between  the  actual  world  and  ideal  principle 
of  evolution. 

§  92.  While  theism  and  pantheism  appear  to  be 
permanent  j)hases  in  the  philosophy  of  religion, 


NORMATIVE  SCIENCES  AND  RELIGION      207 

deism  is  the  peculiar  product  of  the  eighteenth  cen- 
Deism.  turj.      It    is   hased    upon    a    repudia- 

tion of  supernaturalism  and  "  enthusiasm,"  on  the 
one  hand,  and  a  literal  acceptance  of  the  cosmo- 
logical  and  teleological  proofs  on  the  other.  Re- 
ligions, like  all  else,  were  required,  in  this  epoch 
of  clear  thinking,  to  submit  to  the  canons  of  experi- 
mental observation  and  practical  common  sense. 
These  authorize  only  a  natural  religion,  the  ac- 
knowledgment in  pious  living  of  a  God  Avho,  hav- 
ing contrived  this  natural  world,  has  given  it  over 
to  the  rule,  not  of  priests  and  prophets,  but  of 
natural  law.  The  artificiality  of  its  conception  of 
God,  and  the  calculating  spirit  of  its  piety,  make 
deism  a  much  less  genuine  expression  of  the  re- 
ligious experience  than  either  the  moral  chivalry 
of  theism  or  the  intellectual  and  mystical  exalta- 
tion of  pantheism. 

§  93.  The  systematic  development  of  philosophy 
leads  to  the  inclusion  of  conceptions  of  God  within 
Metaphysics  the  problem  of  metaphysics,  and  the 
and  Theology,  g^^bordination  of  the  proof  of  God  to 
the  determination  of  the  fundamental  principle  of 
reality.  There  Avill  always  remain,  however,  an 
outstanding  theological  discipline,  whose  function 
it  is  to  interpret  worship,  or  the  living  religious 


208  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

attitude,  in  terms  of  the  theoretical  principles  of 
philosophy. 

§  94.  Psychology  is  the  theory  of  the  soul.  As 
Ave  have  already  seen,  the  rise  of  scepticism  directs 
Psychology  is   attention  from  the  object  of  thought  to 

the  Theory  of 

the  Soul.  the  thinker,  and  so  emphasizes  the  self  as 
a  field  for  theoretical  investigation.  But  the  orig- 
inal and  the  dominating  interest  in  the  self  is  a 
practical  one.  The  precept,  yvco0i  ceaxnov,  has 
its  deepest  justification  in  the  concern  for  the 
salvation  of  one's  soul.  In  primitive  and  half- 
instinctive  belief  the  self  is  recognized  in  practical 
relations.  In  its  animistic  phase  this  belief  ad- 
mitted of  such  relations  with  all  living  creatures, 
and  extended  the  conception  of  life  very  generally 
to  natural  processes.  Thus  in  the  beginning  the 
self  was  doubtless  indistinguishable  from  the  vital 
principle.  In  the  first  treatise  on  psychology,  the 
"Trepl  '^vxn^"  of  Aristotle,  this  interpretation 
finds  a  place  in  theoretical  philosophy.  For  Aris- 
totle the  soul  is  the  entelechy  of  the  body — that 
function  or  activity  wliicli  makes  a  man  of  it. 
lie  recognized,  furthermore,  three  stages  in  this 
activity :  the  nutritive,  sensitive,  and  rational  souls, 
or  the  vegetable,  animal,  and  distinctively  human 
natures,   respectively.      The   rational  soul,    in   its 


NORMATIVE  SCIENCES  AND  RELIGION      209 

own  proper  activity,  is  man's  highest  prerogative, 
the  soul  to  be  saved.  By  virtue  of  it  man  rises 
above  bodily  conditions,  and  lays  hold  on  the 
divine  and  eternal.  But  Plato,  who,  as  w^e  have 
seen,  was  ever  ready  to  grant  reality  to  the  ideal 
apart  from  the  circumstances  of  its  particular  em- 
bodiment, had  already  undertaken  to  demonstrate 
the  immortality  of  the  soul  on  the  ground  of  its 
distinctive  nature.^ ^  According  to  his  way  of 
thinking,  the  soul's  essentially  moral  nature  made 
it  incapable  of  destruction  through  the  operation 
of  natural  causes.  It  is  evident,  then,  that  there 
were  already  ideas  in  vogue  capable  of  interpret- 
ing the  Christian  teaching  concerning  the  exist- 
ence of  a  soul,  or  of  an  inner  essence  of  man  capa- 
ble of  being  made  an  object  of  divine  interest. 

§  95.  The  immediate  effect  of  Christianity  was 
to  introduce  into  philosophy  as  one  of  its  cardinal 
Spiritual  doctrines  the  theory  of  a  spiritual  being, 

Substance  constituting  the  true  self  of  the  indi- 
vidual, and  separable  from  the  body.  The  differ- 
ence recognized  in  Plato  and  Aristotle  between  the 
divine  spark  and  the  appetitive  and  perceptual 
parts  of  human  nature  was  now  emphasized.  The 
former  (frequently  called  the  "  spirit,"  to  distin- 
"  Especiall}'  in  the  Phoedo. 


210  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

giiish  it  from  the  lower  soul)  was  defined  as  a 
substance  having  the  attributes  of  thought  and 
will.  The  fundamental  argument  for  its  existence 
was  the  immediate  appeal  to  self-consciousness; 
and  it  was  further  defined  as  indestructible  on 
the  ground  of  its  being  utterly  discontinuous  and 
incommensurable  with  its  material  environment. 
This  theory  survives  at  the  present  day  in  the  con- 
ception of  pure  activity,  but  on  the  whole  the  attri- 
butes of  the  soul  have  superseded  its  substance. 

§  96.  Intellectualism  and  voluntarism  are  the 
two  rival  possibilities  of  emphasis  when  the  soul  is 
inteiiectuaUsm  defined  in  terms  of  its  known  activities. 

and  Voluntar- 
ism. Wherever  the  essence  of  personality  is 

in  question,  as,  also  occurs  in  the  case  of  theology, 

thought  and  will  present  their  respective  claims 

to  the  jilace  of  first  importance.     Intellectualism 

would  mahe  will  merely  the  concluding  phase  of 

thought  J  while  voluntarism  would  reduce  thought 

to  one  of  the  interests  of  a  general  appetency.     It 

is   evident  that   idealistic  theories  will  be  much 

concerned  with  this  question  of  priority.      It  is 

also  true,  though  less  evident,  that  intellectualism, 

since    it    emphasizes    the    general    and    objective 

features   of   the   mind,   tends   to   subordinate   the 

individual    to   the   universal;    while   voluntarism, 


NORMATIVE  SCIENCES  AND  RELICilOX      211 

emphasizing  desire  and  action,  is  relatively  indi- 
vidualistic, and  so,  since  there  are  many  indi- 
viduals, also  pluralistic.^'^ 

§  97.  The  question  of  the  freedom  of  the  will 
furnishes  a  favorite  controversial  topic  in  philos- 
Freedomof  ophy.  For  the  interest  at  stake  is  no 
Ne«ssitarian-  l^ss  than  the  individual's  responsibility 
K^' ^nrif'"  before  man  and  God  for  his  good  or 

ism,  and  In-  <-> 

determinism.  ^^^  works.  It  bcars  alike  upon  science, 
religion,  and  philosophy,  and  is  at  the  same  time 
a  question  of  most  fundamental  practical  impor- 
tance. But  this  diffusion  of  the  problem  has  led 
to  so  considerable  a  complication  of  it  that  it  be- 
comes necessary  in  outlining  it  to  define  two  issues. 
In  the  first  place,  the  concept  of  freedom  is  de- 
signed to  express  generally  the  distinction  between 
man  and  the  rest  of  nature.  To  make  man  in  all 
respects  the  product  and  creature  of  his  natural 
environment  would  be  to  deny  freedom  and  accept 
the  radically  necessitarian  doctrine.  The  question 
still  remains,  however,  as  to  the  causes  which  domi- 
nate man.  He  may  be  free  from  nature,  and  yet 
be  ruled  by  God,  or  by  distinctively  spiritual 
causes,  such  as  ideas  or  character.  Where  in  gen- 
eral the  will  is  regarded  as  submitting  only  to  a 
"  Schopenhauer  is  a  notable  exception.     Cf.  §§  135,  138. 


212  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

spiritual  causation  proper  to  its  own  realm,  the 
conception  is  best  named  determinism ;  though  in 
the  tradition  of  philosophy  it  is  held  to  be  a  doc- 
trine of  freedom,  because  contrasted  with  the 
necessitarianism  above  defined.  There  remains 
indeterminism,  which  attributes  to  the  will  a  spon- 
taneity that  makes  possible  the  direct  presence  to 
it  of  genuine  alternatives.  The  issue  may  here 
coincide  with  that  between  intellectualism  and 
voluntarism.  If,  e.g.,  in  God's  act  of  creation,  his 
ideals  and  standards  are  prior  to  his  fiat,  his  con- 
duct is  determined ;  whereas  it  is  free  in  the  radi- 
cal or  indeterministic  sense  if  his  ideals  themselves 
are  due  to  his  sheer  will.  This  theory  involves  at 
a  certain  point  in  action  the  absence  of  cause.  On 
this  account  the  free  will  is  often  identified  with 
chance,  in  which  case  it  loses  its  distinction  from 
nature,  and  we  have  swung  round  the  circle. 

§  98.  There  is  similar  complexity  in  the  prob- 
lem concerning  immortality.  Were  the  extreme 
immortauty.    claims  of  naturalism  to  be  established, 

Survival  and 

Eternaiism.  there  would  bc  HO  grouud  whatsoever 
upon  which  to  maintain  the  immortality  of  man, 
mere  dust  returning  unto  dust.  The  philosophical 
concept  of  immortality  is  due  to  the  supposition 
that  the  quintessence  of  the  individual's  nature  is 


NORMATIVE  SCIENCES  AND  RELIGION       213 

divine.''^  But  several  possibilities  are  at  this 
point  open  to  ns.  The  first  would  maintain  the 
survival  after  death  of  a  recognizable  and  discrete 
personality.  Another  would  suppose  a  preserva- 
tion after  death,  through  being  taken  up  into  the 
life  of  God.  Still  another,  the  theory  commonly 
maintained  on  the  ground  of  rationalistic  and 
idealistic  metaphysics,  would  deny  that  immortal- 
ity has  to  do  with  life  after  death,  and  affirm  that 
it  signifies  the  perpetual  membership  of  the  human 
individual  in  a  realm  of  eternity  through  the  truth 
or  virtue  that  is  in  him.  But  this  interpretation 
evidently  leaves  open  the  question  of  the  immor- 
tality of  that  which  is  distinctive  and  personal  in 
human  nature. 

§  99.  So  far  we  have  followed  the  fortunes  only 
of  the  "  spirit "  of  man.  What  of  that  lower  soul 
The  Natural     through  which  he  is  identified  with  the 

Science  of 

Psychology,     fortuucs  of  his  body  ?     When  philos- 

Its  Problems  ^ 

and  Method,     ophy  gradually  ceased,  in  the  sixteenth 

and  seventeenth  centuries,  to  be  "  the  handmaid  of 

religion,"  there  arose  a  renewed  interest  in  that 

part  of  human  nature  lying  between  the  strictly 

^^  It  is  interesting,  however,  to  observe  that  current  spirit- 
uaUstic  theories  maintain  a  naturalistic  theory  of  immor- 
tality, verifiable,  it  is  alleged,  in  certain  extraordinary 
empirical  observations. 


214  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHH.OSOPHY 

physiological  functions,  on  the  one  hand,  and 
thonght  and  will  on  the  other.  Descartes  and 
Spinoza  analyzed  what  they  called  the  "  passions," 
meaning  such  states  of  mind  as  are  conditioned 
by  a  concern  for  the  interests  of  the  body.  At  a 
later  period,  certain  English  philosophers,  follow- 
ing Locke,  traced  the  deiiendence  of  ideas  upon 
the  senses.  Tlieir  method  was  that  of  introspec- 
tion, or  the  direct  examination  by  the  individual 
of  his  own  ideas,  and  for  the  sake  of  noting  their 
origin  and  composition  from  simple  factors.  The 
lineal  descendants  of  these  same  English  philos- 
ophers defined  more  carefully  the  process  of  asso- 
ciation, whereby  the  complexity  and  sequence  of 
ideas  are  brought  about,  and  made  certain  con- 
jectures as  to  its  dependence  upon  properties 
and  transactions  in  the  physical  brain.  These  are 
the  three  main  philosophical  sources  of  what  has 
now  grown  to  be  the  separate  natural  science  of 
psychology.  It  will  be  noted  that  there  are  two 
characteristics  which  all  of  these  studies  have  in 
common.  They  deal  with  the  experience  of  the 
individual  as  composing  his  own  private  history, 
and  tend  to  attribute  the  specific  course  which  this 
private  history  takes  to  bodily  conditions.  Tt  is 
only   recently   that   these   investigations   have   ac- 


I 


NORMATIVE  SCIENCES  AND  RELIGIOX      215 

quired  suflScient  unity  and  exclusiveness  of  aim  to 
warrant  their  being  regarded  as  a  special  science. 
But  such  is  now  so  far  the  case  that  the  psychol- 
ogist of  this  type  pursues  his  way  quite  indepen- 
dently of  philosophy.  It  is  true  his  research  has 
advanced  considerably  beyond  his  understanding 
of  its  province.  But  it  is  generally  recognized 
that  he  must  examine  those  very  factors  of  sub- 
jectivity which  the  natural  scientist  otherwise 
seeks  to  evade,  and,  furthermore,  that  he  must  seek 
to  provide  for  them  in  nature.  He  treats  the  inner 
life  in  what  Locke  called  "  the  plain  historical 
method,"  that  is  to  say,  instead  of  interpreting 
and  defining  its  ideas,  he  analyzes  and  reports 
upon  its  content.  He  would  not  seek  to  justify  a 
moral  judgment,  as  would  ethics,  or  to  criticise 
the  cogency  of  thought,  as  would  logic;  but  only 
to  describe  the  actual  state  as  he  found  it.  In 
order  to  make  his  data  commensurable  with  the 
phenomena  of  nature,  he  discovers  or  defines  bod- 
ily conditions  for  the  subjective  content  which  he 
analyzes.  His  fundamental  principle  of  method 
is  the  postulate  of  psycho-physical  parallelism,  ac- 
cording to  which  he  assumes  a  state  of  brain  or 
nervous  system  for  every  state  of  mind.  But  in 
adopting  a  province  and  a  method  the  psychologist 


216  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHH^OSOPHY 

foregoes  finality  of  truth  after  the  manner  of  all 
natural  science.  He  deals  admittedly  with  an 
aspect  of  experience,  and  his  conclusions  are  no 
more  adequate  to  the  nature  of  the  self  than  they 
are  to  the  nature  of  outer  objects.  An  admirable 
reference  to  this  abstract  division  of  experience 
occurs  in  Klilpe's  "  Introduction  to  Philosophy  " : 

"  For  the  developed  consciousness,  as  for  the  naive, 
every  experience  is  an  unitary  whole;  and  it  is  only  the 
habit  of  abstract  reflection  upon  experience  that  makes 
the  objective  and  subjective  worlds  seem  to  fall  apart 
as  originally  different  forms  of  existence.  Just  as  a 
plane  curve  can  be  represented  in  analytical  geometry 
as  the  function  of  two  variables,  the  abscissae  and  the 
ordinates,  without  prejudice  to  the  unitary  course  of  the 
curve  itself,  so  the  world  of  human  experience  may  be 
reduced  to  a  subjective  and  an  objective  factor,  without 
prejudice  to  its  real  coherence."" 

§  100.  The  problems  of  psychology,  like  those 
of  theology,  tend  to  disappear  as  independent  philo- 
Psychoiogy      sophical  topics.      The  ultimate  nature 

and  Philos-  f     i  ^  c        • 

ophy.  of  the  self  will  continue  to  interest  phi- 

losophers— more  deeply,  perhaps,  than  any  aspect 
of  experience — but  their  conception  of  it  will  be 
a  corollary  of  their  metaphysics  and  epistemology. 
The  remainder  of  che  field  of  the  old  philosophical 
psycholog}^,    the    introspective    and    experimental 

"  Translation  by  Pillsbury  and  Titchener,  p.  59. 


NORMATIVE  SCIENCES  AND  RELIGION      217 

analysis  of  special  states  of  mind,  is  already  the 
province  of  a  natural  science  which,  is  becoming 
more  and  more  free  from  the  stand-point  and 
method  of  philosophy. 

§  101.  Reminding  ourselves  anew  that  philo- 
sophical problems  cannot  be  treated  in  isolation 
Transition       from  ouc  another,  we  shall  hereinafter 

from  Classifi-  i     .      i  •     <    j        -ii  i 

cation  by  seck  to  bccome  acquainted  with  general 
c[a°s"rfkIion  Stand-points  that  give  systematic  unity 
by  Doctrines,    .j.^  ^j^g  issucs  which  havc  bccu  enumer- 

Naturalism. 

Subjectivism,    gitcd.     Such  staud-poiuts  are  not  clearly 

Absolute  ^  -^ 

ideaUsm.         defined    by    those    who    occupy    them. 

Absolute 

ReaUsm.  and  they  afford  no  clear-cut  classifica- 
tion of  all  historical  philosophical  philosophies. 
But  system-making  in  philosophy  is  commonly 
due  to  the  moving  in  an  individual  mind  of 
some  most  significant  idea;  and  certain  of  these 
ideas  have  reappeared  so  frequently  as  to  define 
more  or  less  clearly  marked  tendencies,  or  con- 
tinuous strands,  out  of  which  the  history  of 
thought  is  forever  weaving  itself.  Such  is  clearly 
the  case  with  naturalism.  From  the  beginning 
until  now  there  have  been  men  whose  philos- 
ophy is  a  summation  of  the  natural  sciences, 
whose  entire  thought  is  based  upon  an  acceptance 
of  the  methods  and  the  fundamental  conceptions 


218  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

of  these  disciplines.  This  tendency  stands  in  the 
history  of  thought  for  the  conviction  that  the  vis- 
ible and  tangible  world  which  interacts  with  the 
body  is  veritable  reality.  This  philosophy  is 
realistic  and  empirical  to  an  extent  entirely  deter- 
mined by  its  belief  concerning  being.  But  while 
naturalism  is  only  secondarily  epistemological, 
subjectivism  and  absolute  idealism  have  their 
very  source  in  the  self-examination  and  the  self- 
criticism  of  thought.  Subjectivism  signifies  the 
conviction  that  the  knower  cannot  escape  himself. 
If  reality  is  to  be  kept  within  the  range  of  possible 
knowledge,  it  must  be  defined  in  terms  of  the 
processes  or  states  of  selves.  Absolute  idealism 
arises  from  a  union  of  this  epistemological  motive 
with  a  recognition  of  what  are  regarded  as  the 
logical  necessities  to  which  reality  must  submit. 
Reality  must  be  both  knowledge  and  rational 
knowledge;  the  object,  in  short,  of  an  absolute 
mind,  which  shall  be  at  once  all-containing  and 
systematic.  This  rationalistic  motive  was,  how- 
ever, not  originally  associated  with  an  idealistic 
epistemology,  but  with  the  common-sense  principle 
that  being  is  discovered  and  not  constituted  by 
tliought.  Such  an  absolute  realism  is,  like  natu- 
ralism, primarily  metaphysical  rather  than  episte- 


NORMATIVE  SCIENCES  AND  RELIGION      219 

mological;  but,  unlike  naturalism,  it  seeks  to  de- 
fine reality  as  a  logical  or  ethical  necessity. 

Under  these  several  divisions,  then,  we  shall 
meet  once  more  with  the  special  problems  of  phi- 
losophy, but  this  time  they  will  be  ranged  in  an 
order  that  is  determined  by  some  central  doctrine. 
They  will  appear  as  parts  not  of  the  general  prob- 
lem of  philosophy,  but  of  some  definite  system  of 
philosophy. 


PART   III 

SYSTEMS   OF   PHILOSOPHY 


CHAPTER    VIII 


NATURALISM 


§  102.  The  meaning  conveyed  by   any  philo- 
sophical term  consists  largely  of  the  distinctions 

The  General  iwhich  it  SUggCStS.  ItS  pCCuliar  QUal- 
Meaning  of 

Materialism,  ity,  like  the  physiognoiiiy  of  the  battle- 
scarred  veteran,  is  a  composite  of  the  controversies 
which  it  has  survived.  There  is,  therefore,  an 
almost  unavoidable  confusion  attendant  upon  the 
denomination  of  any  early  phase  of  philosophy  as 
materialism.  But  in  the  historical  beginnings  of 
thought,  as  also  in  the  common-sense  of  all  ages, 
there  is  at  any  rate  present  a  very  essential  strand 
of  this  theory.  The  naive  habit  of  mind  which, 
in  the  sixth  century  before  Christ,  prompted  suc- 
cessive Greek  thinkers  to  define  reality  in  terms 

*  Preliminary  Note.  —  By  naturalism  is  meant  that 
system  of  philosophy  whicli  defines  the  universe  in  the 
terms  of  natural  science.  In  its  dogmatic  phase,  wherein  it 
maintains  that  being  is  corporeal,  it  is  called  materialism.. 
In  its  critical  phase,  wherein  it  makes  the  general  assertion 
that  the  natural  sciences  constitute  the  only  possible  knowl- 
edge, whatever  be  the  nature  of  reality  itself,  it  is  called 
positivis7n,  agnosficisni,  or  simply  naturalism. 
223 


224  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

of  water,  air,  and  fire,  is  in  this  respect  one  with 
that  exhibited  in  Dr.  Samuel  Johnson's  smiting 
the  gi-ound  with  his  stick  in  curt  refutation  of 
Bishop  Berkeley's  idea-philosophy.  There  is  a 
theoretical  instinct,  not  accidental  or  perverse,  but 
springing  from  the  very  life-preserving  equipment 
of  the  organism,  which  attributes  reality  to  tangi- 
hle  space-filling  things  encountered  by  the  body. 
For  obvious  reasons  of  self-interest  the  organism 
is  first  of  all  endowed  with  a  sense  of  contact,  and 
the  more  delicate  senses  enter  into  its  practical 
economy  as  means  of  anticipating  or  avoiding 
contact.  From  such  practical  expectations  con- 
cerning the  proximity  of  that  which  may  press 
upon,  injure,  or  displace  the  body,  arise  the  first 
crude  judgments  of  reality.  And  these  are  at  the 
same  time  the  nucleus  of  naive  philosophy  and 
the  germinal  phase  of  materialism. 

§  103.  The  first  philosophical  movement  among 
the  Greeks  was  a  series  of  attempts  to  reduce  the 
Corporeal  tangible  world  to  unity,  and  of  these 
Being.  ^j^^  conception  offered  by  Anaximander 

is  of  marked  interest  in  its  bearing  upon  the  de- 
velopment of  materialism.  This  philosopher  is 
remarkable  for  having  defined  his  first  principle, 
instead  of  having  chosen  it  from  among  the  dif- 


NATURALISM  225 

ferent  elements  already  distinguished  by  common- 
sense.  He  thought  the  unity  of  nature  to  consist 
in  its  periodic  evolution  from  and  return  into 
one  infinite  sum  of  material  (to  uTrecpov),  which, 
much  in  the  manner  of  the  "  nebula  "  of  modern 
science,  is  conceived  as  both  indeterminate  in  its 
actual  state  and  infinitely  rich  in  its  potentiality. 
The  conception  of  matter,  the  most  familiar  com- 
monplace of  science,  begins  to  be  recognizable.  It 
has  here  reached  the  point  of  signifying  a  common 
substance  for  all  tangible  things,  a  substance  that 
in  its  own  general  and  omnipresent  nature  is  with- 
out the  special  marks  that  distinguish  these  tan- 
gible things  from  one  another.  And  in  so  far  the 
philosophy  of  Anaximander  is  materialistic. 

§  104.  But  the  earliest  thinkers  are  said  to  be 
hylozoists,  rather  than  strict  materialists,  because 
Corporeal  ^^  their  failure  to  make  certain  distinc- 
Hyiozolsm  and  ^^^^^  ^^  conucction  with  the  processes 
Mechanism.  ^£  jj^^ttcr.  The  term  hylozoism  unites 
with  the  conception  of  the  formless  material  of 
the  world  {vKrj^,  that  of  an  animating  power  to 
which  its  formations  and  transformations  are  due. 
Hylozoism  itself  was  not  a  deliberate  synthesis  of 
these  two  conceptions,  but  a  primitive  practical 
tendency  to  universalize   the  conception  of  life. 


226  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

Such  "  auimism  "  instinctively  associates  with  an 
object's  bulk  and  hardness  a  capacity  for  locomo- 
tion and  general  initiative.  And  the  material 
principles  defined  by  the  philosophers  retain  this 
vague  and  comprehensive  attribute  as  a  matter 
of  course,  until  it  is  distinguished  and  separated 
through  attempts  to  understand  it. 

That  aspect  of  natural  process  which  was  most 
impressive  to  Greek  minds  of  the  reflective  type 
was  the  alternation  of  "  generation  and  decay." 
In  full  accord  with  his  more  ancient  master,  Epi- 
curus, the  Latin  poet  Lucretius  writes: 

"Thus  neither  can  death-dealing  motions  keep  the 
mastery  always,  nor  entomb  existence  forevermore ;  nor, 
on  the  other  hand,  can  the  birth  and  increase  giving 
motions  of  things  preserve  them  always  after  they  are 
born.  Thus  the  war  of  first  beginnings  waged  from 
eternity  is  carried  on  with  dubious  issue:  now  here, 
now  there,  the  life-bringing  elements  of  things  get  the 
mastery  and  are  o'ermastered  in  turn:  with  the  funeral 
wail  blends  the  cry  which  babies  raise  when  they  enter 
the  borders  of  light;  and  no  night  ever  followed  day,  nor 
morning  night,  that  heard  not,  mingling  with  the  sickly 
infant's  cries,  wailiugs  of  the  attendants  on  death  and 
black  funeral."^ 

In  a  similar  vein,  the  earliest  conceptions  of  natu- 
ral evolution   attributed   it   to  the  co working  of 

*  Lucretius:  De  Rerum  Natura,  Bk.  II,  lines  569-580. 
Translation  by  Munro. 


NATURALISM  227 

two  principles,  that  of  Love  or  union  and  that  of 
Hate  or  dissolution.  The  process  is  here  distin- 
guished from  the  material  of  nature,  but  is  still 
described  in  the  language  of  practical  life.  A 
distinction  between  two  aspects  of  vital  phenomena 
is  the  next  step.  These  may  be  regarded  in  respect 
either  of  the  motion  and  change  which  attend  them, 
or  the  rationality  which  informs  them.  Life  is 
both  effective  and  significant.  Although  neither 
of  these  ideas  ever  wholly  ceases  to  be  animistic, 
they  may  nevertheless  be  applied  quite  indepen- 
dently of  one  another.  The  one  reduces  the  primi- 
tive animistic  world  to  the  lower  end  of  its  scale, 
the  other  construes  it  in  terms  of  a  purposive  util- 
ity commensurable  with  that  of  human  action. 
Now  it  is  with  mechanism,  the  former  of  these 
diverging  ways,  that  the  development  of  material- 
ism is  identified.  For  this  philosophy  a  thing 
need  have  no  value  to  justify  its  existence,  nor  any 
acting  intelligence  to  which  it  may  owe  its  origin. 
Its  bulk  and  position  are  sufficient  for  its  being, 
and  the  operation  of  forces  capable  of  integrating, 
dividing,  or  moving  it  is  sufficient  for  its  deriva- 
tion and  history.  In  short,  there  is  no  rhyme  or 
reason  at  the  heart  of  things,  but  only  actual  mat- 
ter distributed  by  sheer  force.     With  this  elimina- 


228  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

tion  of  the  element  of  purposiveness  from  the 
hylozoistic  world,  the  content  and  process  of  nature 
are  fitted  to  one  another.  Matter  is  that  which  is 
moved  by  force,  and  force  is  the  determining 
principle  of  the  motions  of  matter.  Materialism 
is  now  definitely  equipped  with  its  fundamental 
conceptions. 

§  105.  The  central  conceptions  of  materialism 
as  a  philosophical  theory  differ  from  those  em- 
Materiaiism     ployed  in  the  physical  sciences  only  in 

and  Physical 

Science.  what  is  demanded  of  them.     The  sci- 

entist reports  upon  physical  phenomena  without 
accepting  any  further  responsibility,  while  those 
who  like  Lucretius  maintain  a  physical  meta- 
physics, must,  like  him,  prove  that  "  the  minute 
bodies  of  matter  from  everlasting  continually  up- 
hold the  sum  of  things."  But,  though  they  employ 
them  in  their  own  way,  materialists  and  all  other 
exponents  of  naturalism  derive  their  central  con- 
ceptions from  the  physical  sciences,  and  so  reflect 
the  historical  development  through  which  these 
sciences  have  passed.  To  certain  historical  phases 
of  physical  science,  in  so  far  as  these  bear  directly 
upon  the  meaning  of  naturalism,  we  now  turn. 

§  106.  From  the  earliest  times  down  to  the 
present  day  the  groundwork  of  materialism  has 


NATURALISM  229 

most  commonly  been  east  in  the  form  of  an  atomic 
theory.  Democritus,  the  first  system-builder  of 
The  Develop-   this  school,  adopted  the  conception  of 

ment  of  the  ^  r  i 

Conceptions     indivisible   particles    {aTOfioc),   impene- 

of  Physical 

Science.  trablc  in  their  occupancy  of  space,  and 

Space  and 

Matter.  Varying  among  themselves  only  in  form, 

order,  and  position.  To  provide  for  the  motion 
that  distributes  them  he  conceived  them  as  sep- 
arated from  one  another  by  empty  space.  From 
this  it  follows  that  the  void  is  as  real  as  matter,  or, 
as  Democritus  himself  is  reputed  to  have  said, 
"  thing  is  not  more  real  than  no-thing." 

But  atomism  has  not  been  by  any  means  uni- 
versally regarded  as  the  most  satisfactory  concep- 
tion of  the  relation  between  space  and  matter. 
Not  only  does  it  require  two  kinds  of  being,  with 
the  different  attributes  of  extension  and  hardness, 
respectively,^  but  it  would  also  seem  to  be  experi- 
mentally inadequate  in  the  case  of  the  more  subtle 
physical  processes,  such  as  light.  The  former  of 
these  is  a  speculative  consideration,  and  as  such 
had  no  little  weight  with  the  French  philosopher 
Descartes,  whose  divisions  and  definitions  so  pro- 
foundly affected  the  course  of  thought  in  these 

^  The  reader  will  find  an  interesting  account  of  these 
opposing  views  in  Locke's  chapter  on  Space,  in  his  Essay 
Concerning  Human  Understanding. 


2,30  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

matters  after  the  sixteenth  century.  Holding  also 
"  that  a  vacimm  or  space  in  Avhich  there  is  abso- 
lutely no  body  is  repugnant  to  reason,"  and  that 
an  indivisible  space-filling  particle  is  self-contra- 
dictory, he  was  led  to  identify  space  and  matter; 
that  is,  to  make  matter  as  indispensable  to  space 
as  space  to  matter.  There  is,  then,  but  one  kind 
of  corporeal  being,  whose  attribute  is  extension, 
and  whose  modes  are  motion  and  rest.  The  most 
famous  application  of  the  mechanical  conceptions 
which  he  bases  upon  this  first  principle,  is  his 
theory  of  the  planets,  which  are  conceived  to  be 
embedded  in  a  transparent  medium,  and  to  move 
with  it,  vortex  fashion,  about  the  sun."* 

But  the  conception*  of  the  space-filling  continuity 
of  material  substance  owes  its  prominence  at  the 
present  time  to  the  experimental  hypothesis  of 
ether.  This  substance,  originally  conceived  to 
occupy  the  intermolecular  spaces  and  to  serve  as 
a  medium  for  the  propagation  of  undulations,  is 
now  regarded  by  many  physicists  as  replacing 
matter.  "  It  is  the  great  hope  of  science  at  the 
present  day,"  says  a  contemporary  exponent  of 
naturalism,  "  that  hard  and  heavy  matter  will  be 

*  Descartes  distinguislied  his  theory  from  tliat  of  Democ- 
ritus  in  the  Principles  of  Philosophy,  Part  IV,  §  ccii. 


NATURALISM  231 

shown  to  be  ether  in  motion."  ^  Such  a  theory 
would  reduce  bodies  to  the  relative  displacements 
of  parts  of  a  continuous  substance,  which  would 
be  first  of  all  defined  as  spacial,  and  would  pos- 
sess such  further  properties  as  special  scientific 
hypotheses  might  require. 

Two  broadly  contrasting  theories  thus  appear: 
that  which  defines  matter  as  a  continvious  sub- 
stance coextensive  with  space;  and  that  which  de- 
fines it  as  a  discrete  substance  divided  by  empty 
space.  But  both  theories  are  seriously  affected  by 
the  peculiarly  significant  development  of  the  con- 
ception of  force. 

§  lOY.  In  the  Cartesian  system  the  cause  of 
motion  was  pressure  within  a  plenum.  But  in  the 
Motion  and  Seventeenth  century  this  notion  encoun- 
*Devefo"pment  *^^^^  *^^^  systcm  of  K'cwton,  a  systcm 
and  Extension  ^yhich   sccmcd   to   iuvolvc   actiou   at   a 

of  the  Concep- 
tion of  Force,   distance.      In   the  year   1728    Voltaire 

wrote  from  London: 

"  When  a  Frenchman  arrives  in  London,  he  finds  a 
very  great  change,  in  philosophy  as  well  as  in  most  other 
things.  In  Paris  he  left  the  world  all  full  of  matter; 
here  he  finds  absolute  vacua.  At  Paris  the  miiverse  is 
seen  filled  up  with  ethereal  vortices,  while  here  the  same 

^  Pearson:  Grammar  of  Science,  pp.  259-260.  Cf.  ibid., 
Chap.  VII,  entire. 


232  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

space  is  occupied  with  the  play  of  the  in\asible  forces  of 
gravitation.  In  Paris  the  earth  is  painted  for  us  longish 
like  an  egg,  and  in  London  it  is  oblate  Uke  a  melon.  At 
Paris  the  pressure  of  the  moon  causes  the  ebb  and  flow 
of  tides;  in  England,  on  the  other  hand,  the  sea  gravitates 
toward  the  moon,  so  that  at  the  same  time  when  the 
Parisians  demand  high  water  of  the  moon,  the  gentlemen 
of  London  require  an  ebb."' 

But  these  differences  are  not  matters  of  taste, 
nor  even  rival  hypotheses  upon  an  equal  footing. 
The  Newtonian  system  of  mechanics,  the  consum- 
mation of  a  development  initiated  by  Galileo,  dif- 
fered from  the  vortex  theory  of  Descartes  as  exact 
science  differs  from  speculation  and  unverified 
conjecture.  And  this  difference  of  method  carried 
with  it  eventually  certain  profound  differences  of 
content,  distinguishing  the  Newtonian  theory  even 
from  that  of  Democritus,  with  which  it  had  so 
much  in  common.  Although  Democritus  had 
sought  to  avoid  the  element  of  purposiveness  in 
the  older  hylozoism  by  referring  the  motions  of 
bodies  as  far  as  possible  to  the  impact  of  other 
bodies,  he  nevertheless  attributed  these  motions 
ultimately  to  weight,  signifying  thereby  a  certain 
downward  disposition.  Now  it  is  true  that  in  his 
general  belief  Newton  himself  is  not  free  from 
hylozoism.  He  thought  of  the  motions  of  the 
•  Quoted  in  Ueberweg:  History  of  Philosophy,  II,  p.  124. 


NATURALISM  233 

planets  themselves  as  initiated  and  quickened  by 
a  power  emanating  ultimately  from  God.  They 
are  "  impressed  by  an  intelligent  Agent,"  and 

"  can  be  the  effect  of  nothing  else  than  the  wisdom  and 
skill  of  a  powerful  ever-living  Agent  who,  being  in  all 
places,  is  more  able  by  his  will  to  move  the  bodies  within 
his  boundless  uniform  sensorium,  and  thereby  to  form 
and  reform  the  parts  of  the  universe,  than  we  are  by  our 
will  to  move  the  parts  of  our  own  bodies." ' 

But  by  the  side  of  these  statements  must  be  set 
his  famous  disclaimer,  "  hypotheses  non  fingo.^^ 
In  his  capacity  of  natural  philosopher  he  did  not 
seek  to  explain  motions,  but  only  to  describe  them. 
Disbelieving  as  he  did  in  action  at  a  distance,  he 
saw  no  possibility  of  explanation  short  of  a  refer- 
ence of  them  to  God ;  but  such  "  hypotheses  "  he 
thought  to  be  no  proper  concern  of  science.  As  a 
consequence,  the  mathematical  formulation  of  mo- 
tions came,  through  him,  to  be  regarded  as  the 
entire  content  of  mechanics.  The  notion  of  an 
efficient  cause  of  motion  is  still  suggested  by  the 
term  force,  but  even  this  term  within  the  sys; 
tern  of  mechanics  refers  always  to  a  definite 
amount  of  motion,  or  measurement  of  relative  mo- 
tion.    And  the  same  is  true  of  attraction,  action, 

'  Quoted  from  the   Opticks  of  Newton  by  James  Ward, 
in  his  Naturalism  and  Agnosticism,  I,  p.  43. 


234  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

reaction,  and  the  like.  The  further  explanation 
of  motion,  the  definition  of  a  virtue  or  potency 
that  produces  it,  first  a  neglected  problem,  then  an 
irrelevant  problem,  is  finally,  for  a  naturalistic 
philosophy  in  which  this  progression  is  completed, 
an  insoluble  problem.  For  the  sequel  to  this 
purely  descriptive  procedure  on  the  part  of  science 
is  the  disavowal  of  "  metaphysics  "  by  those  who 
will  have  no  philosophy  but  science.  Thus  the 
scientific  conservatism  of  Newton  has  led  to  the 
positivistic  and  agnostic  phase  of  naturalism.  But 
a  further  treatment  of  this  development  must  be 
reserved  until  the  issue  of  epistemology  shall  have 
been  definitely  raised. 

A  different  emphasis  within  the  general  mechan- 
ical scheme,  attaching  especial  importance  to  the 
conceptions  of  force  and  energy,  has  led  to  a  rival 
tendency  in  science  and  a  contrasting  type  of  natu- 
ralism. The  mechanical  hypotheses  hitherto  de- 
scribed are  all  of  a  simple  and  readily  depicted 
type.  They  suggest  an  imagery  quite  in  accord 
with  common-sense  and  with  observation  of  the 
motions  of  great  masses  like  the  planets.  Material 
particles  are  conceived  to  move  within  a  contain- 
ing space ;  the  motions  of  corpuscles,  atoms,  or  the 
minute   parts  of  ether,   differing  only  in   degree 


NATURALISM  235 

from  those  of  visible  bodies.  The  whole  physical 
universe  may  be  represented  in  the  imagination 
as  an  aggregate  of  bodies  participating  in  motions 
of  extraordinary  complexity,  but  of  one  type. 
But  now  let  the  emphasis  be  placed  upon  the  de- 
termining causes  rather  than  upon  the  moving 
bodies  themselves.  In  other  words,  let  the  bodies 
be  regarded  as  attributive  and  the  forces  as  sub- 
stantive. The  result  is  a  radical  alteration  of  the 
mechanical  scheme  and  the  transcendence  of  com- 
mon-sense imagery.  This  was  one  direction  of 
outgrowth  from  the  w^ork  of  Newton.  His  force 
of  gravitation  prevailed  between  bodies  separated 
by  spaces  of  great  magnitude.  Certain  of  the  fol- 
lowers of  Newton,  notably  Cotes,  accepting  the 
formulas  of  the  master  but  neglecting  his  allusions 
to  the  agency  of  God,  accepted  the  principle  of 
action  at  a  distance.  Force,  in  short,  was  con- 
ceived to  pervade  space  of  itself.  But  if  force  be 
granted  this  substantial  and  self-dependent  char- 
acter, what  further  need  is  there  of  matter  as  a 
separate  form  of  entity?  For  does  not  the  pres- 
ence of  matter  consist  essentially  in  resistance, 
itself  a  case  of  force  ?  Such  reflections  as  these 
led  Boscovich  and  others  to  the  radical  departure 
of  defining  material  particles  as  centres  of  force. 


236  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

§  108.  But  a  more  fruitful  hypothesis  of  the 
same  general  order  is  due  to  the  attention  directed 
The  Develop-  to  the  Conception  of  energy,  or  capacity 

ment  and  Ex- 
tension of  the  for  work,   by  experimental  discoveries 

Conception  /•      i  m  •!• 

of  Energy.  01  the  possibility  01  reciprocal  trans- 
formations without  loss,  of  motion,  heat,  electric- 
ity, and  other  processes.  The  principle  of  the 
conservation  of  energy  affirms  the  quantitative 
constancy  of  that  which  is  so  transformed,  meas- 
ured, for  example,  in  terms  of  capacity  to  move 
units  of  mass  against  gravity.  The  exponents  of 
what  is  called  "  energetics  "  have  in  many  cases 
come  to  regard  that  the  quantity  of  which  is  so 
conserved,  as  a  substantial  reality  whose  forms  and 
distributions  compose  nature.  A  contemporary 
scientist,  whose  synthetic  and  dogmatic  habit  of 
mind  has  made  him  eminent  in  the  ranks  of  popu- 
lar philosophy,  writes  as  follows: 

"  Mechanical  and  chemical  energy,  sound  and  heat, 
light  and  electricity,  are  mutually  convertible;  they 
seem  to  be  but  different  modes  of  one  and  the  same 
fundamental  force  or  energy.  Thence  follows  the  im- 
portant thesis  of  the  unity  of  all  natural  forces,  or,  as  it 
may  also  be  expressed,  the  'monism  of  energy.'"  * 

*  Haeckel:  Riddle  of  the  Universe.  Translation  by  Mc- 
Cabe,  p.  254. 

The    best  systematic    presentation  of  "  energetics"  is  to 

be  finiiid  in  O.stwald's  Vorlcsangcii   iiher  Natur-Philosophie. 


NATURALISM  237 

The  conception  of  energy  seems,  indeed,  to 
afford  an  exceptional  opportunity  to  naturalism. 
We  have  seen  that  the  matter-motion  theory  was 
satisfied  to  ignore,  or  regard  as  insoluble,  problems 
concerning  the  ultimate  causes  of  things.  Further- 
more, as  we  shall  presently  see  to  better  advantage, 
the  more  strictly  materialistic  type  of  naturalism 
must  regard  thought  as  an  anomaly,  and  has  no 
little  difiiculty  with  life.  But  the  conception  of 
energy  is  more  adaptable,  and  hence  better  quali- 
fied to  serve  as  a  common  denominator  for  various 
aspects  of  experience.  The  very  readiness  with 
which  we  can  picture  the  corpuscular  scheme  is  a 
source  of  embarrassment  to  the  seeker  after  unity. 
That  which  is  so  distinct  is  bristling  with  incom- 
patibilities. The  most  aggressive  materialist  hesi- 
tates to  describe  thought  as  a  motion  of  bodies  in 
space.  Energy,  on  the  other  hand,  exacts  little 
if  anything  beyond  the  character  of  measurable 
power.  Thought  is  at  any  rate  in  some  sense  a 
power,  and  to  some  degi-ee  measurable.  Recent 
discoveries  of  the  dependence  of  capacity  for  men- 
tal exertion  upon  physical  vitality  and  measure- 
ments of  chemical  energy  received  into  the  system 

Herbert  Spencer,  in  his  well-known  First  Principles,  makes 
philosophical  use  of  both  "force"  and  "energy." 


238  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

as  food,  and  somehow  exhausted  by  the  activities 
of  thought,  have  lent  plausibility  to  the  hypothesis 
of  a  universal  energy  of  which  physical  and  "  psy- 
chical "  processes  are  alike  manifestations.  And 
the  conception  of  energy  seems  capable  not  only 
of  unifying  nature,  but  also  of  satisfying  the 
metaphysical  demand  for  an  efficient  and  moving 
cause.  This  term,  like  "  force  "  and  "  power,"  is 
endowed  with  such  a  significance  by  common 
sense.  Indeed,  naturalism  would  seem  here  to 
have  swung  round  toward  its  hylozoistic  starting- 
point.  The  exponent  of  energetics,  like  the  naive 
animistic  thinker,  attributes  to  nature  a  power  like 
that  which  he  feels  welling  up  within  himself. 
When  he  acts  upon  the  environment,  like  meets 
like.  Energetics,  it  is  true,  may  obtain  a  definite 
meaning  for  its  central  conception  from  the  meas- 
urable behavior  of  external  bodies,  and  a  meaning 
that  may  be  quite  free  from  vitalism  or  teleology. 
But  in  his  extension  of  the  conception  the  author 
of  a  philosophical  energetics  abandons  this  strict 
meaning,  and  blends  his  thought  even  with  a  phase 
of  subjectivism,  known  as  panpsychism.^  This 
theory  regards  the  inward  life  of  all  nature  as 
homogeneous  with  an  immediately  felt  activity  or 
» Cf.  Chap.  IX. 


NATURALISM  239 

appetency,  as  energetics  finds  the  inner  life  to  be 
homogeneous  with  the  forces  of  nature.  Both  owe 
their  philosophical  appeal  to  their  apparent  success 
in  unifying  the  world  upon  a  direct  empirical 
basis,  and  to  their  provision  for  the  practical  sense 
of  reality. 

Such,  in  brief,  are  the  main  alternatives  avail- 
able for  a  naturalistic  theory  of  being,  in  conse- 
quence of  the  historical  development  of  the  funda- 
mental conceptions  of  natural  science. 

§  109.  We  turn  now  to  an  examination  of  the 

manner  in  which  naturalism,  equipped  with  work- 

,  insr  principles,  seeks  to  meet  the  special 

The  Claims  of         &  r  r       5  r 

Naturalism,  requirements  of  philosophy.  The  con- 
ception of  the  unity  of  nature  is  directly  in  the 
line  of  a  purely  scientific  development,  but  natu- 
ralism takes  the  bold  and  radical  step  of  regarding 
nature  so  unified  as  coextensive  with  the  real,  or 
at  any  rate  knowable,  universe.  It  will  be  remem- 
bered that  among  the  early  Greeks  Anaxagoras 
had  referred  the  creative  and  formative  processes 
of  nature  to  a  non-natural  or  rational  agency,  which 
he  called  the  Nous.  The  adventitious  character  of 
this  principle,  the  external  and  almost  purely 
nominal  part  which  it  played  in  the  actual  cos- 
mology of  Anaxagoras,  betrayed  it  into  the  hands 


240  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

of  the  atomlsts,  with  their  more  consistently  natu- 
ralistic creed.  Better,  these  maintain,  the  some- 
what dogmatic  extension  of  conceptions  proved  to 
be  successful  in  the  description  of  nature,  than  a 
vague  dualism  which  can  serve  only  to  distract  the 
scientific  attention  and  people  the  world  with  ob- 
scurities. There  is  a  remarkable  passage  in  Lu- 
cretius in  which  atomism  is  thus  written  large  and 
inspired  with  cosmical  eloquence: 

"  For  verily  not  by  design  did  the  first-beginnings  of 
things  station  themselves  each  in  its  right  place  guided 
by  keen  intelligence,  nor  did  they  bargain  sooth  to  say 
what  motions  each  should  assimie,  but  because  many  in 
number  and  shifting  about  in  many  ways  throughout 
the  universe,  they  are  driven  and  tormented  by  blows 
during  infinite  time  past,  after  trying  motions  and  unions 
of  every  kind  at  length  they  fall  into  arrangements  such 
as  those  out  of  which  our  sum  of  things  has  been  formed, 
and  by  which  too  it  is  preserved  through  many  great 
years,  when  once  it  has  been  thrown  into  the  appropriate 
motions,  and  causes  the  streams  to  replenish  the  greedy 
sea  with  copious  river  waters,  and  the  earth,  fostered  by 
the  heat  of  the  sun,  to  renew  its  produce,  and  the  race  of 
living  things  to  come  up  and  flourish,  and  the  gliding 
fires  of  ether  to  live:  all  which  these  several  things  could 
in  no  wise  bring  to  pass,  unless  a  store  of  matter  could 
rise  up  from  infinite  space,  out  of  which  store  they  are 
wont  to  make  up  in  due  season  whatever  has  been  lost."" 

The    prophecy    of   La    Place,    the    great    French 

mathematician,    voices    the    similar    faith    of   the 

'"  Lucretius:  Op.  cit.,  lik.  I,  linos  1021-1237. 


NATURALISM  241 

eighteenth  century  in  a  mechanical  understanding 
of  the  universe: 

"  The  human  mind,  in  the  perfection  it  has  been  able 
to  give  to  astronomy,  affords  a  feeble  outline  of  such  an 
intelligence.  Its  discoveries  in  mechanics  and  in  geome- 
try, joined  to  that  of  universal  gravitation,  have  brought 
it  within  reach  of  comprehending  in  the  same  analytical 
expressions  the  past  and  future  states  of  the  system  of 
the  world."" 

As  for  God,  the  creative  and  presiding  intelligence, 
La  Place  had  "  no  need  of  any  such  hypothesis." 

§  110.  But  these  are  the  boasts  of  Homeric 
heroes  before  going  into  battle.  The  moment 
T  k  of  ^^^^  ^  general  position  is  assumed  there 
NaturaUsm.  arise  Sundry  difficulties  in  the  applica- 
tion of  naturalistic  principles  to  special  interests 
and  groups  of  facts.  It  is  one  thing  to  project  a 
mechanical  scheme  in  the  large,  but  quite  another 
to  make  explicit  provision  within  it  for  the  origin 
of  nature,  for  life,  for  the  human  self  with  its 
ideals,  and  for  society  with  its  institutions.  The 
naturalistic  method  of  meeting  these  problems  in- 
volves a  reduction  all  along  the  line  in  the  direc- 
tion of  such  categories  as  are  derived  from  the 
infra-organic  world.     That  which  is  not  like  the 

"  Quoted  from  La  Place's  essay  on  Probability  by  Ward : 
Op.  cit.,  I,  p.  41. 


242  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

planetary  system  must  be  construed  as  mechanical 
by  indirection  and  subtlety. 

§  111.  The  origin  of  the  present  known  natural 
world  was  the  first  philosophical  question  to  be 
TheOri  "n  of  ^^^finitely  met  by  science.  The  general 
the  Cosmos,  form  of  solution  which  naturalism  of- 
fers is  anticipated  in  the  most  ancient  theories  of 
nature.  These  already  suppose  that  the  observed 
mechanical  processes  of  the  circular  or  periodic 
type,  like  the  revolutions  and  rotations  of  the  stars, 
are  incidents  in  a  historical  mechanical  process  of 
a  larger  scale.  Prior  to  the  present  fixed  motions 
of  the  celestial  bodies,  the  whole  mass  of  cosmic 
matter  participated  in  irregular  motions  analogous 
to  present  terrestrial  redistributions.  Such  mo- 
tions may  be  understood  to  have  resulted  in  the 
integration  of  separate  bodies,  to  which  they  at 
the  same  time  imparted  a  rotary  motion.  It  is 
such  a  hypothesis  that  Lucretius  paints  in  his  bold, 
impressionistic  colors. 

But  the  development  of  mechanics  paved  the 
way  for  a  definite  scientific  theory,  the  so-called 
"  nebular  hypothesis,"  announced  by  La  Place  in 
1796,  and  by  the  philosopher  Kant  at  a  still  earlier 
date.  Largely  through  the  Newtonian  principle 
of  the  parallelogram  of  forces,  the  present  masses, 


NATURALISM  243 

orbits,  and  velocities  were  analyzed  into  a  more 
primitive  process  of  concentration  within  a  nebu- 
lous or  Highly  diffused  aggregate  of  matter.  And 
with  the  aid  of  the  principle  of  the  conservation 
of  energy  this  theory  appears  to  make  possible  the 
derivation  of  heat,  light,  and  other  apparently 
non-mechanical  processes  from  the  same  original 
energy  of  motion. 

But  a  persistently  philosophical  mind  at  once 
raises  the  question  of  the  origin  of  this  primeval 
nebula  itself,  with  a  definite  organization  and  a 
vast  potential  energy  that  must,  after  all,  be  re- 
garded as  a  part  of  nature  rather  than  its  source. 
Several  courses  are  here  open  to  naturalism.  It 
may  maintain  that  the  question  of  ultimate  origin 
is  unanswerable;  it  may  regard  such  a  process  of 
concentration  as  extending  back  through  an  infi- 
nitely long  past;^^  or,  and  this  is  the  favorite 
alternative  for  more  constructive  minds,  the  his- 
torical cosmical  process  may  be  included  within  a 
still  higher  type  of  periodic  process,  which  is  re- 
garded as  eternal.  This  last  course  has  been  fol- 
lowed in  the  well-known  synthetic  naturalism  of 
Herbert  Spencer.     "  Evolution,"  he  says,  "  is  the 

"  An  interesting  account  and  criticism  of  such  a  theory 
(Cliflford's)  is  to  be  found  in  Royce's  Spirit  of  Modem  Philoso- 
phy, Lecture  X. 


2-44  THE  APPROACH  TO   PHILOSOPHY 

progressive  integration  of  matter  and  dissipation 
of  motion."  But  such  a  process  eventually  runs 
down,  and  may  be  conceived  as  giving  place  to  a 
counter-process  of  devolution  which  scatters  the 
parts  of  matter  and  gathers  another  store  of  poten- 
tial motion.  The  two  processes  in  alternation  will 
then  constitute  a  cosmical  system  without  begin- 
ning or  end. 

In  such  wise  a  sweeping  survey  of  the  physical 
universe  may  be  thought  in  the  terms  of  natural 
science.  The  uniformitarian  method  in  geology, 
resolving  the  history  of  the  crust  of  the  earth 
into  known  processes,  such  as  erosion  and  igneous 
fusion ;  ^^  and  spectral  analysis,  with  its  discov- 
eries concerning  the  chemical  constituents  of  dis- 
tant bodies  through  the  study  of  their  light,  have 
powerfully  reenforced  this  effort  of  thought,  and 
apparently  completed  an  outline  sketch  of  the  uni- 
verse in  terms  of  infra-organic  processes. 

§  112.  But  the  cosmos  must  be  made  internally 
homogeneous  in  these  same  terms.  There  awaits 
Life.  solution,  in  the  first  place,  the  serious 

Natural  .  , 

Selection.        problem  of  the  genesis  and  maintenance 

of  life  within  a  nature  that  is  originally  and  ulti- 

"  This  method  replaced  the  old  theory  of  "  catastrophes" 
throufjh  the  efforts  of  the  English  geologists,  Hutton  (1726- 
1797)  and  Lyell  (1767-1849). 


NATURALISM  245 

mately  inorganic.  The  assimilation  of  the  field  of 
biology  and  physiology  to  the  mechanical  cosmos 
had  made  little  real  progress  prior  to  the  nine- 
teenth century.  Mechanical  theories  had,  indeed, 
been  projected  in  the  earliest  age  of  philosophy, 
and  proposed  anew  in  the  seventeenth  century.  ^^ 
Nevertheless,  the  structural  and  functional  tele- 
ology of  the  organism  remained  as  apparently 
irrefutable  testimony  to  the  inworking  of  some 
principle  other  than  that  of  mechanical  necessity. 
Indeed,  the  only  fruitful  method  applicable  to 
organic  phenomena  was  that  which  explained  them 
in  terms  of  purposive  adaptation.  And  it  was  its 
provision  for  a  mechanical  interpretation  of  this 
very  principle  that  gave  to  the  Darwinian  law  of 
natural  selection,  promulgated  in  1859  in  the 
"  Origin  of  Species,"  so  profound  a  significance 
for  naturalism.  It  threatened  to  reduce  the  last 
stronghold  of  teleology,  and  completely  to  dispense 
with  the  intelligent  Author  of  nature. 

Darwin's  hypothesis  sought  to  explain  the  origin 
of  animal  species  by  survival  under  competitive 
conditions  of  existence  through  the  possession  of 
a  structure  suited  to  the  environment.     Only  the 

"  Harvey's  discovery  of  the  circulation  of  the  blood, 
published  in  162S,  was  regarded  as  a  step  in  this  direction. 


246  1'HE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

most  elementary  organism  need  Le  presupposed, 
together  with  slight  variations  in  the  course  of 
subsequent  generations,  and  both  may  be  conceived 
to  arise  mechanically.  There  will  then  result  in 
surviving  organisms  a  gradual  accumulation  of 
such  variations  as  promote  survival  under  the  spe- 
cial conditions  of  the  environment.  Such  a  prin- 
ciple had  been  suggested  as  early  as  the  time  of 
Empedocles,  but  it  remained  for  Darwin  to  estab- 
lish it  with  an  unanswerable  array  of  observation 
and  experimentation.  If  any  organism  whatsoever 
endowed  with  the  power  of  generation  be  allowed 
to  have  somehow  come  to  be,  naturalism  now  prom- 
ises to  account  for  the  whole  subsequent  history 
of  organic  phenomena  and  the  origin  of  any  known 
species. 

§  113.  But  what  of  life  itself?  The  question 
of  the  derivation  of  organic  from  inorganic  matter 
„   ^    .    ,      has  proved  insoluble  bv   direct  means, 

Mechanical  ^  v  ^ 

Physiology,  gj^^  ^jj^j  ^^^^  ^f  naturalism  must  here 
rest  upon  such  facts  as  the  chemical  homogeneity 
of  these  two  kinds  of  matter,  and  the  conformity 
^of  physiological  processes  to  more  general  physical 
laws.  Organic  matter  differs  from  inorganic  only 
througli  the  presence  of  proteid,  a  peculiar  product 
of  known  elements,   which  cannot  be   artificially 


NATURALISM  247 

produced,  but  wliicli  is  by  natural  means  perpetu- 
ally dissolved  into  these  elements  without  any  dis- 
coverable residuum.  Respiration  may  be  studied 
as  a  case  of  aerodynamics,  the  circulation  of  the 
blood  as  a  case  of  hydrodynamics,  and  the  heat 
given  off  in  the  course  of  work  done  by  the  body 
as  a  case  of  thermodynamics.  And  although  vital- 
istic  theories  still  retain  a  place  in  physiology,  as 
do  teleological  theories  in  biology,  on  the  whole 
the  naturalistic  programme  of  a  reduction  of  or- 
ganic processes  to  the  type  of  the  inorganic  tends 
to  prevail. 

§  114.  The  history  of  naturalism  shows  that, 
as  in  the  case  of  life,  so  also  in  the  case  of  mind. 
Mind.  its  hypotheses   were   projected  by   the 

to  Sensation.  Greeks,  but  precisely  formulated  and 
verified  only  in  the  modern  period  of  science.  In 
the  philosophy  of  Democritus  the  soul  was  itself 
an  atom,  finer,  rounder,  and  smoother  than  the 
ordinary,  but  thoroughly  a  part  of  the  mechanism 
of  nature.  The  processes  of  the  soul  are  construed 
as  interactions  between  the  soul  and  surrounding 
objects.  In  sensation,  the  thing  perceived  pro- 
duces images  by  means  of  efSuxes  which  impinge 
upon  the  soul-atom.  These  images  are  not  true 
reports  of  the  outer  world,  but  must  be  revised  by 


248  THE  APPROACH  TO   PHILOSOPHY 

thouglit  before  its  real  atomic  structure  emerges. 
For  this  higher  critical  exercise  of  thought  De- 
mocritus  devised  no  special  atomic  genesis.  The 
result  may  be  expressed  either  as  the  invalidity  of 
such  operations  of  mind  as  he  could  provide  for 
in  his  universe,  or  the  irreducibility  to  his  chosen 
first  principles  of  the  very  thought  which  defined 
them.  Later  naturalism  has  generally  sacrificed 
epistemology  to  cosmology,  and  reduced  thouglit  to 
sensation.  Similarly,  will  has  been  regarded  as  a 
highly  developed  case  of  instinct.  Knowledge  and 
will,  construed  as  sensation  and  instinct,  may  thus 
be  interpreted  in  the  naturalistic  manner  within 
the  field  of  biology. 

§  115.  But  the  actual  content  of  sensation,  and 
the  actual  feelings  which  attend  upon  the  prompt- 
Automatism,  ings  of  instinct,  still  stubbornly  testify 
to  the  presence  in  the  universe  of  something  belong- 
ing to  a  wholly  different  category  from  matter  and 
motion.  The  attitude  of  naturalism  in  this  crucial 
issue  has  never  been  fixed  and  unwavering,  but 
there  has  gradually  come  to  predominate  a  method 
of  denying  to  the  inner  life  all  efficacy  and  real 
significance  in  the  cosmos,  while  admitting  its 
presence  on  the  scene.  It  is  a  strange  fact  of  his- 
tory that  Descartes,  the  French  philosopher  who 


NATURALISM  249 

prided  himself  on  having  rid  the  soul  of  all 
dependence  on  nature,  should  have  greatly  con- 
tributed to  this  method.  But  it  is  perhaps  not  so 
strange  when  we  consider  that  every  dualism  is, 
after  all,  symmetrical,  and  that  consequently  what- 
ever rids  the  soul  of  nature  at  the  same  time  rids 
nature  of  the  soul.  It  was  Descartes  who  first  con- 
ceived the  body  and  soul  to  be  utterly  distinct 
substances.  The  corollary  to  this  doctrine  was  his 
automatism,  applied  in  his  own  system  to  animals 
other  than  man,  but  which  those  less  concerned 
with  religious  tradition  and  less  firmly  convinced 
of  the  soul's  originating  activity  were  not  slow  to 
apply  universally.  This  theory  conceived  the  vital 
processes  to  take  place  quite  regardless  of  any 
inner  consciousness,  or  even  without  its  attendance. 
To  this  radical  theory  the  French  materialists  of 
the  eighteenth  century  were  especially  attracted. 
With  them  the  active  soul  of  Descartes,  the  distinct 
spiritual  entity,  disappeared.  This  latter  author 
had  himself  admitted  a  department  of  the  self, 
which  he  called  the  "  passions,"  in  which  the 
course  and  content  of  mind  is  determined  by  bod- 
ily conditions.  Extending  this  conception  to  the 
Avhole  province  of  mind,  they  employed  it  to  dem- 
onstrate the  thorough-going  subordination  of  mind 


250  THE  APPROACH  TO   PHH.OSOPHY 

to  body.  La  Mettrie,  a  physician  and  the  author 
of  a  hook  entitled  "  L'Homme  Machine,"  was  first 
interested  in  this  thesis  by  a  fever  delirium,  and 
afterward  adduced  anatomical  and  pathological 
data  in  support  of  it.  The  angle  from  which  he 
views  human  life  is  well  illustrated  in  the  fol- 
lowing : 

"  What  would  have  sufficed  in  the  case  of  Julius  Caesar, 
of  Seneca,  of  Petronius,  to  turn  their  fearlessness  into 
timidity  or  braggartry?  An  obstruction  in  the  spleen, 
the  liver,  or  the  vena  portae.  For  the  imagination  is 
intimately  connected  with  these  viscera,  and  from  them 
arise  all  the  curious  phenomena  of  hypochondria  and 
hysteria.  ...  'A  mere  nothing,  a  little  fibre,  some 
trifling  thing  that  the  most  subtle  anatomy  cannot  dis- 
cover, would  have  made  two  idiots  out  of  Erasmus  and 
Fontenelle.""^ 

§  116.  The  extreme  claim  that  the  soul  is  a 
physical  organ  of  the  body,  identical  with  the 
Radical  braiu,  marked  the  culmination  of  this 

Materialism. 

Mind  as  an  militant  materialism,  so  good  an  in- 
non.  stance   of  that   over-simplification    and 

whole-hearted  conviction  characteristic  of  the  doc- 
trinaire propagandism  of  France.  Locke,  the  Eng- 
lishman, had  admitted  that  possibly  the  substance 
whieli  thinks  is  corporeal.     In  the  letters  of  Vol- 

^^  From  the  account  of  La  Mettrie  in  Lange:  History  of 
Materialism.     Translation  by  Thomas,  II,  pp.  67-68. 


NATURALISM  251 

taire  this  thought  has  already  found  a  more  posi- 
tive expression : 

"  I  am  body,  and  I  think ;  more  I  do  not  know.  Shall 
I  then  attribute  to  an  unknown  cause  what  I  can  so 
easily  attribute  to  the  only  fruitful  cause  I  am  acquainted 
with?  In  fact,  where  is  the  man  who,  without  an  absurd 
godlessness,  dare  assert  that  it  is  impossible  for  the 
Creator  to  endow  matter  with  thought  and  feeling?  "  " 

Finally,  Plolbach,  the  great  systematizer  of  this 
movement,  takes  the  affair  out  of  the  hands  of  the 
Creator  and  definitively  announces  that  "  a  sensi- 
tive soul  is  nothing  but  a  human  brain  so  consti- 
tuted that  it  easily  receives  the  motions  communi- 
cated to  it."  1^ 

This  theory  has  been  considerably  tempered 
since  the  age  of  Holbach.  IN'aturalism  has  latterly 
been  less  interested  in  identifying  the  soul  with 
the  body,  and  more  interested  in  demonstrating  its 
dependence  upon  specific  bodily  conditions,  after 
the  manner  of  La  Mettrie.  The  so-called  higher 
faculties,  such  as  thought  and  will,  have  been  re- 
lated to  central  or  cortical  processes  of  the  nervous 
system,  processes  of  connection  and  complication 
which  within  the  brain  itself  supplement  the  im- 
pulses and  sensations  congenitally  and  externally 

*'  Quoted  from  Voltaire's  London  Letter  on  the  English, 
by  Lange:  Op.  cit.,  II,  p.  18. 

1'  Quoted  by  Lange:  Op.  cit.,  II,  p.  113. 


252  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

stimulated.  The  term  "  epiphenomenon  "  has  been 
adopted  to  express  the  distinctness  but  entire  de- 
pendence of  the  mind.  Man  is  "  a  conscious 
automaton."  The  real  course  of  nature  passes 
through  his  nervous  system,  while  consciousness 
attends  upon  its  functions  like  a  shadow,  present 
but  not  efficient.^  ^ 

§  117.  Holbach's  "  Systeme  de  la  Nature,"  pub- 
lished in  1770,  marks  the  culmination  of  the  un- 
Knowiedge.  cquivocally  materialistic  form  of  natu- 
AgnosticSil°  ralism.  Its  epistemologieal  difficulties, 
always  more  or  less  in  evidence,  have  since  that 
day  sufficed  to  discredit  materialism,  and  to  foster 
the  growth  of  a  critical  and  apologetic  form  of 
naturalism  known  as  positivism  or  agnosticism. 
The  modesty  of  this  doctrine  does  not,  it  is  true, 
strike  very  deep.  For,  although  it  disclaims  knowl- 
edge of  ultimate  reality,  it  also  forbids  anyone 
else  to  have  any.  Knowledge,  it  affirms,  can  be 
of  but  one  type,  that  which  comprises  the  verifiable 
laws  governing  nature.     All  questions  concerning 

*^  The  phrase  "  psycho-physical  parallelism,"  current  in 
psychology,  may  mean  automatism  of  the  kind  expounded 
above,  and  may  also  mean  dualism.  It  is  used  commonly 
as  a  methodological  principle  to  signify  that  no  causal 
relationship  between  mind  and  body,  but  one  of  corre- 
spondence, is  to  be  looked  for  in  empirical  psychology,  Cf. 
§99. 


NATURALISM  253 

first  causes  are  futile,  a  stimulus  only  to  excursions 
of  fancy  popularly  mistaken  for  knowledge.  The 
superior  certainty  and  stability  which  attaches  to 
natural  science  is  to  be  permanently  secured  by 
the  savant's  steadfast  refusal  to  be  led  away  after 
the  false  gods  of  metaphysics. 

But  though  this  is  sufficient  ground  for  an  ag- 
nostic policy,  it  does  prove  an  agnostic  theory. 
The  latter  has  sprung  from  a  closer  analysis  of 
knowledge,  though  it  fails  to  make  a  very  brave 
showing  for  thoroughness  and  consistency.  The 
crucial  point  has  already  been  brought  within  our 
view.  The  general  principles  of  naturalism  re- 
quire that  knowledge  shall  be  reduced  to  sensations, 
or  impressions  of  the  environment  upon  the  or- 
ganism. But  the  environment  and  the  sensations 
do  not  correspond.  The  environment  is  matter  and 
motion,  force  and  energy;  the  sensations  are  of 
motions,  to  be  sure,  but  much  more  conspicuously 
of  colors,  sounds,  odors,  pleasures,  and  pains. 
Critically,  this  may  be  expressed  by  saying  that 
since  the  larger  part  of  sense-perception  is  so  un- 
mistakably subjective,  and  since  all  knowledge 
alike  must  be  derived  from  this  source,  knowledge 
as  a  whole  must  be  regarded  as  dealing  only  with 
appearances.      There   are   at  least  three   agnostic 


254  THE  APPROACH  TO   PHILOSOPHY 

methods  progressing  from  this  point.  All  agree 
that  the  inner  or  essential  reality  is  unfathomable. 
But,  in  the  first  place,  those  most  close  to  the 
tradition  of  materialism  maintain  that  the  most 
significant  appearances,  the  primary  qualities,  are 
those  which  compose  a  purely  quantitative  and 
corporeal  world.  The  inner  essence  of  things  may 
at  any  rate  be  app'oached  by  a  monism  of  matter 
or  of  enevgy.  This  theory  is  epistemological  only 
to  the  extent  of  moderating  its  claims  in  the  hope 
of  lessening  its  responsibility.  Another  agnosti- 
cism places  all  sense  qualities  on  a  par,  but  would 
regard  physics  and  psychology'  as  complementary 
reports  upon  the  two  distinct  series  of  phenomena 
in  which  the  underlying  reality  expresses  itself. 
This  theory  is  epistemological  to  the  extent  of 
granting  knowledge,  viewed  as  perception,  as  good 
a  standing  in  the  universe  as  that  which  is  accorded 
to  its  object.  But  such  a  dualism  tends  almost 
irresistibly  to  relapse  into  materialistic  monism, 
because  of  the  fundamental  place  of  physical  con- 
ceptions in  the  system  of  the  sciences.  Finally, 
in  another  and  a  more  radical  phase  of  agnosticism, 
we  find  an  attempt  to  make  full  provision  for  the 
legitimate  problems  of  epistemology.  The  only 
datum,  the  only  existent  accessil)le  to  knowledge, 


NATURALISM  255 

is  said  to  be  the  sensation,  or  state  of  consciousness. 
In  the  words  of  Huxley: 

"What,  after  all,  do  we  know  of  this  terrible  'matter' 
except  as  a  name  for  the  unknown  and  hypothetical 
cause  of  states  of  our  own  consciousness?  And  what  do 
we  know  of  that  'spirit'  over  whose  threatened  extinc- 
tion by  matter  a  great  lamentation  is  arising,  .  .  . 
except  that  it  is  also  a  name  for  an  unknown  and  hypo- 
thetical cause,  or  condition,  of  states  of  consciousness?"  " 

The  physical  world  is  now  to  be  regarded  as  a 
construction  which  does  not  assimilate  to  itself  the 
content  of  sensations,  but  enables  one  to  anticipate 
them.  The  sensation  signifies  a  contact  to  which 
science  can  provide  a  key  for  practical  guidance. 

§  118.  This  last  phase  of  naturalism  is  an  at- 
tempt to  state  a  pure  and  consistent  experimental- 
Experimen-  ^®^^'  ^  workable  theory  of  the  routine  of 
taUsm.  sensations.     But  it  commonly  falls  into 

the  error  of  the  vicious  circle.  The  hypothetical 
cause  of  sensations  is  said  to  be  matter.  From  this 
point  of  view  the  sensation  is  a  complex,  compris- 
ing elaborate  physical  and  physiological  processes. 
But  these  processes  themselves,  on  the  other  hand, 
are  said  to  be  analyzable  into  sensations.  Now 
two  such  methods  of  analysis  cannot  be  equally 
ultimate.  If  all  of  reality  is  finally  reducible  to 
»  Quoted  by  Ward:  Oj).  cit.,  I,  p.  18. 


256  'i^HE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

sensations,  then  the  term  sensation  must  be  used 
in  a  new  sense  to  connote  a  self -subs  istent  being, 
and  can  no  longer  refer  merely  to  a  function  of 
certain  physiological  processes.  The  issue  of  this 
would  be  some  form  of  idealism  or  of  the  experi- 
ence-philosophy that  is  now  coming  so  rapidly  to 
the  front.^'^  But  while  it  is  true  that  idealism 
has  sometimes  been  intended,  and  that  a  radically 
new  philosophy  of  experience  has  sometimes  been 
closely  approached,  those,  nevertheless,  who  have 
developed  experimentalism  from  the  naturalistic 
stand-point  have  in  reality  achieved  only  a  thinly 
disguised  materialism.  For  the  very  ground  of 
their  agnosticism  is  materialistic.'^  Knowledge 
of  reality  itself  is  said  to  be  unattainable,  because 
knowledge,  in  order  to  come  within  the  order  of 
nature,  must  be  regarded  as  reducible  to  sensation ; 
and  because  sensation  itself,  when  regarded  as  a 
part  of  nature,  is  only  a  physiological  process,  a 
special  phenomenon,  in  no  way  qualified  to  be 
knowledge  that  is  true  of  reality. 

§  119.  Perhaps,  after  all,  it  would  be  as  fair  to 
the  spirit  of  naturalism  to  relieve  it  of  responsibil- 

^°  There  are  times  when  Huxlej',  e.  g.,  would  seem  to  be 
on  the  ver^e  of  the  Berkcleyan  idealism.     Cf.  Chap.  IX. 

"  For  the  case  of  Karl  Pearson,  read  his  Grammar  of 
Science,  Chap.  II. 


NATURALISM  257 

ity  for  an  epistemology.  It  lias  never  tlioroiiglily 
reckoned  with  this  problem.  It  has  deliberately 
NaturaUstic      Selected  from  among  the  elements  of  ex- 

Epistemology  .  i  •    i  i 

not  Systematic,  pcriencc,  and  been  so  niglily  construc- 
tive in  its  method  as  to  forfeit  its  claim  to  pure 
empiricism;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  has,  in  this 
same  selection  of  categories  and  in  its  insistence 
upon  the  test  of  experiment,  fallen  short  of  a  thor- 
ough-going rationalism.  While,  on  the  one  hand, 
it  defines  and  constructs,  it  docs  so,  on  the  other 
hand,  within  the  field  of  perception  and  with  con- 
stant reference  to  the  test  of  perception.  The  ex- 
planation and  justification  of  this  procedure  is  to 
be  found  in  the  aim  of  natural  science  rather  than 
in  that  of  philosophy.  It  is  this  special  interest, 
rather  than  the  general  problem  of  being,  that  de- 
termines the  order  of  its  categories.  Naturalism 
as  an  account  of  reality  is  acceptable  only  so  far 
as  its  success  in  satisfying  specific  demands  obtains 
for  it  a  certain  logical  immunity.  These  demands 
are  unquestionably  valid  and  fundamental,  but 
they  are  not  coextensive  with  the  demand  for  truth. 
They  coincide  rather  with  the  immediate  practical 
need  of  a  formulation  of  the  spacial  and  temporal 
changes  that  confront  the  will.  Hence  naturalism 
is  acceptable   to  common-sense  as  an  account  of 


258  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

what  the  every-day  attitude  to  the  environment 
treats  as  its  object.  ISTaturalism  is  common-sense 
about  the  "  outer  world,"  revised  and  brought  up 
to  date  with  the  aid  of  the  results  of  science.  Its 
deepest  spring  is  the  organic  instinct  for  the  reality 
of  the  tangible,  the  vital  recognition  of  the  signifi- 
cance of  that  which  is  on  the  plane  of  interaction 
with  the  body. 

§  120.  Oddly  enough,  although  common-sense  is 
ready  to  intrust  to  naturalism  the  description  of 
General  the  situatiou  of  life,  it  prefers  to  deal 

stand-point.  Otherwise  with  its  ideals.  Indeed,  com- 
mon-sense is  not  without  a  certain  suspicion  that 
naturalism  is  the  advocate  of  moral  reversion.  It 
is  recognized  as  the  prophecy  of  the  brute  majority 
of  life,  of  those  considerations  of  expediency  and 
pleasure  that  are  the  warrant  for  its  secular  moods 
rather  than  for  its  sustaining  ideals.  And  that 
strand  of  life  is  indeed  its  special  province.  For 
the  naturalistic  method  of  reduction  must  find  the 
key  to  human  action  among  those  practical  condi- 
tions that  are  common  to  man  and  his  inferiors 
in  the  scale  of  being.  In  short,  human  life, 
like  all  life,  must  be  construed  as  the  adjustment 
of   tlie  organism   to  its  natural  environment  for 


NATURALISM  259 

the  sake  of  preservation  and  economic  advance- 
ment. 

§  121.  Early  in  Greek  philosophy  this  general 
idea  of  life  was  picturesquely  interpreted  in  two 
„    .  .         .   contrasting  wavs,   those   of   the   Cynic 

Cynicism  and  n  ./    >  j 

cyrenaicism.  ^^^  ||^g  Cyrcnaic.  Both  of  these  wise 
men  postulated  the  spiritual  indifference  of  the 
universe  at  large,  and  looked  only  to  the  contact  of 
life  with  its  immediate  environment.  But  while 
the  one  hoped  only  to  hedge  himself  about,  the 
other  sought  confidently  the  gratification  of  his 
sensibilities.  The  figure  of  the  Cynic  is  the  more 
familiar.  Diogenes  of  the  tub  practised  self- 
mortification  until  his  dermal  and  spiritual  callous- 
ness were  alike  impervious.  From  behind  his  pro- 
tective sheath  he  could  without  affectation  despise 
both  nature  and  society.  He  could  reckon  himself 
moi^  blessed  than  Alexander,  because,  with  de- 
mand reduced  to  the  minimum,  he  could  be  sure 
of  a  surplus  of  supply.  Having  renounced  all 
goods  save  the  bare  necessities  of  life,  he  could 
neglect  both  promises  and  threats  and  be  played 
upon  by  no  one.  He  was  securely  intrenched 
within  himself,  an  unfurnished  habitation,  but  the 
citadel  of  a  king.  The  Cyrenaic,  on  the  other 
hand,  did  not  seek  to  make  impervious  the  surface 


260  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

of  contact  with  nature  and  society,  but  sought  to 
heighten  its  sensibility,  that  it  might  become  a 
medium  of  pleasurable  feeling.  For  the  inspira- 
tion with  which  it  may  be  pursued  this  ideal  has 
nowhere  been  more  eloquently  set  forth  than  in 
the  pages  of  Walter  Pater,  who  styles  himself 
"  the  new  Cyrenaic." 

"  Not  the  fruit  of  experience,  but  experience  itself,  is 
the  end.  A  counted  number  of  pulses  only  is  given  to 
us  of  a  variegated,  dramatic  life.  How  may  we  see 
in  them  all  that  is  to  be  seen  in  them  by  the  finest 
senses?  How  shall  we  pass  most  swiftly  from  point 
to  point,  and  be  present  always  at  the  focus  where  the 
greatest  number  of  vital  forces  unite  in  their  purest 
energy? 

To  burn  always  with  this  hard,  gemlike  flame,  to 
maintain  this  ecstacy,  is  success  in  life.  .  .  .  While 
all  melts  under  our  feet,  we  may  well  catch  at  any  ex- 
quisite passion,  or  any  contribution  to  knowledge  that 
seems  by  a  lifted  horizon  to  set  the  spirit  free  for  a  mo- 
ment, or  any  stirring  of  the  senses,  strange  dyes,  strange 
colors,  and  curious  odors,  or  work  of  the  artist's  hands, 
or  the  face  of  one's  friend.  Not  to  discriminate  every 
moment  some  passionate  attitude  in  those  about  us, 
and  in  the  brilliancy  of  their  gifts  some  tragic  dividing 
of  forces  on  their  ways,  is,  on  this  short  day  of  frost  and 
sun,  to  sleep  before  evening."" 


§  122.  In  the  course  of  modern  philosophy  the 
f  naturalism  has  imdergone  a  tra 

«  Pater:  The  Renaissance,  pp.  249-250. 


ethics  of  naturalism  has  imdergone  a  transforma- 


NATURALISM  261 

tion  and  development  that  equip  it  much  more 
formidably  for  its  competition  with  rival  theories. 
Development    If  the  Cjnic  and  Cjrenaic  philosophies 

of  Utilitarian- 
ism, of  life  seem  too  egoistic  and  narrow  in 

Evolutionary  i        i  •      •        n 

Conception      outlook,  this  madequacj  has  been  large- 

of  Social  ,  1111 

Relations.  ty  overcome  tlirougli  the  modern  con- 
ception of  the  relation  of  the  individual  to  society. 
Man  is  regarded  as  so  dependent  upon  social  rela- 
tions that  it  is  both  natural  and  rational  for  him 
to  govern  his  actions  with  a  concern  for  the  com- 
munity. There  was  a  time  when  this  relation  of 
dependence  was  viewed  as  external,  a  barter  of 
goods  between  the  individual  and  society,  sanc- 
tioned by  an  implied  contract.  Thomas  Hobbes, 
whose  unblushing  materialism  and  egoism  stimu- 
lated by  opposition  the  whole  development  of  Eng- 
lish ethics,  conceived  morality  to  consist  in  rules 
of  action  which  condition  the  stability  of  the  state, 
and  so  secure  for  the  individual  that  "  peace " 
which  self-interest  teaches  him  is  essential  to  his 
welfare. 

"And  therefore  so  long  a  man  is  in  the  condition  of 
mere  nature,  which  is  a  condition  of  war,  as  private 
appetite  is  the  measure  of  good  and  e\'il:  and  conse- 
quently all  men  agree  on  this,  that  peace  is  good,  and 
therefore  also  the  ways  or  means  of  peace,  which,  as  I 
have  showed  before,  are  'justice,'  'gratitude,'  modesty,' 


262  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

'equity/  'mercy,'  and  the  rest  of  the  laws  of  Nature,  are 
good;  that  is  to  say,  'moral  virtues';  and  their  contrary 
'vices,'  evil."^ 

Jeremy  Bentham,  the  apostle  of  utilitarianism  in 
the  eighteenth  century,  defined  political  and  social 
sanctions  through  which  the  individual  could  pur- 
chase security  and  good  repute  with  action  condu- 
cive to  the  common  welfare.  But  the  nineteenth 
century  has  understood  the  matter  better — and  the 
idea  of  an  evolution  under  conditions  that  select 
and  reject,  is  here  again  the  illuminating  thought. 
;N'o  individual,  evolutionary  naturalism  maintains, 
has  survived  the  perils  of  life  without  possessing 
as  an  inalienable  part  of  his  nature,  congenital  like 
his  egoism,  certain  impulses  and  instinctive  desires 
in  the  interest  of  the  community  as  a  whole.  The 
latest  generation  of  a  race  whose  perpetuation  has 
been  conditioned  by  a  capacity  to  sustain  social 
relations  and  make  common  cause  against  a  more 
external  environment,  is  moral,  and  does  not  adopt 
morality  in  the  course  of  a  calculating  egoism. 
Conscience  is  the  racial  instinct  of  self-preservation 
uttering  itself  in  the  individual  member,  who  draws 
Ills  very  life-blood  from  the  greater  organism. 
§  123.  This  latest  word  of  naturalistic  ethics  has 

^  Hobbes:  Leviathan,  Chap.  XV. 


NATURALISM  263 

not  won  acceptance  as  the  last  word  in  ethics,  and 
this  in  spite  of  its  indubitable  truth  within  its  scope. 
NaturaUstic      YoT  the  deeper  ethical  interest  seeks  not 

Ethics  not  />         i  i 

Systematic.  SO  much  to  account  lor  the  moral  nature 
as  to  construe  and  justify  its  promptings.  The 
evolutionary  theory  reveals  the  genesis  of  con- 
science, and  demonstrates  its  continuity  with  nat- 
ure, but  this  falls  as  far  short  of  realizing  the  pur- 
pose of  ethical  study  as  a  history  of  the  natural 
genesis  of  thought  would  fall  short  of  logic.  In- 
deed, naturalism  shows  here,  as  in  the  realm  of 
epistemology,  a  persistent  failure  to  appreciate  the 
central  problem.  Its  acceptance  as  a  philosophy, 
we  are  again  reminded,  can  be  accounted  for  only 
on  the  score  of  its  genuinely  rudimentary  char- 
acter. As  a  rudimentary  phase  of  thought  it 
is  both  indispensable  and  inadequate.  It  is  the 
philosophy  of  instinct,  which  should  in  normal 
development  precede  a  philosophy  of  reason,  in 
which  it  is  eventually  assimilated  and  supple- 
mented. 

§  124.  There  is,  finally,  an  inspiration  for  life 
which  this  philosophy  of  naturalism  may  convey — 
NaturaUsm  as  athcism,  its  dctractors'would  call  it,  but 
to^ReSr  none  the  less  a  faith  and  a  spiritual  ex- 
altation that  spring  from  its  summing  up  of  truth. 


264  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

It  is  well  first  to  realize  that  which  is  dispiriting 
iu  it,  its  failure  to  provide  for  the  freedom,  im- 
mortality, and  moral  providence  of  the  more  san- 
guine faith. 

"  For  what  is  man  looked  at  from  this  point  of  view? 
.  .  .  Man,  so  far  as  natural  science  by  itself  is  able 
to  teach  us,  is  no  longer  the  final  cause  of  the  universe, 
the  Heaven-descended  heir  of  all  the  ages.  His  very 
existence  is  an  accident,  his  story  a  brief  and  transitory 
episode  in  the  life  of  one  of  the  meanest  of  the  planets. 
Of  the  combination  of  causes  which  first  converted  a 
dead  organic  compound  into  the  Uving  progenitors  of 
humanity,  science,  indeed,  as  yet  knows  nothing.  It 
is  enough  that  from  such  beginnings  famine,  disease, 
and  mutual  slaughter,  fit  nurses  of  the  future  lords  of 
creation,  have  gradually  evolved,  after  infinite  travail, 
a  race  with  conscience  enough  to  feel  that  it  is  vile,  and 
intelligence  enough  to  know  that  it  is  insignificant. 
.  .  .  We  sound  the  future,  and  learn  that  after  a 
period,  long  compared  with  the  individual  life,  but  short 
indeed  compared  with  the  divisions  of  time  open  to  our 
investigation,  the  energies  of  our  system  will  decay,  the 
glory  of  the  sun  will  be  dimmed,  and  the  earth,  tideless 
and  inert,  will  no  longer  tolerate  the  race  which  has  for 
a  moment  disturbed  its  sohtude.  Man  will  go  down  into 
the  pit,  and  all  his  thoughts  will  perish.  The  uneasy 
consciousness,  which  in  this  obscure  corner  has  for  a 
brief  space  broken  the  contented  silence  of  the  universe, 
will  be  at  rest.  Matter  will  know  itself  no  longer.  'Im- 
perishable monuments'  and  'immortal  deeds,'  death 
itself,  and  love  stronger  than  death,  will  be  as  though 
they  had  never  been.  Nor  will  anything  that  is  be 
better   or  be  worse  for  all  that  the  labor,  genius,  devo- 


NATURALISM  265 

tion,  and  suffering  of  man  have  striven  through  count- 
less generations  to  effect."  ^* 

§  125.  But  though  our  philosopher  must  accept 
the  truth  of  this  terrible  picture,  he  is  not  left 
Naturausm  as  ^^'ithout  Spiritual  resourccs.  The  ab- 
ReU^-oTor^  stract  religion  provided  for  the  agnostic 
Service,  faithful  bv  Herbert  Spencer  does  not, 

Wonder,  and  •'  ^  ' 

Renunciation.  [^  [g  truc,  afford  any  nourishment  to  the 
religious  nature.  He  would  have  men  look  for  a 
deep  spring  of  life  in  the  negative  idea  of  mystery, 
the  apotheosis  of  ignorance,  while  religious  faith  to 
live  at  all  must  lay  hold  upon  reality.  But  there 
does  spring  from  naturalism  a  positive  religion, 
whose  fundamental  motives  are  those  of  service, 
wonder,  and  renunciation:  service  of  humanity  in 
the  present,  wonder  at  the  natural  truth,  and  re- 
nunciation of  a  universe  keyed  to  vibrate  with 
human  ideals. 

"Have  you,"  writes  Charles  Ferguson,  "had  dreams 
of  Nirvana  and  sickly  visions  and  raptures?  Have  you 
imagined  that  the  end  of  your  life  is  to  be  absorbed  back 
into  the  life  of  God,  and  to  flee  the  earth  and  forget  all? 
Or  do  you  want  to  walk  on  air,  or  fly  on  wings,  or  build  a 
heavenly  city  in  the  clouds?  Come,  let  us  take  our  kit 
on  our  shoulders,  and  go  out  and  build  the  city  /lere."" 

^*  Quoted  from  Balfour:  Foundations  of  Belief,  pp.  29-31. 
^  Ferguson:  Religion  of  Democracy,  p.  10. 


266  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

For  Haeckel  "  natural  religion  "  is  siicli  as 

"  the  astonishment  with  which  we  gaze  upon  the  starry 
heavens  and  the  microscopic  life  in  a  drop  of  water, 
the  awe  with  which  we  trace  the  marvellous  working 
of  energy  in  the  motion  of  matter,  the  reverence  with 
which  we  grasp  the  universal  dominance  of  the  law  of 
substance  throughout  the  universe."^' 

There  is  a  deeper  and  a  sincerer  note  in  the  stout, 
forlorn  humanism  of  Huxley: 

"  That  which  lies  before  the  human  race  is  a  constant 
struggle  to  maintain  and  improve,  in  opposition  to  the 
State  of  Nature,  the  State  of  Art  of  an  organized  poHty; 
in  which,  and  by  which,  man  may  develop  a  worthy 
civilization,  capable  of  maintaining  and  constantly 
improving  itself,  until  the  evolution  of  our  globe  shall 
have  entered  so  far  upon  its  downward  course  that  the 
cosmic  process  resumes  its  sway;  and,  once  more,  the 
State  of  Nature  prevails  over  the  surface  of  our  planet."" 

2«  Haeckel:  Op.  cit.,  p.  344. 

"  Huxley:  Evolution  and  Ethics,  p.  45.  Collected  Essays, 
Vol.  IX. 


CHAPTER   IX 


SUBJECTIVISM 


§  126.  When,  in  the  year  1710,  Bishop  Berke- 
ley maintained  the  thesis  of  empirical  idealism, 
Subjectivism  having  rediscovered  it  and  announced 
sodatTd'^th'  ^^  ^^'^^^  ^  justifiable  sense  of  originality, 
'^^d^s^'T  ^^^  provoked  a  kind  of  critical  judgment 
cism.  ii^^^  ^as  keenly  annoying  if  not  entirely 

surprising  to  him.  In  refuting  the  conception  of 
material  substance  and  demonstrating  the  depend- 
ence of  being  upon  mind,  he  at  once  sought,  as  he 
did  repeatedly  in  later  years,  to  establish  the  world 
of  practical  belief,  and  so  to  reconcile  metaphysics 
and  common-sense.  Yet  he  found  himself  hailed 
as  a  fool  and  a  sceptic.     In  answer  to  an  inquiry 

*  Preliminary  Note.  By  Subjectivism  is  meant  that 
system  of  philosophy  which  construes  the  universe  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  epistemological  principle  that  all  kno^dedge 
is  of  its  own  states  or  activities.  In  so  far  as  subjectivism 
reduces  reality  to  states  of  knowledge,  such  as  perceptions 
or  ideas,  it  is  phenomenalism.  In  so  far  as  it  reduces  reality 
to  a  more  internal  active  principle  such  as  spirit  or  will, 
it  is  spiritualism. 

267 


268  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

concerning  the  reception  of  his  book  in  London, 

his  friend  Sir  John  Percival  wrote  as  follows: 

"  I  did  but  name  the  subject  matter  of  your  book  of 
Principles  to  some  ingenious  friends  of  mine  and  they 
immediately  treated  it  with  ridicule,  at  the  same  time 
refusing  to  read  it,  which  I  have  not  yet  got  one  to  do. 
A  physician  of  my  acquaintance  undertook  to  discover 
your  person,  and  argued  you  must  needs  be  mad,  and 
that  you  ought  to  take  remedies.  A  bishop  pitied  you, 
that  a  desire  of  starting  something  new  should  put  you 
upon  such  an  undertaking.  Another  told  me  that  you 
are  not  gone  so  far  as  another  gentleman  in  town,  who 
asserts  not  only  that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  Matter, 
but  that  we  ourselves  have  no  being  at  all."  ^ 

There  can  be  no  doubt  but  that  the  idea  of  the 
dependence  of  real  things  upon  their  appearance 
to  the  individual  is  a  paradox  to  common-sense. 
It  is  a  paradox  because  it  seems  to  reverse  the 
theoretical  instinct  itself,  and  to  define  the  real 
in  those  very  terms  which  disciplined  thought 
learns  to  neglect.  In  the  early  history  of  thought 
the  nature  of  the  thinker  himself  is  recognized  as 
that  which  is  likely  to  distort  truth  rather  than 
that  which  conditions  it.  When  the  wise  man,  the 
devotee  of  truth,  first  makes  his  appearance,  his 
authority  is  acknowledged  because  he  has  re- 
nounced  himself.      As   witness   of   the   universal 

2  Berkeley:  Complete  Works,  Vol.  I,  p.  352.  Frascr's 
edition. 


SUBJECTIVISM  269 

being  he  purges  himself  of  whatever  is  peculiar  to 
his  own  individuality,  or  even  to  his  human  nature. 
In  the  aloofness  of  his  meditation  he  escapes  the 
cloud  of  opinion  and  prejudice  that  obscures  the 
vision  of  the  common  man.  In  short,  the  element 
of  belief  dependent  upon  the  thinker  himself  is 
the  dross  which  must  be  refined  away  in  order  to 
obtain  the  pure  truth.  When,  then,  in  the  critical 
epoch  of  the  Greek  sophists,  Protagoras  declares 
that  there  is  no  belief  that  is  not  of  this  character, 
his  philosojihy  is  promptly  recognized  as  scepti- 
cism. Protagoras  argues  that  sense  qualities  are 
clearly  dependent  upon  the  actual  operations  of  the 
senses,  and  that  all  knowledge  reduces  ultimately 
to  these  terms. 

"The  senses  are  variously  named  hearing,  seeing, 
smelling;  there  is  the  sense  of  heat,  cold,  pleasure,  pain, 
desire,  fear,  and  many  more  which  are  named,  as  well  as 
innumerable  others  which  have  no  name;  toith  each  of 
than  there  is  horn  an  object  of  sense, — all  sorts  of  colors 
born  with  all  sorts  of  sight  and  sounds  in  like  manner 
with  hearing,  and  other  objects  with  the  other  senses."' 

If  the  objects  are  "  born  with  "  the  senses,  it  fol- 
lows that  they  are  born  with  and  appertain  to  the 
individual  perceiver. 

'  Plato:  Theaetetus,  156.  Translation  by  Jowett.  The 
italics  are  mine. 


270  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

"  Either  show,  if  you  can,  that  our  sensations  are  not 
relative  and  individual,  or,  if  you  admit  that  they  are 
individual,  prove  that  this  does  not  involve  the  con- 
sequence that  the  appearance  becomes,  or,  if  you  like  to 
say,  is  to  the  individual  only."* 

The  same  motif  is  thus  rendered  by  Walter  Pater 
in  the  Conclusion  of  his  "  Renaissance  " : 

"At  first  sight  experience  seems  to  bury  us  under  a 
flood  of  external  objects,  pressing  upon  us  with  a  sharp 
and  importunate  reality,  calling  us  out  of  ourselves  in  a 
thousand  forms  of  action.  But  when  reflexion  begins 
to  act  upon  those  objects  they  are  dissipated  under  its 
influence;  the  cohesive  force  seems  suspended  hke  a 
trick  of  magic;  each  object  is  loosed  into  a  group  of 
impressions — color,  odor,  texture — in  the  mind  of  the 
observer.  .  .  .  Experience,  already  reduced  to  a 
swarm  of  impressions,  is  ringed  round  for  each  one  of 
us  by  that  thick  wall  of  personality  through  which  no 
real  voice  has  ever  pierced  on  its  way  to  us,  or  from  us  to 
that  which  we  can  only  conjecture  to  be  without.  Every 
one  of  these  impressions  is  the  impression  of  the  indi- 
vidual in  his  isolation,  each  mind  keeping  as  a  solitary 
prisoner  its  own  dream  of  a  world." 

The  Protagorean  generalization  is  due  to  the  re- 
flection that  all  experience  is  some  individual  ex- 
perience, that  no  subject  of  discourse  escapes  the 
imputation  of  belonging  to  some  individual's  pri- 
vate history.  The  individual  must  start  with  his 
own  experiences  and  ideas,  and  he  can  never  get 

*  Plato:    Op.  cit.,  IGO. 


SUBJECTIVISM  271 

beyond  them,  for  he  cannot  see  outside  his  own 
vision,  or  even  think  outside  his  own  mind.  The 
scepticism  of  this  theory  is  explicit,  and  the  for- 
mulas of  Protagoras — the  famous  "  Man  is  the 
measure  of  all  tJdngs,^'  and  the  more  exact  for- 
mula, "  The  truth  is  what  appears  to  each  man  at 
each  time  "  ^ — have  been  the  articles  of  scepticism 
throughout  the  history  of  thought. 

§  127.  There  is,  therefore,  nothing  really  sur- 
prising in  the  reception  accorded  the  "  new  phi- 
Phenomenai-   losophy  "  of  Bishop  Berkeley.     A  scep- 

ism  and  Spirit-     .      ,        ,      .    .  .        ,  , .  ,  - 

uaUsm.  tical  rclativisui  IS  the  earliest  phase  oi 

subjectivism,  and  its  avoidance  at  once  becomes 
the  most  urgent  problem  of  any  philosophy  which 
proposes  to  proceed  forth  from  this  principle. 
And  this  problem  Berkeley  meets  with  great  adroit- 
ness and  a  wise  recognition  of  difficulties.  But 
his  sanguine  temperament  and  speculative  interest 
impel  him  to  what  he  regards  as  the  extension  of 
his  first  principle,  the  reintroduction  of  the  con- 
ception of  substance  under  the  form  of  spirit,  and 
of  the  objective  order  of  nature  under  the  form 
of  the  mind  of  God.  In  short,  there  are  two  mo- 
tives at  work  in  him,  side  by  side:  the  epistemo- 
logical  motive,   restricting  reality  to   perceptions 


272  THE  APPROACH  TO   PHILOSOPHY 

and  thoughts,  and  the  metaphysical-religious  mo- 
tive, leading  him  eventually  to  the  definition  of 
reality  in  terms  of  perceiving  and  thinking  spirits. 
And  from  the  time  of  Berkeley  these  two  prin- 
ciples, phenomenalism  and  spiritualism,  have  re- 
mained as  distinct  and  alternating  phases  of 
subjectivism.  The  former  is  its  critical  and 
dialectical  conception,  the  latter  its  constructive 
and  practical  conception. 

§  128.  As  phenomenalism  has  its  classic  state- 
ment and  proof  in  the  writings  of  Berkeley,  we 
Phenomenal-  ^hall  do  wcll  to  return  to  these.  The 
ism  as  Main-    £^^^  ^j^^^  ^j^-g  philosopher  wishcd  to  be 

tamed  by  r  x 

The'^Pr^biem  regarded  as  the  prophet  of  common- 
inherited  from  sense  has  already  been  mentioned.    This 

Descartes  -  "^ 

and  Locke.  purpose  rcveals  itself  explicitly  in  the 
series  of  "  Dialogues  between  Hylas  and  Philo- 
nous."  The  form  in  which  Berkeley  here  advances 
his  thesis  is  further  determined  by  the  manner  in 
which  the  lines  were  drawn  in  his  day  of  thought. 
The  world  of  enlightened  public  opinion  was  then 
threefold,  consisting  of  God,  physical  nature,  and 
the  soul.  In  the  early  years  of  the  seventeenth 
century  Descartes  had  sharply  distinguished  be- 
tween the  two  substances — mind,  with  its  attri' 
bute  of  thought;  and  body,  with  its  attribute  of 


SUBJECTIVISM  273 

extension — and  divided  the  finite  world  between 
them.  God  was  regarded  as  the  infinite  and  sus- 
taining cause  of  both.  Stated  in  the  terms  of 
epistemology,  the  object  of  clear  thinking  is  the 
physical  cosmos,  the  subject  of  clear  thinking  the 
immortal  soul.  The  realm  of  perception,  wherein 
the  mind  is  subjected  to  the  body,  embarrasses  the 
Cartesian  system,  and  has  no  clear  title  to  any 
place  in  it.  And  without  attaching  cognitive  im- 
portance to  this  realm,  the  system  is  utterly  dog- 
matic in  its  epistemology.^  For  what  one  sub- 
stance thinks,  must  be  assumed  to  be  somehow  true 
of  another  quite  independent  substance  without 
any  medium  of  communication.  Now  between 
Descartes  and  Berkeley  appeared  the  sober  and 
questioning  "  Essay  Concerning  Human  Under- 
standing," by  John  Locke.  This  is  an  interesting 
combination  (they  cannot  be  said  to  blend)  of 
traditional  metaphysics  and  revolutionary  episte- 
mology.  The  universe  still  consists  of  God,  the 
immortal  thinking  soul,  and  a  corporeal  nature, 
the  object  of  its  thought.  But,  except  for  certain 
proofs  of  God  and  self,  knowledge  is  entirely 
reduced  to  the  perceptual  type,  to  sensations,  or 
ideas  directly  imparted  to  the  mind  by  the  objects 
'For  another  issue  out  of  this  situation,  cf.  §§  185-187. 


274  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

themselves.  To  escape  dogmatism  it  is  main- 
tained that  the  real  is  what  is  observed  to  he  pres- 
ent. But  Locke  thinks  the  qualities  so  discovered 
belong  in  part  to  the  perceiver  and  in  part  to 
the  substance  outside  the  mind.  Color  is  a  case 
of  the  former,  a  "  secondary  quality  " ;  and  exten- 
sion a  case  of  the  latter,  a  "  primary  quality." 
And  evidently  the  above  empirical  test  of  knowl- 
edge is  not  equally  well  met  in  these  two  cases. 
When  I  see  a  red  object  I  know  that  red  exists, 
for  it  is  observed  to  be  present,  and  I  make  no 
claim  for  it  beyond  the  present.  But  when  I  note 
that  the  red  object  is  square,  I  am  supposed  to 
know  a  property  that  will  continue  to  exist  in  the 
object  after  I  have  closed  my  eyes  or  turned  to 
something  else.  Here  my  claim  exceeds  my  ob- 
servation, and  the  empirical  principle  adopted  at 
the  outset  would  seem  to  be  violated.  Berkeley 
develops  his  philosophy  from  this  criticism.  His 
refutation  of  material  substance  is  intended  as  a 
full  acceptance  of  the  implications  of  the  new  em- 
pirical epistemolog}\  Knowledge  is  to  be  all  of 
the  perceptual  type,  where  what  is  known  is 
directly  presented;  and,  in  conformity  with  this 
principle,  being  is  to  be  restricted  to  the  content 
of  the  living  pulses  of  experience. 


SUBJECTIVISM  275 

§  129.  Berkeley,  then,  beginning  with  the  three- 
fold world  of  Descartes  and  of  common-sense, 
The  Refuta-  proposcs  to  apply  Lockc's  theory  of 
ifia^eriai  knowledge  to  the  discomfiture  of  cor- 

Substance.  porcal  nature.  It  was  a  radical  doc- 
trine, because  it  meant  for  him  and  for  his 
contemporaries  the  denial  of  all  finite  objects  out- 
side the  mind.  But  at  the  same  time  it  meant  a 
restoration  of  the  homogeneity  of  experience,  the 
reestablishment  of  the  qualitative  world  of  every- 
day living,  and  so  had  its  basis  of  appeal  to 
common-sense.  The  encounter  between  Hylas,  the 
advocate  of  the  traditional  philosophy,  and  Philo- 
nous,  who  represents  the  author  himself,  begins 
with  an  exchange  of  the  charge  of  innovation. 

Hyl.  I  am  glad  to  find  there  was  nothing  in  the 
accounts  I  heard  of  you. 

Phil.     Pray,  what  were  those? 

Hyl.  You  were  represented,  in  last  night's  conversa- 
tion, as  one  who  maintained  the  most  extravagant 
opinion  that  ever  entered  into  the  mind  of  man,  to  wit, 
that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  material  substance  in  the 
world. 

Phil.  That  there  is  no  such  thing  as  what  'philosophers 
call  material  substance,  I  am  seriously  persuaded:  but  if 
I  were  made  to  see  anything  absurd  or  sceptical  in  this, 
I  should  then  have  the  same  reason  to  renounce  this 
that  I  imagine  I  have  now  to  reject  the  contrary  opinion. 

Hyl.     What!  can  anything  be  more  fantastical,  more 


276  THE  APPROACH   TO   PHILOSOPHY 

repugnant  to  Common-Sense,  or  a  more  manifest  piece 
of  Scepticism,  than  to  believe  there  is  no  such  thing  as 
matter? 

Phil.  Softly,  good  Hylas.  What  if  it  should  prove 
that  you,  who  hold  there  is,  are,  by  virtue  of  that  opinion, 
a  greater  sceptic,  and  maintain  more  paradoxes  and 
repugnances  to  Common-Sense,  than  I  who  believe  no 
such  tiling?^ 

Philonous  now  proceeds  with  his  case.  Begin- 
ning by  obtaining  from  Hylas  the  admission  that 
pleasure  and  pain  are  essentially  relative  and  sub- 
jective, he  argues  that  sensations  such  as  heat, 
since  they  are  inseparable  from  these  feelings, 
must  be  similarly  regarded.  And  he  is  about 
to  annex  other  qualities  in  turn  to  this  core 
of  subjectivity,  when  Hylas  enters  a  general 
demurrer : 

"  Hold,  Philonous,  I  now  see  what  it  was  deluded  me 
all  this  time.  You  asked  me  whether  heat  and  cold, 
sweetness  and  bitterness,  were  not  particular  sorts  of 
pleasure  and  pain;  to  which  I  answered  simply  that  they 
were.  Whereas  I  should  have  thus  distinguished: — 
those  qualities  as  perceived  by  us,  are  pleasures  or  pains; 
but  not  as  existing  in  the  external  objects.  We  must 
not  therefore  conclude  absolutely,  that  there  is  no  heat 
in  the  fire,  or  sweetness  in  the  sugar,  but  only  that  heat 
or  sweetness,  as  perceived  by  us,  are  not  in  the  fire  or 
sugar."* 

^  Berkeley:  Op.  cit.,  Vol.  I,  pp.  380-381. 
*  Ibid.,  p.  389. 


SUBJECTIVISM  277 

§  130.  Here  the  argument  touches  upon  pro- 
found issues.  Philonous  now  assumes  the  extreme 
The  A  lica-  ^^^^pi^'ical  Contention  that  knowledge 
tion  of  the  applies  only  to  its  own  psychological 
cai  Principle,  moment,  that  its  object  in  no  way  ex- 
tends beyond  that  individual  situation  which  we 
call  the  state  of  knowing.  The  full  import  of  such 
an  epistemology  Berkeley  never  recognized,  but  he 
is  clearly  employing  it  here,  and  the  overthrow  of 
Hylas  is  inevitable  so  long  as  he  does  not  challenge 
it  or  turn  it  against  his  opponent.  This,  however, 
as  a  protagonist  of  Berkeley's  own  making,  he  fails 
to  do,  and  he  plays  into  Philonous's  hands  by  ad- 
mitting that  what  is  known  only  in  perception 
must  for  that  reason  consist  in  perception.  He 
frankly  owns  "  that  it  is  vain  to  stand  out  any 
longer,"  that  "  colors,  sounds,  tastes,  in  a  word, 
all  those  termed  secondary  qualities^  have  certainly 
no  existence  without  the  mind."  ^ 

Hylas  has  now  arrived  at  the  distinction  be- 
tween primary  and  secondary  qualities.  "  Exten- 
sion, Figure,  Solidity,  Gravity,  Motion,  and  Rest  " 
are  the  attributes  of  an  external  substance  which 
is  the  cause  of  sensations.  But  the  same  episte- 
mological  principle  readily  reduces  these  also  to 
» Ibid.,  p.  397. 


278  THE  APPROACH   TO   PHILOSOPHY 

dependence  on  mind,  for,  like  the  secondary  quali- 
ties, their  content  is  given  only  in  perception. 
Hylas  is  then  driven  to  defend  a  general  material 
substratum,  which  is  the  cause  of  ideas,  hut  to 
which  none  of  the  definite  content  of  these  ideas 
can  he  attributed.  In  short,  he  has  put  all  the 
content  of  knowledge  on  the  one  side,  and  admitted 
its  inseparability  from  the  perceiving  spirit,  and 
left  the  being  of  things  standing  empty  and  for- 
lorn on  the  other.  This  amounts,  as  Philonous  re- 
minds him,  to  the  denial  of  the  reality  of  the 
known  world. 

"  You  are  therefore,  by  your  principles,  forced  to 
deny  the  reality  of  sensible  things;  since  you  made  it  to 
consist  in  an  absolute  existence  exterior  to  the  mind. 
That  is  to  say,  you  are  a  downright  sceptic.  So  I  have 
gained  my  point,  which  was  to  show  your  principles  led 
to  Scepticism.""* 

§  131.  Having  advanced  the  direct  empiricist 
argument  for  phenomenalism,  Berkeley  now  gives 
The  Refuta-     the  rationalistic  motive  an  opportunity 

tion  of  a 

Conceived  to  cxprcss  itsclf  iu  the  queries  of  Hylas 
World.  as  to  whether  there  be  not  an  "  absolute 

extension,"  somehow  abstracted  by  thought  from 
the  relativities  of  perception.     Is  there  not  at  least 
a   conceivable   world    independent  of  perception  ? 
'«/6/V/.,  p.  418. 


SUBJECTIVISM  279 

The  answers  of  Philonous  throw  much  light  upon 
the  Berkeleyan  position.  lie  admits  that  thought 
is  capable  of  separating  the  primary  from  the  sec- 
ondary qualities  in  certain  operations,  but  at  the 
same  time  denies  that  this  is  forming  an  idea  of 
them  as  separate. 

"  I  acknowledge,  Hylas,  it  is  not  difficult  to  form 
general  propositions  and  reasonings  about  those  quali- 
ties, without  mentioning  any  other;  and,  in  this  sense, 
to  consider  or  treat  of  them  abstractedly.  But,  how 
doth  it  follow  that,  because  I  can  pronounce  the  word 
motion  by  itself,  I  can  form  the  idea  of  it  in  my  mind 
exclusive  of  body?  or,  because  theorems  may  be  made 
of  extension  and  figures,  without  any  mention  of  great 
or  small,  or  any  other  sensible  mode  or  quality,  that 
therefore  it  is  possible  such  an  abstract  idea  of  extension, 
without  any  particular  size  or  figure,  or  sensible  quality, 
should  be  distinctly  formed,  and  apprehended  by  the 
mind?  Mathematicians  treat  of  quantity,  without  re- 
garding what  other  sensible  qualities  it  is  attended  with, 
as  being  altogether  indifferent  to  their  demonstrations. 
But,  when  laying  aside  the  words,  they  contemplate  the 
bare  ideas,  I  believe  you  will  find,  they  are  not  the  pure 
abstracted  ideas  of  extension."" 

Berkeley  denies  that  we  have  ideas  of  pure  exten- 
sion or  motion,  because,  although  we  do  actually 
deal  with  these  and  find  them  intelligible,  we  can 
never  obtain  a  state  of  mind  in  which  they  appear 
as  the  content.  He  applies  this  psychological  test 
"  Ibid.,  pp.  403-404. 


2S0  THE  APPROACH   TO   PHILOSOPHY 

because  of  his  adherence  to  the  general  empirical 
postulate  that  knowledge  is  limited  to  the  indi- 
vidual content  of  its  own  individual  states.  "  It 
is  a  universally  received  maxim,"  he  says,  "  that 
everything  which  exists  is  particular^  I^ow  the 
truth  of  mathematical  reckoning  is  not  particular, 
hut  is  valid  wherever  the  conditions  to  which  it 
refers  are  fulfilled.  Mathematical  reckoning,  if 
it  is  to  be  particular,  must  be  regarded  as  a 
particular  act  or  state  of  some  thinker.  Its  truth 
must  then  be  construed  as  relative  to  the  interests 
of  the  thinker,  as  a  symbolism  which  has  an  in- 
strumental rather  than  a  purely  cognitive  value. 
This  conclusion  cannot  be  disputed  short  of  a  rad- 
ical stand  against  the  general  epistemological  prin- 
ciple to  which  Berkeley  is  so  far  true,  the  principle 
that  the  reality  which  is  known  in  any  state  of 
thinking  or  perceiving  is  the  state  itself. 

§  132.  This  concludes  the  purely  phenomenal- 
istic  strain  of  Berkeley's  thought.     lie  has  taken 

TheTraniti  *^^®  immediate  apprehension  of  sensible 
tospirituausm.  QJ^jgg^-g    j^    ^    g^^^g    Qf    j^^Jn^    centring 

about  the  pleasure  and  pain  of  an  individual,  to 
be  the  norm  of  knowledge.  He  has  further  main- 
tained that  knowledge  cannot  escape  the  particu- 
larity of  its  own  states,      Tlic  result  is  that  the 


SUBJECTIVISM  281 

universe  is  composed  of  private  perceptions  and 
ideas.  Strictly  on  the  basis  of  what  has  preceded, 
Hylas  is  justified  in  regarding  this  conclusion  as 
no  less  sceptical  than  that  to  which  his  own  posi- 
tion had  been  reduced ;  for  while  he  had  been 
compelled  to  admit  that  the  real  is  unknowable, 
Philonous  has  apparently  defined  the  knowable  as 
relative  to  the  individual.  But  the  supplementary 
metaphysics  which  had  hitherto  been  kept  in  the 
background  is  now  revealed.  It  is  maintained 
that  though  perceptions  know  no  external  world, 
they  do  nevertheless  reveal  a  spiritual  substance 
of  which  they  are  the  states.  Although  it  has 
hitherto  been  argued  that  the  esse  of  things  is  in 
their  percipi,  this  is  now  replaced  by  the  more 
fundamental  principle  that  the  esse  of  things  is  in 
their  percipere  or  velle.  The  real  world  consists 
not  in  perceptions,  but  in  perceivers. 

§  133.  Now  it  is  at  once  evident  that  the  episte- 
mological  theory  which  has  been  Berkeley's  dia- 
FurtherAt-     lectical  wcapon  in  the  foregoing  argu- 

tempts  to 

Maintain         ment  is  uo  longer  available.    And  those 

Phenomenal-  ,  c  i  •        i 

ism.  who  have  cared  more  lor  this  theory 

than  for  metaphysical  speculation  have  attempted 
to  stop  at  this  point,  and  so  to  construe  phenom- 
enalism as  to  make  it  self-sufiicient  on  its  own 


282  THE   APPROACH  TO   PHILOSOPHY 

grounds.  Such  attempts  are  so  instructive  as  to 
make  it  worth  our  while  to  review  them  before 
proceeding  with  the  development  of  the  spiritual- 
istic motive  in  subjectivism. 

The  world  is  to  be  regarded  as  made  up  of  sense- 
perceptions,  ideas,  or  plienomena.  What  is  to  be 
accepted  as  the  fundamental  category  which  gives 
to  all  of  these  terms  their  subjectivistic  signifi- 
cance ?  So  far  there  seems  to  be  nothing  in  view 
save  the  principle  of  relativity.  The  type  to  which 
these  were  reduced  was  that  of  the  peculiar  or 
unsharable  experience  best  represented  by  an  in- 
dividual's pleasure  and  pain.  But  relativity  will 
not  work  as  a  general  principle  of  being.  It  con- 
signs the  individual  to  his  private  mind,  and  can- 
not provide  for  the  validity  of  knowledge  enough 
even  to  maintain  itself.  Some  other  course,  then, 
must  be  followed.  Perception  may  be  given  a 
psycho-physical  definition,  which  employs  physical 
terms  as  fundamental;^-  but  this  flagrantly  con- 
tradicts the  phenomenalistic  first  principle.  Or, 
reality  may  be  regarded  as  so  stamped  with  its 
marks  as  to  insure  the  proprietorship  of  thought. 
But  this  definition  of  certain  objective  entities  of 

'^  Cf.  Pearson:  Grammar  of  Science,  Chap.  II.     See  above, 

§  lis. 


SUBJECTIVISM  283 

mind,  of  beings  attributed  to  intelligence  because 
of  their  intrinsic  intelligibility,  is  inconsistent 
with  empiricism,  if  indeed  it  does  not  lead  eventu- 
ally to  a  realism  of  the  Platonic  type.^^  Finally, 
and  most  commonly,  the  terms  of  phenomenalism 
have  been  retained  after  their  orignal  meaning  has 
been  suffered  to  lapse.  The  "  impressions "  of 
Hume,  e.  g.,  are  the  remnant  of  the  Bcrkeleyan 
world  with  the  spirit  stricken  out.  There  is  no 
longer  any  point  in  calling  them  impressions,  for 
they  now  mean  only  elements  or  qualities.  As  a 
consequence  this  outgrowth  of  the  Berkeleyanism 
epistemology  is  at  present  merging  into  a  realistic 
philosophy  of  experience.^"*  Any  one,  then,  of 
these  three  may  be  the  last  state  of  one  who  under- 
takes to  remain  exclusively  faithful  to  the  phe- 
nomenalistic  aspect  of  Berkeleyanism,  embodied  in 
the  principle  esse  est  percipi. 

"  See  Chap.  XI.     Cf.  also  §  140. 

"  The  same  may  be  said  of  the  "  permanent  possibilities  of 
sensation,"  proposed  by  J.  S.  Mill.  Such  possibilities  oul>- 
side  of  actual  perception  are  either  nothing  or  things  such 
as  they  are  known  to  be  in  perception.  In  either  case  they  are 
not  perceptions. 

In  Ernst  Mach's  Analysis  of  Sensations,  the  reader  will 
find  an  interesting  transition  from  sensationalism  to  realism 
through  the  substitution  of  the  term  Bestayidtheil  for  Em- 
pfijidung.  (See  Translation  by  Williams,  pp.  18-20.)  See 
below,  §  207. 


284  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

Berkeley's  §  13-4.    Lct  US  DOW  folloW  the  foi'tlineS 

Spiritualism. 

Immediate       of   tliG  otlier   phasG   of  subjectivism — 

Knowledge  of  i  •    i       i         i  i  •  /. 

the  Perceiver.  tliat  wlucli  develops  the  Conception  of 
the  perceiver  rather  than  the  perceived.  When 
Berkeley  holds  that 

"all  the  choir  of  heaven  and  furniture  of  the  Earth,  in 
a  word,  all  those  bodies  which  compose  the  mighty 
frame  of  the  world,  have  not  any  subsistence  without 
a  Mind," 

his  thought  has  transcended  the  epistemology  with 
which  he  overthrew  the  conception  of  material  sub- 
stance, in  two  directions.  For  neither  mind  of  the 
finite  type  nor  mind  of  the  divine  type  is  perceived. 
But  the  first  of  these  may  yet  be  regarded  as  a 
direct  empirical  datum,  even  though  sharply  dis- 
tinguished from  an  object  of  perception.  In  the 
third  dialogue,  Philonous  thus  expounds  this  new 
kind  of  knowledge : 

"  I  own  I  have  properly  no  idea,  either  of  God  or  any 
other  spirit ;  for  these  being  active,  cannot  be  represented 
by  things  perfectly  inert,  as  our  ideas  are.  I  do  never- 
theless know  that  I,  who  am  a  spirit  or  thinking  sub- 
stance, exist  as  certainly  as  I  know  my  ideas  exist. 
Farther,  I  know  what  I  mean  by  the  terms  /  and  myself; 
and  I  know  this  immediately  or  intuitively,  though  I 
do  not  perceive  it  as  I  perceive  a  triangle,  a  color,  or  a 
sound."  '* 

'^  Berkeley:  Op.  cit.,  p.  447. 


SUBJECTIVISM  285 

The  knowledge  here  provided  for  may  be  regarded 
as  empirical  because  the  reality  in  question  is  an 
individual  present  in  the  moment  of  the  knowl- 
edge. Particular  acts  of  perception  are  said  di- 
rectly to  reveal  not  only  perceptual  objects,  but 
perceiving  subjects.  And  the  conception  of  spir- 
itual substance,  once  accredited,  may  then  be  ex- 
tended to  account  for  social  relations  and  to  fill 
in  the  nature  of  God.  The  latter  extension,  in  so 
far  as  it  attributes  such  further  predicates  as  uni- 
versality and  infinity,  implies  still  a  third  episte- 
mology,  and  threatens  to  pass  over  into  rationalism. 
But  the  knowledge  of  one's  fellow-men  may,  it  is 
claimed,  be  regarded  as  immediate,  like  the  knowl- 
edge of  one's  self.  Perceptual  and  volitional  ac- 
tivity has  a  sense  for  itself  and  also  a  sense  for 
other  like  activity.  The  self  is  both  self-conscious 
and  socially  conscious  in  an  immediate  experience 
of  the  same  type. 

§  135.  But  this  general  spiritualistic  conception 
is  developed  with  less  singleness  of  purpose  in 
Schopen-         Berkeley  than  among  the  voluntarists 

hauer's  Spirit- 

uaUsm,  or       and    panpsycMsts    who     spring    from 

Voluntarism.  ,  .  ,.  .      . 

Immediate  bchopenhauer,  the  orientalist,  pessimist, 
of  the  wiu.  and  mystic  among  the  German  Kan- 
tians  of  the  early  nineteenth  century.     His  great 


286  THE  APPROACH  TO   PHILOSOPHY 

book,  "Die  Welt  als  Wille  und  Vorstellung," 
opens  with  the  phenomenalistic  contention  that 
"  the  world  is  my  idea."  It  soon  appears,  how- 
ever, that  the  "  my  "  is  more  profoundly  signifi- 
cant than  the  "  idea."  ]^ature  is  my  creation, 
due  to  the  working  within  me  of  certain  fixed 
principles  of  thought,  such  as  space,  time,  and 
causality.  But  nature,  just  because  it  is  my  crea- 
tion, is  less  than  me :  is  but  a  manifestation  of  the 
true  being  for  which  I  must  look  within  myself. 
But  this  inner  self  cannot  be  made  an  object  of 
thought,  for  that  would  be  only  to  create  another 
term  of  nature.  The  will  itself,  from  which  such 
creation  springs,  is  "  that  which  is  most  immedi- 
ate "  in  one's  consciousness,  and  "  makes  itself 
known  in  a  direct  manner  in  its  particular  acts." 
The  term  will  is  used  by  Schopenhauer  as  a  gen- 
eral term  covering  the  whole  dynamics  of  life,  in- 
stinct and  desire,  as  well  as  volition.  It  is  that 
sense  of  life-preserving  and  life-enhancing  appe- 
tency which  is  the  conscious  accompaniment  of 
struggle.  With  its  aid  the  inwardness  of  the  whole 
world  may  now  be  apprehended. 

"  Whoever  has  now  gained  from  all  these  expositions 
a  knowledge  in  abstracto,  and  therefore  clear  and  certain, 

of  what  everyone    knows    directly  in  concreto,  i.   e.,  as 


SUBJECTIVISM  287 

feeling,  a  knowledge  that  his  will  is  the  real  inner  nature 
of  his  phenomenal  being,  .  .  .  and  that  his  will  is 
that  which  is  most  immediate  in  his  consciousness, 
.  .  .  will  find  that  of  itself  it  affords  him  the  key  to 
the  knowledge  of  the  inmost  being  of  the  whole  of  nature ; 
for  he  now  transfers  it  to  all  those  phenomena  which  are 
not  given  to  him,  like  his  own  phenomenal  existence, 
both  in  direct  and  indirect  knowledge,  but  only  in  the 
latter,  thus  merely  one-sidedly  as  idea  alone."" 

The  heart  of  reality  is  thus  known  by  an  "  intui- 
tive interpretation,"  which  begins  at  home  in  the 
individual's  own  heart. 

§  136.  The  panpsychist  follows  the  same  course 
of  reflection.  There  is  an  outwardness  and  an 
Panpsychism.  iuwardncss  of  nature,  corresponding  to 
the  knower's  body  on  the  one  hand,  and  his  feel- 
ing or  will  on  the  other.  With  this  princij)le  in 
hand  one  may  pass  down  the  whole  scale  of  being 
and  discover  no  breach  of  continuity.  Such  an 
interpretation  of  nature  has  been  well  set  forth  by 
a  contemporary  writer,  who  quotes  the  following 
from  the  botanist,  C.  v.  I^aegeli: 

"  Sensation  is  clearly  connected  with  the  reflex  actions 
of  higher  animals.  We  are  obliged  to  concede  it  to  the 
other  animals  also,  and  we  have  no  gi'ounds  for  denying 
it  to  plants  and  inorganic  bodies.  The  sensation  arouses 
in  us  a  condition  of  comfort  and  discomfort.     In  general, 

'°  Schopenhauer:  The  World  as  Will  and  Idea.  Transla- 
tion by  Haldane  and  Kemp,  Vol.  I,  p.  141. 


288  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

the  feeling  of  pleasure  arises  when  the  natural  impulses 
are  satisfied,  the  feeling  of  pain  when  they  are  not  satis- 
fied. Since  all  material  processes  are  composed  of 
movements  of  molecules  and  elementary  atoms,  pleasure 
and  pain  must  have  their  seat  in  these  particles.  .  .  . 
Thus  the  same  mental  thread  runs  through  all  material 
phenomena.  The  human  mind  is  nothing  but  the 
highest  devolpment  on  our  earth  of  the  mental  processes 
which  universally  animate  and  move  nature."" 

According  to  panpsyebism,  then,  physical  nature 
is  the  manifestation  of  an  appetency  or  hare  con- 
sciousness generalized  from,  the  thinner's  awareness 
of  Ids  most  intimate  self.  Such  appetency  or  bare 
consciousness  is  the  essential  or  substantial  state 
of  that  which  appears  as  physical  nature. 

§  137.  We  must  now  turn  to  the  efforts  which 
this  doctrine  has  made  to  maintain  itself  against 
The  Inherent  ^^^^  sccptical  trend  of  its  owu  episte- 
s'SdtuaUsm  niology.  For  precisely  as  in  the  case 
No  Provision    q£  phenomenalism  its  dialectical  prin- 

for  Objective  '■  *■ 

Knowledge,  ciplc  threatens  to  be  self-destructive. 
Immediate  presence  is  still  the  test  of  knowledge. 
But  does  not  immediate  presence  connote  relativ- 
ity and  inadequacy,  at  best;  an  initial  phase  of 
knowledge  that  must  be  supplemented   and   cor- 

"  Quoted  from  Naegeli:  Die  Mechanisch-physiologischs  Theo- 
rie  der  Abstammungslehre,  by  Friedrich  Paulsen,  in  his  Intro- 
duction to  Pliilosophy.     Translation  by  Thilly,  p.  103. 


SUBJECTIVISM  289 

reeled  before  objective  reality  and  valid  truth 
are  apprehended?  Does  not  the  individuality  of 
the  individual  thinker  connote  the  very  maximum 
of  error  ?  Indeed,  spiritualism  would  seem  to  have 
exceeded  even  Protagoreanism  itself,  and  to  have 
passed  from  scepticism  to  deliberate  nihilism.  The 
object  of  knowledge  is  no  longer  even,  as  with  the 
phenomenalist,  the  thinker's  thought,  but  only  his 
thinking.  And  if  the  thinker's  thought  is  relative 
to  him,  then  the  thinker's  act  of  thinking  is  the 
very  vanishing-point  of  relativity,  the  negative 
term  of  a  negating  relation.  How  is  a  real,  a 
self-subsistent  world  to  be  composed  of  such  ?  Im- 
pelled by  a  half -conscious  realization  of  the  hope- 
lessness of  this  situation,  the  exponent  of  spiritu- 
alism has  sought  to  universalize  his  conception ; 
to  define  an  absolute  or  ultimate  spirit  other  than 
the  individual  thinker,  though  known  in  and 
through  him.  But  it  is  clear  that  this  development 
of  spiritualism,  like  all  of  the  speculative  proced- 
ure of  subjectivism,  threatens  to  exceed  the  scope 
of  the  original  principle  of  knowdedge.  There  is 
a  strong  presumption  against  the  possibility  of 
introducing  a  knowledge  of  God  by  the  way  of 
the  particular  presentations  of  an  individual  con- 
sciousness. 


290  THE  APPROACH  TO   PHILOSOPHY 

§  138.  Schopenliauer  must  be  credited  with  a 
genuine  effort  to  accept  the  metaphysical  consc- 
Schopen-  quenccs  of  his  epistemology.  His 
tempt  ^to^*"  epistemology,  as  we  have  seen,  defined 
umversauze     knowledge  as  centripetal.     The  obiect 

Subjectivism.  ox  j 

Mysticism.  gf  Ycal  knowledge  is  identical  with  the 
subject  of  knowledge.  If  I  am  to  know  the  uni- 
versal will,  therefore,  I  must  in  knowing  become 
that  will.  And  this  Schopenliauer  maintains. 
The  innermost  heart  of  the  individual  into  which 
he  may  retreat,  even  from  his  private  will,  is — the 
universal.  But  there  is  another  way  of  arriving 
at  the  same  knowledge.  In  contemplation  I  may 
become  absorbed  in  principles  and  laws,  rather 
tlian  be  diverted  by  the  particular  spacial  and 
temporal  objects,  imtil  (and  this  is  peculiarly  true 
of  the  aesthetic  experience)  my  interest  no  longer 
distinguishes  itself,  but  coincides  with  truth.  In 
other  words,  abstract  thinking  and  pure  willing 
are  not  opposite  extremes,  but  adjacent  points  on 
the  deeper  or  transcendent  circle  of  experience. 
One  may  reach  this  part  of  the  circle  by  moving 
in  either  of  two  directions  that  at  the  start  are 
directly  opposite:  by  turning  in  upon  the  subject 
or  by  utterly  giving  one's  self  up  to  the  object. 
Roalitv  obtains  no  definition  bv  tliis  means.     Phi- 


SUBJECTIVISM  291 

losophy,  for  Schopenhauer,  is  rather  a  programme 
for  realizing  the  state  in  which  I  will  the  universal 
and  know  the  universal  will.  The  final  theory  of 
knowledge,  then,  is  mysticism,  reality  directly  ap- 
prehended in  a  supreme  and  incommunicable  ex- 
perience, direct  and  vivid,  like  perception,  and  at 
the  same  time  universal,  like  thought.  But  the 
empiricism  with  which  Schopenhauer  began,  the 
appeal  to  a  familiar  experience  of  self  as  will,  has 
meanwhile  been  forgotten.  The  idea  as  object  of 
my  perception,  and  the  will  as  its  subject  were  in 
the  beginning  regarded  as  common  and  verifiable 
items  of  experience.  But  who,  save  the  occasional 
philosopher,  knows  a  universal  will  ?  I^or  have  at- 
tempts to  avoid  mysticism,  while  retaining  Scho- 
penhauer's first  principle,  been  successful.  Certain 
voluntarists  and  panpsychists  have  attempted  to 
do  without  the  universal  will,  and  define  the  world 
solely  in  terms  of  the  many  individual  wills.  But, 
as  Schopenhauer  himself  pointed  out,  individual 
wills  cannot  be  distinguished  except  in  terms  of 
something  other  than  will,  such  as  space  and  time. 
The  same  is  true  if  for  will  there  be  substituted 
inner  feeling  or  consciousness.  Within  this  cate- 
gory individuals  can  be  distinguished  only  as 
points  of  view,  which  to  be  comparable  at  all  must 


292  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

contain  common  objects,  or  be  defined  in  terms 
of  a  system  of  relations  like  that  of  the  physical 
world  or  that  of  an  ethical  community.  The  con- 
ception of  pure  will  or  jDure  feeling  inevitably  at- 
taches to  itself  that  of  an  undivided  unity,  if  for 
no  other  reason  because  there  is  no  ground  for  dis- 
tinction. And  such  a  unity,  a  will  or  conscious- 
ness that  is  no  particular  act  or  idea,  can  be  known 
only  in  the  unique  experience  which  mysticism 
provides. 

§  139.  The  way  of  Schopenhauer  is  the  way  of 
one  who  adheres  to  the  belief  that  what  the  thinker 
Objective  knows  must  always  be  a  part  of  himself, 
spirituausm.  j^jg  g^^te  or  his  activity.  From  this 
point  of  view  the  important  element  of  being,  its 
very  essence  or  substance,  is  not  any  definable 
nature  but  an  immediate  relation  to  the  knower. 
The  consequence  is  that  the  universe  in  the  last 
analysis  can  only  be  defined  as  a  supreme  state  or 
activity  into  which  the  individual's  consciousness 
may  develop.  Spiritualism  has,  however,  other 
interests,  interests  which  may  be  quite  independent 
of  epistemology.  It  is  speculatively  interested  in 
a  kind  of  being  which  it  defines  as  spiritual,  and 
in  terms  of  which  it  proposes  to  define  the  universe. 
Such   procedure   is   radically   different   from   the 


SUBJECTIVISM  293 

epistemological  criticism  which  led  Berkeley  to 
maintain  that  the  esse  of  objects  is  in  their  percipi, 
or  Schopenhauer  to  maintain  that  "  the  world  is 
my  idea,"  or  that  led  both  of  these  philosophers  to 
find  a  deeper  reality  in  immediately  intuited  self- 
activity.  For  now  it  is  proposed  to  understand 
spirit,  discover  its  properties,  and  to  acknowledge 
it  only  where  these  properties  appear.  I  may  now 
know  spirit  as  an  object;  which  in  its  properties, 
to  be  sure,  is  quite  different  from  matter,  but  which 
like  matter  is  capable  of  subsisting  quite  independ- 
ently of  my  knowledge.  This  is  a  metaphysical 
spiritualism  quite  distinct  from  epistemological 
spiritualism,  and  by  no  means  easily  made  con- 
sistent therewith.  Indeed,  it  exhibits  an  almost 
irrepressible  tendency  to  overstep  the  bounds  both 
of  empiricism  and  subjectivism,  an  historical  con- 
nection with  which  alone  justifies  its  introduction 
in  the  present  chapter. 

§  140.  To  return  again  to  the  instructive  ex- 
Berkeiey's        ample  of  Bishop  Berkeley,  we  find  him 

Conception  of 

God  as  Cause,  proving  God  f  rom  the  evidence  of  him 

Goodness  and     .  . 

Order.  in  experience,  or  the  need  of  him  to 

support  the  claims  of  experience. 

"  But,   whatever  power   I   may  have   over   my  own 
thoughts,  I  find  the  ideas  actually  perceived  by  Sense 


294  THE   APPROACH  TO   PHILOSOPHY 

have  not  a  like  dependence  on  my  will.  When  in  broad 
daylight  I  open  my  eyes,  it  is  not  in  my  power  to  choose 
whether  I  shall  see  or  no,  or  to  determine  what  particular 
objects  shall  present  themselves  to  my  view:  and  so 
likewise  as  to  the  hearing  and  other  senses;  the  ideas 
imprinted  on  them  are  not  creatures  of  my  will.  There  is 
therefore  some  other  Will  or  Spirit  that  produces  them. 

The  ideas  of  Sense  are  more  strong,  lively,  and  distinct 
than  those  of  the  Imagination;  they  have  like\\ise  a 
steadiness,  order,  and  coherence,  and  are  not  excited  at 
random,  as  those  which  are  the  effects  of  human  wills 
often  are,  but  in  a  regular  train  or  series — the  admirable 
connection  whereof  sufficiently  testifies  the  wisdom  and 
benevolence  of  its  Author.  Now  the  set  rules,  or  estab- 
lished methods,  wherein  the  Mind  we  depend  on  excites 
in  us  the  ideas  of  Sense,  are  called  the  laws  of  nature."  '^ 

Of  the  attributes  of  experience  here  in  question, 
independence  or  "  steadiness  "  is  not  regarded  as 
prima  facie  evidence  of  spirit,  but  rather  as  an 
aspect  of  experience  for  which  some  cause  is  nec- 
essary. But  it  is  assumed  that  the  power  to  "  pro- 
duce," with  which  such  a  cause  must  be  endowed, 
is  the  peculiar  prerogative  of  spirit,  and  that  this 
cause  gives  further  evidence  of  its  spiritual  nature, 
of  its  eminently  spiritual  nature,  in  the  orderli- 
ness and  the  goodness  of  its  effects. 

"  The  force  that  produces,  the  intellect  that  orders,  the 
goodness  that  perfects  all  thingb  is  the  Supreme  Being."  *' 

"  Berkeley:  Op.  a  I.,  p.  273. 
"  Op.  cil.,  Vol.  I,  pp.  272-273. 


SUBJECTIVISM  295 

That  spirit  is  possessed  of  causal  efficacy,  Berke- 
ley has  in  an  earlier  passage  proved  by  a  direct 
appeal  to  the  individual's  sense  of  power. 

"  I  find  I  can  excite  ideas  in  my  mind  at  pleasure, 
and  vary  and  shift  the  scene  as  oft  as  I  think  fit.  It  is 
no  more  than  willing,  and  straightway  this  or  that  idea 
arises  in  my  fancy;  and  by  the  same  power  it  is  ob- 
literated and  makes  way  for  another.  This  making 
and  unmaking  of  ideas  doth  very  properly  denominate 
the  mind  active.  Thus  much  is  certain  and  grounded 
on  experience:  but  when  we  talk  of  unthinking  agents, 
or  of  exciting  ideas  exclusive  of  volition,  we  only  amuse 
ourselves  with  words."  ^° 

Although  Berkeley  is  here  in  general  agreement 
veith  a  very  considerable  variety  of  philosophical 
views,  it  will  be  readily  observed  that  this  doctrine 
tends  to  lapse  into  mysticism  whenever  it  is  re- 
tained in  its  purity.  Berkeley  himself  admitted 
that  there  was  no  "  idea  "  of  such  power.  x\nd 
philosophers  will  as  a  rule  either  obtain  an  idea 
corresponding  to  a  term  or  amend  the  term — 
always  excepting  the  mystical  appeal  to  an  inar- 
ticulate and  indefinable  experience.  Hence  pure 
power  revealed  in  an  ineffable  immediate  experi- 
ence tends  to  give  place  to  kinds  of  power  to  which 
some  definite  meaning  may  be  attached.  The 
energy  of  physics,  defined  by  measurable  quan- 
go Op.  cit.,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  278. 


296  THE  .APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

titative  equivalence,  is  a  ease  in  point.  The  ideal- 
istic trend  is  in  another  direction,  power  coming 
to  signify  ethical  or  logical  connection.  Simi- 
larly, in  the  later  philosophy  of  Berkeley  himself, 
God  is  known  by  the  nature  of  his  activity  rather 
than  by  the  fact  of  his  activity;  and  we  are  said 
"  to  account  for  a  thing,  when  we  show  that  it 
is  so  best."  God's  j)ower,  in  short,  becomes  indis- 
tinguishable from  his  universality  attended  with 
the  attributes  of  goodness  and  orderliness.  But 
this  means  that  the  analogy  of  the  human  spirit, 
conscious  of  its  own  activity,  is  no  longer  the  basis 
of  the  argument.  By  the  divine  will  is  now  meant 
ethical  principles,  rather  than  the  "  here  am  I 
willing "  of  the  empirical  consciousness.  Simi- 
larly the  divine  mind  is  defined  in  terms  of  logical 
principles,  such  as  coherence  and  order,  rather 
than  in  terms  of  the  "  here  am  I  thinking  "  of  the 
finite  knower  himself.  But  enough  has  been  said 
to  make  it  plain  that  this  is  no  longer  the  stand- 
point of  empirio-idealism.  Indeed,  in  his  last 
philosophical  v.'riting,  tlie  "  Siris,"  Berkeley  is  so 
far  removed  from  the  principles  of  knowledge 
which  made  him  at  once  the  disciple  and  the  critic 
of  Locke,  as  to  pronounce  himself  the  devotee  of 
Platonism  and  the  prophet  of  transcendentalism. 


SUBJECTIVISM  297 

The  former  strain  appears  in  his  conclusion  tliat 
"  the  principles  of  science  are  neither  objects  of 
sense  nor  imagination;  and  that  intellect  and  rea- 
son are  alone  the  sure  guides  to  truth."  ^i  His 
transcendentalism  appears  in  his  belief  that  such 
principles,  participating  in  the  vital  unity  of  the 
Individual  Purpose,  constitute  the  meaning  and  so 
the  substantial  essence  of  the  universe. 

§  141.  Such  then  are  the  various  paths  which 
lead  from  subjectivism  to  other  types  of  philos- 
The  General     opliy,  demonstrating  the  peculiar  apti- 

Tendency  of  or  i 

Subjectivism     tude  of  the  fomicr  for  departing  from 

to  Transcend 

Itself.  its  first  principle.     Beginning  with  the 

relativity  of  all  knowable  reality  to  the  individual 
knower,  it  undertakes  to  conceive  reality  in  one  or 
the  other  of  the  terms  of  this  relation,  as  particu- 
lar state  of  knowledge  or  as  individual  subject  of 
knowledge.  But  these  terms  develop  an  intrinsic 
nature  of  their  own,  and  become  respectively 
empirical  datum,  and  logical  or  ethical  principle. 
In  either  case  the  subjectivistic  princii^le  of  knowl- 
edge has  been  abandoned.  Those  whose  specula- 
tive interest  in  a  definable  objective  world  has  been 
less  strong  than  their  attachment  to  this  principle, 
have  either  accepted  the  imputation  of  scepticism, 
"  Op.  cit.,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  249. 


298  THE  APPROACH  TO   PHILOSOPHY 

or  had  recourse  to  the  radical  epistemological  doc- 
trine of  mysticism. 

§  142.  Since  the  essence  of  subjectivism  is 
epistemological  rather  than  metaphysical,  its  prac- 
Ethicai  tical    and    religious    implications    are 

Theories.  .  i   •       i        i  •  i  •    i 

Relativism.  various.  The  ethical  theories  which 
are  corollary  to  the  tendencies  expounded  above, 
range  from  extreme  egoism  to  a  mystical  univer- 
salism.  The  close  connection  between  the  former 
and  relativism  is  evident,  and  the  form  of  egoism 
most  consistent  with  epistemological  relativism  is 
to  be  found  among  those  same  Sophists  who  first 
maintained  this  latter  doctrine.  If  we  may 
believe  Plato,  the  Sophists  sought  to  create  for 
their  individual  pupils  an  appearance  of  good. 
In  the  "  Theaetetus,"  Socrates  is  represented  as 
speaking  thus  on  behalf  of  Protagoras: 

"  And  I  am  far  from  saying  that  wisdom  and  the  wise 
man  have  no  existence;  but  I  say  that  the  wise  man  is 
he  who  makes  the  evils  which  are  and  appear  to  a  man, 
into  goods  which  are  and  appear  to  him.  ...  I  say 
that  they  (the  wise  men)  are  the  physicians  of  the  human 
body,  and  the  husbanchuen  of  plants — for  the  husband- 
men also  take  away  the  evil  and  disordered  sensations 
of  plants,  and  infuse  into  them  good  and  healthy  sensa- 
tions as  well  as  true  ones ;  and  the  wise  and  good  rhetori- 
cians make  the  good  instead  of  the  evil  seem  just  to  states ; 
for  whatever  appears  to  be  just  and  fair  to  a  state,  while 


SUBJECTIVISM  299 

sanctioned  by  a  state,  is  just  and  fair  to  it;  but  the  teacher 
of  wisdom  causes  the  good  to  take  the  place  of  the  evil, 
both  in  appearance  and  in  reality."  ^^ 

As  truth  is  indistinguishable  from  the  appearance 
of  truth  to  the  individual,  so  good  is  indistinguish- 
able from  a  particular  seeming  good.  The  su- 
preme moral  value  according  to  this  plan  of  life 
is  the  agreeable  feeling  tone  of  that  dream  world 
to  which  the  individual  is  forever  consigned.  The 
possible  perfection  of  an  experience  which  is  "  re- 
duced to  a  swarm  of  impressions,"  and  "  ringed 
round  "  for  each  one  of  us  by  a  "  thick  wall  of 
personality  "  has  been  brilliantly  depicted  in  the 
passage  already  quoted  from  Walter  Pater,  in 
whom  the  naturalistic  and  subjectivistic  motives 
unite,^^  If  all  my  experience  is  strictly  my  own, 
then  my  good  must  likewise  be  my  o^vn.  And  if 
all  of  my  experience  is  valid  only  in  its  instants  of 
immediacy,  then  my  best  good  must  likewise  con- 
sist in  some  "  exquisite  passion,"  or  stirring  of  the 
senses. 

§  143.  But     for     Schopenhauer     the     internal 
world  opens  out  into  the  boundless  and  unfathom- 

Pessimism  and  ^^^^  ^^^  ^^  ^^e  Uuivcrsal  will.        If  I  TO- 

Seif-demai.      ^'^.g  fj-om  the  world  upon  my  own  pri- 

^^  Plato:  Theaetetus,  167.     Translation  by  Jowett. 
-^  See  §  121. 


300  THE  APPROACH  TO   PHILOSOPHY 

vate  feelings,  I  am  still  short  of  the  true  life,  for 
I  am  asserting  myself  against  the  world.  I  should 
seek  a  sense  of  unison  with  a  world  whose  deeper 
heart-beats  I  may  learn  to  feel  and  adopt  as  the 
rhythm  of  my  own.  The  folly  of  willing  for  one's 
private  self  is  the  ground  of  Schopenhauer's 
pessimism. 

"  All  willing  arises  from  want,  therefore  from  de- 
ficiency, and  therefore  from  suffering.  The  satisfaction 
of  a  wish  ends  it;  yet  for  one  wish  that  is  satisfied  there 
remain  at  least  ten  which  are  denied.  Further,  the 
desire  lasts  long,  the  demands  are  infinite;  the  satisfac- 
tion is  short  and  scantily  measured  out.  But  even  the 
final  satisfaction  is  itself  only  apparent;  every  satisfied 
wish  at  once  makes  room  for  a  new  one,  both  are  illusions ; 
the  one  is  known  to  be  so,  the  other  not  yet.  No  at- 
tained object  of  desire  can  give  lasting  satisfaction,  but 
merely  a  fleeting  gratification;  it  is  like  the  alms  thrown 
to  the  beggar,  that  keeps  him  alive  to-day  that  his  misery 
may  be  prolonged  till  the  morrow.  .  .  .  The  subject 
of  willing  is  thus  constantly  stretched  on  the  revolving 
wheel  of  Ixion,  pours  water  into  the  sieve  of  the  Danaids, 
is  the  ever-longing  Tantalus."  ^^ 

The  escape  from  this  torture  and  self-deception  is 

possible  through  the  same  mystical  experience,  the 

same  blending  with  the  universe  that  conditions 

knowledge. 

§  144.  But  though   pleasant   dreaming  be  the 

^*  Schopenhauer:  Op.  cit.  Translation  by  Haldane  and 
Kemp,  Vol.  I,  pp.  2.53-2.54. 


SUBJECTIVISM  301 

most  consistent  practical  sequel  to  a  subjectivistic 
cpistemology,  its  individualism  presents  another 
The  Ethics  ^^^^^  foi"  life  with  quite  different  pos- 
of  Welfare,  gibilities  of  cmphasis.  It  may  develop 
into  an  aggressive  egoism  of  the  type  represented 
by  the  sopliist  Thrasymachus,  in  his  proclamation 
that  "  might  is  right,  justice  the  interest  of  the 
stronger."  -^  But  more  commonly  it  is  tempered 
by  a  conception  of  social  interest,  and  serves  as 
the  champion  of  action  against  contemplation. 
The  gospel  of  action  is  always  individualistic.  It 
requires  of  the  individual  a  sense  of  his  inde- 
pendence, and  of  the  real  virtue  of  his  initiative. 
Hence  those  voluntarists  who  emphasize  the  many 
individual  wills  and  decline  to  reduce  them,  after 
the  manner  of  Schopenhauer,  to  a  universal,  may 
be  said  to  afford  a  direct  justification  of  it.  It  is 
true  that  this  practical  realism  threatens  the  tena- 
bility  of  an  epistemological  idealism,  but  the  two 
have  been  united,  and  because  of  their  common 
emphasis  upon  the  individual  such  procedure  is 
not  entirely  inconsequential.  Friedrich  Paulsen, 
whose  panpsychism  has  already  been  cited,  is  an 
excellent  case  in  point.  The  only  good,  he  main- 
tains, is  "  welfare,"  the  fulfilment  of  those  natural 
"  See  Plato:  Republic,  Bk.  I,  338. 


302  THE  APPROACH   TO   PHH^OSOrHV 

desires  which  both  distinguish  the  individual  and 
signify  his  continuity  with  all  grades  of  being. 

"  The  goal  at  which  the  will  aims  does  not  consist  in 
a  maximum  of  pleasurable  feelings,  but  in  the  normal 
exercise  of  the  vital  functions  for  which  the  species  is 
predisposed.  In  the  case  of  man  the  mode  of  life  is  on 
the  whole  determined  by  the  nature  of  the  historical 
unity  from  which  the  individual  evolves  as  a  member. 
Here  the  objective  content  of  life,  after  which  the  will 
strives,  also  enters  into  consciousness  with  the  progres- 
sive evolution  of  presentation;  the  type  of  life  becomes 
a  conscious  ideal  of  life."^ 

Here,  contrary  to  the  teaching  of  Schopenhauer, 
the  good  consists  in  individual  attainment,  the 
extension  and  fulfilment  of  the  distinct  interests 
that  arise  from  the  conmion  fund  of  nature.  To 
be  and  to  do  to  the  uttermost,  to  realize  the  maxi- 
mum from  nature's  investment  in  one's  special 
capacities  and  powers — this  is  indeed  the  first 
principle  of  a  morality  of  action. 

§  145.  But  a  type  of  ethics  still  further  re- 
moved from  the  initial  relativism  has  been  adopted 
The  Ethical  ^^^^  morc  or  Icss  succcssfully  assimi- 
community.  i^tcd  by  subjectivistic  philosophies. 
AccejDting  Berkeley's  spirits,  with  their  indefinite 
capacities,  and  likewise  the  stability  of  the  ideal 
principles  that  underlie  a  God-administered  world, 
2«  Paulsen:  Op.  cit.,  p.  423. 


SUBJECTIVISM  303 

and  morality  becomes  the  obedience  which  the  in- 
dividual renders  to  the  law.  Tlie  individual,  free 
to  act  in  his  own  right,  cooperates  with  the  pur- 
poses of  the  general  spiritual  community,  whose 
laws  are  worthy  of  obedience  though  not  coercive. 
The  recognition  of  such  a  spiritual  citizenship, 
entailing  opportunities,  duties,  and  obligations, 
rather  than  thraldom,  partakes  of  the  truth  as 
well  as  the  inadequacy  of  common-sense. 

§  146.  As  for  religion,  at  least  two  distinct 
practical  appreciations  of  the  universe  have  been 
of  liistorically  associated  with  this  chap- 
Mysticism.  ^QY  in  philosophy.  The  one  of  these 
is  the  mysticism  of  Schopenhauer,  the  religious 
sequel  to  a  universalistic  voluntarism.  Schopen- 
hauer's ethics,  his  very  philosophy,  is  religion. 
For  the  good  and  the  true  are  alike  attainable  only 
through  identification  with  the  Absolute  Will. 
This  consummation  of  life,  transcending  practical 
and  theoretical  differences,  engulfing  and  effacing 
all  qualities  and  all  values,  is  like  the  J^irvana  of 
the  Orient — a  positive  ideal  only  for  one  who  has 
appraised  the  apparent  world  at  its  real  value. 

"  Rather  do  we  freely  acknowledge  that  what  remains 
after  the  entire  abolition  of  will  is  for  all  those  who  are 

still  full   of  will   certainly  nothing;  but,   conversely,  to 


304  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

those  in  whom  the  will  has  turned  and  has  denied  itself, 
this  our  world,  which  is  so  real,  with  all  its  suns  and 
milky- ways — is  nothing."  ^^ 

§  147.  From  the  union  of  the  two  motives  of 
voluntarism  and  individualism  springs  another 
The  Religion  ^^^  ^  morc  familiar  type  of  religion, 
coapeiatton^  that  of  Cooperative  spiritual  endeavor. 
with  God.  jj^  |.|jg  religion  of  Schopenhauer  the 
soul  must  utterly  lose  itself  for  the  sake  of  peace ; 
here  the  soul  must  persist  in  its  own  being  and 
activity  for  the  sake  of  the  progressive  goodness 
of  the  world.  For  Schopenhauer  God  is  the  uni- 
versal solution,  in  which  all  motions  cease  and  all 
differences  disappear;  here  God  is  the  General  of 
moral  forces.  The  deej^er  and  more  significant 
universe  is 

"a  society  of  rational  agents,  acting  under  the  eye  of 
Providence,  concurring  in  one  design  to  promote  the 
common  benefit  of  the  whole,  and  conforming  their 
actions  to  the  estabhshed  laws  and  order  of  the  Divine 
parental  wisdom:  wherein  each  particular  agent  shall 
not  consider  himself  apart,  but  as  the  member  of  a  great 
City,  whose  author  and  founder  is  God:  in  which  the 
civil  laws  are  no  other  than  the  rules  of  virtue  and  the 
duties  of  religion:  and  where  everyone's  true  interest  is 
combined  with  his  duty."^* 

"  Schopenhauer:   Op.  cit.    Translation  by  Haldane  and 
Kemp,  p.  532. 

28  Berkeley:  Op.  cit.,  Vol.  H,  p.  138. 


SUBJECTIVISM  305 

But  so  uncompromising  an  optimism  is  not  essen- 
tial to  this  religion.  Its  distinction  lies  rather  in 
its  acceptance  of  the  manifest  plurality  of  souls, 
and  its  appeal  to  the  faith  that  is  engendered  by 
service.^^    As  William  James  has  said : 

"  Even  God's  being  is  sacred  from  ours.  To  cooperate 
with  his  creation  by  the  best  and  rightest  response  seems 
all  he  wants  of  us.  In  such  cooperation  with  his  pur- 
poses, not  in  any  chimerical  speculative  conquest  of  him, 
not  in  any  theoretical  drinking  of  him  up,  must  he  the 
real  meaning  of  our  destiny."'" 

^°  For    an    interesting    characterization    of    this    type    of 
rehgion,  of.  Royce:  Spirit  of  Modern  Philosophy,  p.  46. 
'"  James:  The  Will  to  Believe,  p.  141. 


CHAPTEE    X 

ABSOLUTE    REALISM  * 

§  148.  No  one  has  understood  better  than  the 
philosopher  himself  that  he  cannot  hope  to  be  popu- 
The  Phiioso-  ^^^  witli  men  of  practical  common- 
pher's  Task,     gg^gg^     Indeed,  it  has  commonly  been 

and  the  '  '' 

Philosopher's    ^    matter    of    pride    with    him.     The 

Object,  or  the  ^ 

Absolute.  classic  representation  of  the  philoso- 
pher's faith  in  himself  is  to  be  found  in  Plato's 
"  Republic."  The  philosopher  is  there  portrayed 
in  the  famous  cave  simile  as  one  who  having  seen 
the  light  itself  can  no  longer  distinguish  the 
shadows  which  are  apparent  to  those  who  sit  per- 
petually in  the  twilight.  Within  the  cave  of 
shadows  he  is  indeed  less  at  his  ease  than  those 
who  have  never  seen  the  sun.  But  since  he  knows 
the  source  of  the  shadows,  his  knowledge  surrounds 

'  By  Absolute  Realism  is  meant  that  system  of  philosophy 
which  defines  ths  universe  as  the  absolute  being,  iniphcd 
in  knowledge  as  its  final  object,  but  assumed  to  be  inde- 
pendent of  knowledge.  In  the  Spinozistic  system  this 
aljsolute  being  is  conceived  under  the  form  of  substance,  or 
self-sufficiency;  in  Platonism  imder  the  form  of  'perfection; 
and  in  the  Aristotelian  system  under  the  form  of  a  hierarchy 
oj  substances. 

306 


ABSOLUTE  REALISM  307 

that  of  tlic  shadow  connoisseurs.  And  his  equa- 
nimity need  not  suffer  from  the  contempt  of  those 
whom  lie  understands  better  than  they  understand 
themselves.  The  history  of  philosophy  is  due  to 
the  dogged  persistence  with  which  the  philosopher 
has  taken  himself  seriously  and  endured  the  poor 
opinion  of  the  world.  But  the  pride  of  the  phi- 
losopher has  done  more  than  perpetuate  the  philo- 
sophical outlook  and  problem ;  it  has  led  to  the 
formulation  of  a  definite  philosophical  conception, 
and  of  two  great  philosophical  doctrines.  The 
conception  is  that  of  the  absolute;  and  the  doc- 
trines are  that  of  the  absolute  being,  and  that  of 
the  absolute  self  or  mind.  The  former  of  these 
doctrines  is  the  topic  of  the  present  chapter. 

Among  the  early  Greeks  the  role  of  the  philos- 
opher was  one  of  superlative  dignity.  In  point 
of  knowledge  he  was  less  easily  satisfied  than 
other  men.  Pie  thought  beyond  immediate  prac- 
tical problems,  devoting  himself  to  a  profounder 
reflection,  that  could  not  but  induce  in  him  a  sense 
of  superior  intellectual  worth.  The  familiar  was 
not  binding  upon  him,  for  his  thought  was  eman- 
cipated from  routine  and  superficiality.  Fur- 
thermore his  intellectual  courage  and  resolution 
did  not  permit  him  to  indulge  in  triviality,  doubt. 


308  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

or  paradox.  lie  sought  liis  own  with  a  faith  that 
could  not  be  denied.  Even  Heraelitus  the  Dark, 
Avho  was  also  called  "  the  Weeping  Philosopher," 
because  he  found  at  the  very  heart  of  nature  that 
transiency  which  the  philosophical  mind  seeks  to 
escape,  felt  himself  to  be  exalted  as  well  as  isolated 
bv  that  insight.  But  this  sentiment  of  personal 
aloofness  led  at  once  to  a  division  of  experience. 
He  who  knows  truly  belongs  to  another  and  more 
abiding  world.  As  there  is  a  philosophical  way 
of  thought,  there  is  a  philosophical  way  of  life,  and 
a  philosophical  object.  Since  the  philosopher  and 
the  common  man  do  not  see  alike,  the  terms  of 
their  experience  are  incommensurable.  In  Par- 
menides  the  Eleatic  this  motive  is  most  strikingly 
exhibited.  There  is  a  Way  of  Truth  which  di- 
verges from  the  Way  of  Opinion.  The  philoso- 
pher walks  the  former  way  alone.  And  there  is 
an  object  of  truth,  accessible  only  to  one  who  takes 
this  way  of  truth.  Parmenides  finds  this  object 
to  be  the  content  of  pure  affirmation. 

"  One  path  only  is  left  for  us  to  speak  of,  namely, 
that  It  is.  In  it  are  very  many  tokens  that  what  is, 
is  uncreated  and  indestructible,  alone,  complete,  im- 
movable, and  without  end.  Nor  was  it  ever,  nor  will 
it  be;  for  now  it  is,  all  at  once,  a  continuous  one."' 

*  Burnet:  Early  Greek  Philosophy,  p.  185. 


ABSOLUTE  REALISM  309 

The  philosophy  of  Parmenides,  commonly  called 
the  Eleatic  Philosophy,  is  notable  for  this  emer- 
gence of  the  pure  concept  of  absolute  being  as  the 
final  object  of  knowledge.  The  philosopher  aims 
to  discover  that  which  is,  and  so  turns  away  from 
that  which  is  not  or  that  which  ceases  to  be.  The 
negative  and  transient  aspects  of  experience  only 
hinder  him  in  his  search  for  the  eternal.  It  was 
the  great  Eleatic  insight  to  realize  that  the  out- 
come of  thought  is  thus  predetermined;  that  the 
answer  to  philosophy  is  contained  in  the  question 
of  philosophy.  The  philosopher,  in  that  he  reso- 
lutely avoids  all  partiality,  relativity,  and  super- 
ficiality, must  affirm  a  complete,  universal,  and 
ultimate  being  as  the  very  object  of  that  perfect 
knowledge  which  he  means  to  possess.  This  ob- 
ject is  known  in  the  history  of  these  philosophies 
as  the  infinite  or  absolute.^ 

§  149.  The  Eleatic  reasons  somewhat  as  fol- 
lows. The  philosopher  seeks  to  know  what  is. 
The  Eleatic      The  objcct  of  his  knowledge  will  then 

Conception  .  .  ,  ,  .    , 

of  Being.  coutam  as  its  primary  and  essential 
predicate,  that  of  being.  It  is  a  step  further  to 
define  being  in  terms  of  this  essential  predicate. 
5  Wlien  contrasted  with  the  temporal  realm  of  "  genera- 
tion and  decay,"  this  ultimate  object  is  often  called  the 
eternal. 


310  THE  APPROACH  TO   PHILOSOPHY 

Parmenides  thinks  of  being  as  a  power  or  strength, 
a  positive  self-maintenance  to  which  all  affirma- 
tions refer.  The  remainder  of  the  Eleatic  philos- 
ophy is  the  analysis  of  this  concept  and  the  proof 
of  its  implications.  Being  must  persist  through 
all  change,  and  span  all  chasms.  Before  being 
there  can  be  only  nothing,  which  is  the  same  as  to 
say  that  so  far  as  being  is  concerned  there  is  no 
before.  Similarly  there  can  be  no  after  or  beyond. 
There  can  be  no  motion,  change,  or  division  of 
being,  because  being  will  be  in  all  parts  of  every 
division,  and  in  all  stages  of  every  process. 
Hence  being  is  "  uncreated  and  indestructible, 
alone,  complete,  innnovable,  and  without  end." 

The  argument  turns  upon  the  application  to 
being  as  a  Avhole  of  the  meaning  and  the  implica- 
tions of  only  being.  Being  is  the  affirmative  or 
positive.  From  that  alone,  one  cap  derive  only  such 
properties  as  eternity  or  unity.  For  generation  and 
decay  and  plurality  may  belong  to  that  which  is 
also  affirmative  and  positive,  but  not  to  that  which 
is  affirmative  and  positive  only.  The  Eleatic  phi- 
losophy is  due,  then,  to  tlie  determination  to  de- 
rive the  whole  of  reality  from  the  bare  necessity 
of  being,  to  cut  down  rcnility  to  what  flows  en- 
tirely from  the  assertion  of  its  only  known  nee- 


ABSOLUTE  REALISM  311 

essary  aspect,  that  of  being.  We  meet  here  in  its 
simplest  form  a  persistent  rationalistic  motive,  the 
attempt  to  derive  the  imiverse  from  the  isolation 
and  analysis  of  its  most  universal  character.  As 
in  the  case  of  every  well-defined  philosophy,  this 
motive  is  always  attended  by  a  "  besetting  "  prob- 
lem. Here  it  is  the  accounting  for  what,  empiri- 
cally at  least,  is  alien  to  that  universal  character. 
And  this  difficulty  is  emphasized  rather  than  re- 
solved by  Parmenides  in  his  designation  of  a  limbo 
of  opinion,  "  in  which  is  no  true  belief  at  all,"  to 
which  the  manifold  of  common  experience  with 
all  its  irrelevancies  can  be  relegated. 

§  150.  The  Eleatic  philosophy,  enriched  and 
supplemented,  appears  many  centuries  later  in  the 
Spinoza's         rigorous  rationalism  of  Spinoza.^    With 

Conception  .  i  -i  i         •  i 

of  Substance,  bpiuoza  philosophy  IS  a  demonstration 
of  necessities  after  the  manner  of  geometry. 
Reality  is  to  be  set  forth  in  theorems  derived  from 
fimdamental  axioms  and  definitions.  As  in  the 
case  of  Parmenides,  these  necessities  are  the  im- 
plications of  the  very  problem  of  being.  The  phi- 
losopher's problem  is  made  to  solve  itself.  But 
for  Spinoza  that  problem  is  more  definite  and 
more  pregnant.  The  problematic  being  must  not 
*  HoUand,  1632-1677. 


312  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

only  be,  but  must  be  sufficient  to  itself.  What  the 
philosopher  seeks  to  know  is  primarily  an  intrinsic 
entity.  Its  nature  must  be  independent  of  other 
natures,  and  my  knowledge  of  it  independent  of  my 
knowledge  of  anything  else.  Reality  is  something 
which  need  not  be  sought  further.  So  construed, 
being  is  in  Spinoza's  philosophy  termed  substance. 
It  will  be  seen  that  to  define  svibstance  is  to  affirm 
the  existence  of  it,  for  substance  is  so  defined  as 
to  embody  the  very  qualification  for  existence. 
Whatever  exists  exists  under  the  form  of  substance, 
as  that  "  which  is  in  itself,  and  is  conceived 
through  itself:  in  other  words,  that  of  which  a 
conception  can  be  formed  independently  of  any 
other  conception."  ■'' 

§  151.  There  remains  but  one  further  funda- 
mental thesis  for  the  establishment  of  the  Spino- 
Spinoza's         zistic  plulosophy,  the  thesis  which  main- 

Proof  of  God, 

the  Infinite  tains  tlic  cxclusive  existence  of  the  one 
The  Modes  "  absolutcly  infinite  being,"  or  God. 
Attributes.  The  cxclusive  existence  of  God  follows 
from  his  existence,  because  of  the  exhaustiveness 
of  his  nature.  His  is  the  nature  "  consisting  in 
infinite  attributes,  of  wliich  each  expresses  eternal 
and  infinite  essentiality."  Tie  will  contain  all 
*  Spiiioza:  Ethics,  Part  I.     Translation  by  Elwes,  p.  45. 


ABSOLUTE  REALISM  313 

meaning,  and  all  possible  meaning,  within  his  fixed 
and  necessary  constitution.  It  is  evident  that  if 
such  a  God  exist,  nothing  can  fall  outside  of  him. 
One  such  substance  must  be  the  only  substance. 
But  upon  what  grounds  are  we  to  assert  God's 
existence  ? 

To  proceed  further  with  Spinoza's  philosophy 
we  must  introduce  two  terms  which  are  scarcely 
less  fundamental  in  his  system  than  that  of  sub- 
stance. The  one  of  these  is  "  attribute,"  by  which 
he  means  Tiind  or  general  property;  the  other  is 
"  mode,"  by  wdiich  he  means  case  or  individual 
thing.  Spinoza's  proof  of  God  consists  in  show- 
ing that  no  single  mode,  single  attribute,  or  finite 
group  of  modes  or  attributes,  can  be  a  substance ; 
but  only  an  infinite  system  of  all  modes  of  all  at- 
tributes. Translated  into  common  speech  this 
means  that  neither  kinds  nor  cases,  nor  special 
groups  of  either,  can  stand  alone  and  be  of  them- 
selves, but  only  the  unity  of  all  possible  cases  of 
all  possible  kinds. 

The  argument  concerning  the  possible  substan- 
tiality of  the  case  or  individual  thing  is  relatively 
simple.  Suppose  an  attribute  or  kind,  A,  of  which 
there  are  cases  am^,  am2,  am^,  etc.  The  number 
of  cases  is  never  involved  in  the  nature  of  the 


314  THE  APPROACH  TO   PHILOSOPHY 

kind,  as  is  seen  for  example  in  the  fact  that  the 
definition  of  triangle  prescribes  no  special  num- 
her  of  individual  triangles.  Hence  ami,  am2,  arn^, 
etc.,  must  be  explained  by  something  outside  of 
their  nature.  Their  being  cases  of  A  does  not  ac- 
count for  their  existing  severally.  This  is  Spi- 
noza's statement  of  the  argument  that  individual 
events,  such  as  motions  or  sensations,  are  not  self- 
dependent,  but  belong  to  a  context  of  like  events 
which  are  mutually  dependent. 

The  question  of  the  attribute  is  more  difficult. 
Why  may  not  an  attribute  as  a  complete  domain 
of  interdependent  events,  itself  be  independent  or 
substantial  ?  Spinoza's  predecessor,  Descartes,  had 
maintained  precisely  that  thesis  in  behalf  of  the 
domain  of  thought  and  the  domain  of  space. 
Spinoza's  answer  rests  upon  the  famous  ontological 
argument,  inherited  from  scholasticism  and  gen- 
erally accepted  in  the  first  period  of  modern  philos- 
ophy. The  evidence  of  existence,  he  declares,  is 
clear  and  distinct  conceivability. 

"For  a  person  to  say  that  he  has  a  clear  and  distinct — 
that  is,  a  true — idea  of  a  substance,  but  that  he  is  not 
sure  whether  such  substance  exists,  would  be  the  same 
as  if  he  said  that  he  had  a  true  idea,  but  was  not  sure 
whether  or  no  it  was  false."' 

» Ibid.,  p.  49. 


ABSOLUTE  REALISM  31 5 

Now  we  can  form  a  clear  and  distinct  idea  of  an 
absolutely  infinite  being  that  shall  have  all  possible 
attributes.  This  idea  is  a  well-recognized  stand- 
ard and  object  of  reference  for  thought.  But  it  is 
a  conception  Avhich  is  highly  qualified,  not  only 
through  its  clearness  and  distinctness,  but  also 
through  its  abundance  of  content.  It  affirms  itself 
therefore  with  a  certainty  that  surpasses  any  other 
certainty,  because  it  is  supported  by  each  and 
every  other  certainty,  and  even  by  the  residuum 
of  possibility.  If  any  intelligible  meaning  be 
permitted  to  affirm  itself,  so  much  the  more  irre- 
sistible is  the  claim  of  this  infinitely  rich  mean- 
ing. Since  every  attribute  contributes  to  its  valid- 
ity, the  being  with  infinite  attributes  is  infinitely 
or  absolutely  valid.  The  conclusion  of  the  argu- 
ment is  now  obvious.  If  the  being  constituted  by 
the  infinite  attributes  exists,  it  swallows  up  all 
possibilities  and  exists  exclusively. 

§  152.  The  vulnerable  point  in  Spinoza's  argu- 
ment can  thus  be  expressed:  that  wdiich  is  im- 
The  Limits  of  portaut  is  questionable,  and  that  which 
^g^ument  ^^  Unquestionable  is  of  doubtful  im- 
forGod.  portance.     Have  I  indeed  a  clear  and 

distinct  idea  of  an  absolutely  infinite  being? 
The    answer    turns    upon    the    meaning    of    the 


316  THE  APPROACH  TO   PHILOSOPHY 

phrase  "  idea  of."  It  is  true  I  can  add  to  such 
meaning  as  I  apprehend  the  thought  of  possible 
other  meaning,  and  suppose  the  whole  to  have 
a  definiteness  and  systematic  unity  like  that 
of  the  triangle.  But  such  an  idea  is  prob- 
lematic. I  am  compelled  to  use  the  term  "  pos- 
sible/' and  so  to  confess  the  failure  of  definite 
content  to  measure  up  to  my  idea.  My  idea  of  an 
absolutely  infinite  being  is  like  my  idea  of  a  uni- 
versal language:  I  can  think  of  it,  but  I  cannot 
think  it  out,  for  lack  of  data  or  because  of  the  con- 
flicting testimony  of  other  data.  If  I  mean  the 
infinity  of  my  being  to  be  a  term  of  inclusiveness, 
and  to  insist  that  the  all  must  be,  and  that  there 
can  be  nothing  not  included  in  the  all,  I  can 
scarcely  be  denied.  But  it  is  reasonable  to  doubt 
the  importance  of  such  a  truth.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  I  mean  that  my  infinite  being  shall  have 
the  compactness  and  organic  unity  of  a  triangle, 
I  must  admit  that  such  a  being  is  indeed  prob- 
lematic. The  degree  to  which  the  meaning  of  the 
part  is  dependent  upon  the  meaning  of  the  whole, 
or  the  degree  to  which  the  geometrical  analogy  is 
to  be  preferred  to  the  analogy  of  aggregates,  like 
the  events  within  a  year,  is  a  problem  that  falls 
quite  outside   Spinoza's  fundamental  arguments. 


ABSOLUTE  REALISM  317 

§  153.  But  the  advance  of  Spinoza  over  the 
Eleatics  must  not  be  lost  sight  of.  The  modern 
Spinoza's         philosopher  has  so  conceived  being  as 

Provision  for  •  ^       r  •   i   •  •      t     •  i 

the  Finite.  to  providc  lor  parts  witliin  an  individ- 
ual unity.  The  geometrical  analogy  is  a  most 
illuminating  one,  for  it  enables  us  to  understand 
how  manyness  may  be  indispensable  to  a  being  that 
is  essentially  unitary.  The  triangle  as  triangle 
is  one.  But  it  could  not  be  such  without  sides  and 
angles.  The  unity  is  equally  necessary  to  the 
parts,  for  sides  and  angles  of  a  triangle  could  not 
be  such  without  an  arrangement  governed  by  the 
nature  triangle.  The  whole  of  nature  may  be 
similarly  conceived :  as  the  reciprocal  necessity  of 
natura  naturans,  or  nature  defined  in  respect  of 
its  unity,  and  natura  naturata,  or  nature  specified 
in  detail.  There  is  some  promise  here  of  a  recon- 
ciliation of  the  Way  of  Opinion  with  the  Way  of 
Truth.  Opinion  would  be  a  gathering  of  detail, 
truth  a  comprehension  of  the  intelligible  unity. 
Both  would  be  provided  for  through  the  considera- 
tion that  whatever  is  complete  and  necessary  must 
be  made  up  of  incompletenesses  that  are  necessary 
to  it. 

§  154.  This   consideration,    however,    does   not 
receive  its  most  effective  formulation  in  Spinoza. 


318  THE  APPROACH  TO   PHILOSOPHY 

The  isolation  of  the  parts,  the  actual  severalty 
and  irrelevance  of  the  modes^  still  presents  a  grave 
Transition  to   problem.     Is  there  a  kind  of  wliole  to 

Teleological  t  •    ^  i  ^         r 

Conceptions,  which  not  onlj  parts  but  fragments,  or 
l^arts  in  their  very  incompleteness,  are  indispen- 
sable ?  This  would  seem  to  be  true  of  a  progres- 
sion or  development,  since  that  would  require  both 
perfection  as  its  end,  and  degrees  of  imperfection 
as  its  stages.  Spinoza  was  prevented  from  making 
much  of  this  idea  by  his  rejection  of  the  principle 
of  teleology.  He  regarded  appreciation  or  valu- 
ation as  a  projection  of  personal  bias.  "  Nature 
has  no  particular  goal  in  view,"  and  "  final  causes 
are  mere  human  figments."  "  The  }^rfection  of 
things  is  to  be  reckoned  only  from  their  own  nature 
and  power."  "^  The  philosophical  method  which 
Spinoza  here  repudiates,  the  interpretation  of  the 
world  in  moral  terms,  is  Platonism,  an  indepen- 
dent and  profoundly  important  movement,  belong- 
ing to  the  same  general  realistic  type  with  Eleati- 
cism  and  Spinozism.  Absolute  being  is  again  the 
fundamental  conception.  Here,  however,  it  is 
conceived  that  being  is  primarily  not  afiirmation 
or  self-sufficiency,  but  the  good  or  ideal.  There 
are  few  great  metaphysical  systems  that  have  not 
Uhid.,  pp.  77,  81. 


ABSOLUTE  REALISM  319 

been  deeply  influenced  by  Platonism ;  hence  the 
importance  of  understanding  it  in  its  purity.  To 
this  end  we  must  return  again  to  the  early  Greek 
conception  of  the  philosopher ;  for  Platonism,  like 
Eleaticism,  is  a  sequel  to  the  philosopher's  self- 
consciousness. 

§  155.  Although  the  first  Greek  philosophers, 
such  men  as  Thales,  Ileraclitus,  Parmenides,  and 
Early  Greek  Empedoclcs,  wcro  clearly  aware  of  their 
nof  se°i?"'  distinction  and  high  calling,  it  by  no 
critical.  means    follows    that    they    were    good 

judges  of  themselves.  Their  sense  of  intellectual 
power  was  unsuspecting;  and  they  praised  phi- 
losophy without  definitely  raising  the  question  of 
its  meaning.  They  were  like  unskilled  players 
who  try  all  the  stops  and  scales  of  an  organ, 
and  know  that  somehow  they  can  make  a  music 
that  exceeds  the  noises,  monotones  or  simple 
melodies  of  those  who  play  upon  lesser  instru- 
ments. They  knew  their  power  rather  than 
their  instrument  or  their  art.  The  first  philoso- 
phers, in  short,  were  self-conscious  but  not  self- 
critical. 

§  156.  The  immediately  succeeding  phase  in  the 
history  of  Greek  philosophy  was  a  curtailment,  but 


320  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

only  in  the  most  superficial  sense  a  criticism,  of 
the  activity  of  the  philosopher.  In  the  Pericleau 
Curtailment  of  ^ge  philosophy  Suffered  more  from  in- 
Phiiosophyin  attention   than  from   refutation.      The 

the  Age  of 

the  Sophists,  scepticism  of  the  sophists,  who  were  the 
knowing  men  of  this  age,  was  not  so  much  convic- 
tion as  indisposition.  They  failed  to  recognize  the 
old  philosophical  problem;  it  did  not  appeal  to 
them  as  a  genuine  problem.  The  sophists  were  the 
intellectual  men  of  an  age  of  humanism,  individu- 
alism, and  secularism.  These  were  years  in  which 
the  circle  of  human  society,  the  state  with  its  in- 
stitutions, citizenship  with  its  manifold  activities 
and  interests,  bounded  the  horizon  of  thought. 
What  need  to  look  beyond  ?  Life  was  not  a  prob- 
lem, but  an  abundant  opportunity  and  a  sense  of 
capacity.  The  world  was  not  a  mystery,  but  a 
place  of  entertainment  and  a  sphere  of  action.  Of 
this  the  sophists  were  faithful  witnesses.  In 
their  love  of  novelty,  irreverence,  impressionism, 
elegance  of  speech,  and  above  all  in  their  praise 
of  individual  efficiency,  they  preached  and  pan- 
dered to  their  age.  Their  public,  though  it  loved 
to  abuse  them,  was  the  greatest  sophist  of  them 
all — brilliant  and  capricious,  incomparably  rich  in 
all  but  wisdom.     The  majority  belonged  to  what 


^  ABSOLUTE  REALISM  32 1 

Plato  called  "  the  sight-loving,  art-loving,  busy 
class."  This  is  an  age,  then,  when  the  man  of 
practical  common-sense  is  preeminent,  and  the 
philosopher  with  his  dark  sayings  has  passed  away. 
The  pride  of  wisdom  has  given  way  to  the  pride 
of  power  and  the  pride  of  cleverness.  The  many 
men  pursue  the  many  goods  of  life,  and  there  is  no 
spirit  among  them  all  who,  sitting  apart  in  con- 
templation, wonders  at  the  meaning  of  the  whole. 
§  157.  But  in  their  midst  there  moved  a  strange 
prophet,  whom  they  mistook  for  one  of  themselves. 
Socrates  and  Socratos  was  not  onc  who  prayed  in  the 
the  Self-  wilderness,  but  a  man  of  the  streets  and 

criticism  of  the  ' 

Philosopher.  ^^Q  market-place,  who  talked  rather 
more  incessantly  than  the  rest,  and  apparently  with 
less  right.  He  did  not  testify  to  the  truth,  but 
pleaded  ignorance  in  extenuation  of  an  exasperat- 
ing habit  of  asking  questions.  There  was,  how- 
ever, a  humor  and  a  method  in  his  innocence  that 
arrested  attention.  He  was  a  formidable  adversary 
in  discussion  from  his  very  irresponsibility ;  and  he 
was  especially  successful  with  the  more  rhetorical 
sophists  because  he  chose  his  own  weapons,  and 
substituted  critical  analysis,  question  and  answer, 
for  the  long  speeches  to  which  these  teachers  were 
habituated  by  their  profession.     He  appeared  to 


322  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

be  governed  hj  an  insatiable  inquisitiveness,  and 
a  somewhat  malicious  desire  to  discredit  those 
who  spoke  with  authority. 

But  to  those  who  knew  him  better,  and  especially 
to  Plato,  who  knew  him  best,  Socrates  was  at  once 
the  sweetest  and  most  compelling  spirit  of  his  age. 
There  was  a  kind  of  truth  in  the  quality  of  his 
character.  He  was  perhaps  the  first  of  all  reverent 
men.  In  the  presence  of  conceit  his  self-deprecia- 
tion was  ironical,  but  in  another  presence  it  was 
most  genuine,  and  his  deepest  spring  of  thought 
and  action.  This  other  presence  was  his  own 
ideal.  Socrates  was  sincerely  humble  because,  ex- 
pecting so  much  of  philosophy,  he  saw  his  own  de- 
ficiency. Unlike  the  unskilled  player,  he  did  not 
seek  to  make  music ;  but  he  loved  music,  and  knew 
that  such  music  as  is  indeed  music  was  beyond  his 
power.  On  the  other  hand  he  was  well  aware  of 
his  superiority  to  those  in  whom  self-satisfaction 
was  possible  because  they  had  no  conception  of  the 
ideal.  Of  such  he  could  say  in  truth  that  they 
did  not  know  enough  even  to  realize  the  extent  of 
their  ignorance.  The  world  has  long  been  famil- 
iar with  the  vivid  portrayal  of  the  Socratic  con- 
sciousness which  is  contained  in  Plato's  "  Apol- 
ogy."    Socrates  had  set  out  in  life  with  the  opinion 


ABSOLUTE   REALISM  323 

that  his  was  an  age  of  exceptional  enlightenment. 
But  as  he  came  to  know  men  he  found  that  after 
all  no  one  of  them  really  knew  what  he  was  about. 
Each  "  sight-loving,  art-loving,  busy "  man  was 
quite  blind  to  the  meaning  of  life.  Wliile  he  was 
capable  of  practical  achievement,  his  judgments 
concerning  the  real  virtue  of  his  achievements 
were  conventional  and  ungrounded,  a  mere  reflec- 
tion of  tradition  and  opinion.  When  asked  con- 
cerning the  meaning  of  life,  or  the  ground  of  his 
opinions,  he  was  thrown  into  confusion  or  aggra- 
vated to  meaningless  reiteration.  Such  men,  Soc- 
rates reflected,  were  both  unwise  and  confirmed 
in  their  folly  through  being  unconscious  of  it. 
Because  he  knew  that  vanity  is  vanity,  that  opin- 
ion is  indeed  mere  opinion,  Socrates  felt  himself 
to  be  the  wisest  man  in  a  generation  of  dogged 
unwisdom. 

§  158.  It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  point  out  that 
this  insight,  however  negatively  it  be  used,  is  a 
Socrates's  revclatiou  of  positive  knowledge.  Her- 
seu-criticism    ^clitus    and    Parmenides    claimed    to 

a  Prophecy 

of  Truth.  know ;  Socrates  disclaimed  knowledge 
for  reasons.  Like  all  real  criticism  this  is  at  once 
a  confounding  of  error  and  a  prophecy  of  truth. 
The  truth  so  discovered  is  indeed  not  ordinarv 


324  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

truth  concerning  historical  or  physical  things,  but 
not  on  that  account  less  significant  and  necessary. 
This  truth,  it  will  also  be  admitted,  is  virtually 
rather  than  actually  set  forth  by  Socrates  himself. 
He  knew  that  life  has  some  meaning  which  those 
who  live  with  conviction  desire  at  heart  to  realize, 
and  that  knowledge  has  principles  with  which 
those  who  speak  with  conviction  intend  to  be  con- 
sistent. There  is,  in  short,  a  rational  life  and  a 
rational  discourse.  Furthermore,  a  rational  life 
will  be  a  life  wisely  directed  to  the  end  of  the 
good ;  and  a  rational  discourse  one  constructed  with 
reference  to  the  real  natures  of  things,  and  the 
necessities  which  flow  from  these  natures.  But 
Socrates  did  not  conclusively  define  either  the 
meaning  of  life  or  the  form  of  perfect  knowledge. 
He  testified  to  the  necessity  of  some  such  truths, 
and  his  testimony  demonstrated  both  the  blindness 
of  his  contemporaries  and  also  his  own  deficiency. 
§  159.  The  character  and  method  of  Socrates 
have  their  best  foil  in  the  sophists,  but  their 
The  Historical  bearing  on  the  earlier  philosophers  is 

Preparation 

for  Plato.  for  our  purposes  even  more  instructive. 
Unlike  Socrates  these  philosophers  had  not  made 
a  study  of  the  task  of  the  philosopher.  They  were 
philosophers — "  spectators  of  all  time  and  all  ex- 


ABSOLUTE  REALISM  325 

istence  " ;  but  they  were  precritical  or  dogmatic 
philosophers,  to  whom  it  had  not  occurred  to  define 
the  requirements  of  philosophy.  They  knew  no 
perfect  knowledge  other  than  their  own  actual 
knowledge.  They  defined  being  and  interpreted 
life  without  reflecting  upon  the  quality  of  the 
knowledge  whose  object  is  being,  or  the  quality  of 
insight  that  would  indeed  be  practical  wisdom. 
But  when  through  Socrates  the  whole  philosophical 
prospect  is  again  revealed  after  the  period  of 
humanistic  concentration,  it  is  as  an  ideal  whose 
possibilities,  whose  necessities,  are  conceived  be- 
fore they  are  realized.  Socrates  celebrates  the  role 
of  the  philosopher  without  assigning  it  to  himself. 
The  new  philosophical  object  is  the  philosopher 
himself;  and  the  new  insight  a  knowledge  of 
knowledge  itself.  These  three  types  of  intellectual 
jirocedure,  dogmatic  speculation  concerning  being, 
humanistic  interest  in  life,  and  the  self-criticism  of 
thought,  form  the  historical  preparation  for  Plato, 
the  philosopher  who  defined  being  a  the  ideal  of 
thought,  and  upon  this  ground  interpreted  life. 

There  is  no  more  striking  case  in  history  of  the 
subtle  continuity  of  thought  than  the  relation 
between  Plato  and  his  master  Socrates.  The 
M'onder  of  it  is  due  to  the  absence  of  any  formula- 


326  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

tion  of  doctrine  on  the  part  of  Socrates  himself. 
He  only  lived  and  talked ;  and  yet  Plato  created  a 
system  of  philosophy  in  which  he  is  faithfully 
embodied.  The  form  of  embodiment  is  the  dia- 
logue, in  which  the  talking  of  Socrates  is  perpetu- 
ated and  conducted  to  profounder  issues,  and  in 
which  his  life  is  both  rendered  and  interpreted. 
But  as  the  vehicle  of  Plato's  thought  preserves  and 
makes  perfect  the  Socratic  method,  so  the  thought 
itself  begins  with  the  Socratic  motive  and  remains 
to  the  end  an  expression  of  it.  The  presentiment 
of  perfect  knowledge  which  distinguished  Socrates 
from  his  contemporaries  becomes  in  Plato  the  clear 
vision  of  a  realm  of  ideal  truth. 

§  160.  Plato  begins  his  philosophy  with  the 
philosopher  and  the  philosopher's  interest.  The 
piatonism:  philosophcr  is  a  lover,  who  like  all  lov- 
AbSr  Well  e^'s  ^ong^  fo^  *^^^  beautiful.  But  he  is 
or  Good.  ^Yie  supreme  lover,  for  he  loves  not  the 
individual  beautiful  object  but  the  Absolute 
Beauty  itself.  lie  is  a  lover  too  in  that  he  does 
not  possess,  but  somehow  apprehends  his  object 
from  afar.  Though  imperfect,  he  seeks  perfec- 
tion ;  though  standing  like  all  his  fellows  in  the 
twilight  of  half-reality,  he  faces  toward  the  sun. 
Xow  it  is  the  fundnnicntal  proposition  of  the  Pla- 


ABSOLUTE  REALISM  327 

tonic  philosoijhy  that  reality  is  the  sun  itself,  or 
the  perfection  whose  possession  every  wise  thinker 
covets,  whose  presence  would  satisfy  every  long- 
ing of  experience.  The  real  is  that  heloved  object 
which  is  "  truly  beautiful,  delicate,  perfect,  and 
blessed."  There  is  both  a  serious  ground  for  such 
an  affirmation  and  an  important  truth  in  its  mean- 
ing. The  ground  is  the  evident  incompleteness  of 
every  special  judgment  concerning  experience. 
We  understand  only  in  part,  and  we  know  that  we 
understand  only  in  part.  What  we  discover  is 
real  enough  for  practical  purposes,  but  even  com- 
mon-sense questions  the  true  reality  of  its  objects. 
Special  judgments  seem  to  terminate  our  thought 
abruptly  and  arbitrarily.  We  give  "  the  best 
answer  we  can,"  but  such  answers  do  not  come  as 
the  completion  of  our  thinking.  Our  thought  is 
in  some  sense  surely  a  seeking,  and  it  would  appear 
that  we  are  not  permitted  to  rest  and  be  satisfied 
at  any  stage  of  it.  If  we  do  so  we  are  like  the 
sophists — blind  to  our  own  ignorance.  But  it  is 
equally  true  that  our  thought  is  straightforward 
and  progressive.  We  are  not  permitted  to  return 
to  earlier  stages,  but  must  push  on  to  that  which  is 
not  less,  but  more,  than  what  we  have  as  yet  found. 
There  is  good  hope,  then,  of  understanding  what 


328  THE  APPROACH  TO   PHILOSOPHY 

tlie  ideal  may  be  from  our  knowledge  of  the  direc- 
tion which  it  impels  lis  to  follow. 

But  to  understand  Plato's  conception  of  the 
progression  of  experience  we  must  again  catch  up 
the  Socratic  strain  which  he  weaves  into  every 
theme.  For  Socrates,  student  of  life  and  man- 
kind, all  objects  were  objects  of  interest,  and  all 
interests  practical  interests.  One  is  ignorant 
when  one  does  not  know  the  good  of  things ;  opin- 
ionative  when  one  rates  things  by  conventional 
standards;  wise  when  one  knows  their  real  good. 
In  Platonism  this  practical  interpretation  of  ex- 
perience appears  in  the  principle  that  the  object 
of  perfect  knowledge  is  the  good.  The  nature  of 
things  which  one  seeks  to  know  better  is  the  good 
of  things,  the  absolute  being  which  is  the  goal  of 
all  thinking  is  the  very  good  itself.  Plato  does 
not  use  the  term  good  in  any  merely  utilitarian 
sense.  Indeed  it  is  very  significant  that  for  Plato 
there  is  no  cleavage  between  theoretical  and  prac- 
tical interests.  To  be  morally  good  is  to  know  the 
good,  to  set  one's  heart  on  the  true  object  of  affec- 
tion ;  and  to  be  theoretically  sound  is  to  understand 
perfection.  The  good  itself  is  the  end  of  every 
aim,  that  in  which  all  interests  converge.  Hence 
it  cannot  be  defined,  as  might  a  special  good,  in 


ABSOLUTE  REALISM  329 

terms  of  the  fulfilment  of  a  set  of  concrete  condi- 
tions, but  only  in  terms  of  the  sense  or  direction 
of  all  purposes.  The  following  passage  occurs  in 
the  "  Symposium  "  : 

"The  true  order  of  going  or  being  led  by  others  to  the 
things  of  love,  is  to  use  the  beauties  of  earth  as  steps 
along  which  he  mounts  upward  for  the  sake  of  that 
other  beauty,  going  from  one  to  two,  and  from  two  to 
all  fair  forms,  and  from  fair  forms  to  fair  actions,  and 
from  fair  actions  to  fair  notions,  until  from  fair  notions 
he  arrives  at  the  notion  of  absolute  beauty,  and  at  last 
knows  what  the  essence  of  beauty  is."^ 

§  161.  There  is,  then,  a  "  true  order  of  going," 
and  an  order  that  leads  from  one  to  many,  from 
The  Progres-  thcncc  to  forms,  f rom  thence  to  moral- 
!I°"  **/  ity,  and  from  thence  to  the  general  ob- 

Expenence  "^  '  c> 

toward  God.  j^^^g  ^f  thought  or  tlw  ideas.  In  the 
"  Republic,"  where  the  proper  education  of  the  phi- 
losopher is  in  question,  it  is  proposed  that  he  shall 
study  arithmetic,  geometry,  astronomy,  and  dia- 
lectic. Thus  in  each  case  mathematics  is  the  first 
advance  in  knowledge,  and  dialectic  the  nearest  to 
perfection.  Most  of  Plato's  examples  are  dra\\Ti 
from  mathematics.  This  science  replaces  the  va- 
riety and  vagueness  of  the  forms  of  experience 
with  clear,  unitary,  definite,  and  eternal  natures, 

*  Plato:  S;ini poftiiim ,  211.     Translation  by  Jowett. 


330  THE   APPROACH   TO   PHILOSOPHY 

such  as  the  number  and  the  geometrical  figure. 
Thus  certain  individual  things  are  approximately 
triangular,  but  subject  to  alteration,  and  indefi- 
nitely many.  On  the  other  hand  the  triangle  as 
defined  by  geometry  is  the  fixed  and  unequivocal 
nature  or  idea  which  such  experiences  suggest ;  and 
the  philosophical  mind  will  at  once  pass  to  it  from 
these.  But  the  mathematical  objects  are  them- 
selves not  thoroughly  understood  when  understood 
only  in  mathematical  terms,  for  the  foundations 
of  mathematics  are  arbitrary.  And  the  same  is 
true  of  all  the  so-called  special  sciences.  Even  the 
scientists  themselves,  says  Plato, 

"  only  dream  about  being,  but  never  can  behold  the 
waking  reality  so  long  as  they  leave  the  hypotheses 
they  use  unexamined,  and  are  unable  to  give  an  ac- 
count of  them.  For  when  a  man  knows  not  his  own 
first  principle,  and  when  the  conclusion  and  intermediate 
steps  are  also  constructed  out  of  he  knows  not  what, 
how  can  he  imagine  that  such  a  conventional  statement 
will  ever  become  science?"' 

Within  the  science  of  dialectics  we  are  to  under- 
stand the  connections  and  sequences  of  ideas  them- 
selves, in  the  hope  of  eliminating  every  arbitrari- 
ness and  conventionality  within  a  system  of  truth 
that  is  pure   and   self-luminous  rationality.     To 

»  Plato:  Republic,  53.'?.     Translation  l)y  Jowett. 


ABSOLUTE  REALISM  33 1 

this  science,  which  is  the  great  interest  of  his 
later  years,  Plato  contributes  only  incomplete 
studies  and  experiments.  We  must  be  satisfied 
with  the  playful  answer  with  which,  in  the  "  Ke- 
public,"  he  replies  to  Glaucon's  entreaty  that  ^'  he 
proceed  at  once  from  the  prelude  or  preamble  to 
the  chief  strain,  and  describe  that  in  like  man- 
ner " :  "  Dear  Glaucon,  you  will  not  be  able  to  fol- 
low me  here,  though  I  would  do  my  best." 

But  a  philosophical  system  has  been  projected. 
The  real  is  that  perfect  significance  or  meaning 
which  thought  and  every  interest  suggests,  and 
toward  which  there  is  in  experience  an  appreciable 
movement.  It  is  this  significance  which  makes 
things  what  they  really  are,  and  which  constitutes 
our  understanding  of  them.  In  itself  it  tran- 
scends the  steps  which  lead  to  it ;  "  for  God,"  says 
Plato,  "  mingles  not  with  men."  But  it  is  never- 
theless the  meaning  of  human  life.  And  this  we 
can  readily  conceive.  The  last  word  may  trans- 
form the  sentence  from  nonsense  into  sense,  and 
it  would  be  true  to  say  that  its  sense  mingles  not 
with  nonsense.  Similarly  the  last  touch  of  the 
brush  may  transform  an  inchoate  mass  of  color 
into  a  picture,  disarray  into  an  object  of  beauty; 
and  its  beauty  mingles  not  with  ugliness.     So  lifc^, 


332  THE  .\PPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

when  it  finally  realizes  itself,  obtains  a  new  and 
incommensurable  quality  of  perfection  in  which 
humanity  is  transformed  into  deity.  There  is 
frankly  no  provision  for  imperfection  in  such  a 
world.  In  his  later  writings  Plato  sounds  his 
characteristic  note  less  frequently,  and  permits  the 
ideal  to  create  a  cosmos  through  the  admixture  of 
matter.  But  in  his  moment  of  inspiration,  the 
Platonist  will  have  no  sense  for  the  imperfect.  It 
is  the  darkness  behind  his  back,  or  the  twilight 
through  which  he  passes  on  his  way  to  the  light. 
He  Avill  use  even  the  beauties  of  earth  only  "  as 
steps  along  which  he  mounts  upward  for  the  sake 
of  that  other  beauty." 

§  162.  We  have  met,  then,  with  two  distinct 
philosophical  doctrines  which  arise  from  the  con- 
Aristotie's        ccptiou  of  the  tthsolute,  or  the  philoso- 

Hierarchy 

of  Substances   ])]ier's  peculiar  object:  the  doctrine  of 

in  Relation  177,7'  7  i 

to  piatonism.  the  obsolute  hcing  or  substance,  and 
that  of  the  absolute  ideal  or  good.  Both  doctrines 
are  realistic  in  that  they  assume  reality  to  be  de- 
monstrated or  revealed,  rather  than  created,  by 
knowledge.  Both  are  rationalistic  in  that  they 
develop  a  system  of  philosophy  from  the  problem 
of  pliilosophy,  or  deduce  a  definition  of  reality 


ABSOLUTE  REALISM  333 

from  the  conception  of  reality.  There  remains  a 
third  doctrine  of  the  same  type — the  philosophy 
of  Aristotle,  the  most  elaborately  constructed  sys- 
tem of  Greek  antiquity,  and  the  most  potent  in- 
fluence exerted  upon  the  Scholastic  Philosophy  of 
the  long  mediaeval  period.  This  philosophy  was 
rehabilitated  in  the  eighteentli  century  by  Leibniz, 
the  brilliant  librarian  of  the  court  of  Hanover. 
The  extraordinary  comprehensiveness  of  Aris- 
totle's philosophy  makes  it  quite  impossible  to  ren- 
der here  even  a  general  account  of  it.  There  is 
scarcely  any  human  discipline  that  does  not  to  some 
extent  draw  upon  it.  We  are  concerned  only  with 
the  central  principles  of  the  metaphysics. 

Upon  the  common  ground  of  rationalism  and 
realism.,  Plato  and  Aristotle  are  complementary  in 
temper,  method,  and  principle.  Plato's  is  the  gen- 
ius of  inspiration  and  fertility,  Aristotle's  the 
genius  of  erudition,  mastery,  and  synthesis.  In 
form,  Plato's  is  the  gift  of  expression,  Aristotle's 
the  gift  of  arrangement.  Plato  was  born  and 
bred  an  aristocrat,  and  became  the  lover  of  the 
best — the  uncompromising  piirist;  Aristotle  is 
middle-class,  and  limitlessly  wide,  hospitable,  and 
patient  in  his  interests.  Thus  while  both  are 
speculative  and  acute,  Plato's  mind  is  intensive 


334  THE  APPROACH  TO   PHILOSOPHY 

and  profound,  Aristotle's  extensive  and  orderly. 
It  was  inevitable,  then,  that  Aristotle  should  find 
Plato  one-sided.  The  philosophy  of  the  ideal  is 
not  worldly  enough  to  be  true.  It  is  a  religion 
rather  than  a  theory  of  reality.  Aristotle,  how- 
ever, would  not  renounce  it,  but  construe  it  that 
it  may  better  provide  for  nature  and  history. 
This  is  the  significance  of  his  new  terminology. 
Matter,  to  which  Plato  reluctantly  concedes  some 
room  as  a  principle  of  degradation  in  the  uni- 
verse, is  now  admitted  to  good  standing.  Mat- 
ter or  material  is  indispensable  to  being  as 
its  potentiality  or  that  out  of  which  it  is  consti- 
tuted. The  ideal,  on  the  other  hand,  loses  its  ex- 
clusive title  to  the  predicate  of  reality,  and  becomes 
the  form,  or  the  determinate  nature  which  exists 
only  in  its  particular  embodiments.  The  being 
or  substance  is  the  concrete  individual,  of  which 
tliese  are  the  abstracted  aspects.  Aristotle's 
"  form,"  like  Plato's  "  idea,"  is  a  teleological  prin- 
ciple. The  essential  nature  of  the  object  is  its 
perfection.  It  is  furthermore  essential  to  the  ob- 
ject that  it  should  strive  after  a  higher  perfection. 
With  Aristotle,  however,  the  reality  is  not  the 
consummation  of  the  process,  the  highest  perfec- 
tion in  and  for  itself,  ])ut  tlio  very  hicjrarehy  of 


ABSOLUTE   REALISM  335 

objects  that  ascends  toward  it.  The  highest  per- 
fection, or  God,  is  not  itself  coextensive  with 
being,  but  the  iinal  cause  of  being — that  on  account 
of  which  the  whole  progression  of  events  takes 
place.  Reality  is  the  development  with  all  of  its 
ascending  stages  from  the  maximum  of  potential- 
ity, or  matter,  to  the  maximum  of  actuality,  or 
God  the  pure  form. 

§  163.  To  understand  the  virtue  of  this  philoso- 
phy as  a  basis  for  the  reconciliation  of  different 
TheAristote-    interests,   we  must  recall  the   relation 

lian  Philos- 
ophy as  a         between    Plato    and    Spinoza.      Their 

Reconcilia-  ..-,.„  ■, 

tion  of  Plato-    characteristic  difference  appears  to  the 

nism  and  .  .  •  -i-L 

Spinozism.  best  advantage  m  connection  with 
mathematical  truth.  Both  regarded  geometry  as 
the  best  model  for  philosophical  thinking,  but  for 
different  reasons.  Spinoza  prized  geometry  for 
its  necessity,  and  proposed  to  extend  it.  His 
philosophy  is  the  attempt  to  formulate  a  geometry 
of  being,  which  shall  set  forth  the  inevitable  cer- 
tainties of  the  universe.  Plato,  on  the  other 
hand,  prized  geometry  rather  for  its  definition  of 
types,  for  its  knowledge  of  pure  or  perfect  natures 
such  as  the  circle  and  triangle,  which  in  imme- 
diate experience  are  only  approximated.  His 
philosophy  defines  reality  similarly  as  the  absolute 


336  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

perfection.  Applied  to  nature  Spinozism  is  me- 
chanical, and  looks  for  necessary  laws,  while 
Platonism  is  teleological,  and  looks  for  adaptation 
and  significance.  Aristotle's  position  is  inter- 
mediate. With  Plato  he  afiirms  that  the  good  is 
the  ultimate  principle.  But  this  very  principle  is 
conceived  to  govern  a  universe  of  substances,  each 
of  which  maintains  its  own  proper  being,  and  all 
of  which  are  reciprocally  determined  in  their 
changes.  Final  causes  dominate  nature,  but  work 
through  efficient  causes.  Keality  is  not  pure  per- 
fection, as  in  Platonism,  nor  the  indifferent  neces- 
sity, as  in  Spinozism,  but  the  system  of  beings 
necessary  to  the  complete  progression  toward  the 
highest  perfection.  The  Aristotelian  philosophy 
promises,  then,  to  overcome  both  the  hard  realism 
of  Parmenides  and  Spinoza,  and  also  the  super- 
naturalism  of  Plato. 

§  164.  But  it  promises,  furthermore,  to  remedy 
the  defect  common  to  these  two  doctrines,  the  very 
Leibniz's  Ap-    bcsctting  problem  of  this  whole  type  of 

plication  of 

the  Conception  pliilosopliy.     That  problem,  as  has  been 

of  Develop-  .  •  i        <•  i         •  £      j. 

meat  to  the  sccH,  18  to  providc  lor  the  impertcct 
Imperfection,  within  thc  pcrfcct,  for  the  temporal  in- 
cidents of  nature  and  history  within  the  eternal 
being.     Many    absolutist    philosophers    have    de- 


ABSOLUTE  REALISM  337 

clared  the  explanation  of  this  rcahn  to  be  impos- 
sible, and  have  contented  themselves  with  calling 
it  the  realm  of  opinion  or  appearance.  And  this 
realm  of  opinion  or  appearance  has  been  used  as  a 
proof  of  the  absolute.  Zeno,  the  pupil  of  Par- 
menides,  was  the  first  to  elaborate  what  have  since 
come  to  be  known  as  the  paradoxes  of  the  empirical 
world.  Most  of  these  paradoxes  turn  upon  the 
infinite  extension  and  divisibility  of  space  and 
time.  Zeno  was  especially  interested  in  the  diffi- 
culty of  conceiving  motion,  which  involves  both 
space  and  time,  and  thought  himself  to  have  de- 
monstrated its  absurdity  and  impossibility.^*^  His 
argument  is  thus  the  complement  of  Parmenides's 
argument  for  the  indivisible  and  unchanging  sub- 
stance. Now  the  method  which  Zeno  here  adopts 
may  be  extended  to  cover  the  whole  realm  of  nat- 
ure and  history.  We  should  then  be  dialectically 
driven  from  this  realm  to  take  refuge  in  absolute 
being.  But  the  empirical  world  is  not  destroyed 
by  disparagement,  and  cannot  long  lack  champions 
even  among  the  absolutists  themselves.  The  rec- 
onciliation of  nature  and  history  with  the  abso- 
lute being  became  the  special  interest  of  Leibniz, 
the  great  modern  Aristotelian.     As  a  scientist  and 

i»  See  Burnet:  Op.  cit.,  pp.  322-333. 


338  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

man  of  affairs,  he  was  profoundly  dissatisfied  with 
Spinoza's  resolution  of  nature,  the  human  indi- 
vidual, and  the  human  society  into  the  universal 
being.  He  became  an  advocate  of  individualism 
while  retaining  the  general  aim  and  method  of 
rationalism. 

Like  Aristotle,  Leibniz  attributes  reality  to  in- 
dividual substances,  which  he  calls  "  monads  "  ; 
and  like  Aristotle  he  conceives  these  monads  to 
compose  an  ascending  order,  with  God,  the  monad 
of  monads,  as  its  dominating  goal. 

"  Furthermore,  every  substance  is  like  an  entire  world 
and  like  a  mirror  of  God,  or  indeed  of  the  whole  workl 
which  it  portrays,  each  one  in  its  own  fashion;  almost 
as  the  same  city  is  variously  represented  according  to 
the  various  situations  of  him  who  is  regarding  it.  Thus 
the  universe  is  multiplied  in  some  sort  as  many  times 
as  there  are  substances,  and  the  glory  of  God  is  multiplied 
in  the  same  way  by  as  many  wholly  different  representa- 
tions of  his  works."" 

The  very  "  glory  of  God,"  then,  requires  the  in- 
numerable finite  individuals  with  all  their  char- 
acteristic  imperfections,   that   the   universe   may 
lack  no  possible  shade  or  quality  of  perspective. 
§  1G5.  But  the  besetting  problem  is  in  fact  not 

"  Leibniz;  Discourse  on  Metaphysics.  Translation  by 
Montgomery,  p.  15. 

In  so  far  as  the  monads  are  spiritual  this  doctrine  tends 
to  be  suhjectivistic.     Cf.  Chap.  IX. 


ABSOLUTE   REALISM  339 

solved,  and  is  one  of  the  chief  incentives  to  that 
other  philosophy  of  absolutism  which  defines  an 
The  Problem  absolute  Spirit  or  mind.  Both  Aristotle 
tfon'ifem^ai^ns  ^^^  Loibuiz  Undertake  to  make  the 
Unsolved.  perfection  which  determines  the  order 
of  the  hierarchy  of  substances,  at  the  same  time 
the  responsible  author  of  the  whole  hierarchy.  In 
this  case  the  dilemma  is  plain.  If  the  divine  form 
or  the  divine  monad  be  other  than  the  stages  that 
lead  up  to  it,  these  latter  cannot  be  essential  to  it, 
for  God  is  by  definition  absolutely  self-sufficient. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  God  is  identical  with  the 
development  in  its  entirety,  then  two  quite  incom- 
mensurable standards  of  perfection  determine  the 
supremacy  of  the  divine  nature,  that  of  the  whole 
and  that  of  the  highest  parts  of  the  whole.  The 
union  of  these  two  and  the  definition  of  a  perfec- 
tion which  may  be  at  once  the  development  and  its 
goal,  is  the  task  of  absolute  idealism. 

§  166.  Of  the  two  fundamental  questions  of 
epistemology,  absolute  realism  answers  the  one 
Absolute  explicitly,  the  other  implicitly.     As  re- 

Epfs'temo'io  spccts  tliB  souvce  of  the  most  valid 
Rationalism.  l-nowJedge,  Parmenides,  Plato,  Aris- 
totle,  Spinoza  are  all  agreed :  true  knowledge  is 


340  1'HE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

the  work  of  reason,  of  pure  intellection.  Plato 
is  the  great  exponent  of  dialectic,  or  the  reciprocal 
affinities  and  necessities  of  ideas.  Aristotle  is  the 
founder  of  deductive  logic.  Spinoza  proposes  to 
consider  even  "  human  actions  and  desires  "  as 
though  he  were  "  concerned  with  lines,  planes,  and 
solids."  Empirical  data  may  be  the  occasion,  but 
cannot  be  the  ground  of  the  highest  knowledge. 
According  to  Leibniz, 

"  it  seems  that  necessary  truths,  such  as  we  find  in  pure 
mathematics,  and  especially  in  arithmetic  and  geometry, 
must  have  principles  whose  proof  does  not  depend  upon 
instances,  nor,  consequently,  upon  the  witness  of  the 
senses,  although  without  the  senses  it  would  never  have 
come  into  our  heads  to  think  of  them."'^ 

§  167.  The  answers  which  these  philosophies 
give  to  the  question  of  the  relation  between  the 
The  Relation    state  of  knowledge  and  its  object,  divide 

of  Thought 

and  its  Object  them  iuto  two  gToups.     Auioug  the  an- 

in  Absolute  .  .  i     i  i 

Realism.  cicuts  Tcason  IS  regarded  as  the  means 
of  emancipation  from  the  limitations  of  the  pri- 
vate mind.  "  The  sleej)ing  turn  aside  each  into 
a  world  of  his  own,"  but  "  the  waking  " — the  wise 
men — "  have  one  and  the  same  world."  What  the 
individual  knows  belongs  to  himself  only  in  so 

"  I>eibniz:    New   Essays   on    the   Human    Understanding. 
Translation  by  Latta,  p.  363. 


ABSOLUTE   REALISM  34 1 

far  as  it  is  inadequate.  Hence  for  Plato  the  ideas 
are  not  the  attributes  of  a  mind,  but  that  self-sub- 
sistent  truth  to  which,  in  its  moments  of  insight, 
a  mind  may  have  access.  Opinion  is  "  my  own," 
the  truth  is  being.  The  position  of  Aristotle  is 
equally  clear.  "Actual  knowledge,"  he  main- 
tains, "  is  identical  with  its  object." 

Spinoza  and  Leibniz  belong  to  another  age. 
Modern  philosophy  began  with  a  new  emphasis 
upon  self-consciousness.  In  his  celebrated  argu- 
ment— "  I  think,  hence  I  am  "  (cogito  ergo  sum) 
— Descartes  established  the  independent  and  sub- 
stantial reality  of  the  thinking  activity.  The  "  I 
think  "  is  recognized  as  in  itself  a  fundamental 
being,  known  intuitively  to  the  thinker  himself. 
Now  although  Spinoza  and  Leibniz  are  finally  de- 
termined by  the  same  motives  that  obtain  in  the 
cases  of  Plato  and  Aristotle,  they  must  reckon  with 
this  new  distinction  between  the  thinker  and  his 
object.  The  result  in  the  case  of  Sjjinoza  is  the 
doctrine  of  "  parallelism,"  in  which  mind  is  de- 
fined as  an  "  infinite  attribute  "  of  substance,  an 
aspect  or  phase  coextensive  with  the  whole  of 
being.  The  result  in  the  case  of  Leibniz  is  his 
doctrine  of  "  representation  "  and  "  preestablished 
harmony,"  whereby  each  monadic  substance  is  in 


342  THE  APPROACH  TO   PHILOSOPHY 

itself  an  active  spiritual  entitv,  and  belongs  to  the 
universe  through  its  knowledge  of  a  specific  stage 
of  the  development  of  the  universe.  But  both 
Spinoza  and  Leibniz  subordinate  such  conceptions 
as  these  to  the  fundamental  identity  that  pervades 
the  whole.  With  Spinoza  the  attributes  belong 
to  the  same  absolute  substance,  and  with  Leibniz 
the  monads  represent  the  one  universe.  And  with 
both,  finally,  the  perfection  of  knowledge,  or  the 
knowledge  of  God,  is  indistinguishable  from  its 
object,  God  himself.  The  epistemological  subtle- 
ties peculiar  to  these  philosophers  are  not  stable 
doctrines,  but  render  inevitable  either  a  return  to 
the  simpler  and  bolder  realism  of  the  Greeks,  or 
a  passing  over  into  the  more  radical  and  systematic 
doctrine  of  absolute  idealism. 

§  168.  We  have  met  with  two  general  motives, 
both  of  which  are  subordinated  to  the  doctrine  of 
The  stoic  and  ^^  absolute  being  postulated  and  sought 
Etiiks'of  ^y  philosophy.  The  one  of  these  mo- 
Necessity.  tivcs  Icads  to  the  conception  of  the  ab- 
solutely necessary  and  immutable  substance,  the 
other  to  the  conception  of  a  consummate  perfec- 
tion. There  is  an  interpretation  of  life  appropri- 
ate to  eacli  of  these  conceptions.     Both  agi-ee  in 


ABSOLUTE  REALISM  343 

regarding  life  seriously,  in  defining  reason  or  phi- 
losophy as  the  highest  human  activity,  and  in  em- 
phasizing the  identity  of  the  individual's  good 
with  the  good  of  the  universe.  But  there  are 
striking  differences  of  tone  and  spirit. 

Although  the  metaphysics  of  the  Stoics  have 
various  affiliations,  the  Stoic  code  of  morality  is 
the  true  practical  sequel  to  the  Eleatic-Spinozistic 
view  of  the  world.  The  Stoic  is  one  who  has  set 
his  affections  on  the  eternal  being.  He  asks 
nothing  of  it  for  himself,  but  identifies  himself 
with  it.  The  saving  grace  is  a  sense  of  real- 
ity. The  virtuous  man  is  not  one  who  remakes 
the  world,  or  draws  upon  it  for  his  private 
uses;  even  less  one  who  rails  against  it,  or  com- 
plains that  it  has  used  him  ill.  He  is  rather  one 
who  recognizes  that  there  is  but  one  really  valid 
claim,  that  of  the  universe  itself.  But  he  not  only 
submits  to  this  claim  on  account  of  its  superiority ; 
he  makes  it  his  own.  The  discipline  of  Stoicism 
is  the  regulation  of  the  individual  will  to  the 
end  that  it  may  coincide  with  the  universal  will. 
There  is  a  part  of  man  by  virtue  of  which  he  is 
satisfied  with  what  things  are,  whatever  they  be. 
That  part,  designated  by  the  Stoics  as  "  the  ruling 
part,"  is  the  reason.     In  so  far  as  man  seeks  to 


344  THE  APPROACH  TO   PHILOSOPHY 

understand  the  laws  and  natures  "which  actually 
prevail,  he  cannot  be  discontented  with  anything 
whatsoever  that  may  be  known  to  him. 

"  For,  in  so  far  as  we  are  intelligent  beings,  we  cannot 
desire  anything  save  that  which  is  necessary,  nor  yield 
absolute  acquiescence  to  anything,  save  to  that  which  is 
true :  wherefore,  in  so  far  as  we  have  a  right  understand- 
ing of  these  things,  the  endeavor  of  the  better  part  of  our- 
selves is  in  harmony  with  the  order  of  nature  as  a  whole."  " 

In  agreement  with  this  teaching  of  Spinoza's  is  the 
famous  Stoic  formula  to  the  effect  that  "  nothing 
can  happen  contrary  to  the  will  of  the  wise  man," 
who  is  free  through  his  very  acquiescence.  If  rea- 
son be  the  proper  "  ruling  part,"  the  first  step  in 
the  moral  life  is  the  subordination  of  the  appeti- 
tive nature  and  the  enthronement  of  reason.  One 
who  is  himself  rational  will  then  recognize  the 
fellowship  of  all  rational  beings,  and  the  unitary 
and  beneficent  rationality  of  the  entire  universe. 
The  highest  morality  is  thus  already  upon  the 
plane  of  religion. 

§  169.  With  Spinoza  and  the  Stoics,  the  per- 
fection of  the  individual  is  reduced  to  what  the 
The  Platonic    univcrsc  requires  of  him.     The   good 

Ethics  of  .  .,,.  ,  ,  , 

Perfection.       man  IS  Willing  to  be  whatever  he  must 

'^  Spinoza:  Op.  cit.,  Part  IV.  Translation  by  Elwes, 
p.  243. 


ABSOLUTE  REALISM  345 

be,  for  tlie  sake  of  the  whole  with  which  through 
reason  he  is  enabled  to  identify  himself.  With 
Plato  and  Aristotle  the  perfection  of  the  individ- 
ual himself  is  commended,  that  the  universe  may 
abound  in  perfection.  The  good  man  is  the  ideal 
man — the  expression  of  the  type.  And  how  dif- 
ferent the  quality  of  a  morality  in  keeping  with 
this  principle!  The  virtues  which  Plato  enu- 
merates— temperance,  courage,  wisdom,  and  jus- 
tice— compose  a  consummate  human  nature.  He 
is  thinking  not  of  the  necessities  but  of  the  possi- 
bilities of  life.  Knowledge  of  the  truth  will 
indeed  be  the  best  of  human  living,  but  knowledge 
is  not  prized  because  it  can  reconcile  man  to  his 
limitations;  it  is  the  very  overflowing  of  his  cup 
of  life.     The  youth  are  to 

"  dwell  in  the  land  of  health,  amid  fair  sights  and  sounds; 
and  beauty,  the  effluence  of  fair  works,  will  visit  the  eye 
and  ear,  like  a  healthful  breeze  from  a  purer  region,  and 
insensibly  draw  the  soul  even  in  childhood  into  harmony 
with  the  beauty  of  reason."" 

Aristotle's  account  of  human  perfection  is  more 
circumstantial  and  more  prosaic.  "  The  function 
of  man  is  an  activity  of  soul  in  accordance  with 
reason,"  and  his  happiness  or  well-being  will  con- 

"  Plato:  Op.  cit.,  401. 


346  THE  APPROACH  TO   PHILOSOPHY 

sist  in  the  fulness  of  rational  living.  But  such 
fulness  requires  a  sphere  of  life  that  will  call  forth 
and  exercise  the  highest  human  capacities.  Aris- 
totle frankly  pronounces  "  external  goods  "  to  be 
indispensable,  and  happiness  to  be  therefore  "  a 
gift  of  the  gods."  The  rational  man  will  acquire 
a  certain  exquisiteness  or  finesse  of  action,  a 
"  mean  "  of  conduct;  and  this  virtue  will  be  diver- 
sified through  the  various  relations  into  which  he 
must  enter,  and  the  different  situations  which  he 
must  meet.  He  will  be  not  merely  brave,  temper- 
ate, and  just,  as  Plato  would  have  him,  but  liberal, 
magnificent,  gentle,  truthful,  witty,  friendly,  and 
in  all  self-respecting  or  high-minded.  In  addi- 
tion to  these  strictly  moral  virtues,  he  will  possess 
the  intellectual  virtues  of  prudence  and  wisdom, 
the  resources  of  art  and  science;  and  will  finally 
possess  the  gift  of  insight,  or  intuitive  reason. 
Speculation  will  be  his  liighest  activity,  and  the 
mark  of  his  kinship  with  the  gods  who  dwell  in 
the  perpetual  contemplation  of  the  truth. 
The  ReUgion        ^^  170,    Aristotlc's  cthics  expresses  the 

of  Fulfilment, 

and  the  Re-     buoyaucy  of  the  ancient  world,  when 

ligion  of  Re-        ,.,..,  .  , « 

nunciation.  tliG  individual  docs  uot  feel  himself 
0])])rpssod  by  tlie  eternal  reality,  but  rejoices  in  it. 
lie   is  not  too  conscions  of  his  sufferings  to  be 


ABSOLUTE  REALISM  347 

disinterested  in  his  admiration  and  wonder.  It 
is  this  whicli  distinguishes  the  religion  of  Plato 
and  Aristotle  from  that  of  the  Stoics  and  Spinoza. 
With  both  alike,  religion  consists  not  in  making  the 
world,  but  in  contemplating  it ;  not  in  cooperating 
with  God,  but  in  worshipping  him.  Plato  and 
Aristotle,  however,  do  not  find  any  antagonism 
between  the  ways  of  God  and  the  natural  inter- 
ests of  men.  God  does  not  differ  from  men  save 
in  his  exalted  perfection.  The  contemplation  and 
worship  of  him  comes  as  the  final  and  highest  stage 
of  a  life  which  is  organic  and  continuous  through- 
out. The  love  of  God  is  the  natural  love  when 
it  has  found  its  true  object. 

"  For  he  who  has  been  instructed  thus  far  in  the  things 
of  love,  and  who  has  learned  to  sec  the  beautiful  in  due 
order  and  succession,  when  he  comes  toward  the  end 
will  suddenly  perceive  a  nature  of  wondrous  beauty — 
and  this,  Socrates,  is  that  final  cause  of  all  our  former 
toils,  which  in  the  first  place  is  everlasting — not  growing 
and  decaying,  or  waxing  and  waning;  in  the  next  place 
not  fair  in  one  point  of  view  and  foul  in  another,  .  .  . 
or  in  the  likeness  of  a  face  or  hands  or  any  other  part 
of  the  bodily  frame,  or  in  any  form  of  speech  or  knowledge, 
nor  existing  in  any  other  being;  .  .  .  but  beauty 
only,  absolute,  separate,  simple,  and  everlasting,  which 
without  diminution  and  without  increase,  or  any  change, 
is  imparted  to  the  ever-growing  and  perishing  beauties 
of  all  other  things."'* 

'*  Plato:  Sympusiuni,  210-211.     Translation  by  Jowett. 


348  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

The  religion  of  Spinoza  is  the  religion  of  one 
who  has  renounced  the  favor  of  the  universe. 
He  was  deprived  early  in  life  of  every  benefit  of 
fortune,  and  set  out  to  find  the  good  which  required 
no  special  dispensation  but  only  the  common  lot 
and  the  common  human  endowment.  He  found 
that  good  to  consist  in  the  conviction  of  the  neces- 
sity, made  acceptable  through  the  supremacy  of 
the  understanding.  The  like  faith  of  the  Stoics 
makes  of  no  account  the  difference  of  fortune 
between  Marcus  the  emperor  and  Epictetus  the 
slave. 

"  For  two  reasons,  then,  it  is  right  to  be  content  with 
that  which  happens  to  thee;  the  one  because  it  was  done 
for  thee  and  prescribed  for  thee,  and  in  a  manner  had 
reference  to  thee,  originally  from  the  most  ancient  causes 
spun  with  thy  destiny;  and  the  other  because  even  that 
which  comes  severally  to  every  man  is  to  the  power 
which  administers  the  universe  a  cause  of  felicity  and 
perfection,  nay  even  of  its  very  continuance.  For  the 
integrity  of  the  whole  is  mutilated,  if  thou  cuttest  off 
anything  whatever  from  the  conjunction  and  the  con- 
tinuity either  of  the  parts  or  of  the  causes.  And  thou 
dost  cut  off,  as  far  as  it  is  in  thy  power,  when  thou  art 
dissatisfied,  and  in  a  manner  triest  to  put  anything  out 
of  the  way."" 

"  Marcus  Aurelius  Antoninus;  Thoughts.  Translation  by 
Long,  p.  141. 


CHAPTER   XI 

ABSOLUTE    IDEALISM  * 

§  ITI.  Absolute  idealism  is  the  most  elabo- 
rately constructive  of  all  the  historical  types  of 
General  philosophy.     Though  it  may  have  over- 

Constructive 

Character  of     lookod    elementary    truths,    and    have 

Absolute 

ideaUsm.  soiiglit  to  combine  irreconcilable  prin- 
ciples, it  cannot  be  charged  with  lack  of  sophistica- 
tion or  subtlety.  Its  great  virtue  is  its  recognition 
of  problems — its  exceeding  circumspection ;  while 
its  great  promise  is  due  to  its  comprehensiveness — 
its  generous  provision  for  all  interests  and  points 
of  view.  But  its  very  breadth  and  complexity  ren- 
der this  philosophy  peculiarly  liable  to  the  equivo- 
cal use  of  conceptions.  This  may  be  readily 
understood  from  the  nature  of  the  central  doctrine 
of  absolute  idealism.  According  to  this  doctrine 
it  is  proposed  to  define  the  universe  as  an  abso- 

^  By  Absolute  Idealism  is  meant  that  system  cf  philosophy 
which  defines  the  universe  as  the  absolute  spirit,  which  is 
the  human  moral,  cognitive,  or  appreciative  consciousness 
universaUzed;  or  as  the  absolute,  transcendental  mind,  whose 
state  of  complete  knowledge  is  implied  in  all  finite  thinking. 
349 


350  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

lute  spirit;  or  a  being  infinite,  ultimate,  eternal, 
and  self-sufficient,  like  the  being  of  Plato  and 
Spinoza,  but  possessing  at  the  same  time  the  dis- 
tinguishing properties  of  spirit.  Such  conceptions 
as  self-consciousness,  will,  knowledge,  and  moral 
goodness  are  carried  over  from  the  realm  of  human 
endeavor  and  social  relations  to  the  unitary  and 
all-inclusive  reality.  Now  it  has  been  objected 
that  this  procedure  is  either  meaningless,  in  that 
it  so  applies  the  term  spirit  as  to  contradict  its 
meaning;  or  prejudicial  to  spiritual  interests,  in 
that  it  neutralizes  the  properties  of  spirit  through 
so  extending  their  use.  Thus  one  may  contend 
that  to  affirm  that  the  universe  as  a  whole  is  spirit 
is  meaningless,  since  moral  goodness  requires  spe- 
cial conditions  and  relations  that  cannot  be  at- 
tributed to  the  universe  as  a  whole;  or  one  may 
contend  that  such  doctrine  is  prejudicial  to  moral 
interests  because  by  attributing  spiritual  perfec- 
tion to  the  totality  of  being  it  discredits  all  moral 
loyalties  and  antagonisms.  The  difficulties  that 
lie  in  the  way  of  absolute  idealism  are  due,  then, 
to  the  complexity  of  its  synthesis,  to  its  complement- 
ary recognition  of  differences  and  resolution  of 
tliem  into  unity.  But  this  synthesis  is  due  to  the 
urgency  of  certain  great  problems  wliich  the  first 


ABSOLUTE  IDEALISM  35 1 

or  realistic  expression  of  the  absolutist  motive  left 

undiscovered  and  unsolved. 

§  172.  It  is  natural  to  approach  so  deliberate 

and  calculating  a  philosophy  from  the  stand-point 

The  Great  ^^  ^^^  problems  which  it  proposes  to 
Outstanding     g^j^^^^     q^^  ^f  ^j^^g^  jg  ^^^  epistemo- 

Problems  of  ••^ 

Absolutism,  logical  problem  of  the  relation  between 
the  state  of  knowledge  and  its  object.  ISTaturalism 
and  absolute  realism  side  with  common-sense  in 
its  assumption  that  although  the  real  object  is  es- 
sential to  the  valid  state  of  knowledge,  its  being 
known  is  not  essential  to  the  real  object.  Sub- 
jectivism, on  the  other  hand,  maintains  that  being 
is  essentially  the  content  of  a  knowing  state,  or 
an  activity  of  the  knower  himself.  Absolute  ideal- 
ism proposes  to  accept  the  general  epistemological 
principle  of  subjectivism ;  but  to  satisfy  the  real- 
istic demand  for  a  standard,  compelling  object,  by 
setting  up  an  absolute  Jcnower,  with  whom  all  valid 
knowledge  must  be  in  agreement.  This  episte- 
mological statement  of  absolute  idealism  is  its 
most  mature  phase ;  and  the  culminating  phase,  in 
which  it  shows  unmistakable  signs  of  passing  over 
into  another  doctrine.  We  must  look  for  its  pris- 
tine inspiration  in  its  solution  of  another  funda- 
luontal  in-obleni :  that  of  the  relation  between  the 


352  THE  ArPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

absolute  and  tlie  empirical.  Like  absolute  realism, 
this  philosophy  regards  the  universe  as  a  unitary 
and  internally  necessary  being,  and  undertakes  to 
hold  that  being  accountable  for  every  item  of  ex- 
perience. But  "we  have  found  that  absolute  real- 
ism is  beset  with  the  difficulty  of  thus  accounting 
for  the  fragmentariness  and  isolation  of  the  indi- 
vidual. The  contention  that  the  universe  must 
really  be  a  rational  or  perfect  unity  is  disputed  by 
the  evident  multiplicity,  irrelevance,  and  imper- 
fection in  the  foreground  of  experience.  The  in- 
ference to  perfection  and  the  confession  of  im- 
perfection seem  equally  unavoidable.  Rational 
necessities  and  empirical  facts  are  out  of  joint. 

§  173.  Even  Plato  had  been  conscious  of  a  cer- 
tain responsibility  for  matters  of  fact.  Inasmuch 
The  Greek       as  he  attached  the  predicate  of  reality 

Philosophers 

and  the  Prob-  to  the  absolutc  perfection,  he  made  that 

lem  of  Evil.        i      .  i  i  i  •    i        i 

The  Task        being  the  only   source   to  which   they 

of  the  New 

Absolutism,  could  be  referred.  Perhaps,  then,  he 
suggests,  they  are  due  to  the  very  bounteousness 
of  God. 

"  He  was  good,  and  no  goodness  can  ever  have  any 
jealousy  of  anything.  And  being  free  from  jealousy, 
he  desired  that  all  things  should  be  as  like  himself  as 
possible."^ 

*  Plato:  Timceus,  29.     Translation  bv  Jowett. 


ABSOLUTE  IDEALISM  353 

Plotimis,  in  whom  Platonism  is  leavened  by  the 
spirit  of  an  age  which  is  convinced  of  sin,  and 
which  is  therefore  more  keenly  aware  of  the  posi- 
tive existence  of  the  imperfect,  follows  out  this 
suggestion.  Creation  is  "  emanation  " — the  over- 
flow of  God's  excess  of  goodness.  But  one  does 
not  readily  understand  how  goodness,  desiring  all 
things  to  be  like  itself,  should  thereupon  create 
evil — even  to  make  it  good.  The  Aristotelian 
philosophy,  with  its  conception  of  tlie  gradation  of 
substances,  would  seem  to  be  better  equipped 
to  meet  the  difficulty.  A  development  requires 
stages ;  and  every  finite  thing  may  thus  be  perfect 
in  its  way  and  perfect  in  its  place,  while  in  the 
absolute  truth  or  God  there  is  realized  the  meaning 
of  the  whole  order.  But  if  so,  there  is  evidently 
something  that  escapes  God,  to  wit,  the  meaning- 
less and  unfitness,  the  error  and  evil,  of  the  stages 
in  their  successive  isolation.  Xor  is  it  of  any 
avail  to  insist  (as  did  Plato,  Aristotle,  and  Spinoza 
alike)  that  these  are  only  privation,  and  therefore 
not  to  be  counted  in  the  sum  of  reality.  For  pri- 
vation is  itself  an  experience,  with  a  great  variety 
of  implications,  moral  and  psychological ;  and  these 
cannot  be  attributed  to  God  or  deduced  from  him, 
in  consideration  of  his  absolute  perfection. 


354  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

The  task  of  the  new  absolutism  is  now  in  clear 
view.  The  perfect  must  be  amended  to  admit 
the  imperfect.  The  absolute  significance  must  be 
so  construed  as  to  provide  for  the  evident  facts; 
for  the  unmeaning  things  and  changes  of  the  nat- 
ural order;  for  ignorance,  sin,  despair,  and  every 
human  deficiency.  The  new  philosophy  is  to  solve 
this  problem  by  defining  a  spiritual  absolute,  and 
by  so  construing  the  life  or  dynamics  of  spirit,  as  to 
demonstrate  the  necessity  of  the  very  imperfection 
and  opposition  which  is  so  baffling  to  the  realist. 

§  174.  Absolute  idealism,  which  is  essentially 
a  modern  doctrine,  does  not  begin  with  rhapsodies. 
The  Beginning  ^^^  ^ith  a  Very  sobcr  analysis  of  f  amil- 
ideaUsm"**  iar  truths,  conducted  by  the  most  sober 
AnSyS'of  ^^  '*^^  philosophers,  Immanuel  Kant. 
Experience.  This  pliilosopher  livcd  in  Konigsberg, 
Germany,  at  tlie  close  of  the  eighteenth  century. 
He  is  related  to  absolute  idealism  much  as  Soc- 
rates is  related  to  Platonism:  he  was  not  himself 
speculative,  but  employed  a  critical  method  which 
was  transformed  by  his  followers  into  a  metaphysi- 
cal construction,  Tt  is  essential  to  the  understand- 
ing l)oth  of  Kant  and  of  his  more  speculative 
successors,  to  ol)servc  that  he  begins  with  the 
recognition  of  certain  non-philosophical  truths — 


ABSOLUTE   IDEALISM  355 

those  of  natural  science  and  the  moral  conscious- 
ness. He  accepts  the  order  of  nature  formulated 
in  the  Newtonian  dynamics,  and  the  moral  order 
acknowledged  in  the  common  human  conviction  of 
duty.  And  he  is  interested  in  discovering  the 
ground  upon  which  these  common  affirmations 
restj  the  structure  which  virtually  supports  them 
as  types  of  knowledge.  But  a  general  importance 
attaches  to  the  analysis  because  these  two  types 
of  knowledge  (together  with  the  aesthetic  judg- 
ment, which  is  similarly  analyzed)  are  regarded 
by  Kant  as  coextensive  with  experience  itself. 
The  very  least  experience  that  can  be  reported 
upon  at  all  is  an  experience  of  nature  or  duty, 
and  as  such  will  be  informed  with  their  char- 
acteristic principles.  Let  us  consider  the  former 
type.  The  simplest  instance  of  nature  is  the  ex- 
perience of  the  single  perceived  object.  In  the 
first  place,  such  an  object  will  be  perceived  as  in 
space  and  time.  These  Kant  calls  the  forms  of 
intuition.  An  object  cannot  even  be  presented  or 
given  without  them.  But,  furthermore,  it  will  be 
regarded  as  substance,  that  is,  as  having  a  sub- 
stratum that  persists  through  changes  of  position 
or  quality.  It  will  also  be  regarded  as  causally 
dependent  upon  other  objects  like  itself.     Causal- 


356  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

ity,  substance,  and  like  principles  to  the  number 
of  twelve,  Kant  calls  the  categories  of  the  under- 
standing. Both  intuition  and  understanding  are 
indispensable  to  the  experience  of  any  object  what- 
soever. They  may  be  said  to  condition  the  object 
in  general.  Their  principles  condition  the  process 
of  making  something  out  of  the  manifold  of  sen- 
sation. But  similarly,  every  moral  experience 
recognizes  what  Kant  calls  the  categorical  impera- 
tive. The  categorical  imperative  is  the  law  of 
reasonableness  or  impartiality  in  conduct,  requir- 
ing the  individual  to  act  on  a  maxim  which  he 
can  "  will  to  be  law  universal."  No  state  of  de- 
sire or  situation  calling  for  action  means  anything 
morally  except  in  the  light  of  this  obligation. 
Thus  certain  principles  of  thought  and  action  are 
said  to  be  implicit  in  all  experience.  They  are 
universal  and  necessary  in  the  sense  that  they 
are  discovered  as  the  conditions  not  of  any  particu- 
lar experience,  but  of  experience  in  general.  This 
implicit  or  virtual  presence  in  experience  in  gen- 
eral, Kant  calls  their  transcendental  character,  and 
the  process  of  explicating  them  is  his  famous 
Transcendental  Deduction. 

§  175.  The  restriction  which  Kant  puts  upon 
his  method  is  quite  essential  to  its  meaning.     I 


ABSOLUTE  IDEALISM  357 

deduce  the  categories,  for  example,  just  in  so  far 
as  I  find  them  to  be  necessary  to  perception. 
Kant's  Princi-  Without  them  my  perception  is  blind, 
pies  Restricted  j  ^^^^   notliinff  of  it  J  with  them  my  ex- 

to  the  Expen-  "  7  ,/ 

ences  which     pericuce  becomes  systematic  and  ration- 

they  Set  in         ^  '' 

Order.  g^]^     j^u^  Categories  which  I  so  deduce 

must  be  forever  limited  to  the  role  for  which  they 
are  defined.  Categories  without  perceptions  are 
"  empty  " ;  they  have  validity  solely  with  reference 
to  the  experience  which  they  set  in  order.  Indeed, 
I  cannot  even  complete  that  order.  The  orderly 
arrangement  of  parts  of  experience  suggests,  and 
suggests  irresistibly,  a  perfect  system.  I  can  even 
define  the  ideas  and  ideals  through  which  such  a 
perfect  system  might  be  realized.  But  I  cannot 
in  the  Kantian  sense  attach  reality  to  it  because  it 
is  not  indispensable  to  experience.  It  must  re- 
main an  ideal  which  regulates  my  thinking  of 
such  parts  of  it  as  fall  within  the  range  of  my 
perception;  or  it  may  through  my  moral  nature 
become  the  realm  of  my  living  and  an  object  of 
faith.  In  short,  Kant's  is  essentially  a  "  critical 
philosophy,"  a  logical  and  analytical  study  of  the 
special  terms  and  relations  of  human  knowledge. 
He  denies  the  validity  of  these  terms  and  relations 
bevond  this  realm.     His  critiques  are  an  inven- 


358  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

tory  of  the  conditions,  principles,  and  prospects  of 
that  cognition  which,  although  not  alone  ideally 
conceivable,  is  alone  possible. 

§  1Y6.  With  the  successors  of  Kant,  as  with 
the  successors  of  Socrates,  a  criticism  becomes  a 
The  Post-  system  of  metaphysics.  This  transfor- 
Kantian  Meta-     ^j      jg  effected  in  the  post-Kantians 

physics  IS  a  ^ 

GeneraUzation  ^^  ^  generalization  of  the  human 
tive  and  Moral  QQqnitive  consciousness.     According  to 

Consciousness         "^ 

as  Analyzed     Kaut's  aualysis  it  contains  a  manifold 

by  Kant.  The 

Absolute  Spirit,  of  scuse  which  must  be  organized  by 
categories  in  obedience  to  the  ideal  of  a  ra- 
tional universe.  The  whole  enterprise,  with  its 
problems  given  in  perception,  its  instruments 
available  in  the  activities  of  the  understand- 
ing, and  its  ideals  revealed  in  the  reason,  is  an 
organic  spiritual  unity,  manifesting  itself  in  the 
self-consciousness  of  the  thinker.  Now  in  ab- 
solute idealism  this  very  enterprise  of  knowl- 
edge, made  universal  and  called  the  absolute  spirit 
or  mind,  is  taken  to  be  the  ultimate  reality. 
And  here  at  length  would  seem  to  be  afforded  the 
conception  of  a  being  to  which  the  problematic 
and  the  rational,  the  data  and  the  principles,  the 
natural  and  the  ideal,  are  alike  indispensable. 
"We  arc  now  to  seek  the  real  not  in  the  ideal  itself, 


ABSOLUTE  IDEALISM  359 

but  in  that  spiritual  unity  in  which  appearance 
is  the  incentive  to  truth,  and  natural  imperfection 
the  spring  to  goodness.  This  may  be  translated 
into  the  language  which  Plato  uses  in  the  "  Sym- 
posium," when  Diotima  is  revealing  to  Socrates 
the  meaning  of  love.  The  new  reality  will  be  not 
the  loved  one,  but  love  itself. 

"  What  then  is  Love?    Is  he  mortal?" 

"No." 

"What  then?" 

"  As  in  the  former  instance,  he  is  neither  mortal  nor 
immortal,  but  is  a  mean  between  them." 

"  What  is  he  then,  Diotima?  " 

"  He  is  a  great  spirit,  and  like  all  that  is  spiritual  he 
is  intermediate  between  the  divine  and  the  mortal."^ 

Reality  is  no  longer  the  God  who  mingles  not  with 
men,  but  that  power  which,  as  Diotima  further 
says,  "  interprets  and  conveys  to  the  gods  the 
prayers  and  sacrifices  of  men,  and  to  men  the  com- 
mands and  rewards  of  the  gods." 

In  speaking  for  such  an  idealism,  Emerson  says : 

"  Everything  good  is  on  the  highway.  The  middle 
region  of  our  being  is  the  temperate  zone.  We  may 
climb  into  the  thin  and  cold  realm  of  pure  geometry 
and  lifeless  science,  or  sink  into  that  of  sensation.  Be- 
tween these  extremes  is  the  equator  of  life,  of  thought, 
of  spirit,  of  poetry.     .     .     .     The  mid- world  is  best."* 

^  Plato:  Symposium,  202.     Translation  by  Jowett. 
*  Emerson:  Essays,  Second  Series,  pp.  65-66. 


360  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

The  new  reality  is  this  highway  of  the  spirit,  the 
very  course  and  raceway  of  self-consciousness.  It 
is  traversed  in  the  movement  and  self-correction 
of  thought,  in  the  interest  in  ideals,  or  in  the  sub- 
mission of  the  will  to  the  control  of  the  moral  law. 
§  177.  It  is  the  last  of  these  phases  of  self-con- 
sciousness that  Fichte,  who  was  Kant's  immediate 
Fichteanism,    succcssor,  regards  as  of  paramount  im- 

or  the  Abso- 
lute Spirit  as    portaucc.     As  Platonism  began  with  the 

Moral 

Activity.  ideal  of  the  good  or  the  object  of  life, 
so  the  new  idealism  begins  with  the  conviction 
of  duty,  or  the  story  of  life.  Being  is  the  living 
moral  nature  compelled  to  build  itself  a  natural 
order  wherein  it  may  obey  the  moral  law,  and  to 
divide  itself  into  a  community  of  moral  selves 
through  which  the  moral  virtues  may  be  realized. 
N^ature  and  society  flow  from  the  conception  of  an 
absolute  moral  activity,  or  ego.  Such  an  ego 
could  not  be  pure  and  isolated  and  yet  be  moral. 
The  evidence  of  this  is  the  common  moral  con- 
sciousness. My  duty  compels  me  to  act  upon  the 
not-self  or  environment,  and  to  respect  and  cooper- 
ate with  other  selves.  Fichte's  absolute  is  this 
moral  consciousness  universalized  and  made  eter- 
nal. Moral  value  being  its  fundamental  prin- 
ciple the  universe  must  on  that  very  account  em- 


ABSOLUTE  IDEALISM  361 

brace  both  nature,  or  moral  indifference,  and  hu- 
manity, or  moral  limitation. 

§  1Y8.  But  the  Romanticists,  who  followed  close 
upon  Fichte,  were  dissatisfied  with  so  hard  and  ex- 
Romanticism,  elusive  a  conception  of  spiritual  being. 
sp^"t^"''''''Uie,  they  said,  is  not  all  duty.  In- 
sentiment.       ^j^^j^  ^j^^   ^^^^^   spiritual   Hfc   IS   quite 

other,  not  harsh  and  constrained,  but  free  and  spon- 
taneous— a  wealth  of  feeling  playing  about  a  con- 
stantly shifting  centre.  Spirit  is  not  consecutive 
and  law-abiding,  but  capricious  and  wanton,  seek- 
ing the  beautiful  in  no  orderly  progression,  but  in 
a  refined  and  versatile  sensibility.  If  this  be  the 
nature  of  spirit,  and  if  spirit  be  the  nature  of  real- 
ity, then  he  is  most  wise  who  is  most  rich  in  sen- 
timent. The  Romanticists  were  the  exponents 
of  an  absolute  sentimentalism.  And  they  did 
not  prove  it,  but  like  good  sentimentalists  they 
felt  it. 

§  179.  Hegel,  the  master  of  the  new  idealism, 
set  himself  the  task  of  construing  spirit  in  terms 
HegeUanism,  ^^  consccutive  as  thoso  of  Fichto,  and 
Spirit*  ^s^^°^"*^^^  comprehensive  as  those  of  the  Ro- 
Diaiectic.  mauticists.  Like  Plato,  he  found  in 
dialectic  the  supreme  manifestation  of  the  spirit- 
ual life.     There  is  a  certain  flow  of  ideas  which 


362 


THE  APPROACH  TO   PHILOSOPHY 


determines  the  meaning  of  experience,  and  is  the 
truth  of  truths.  But  the  mark  of  the  new  prophet 
is  this :  the  flow  of  ideas  itself  is  a  process  of  self- 
correction  due  to  a  sense  of  error.  Thus  bare 
sensation  is  abstract  and  bare  thought  is  abstract. 
The  real,  however,  is  not  merely  the  concrete  in 
which  they  are  united,  but  the  very  process  in  the 
course  of  which  through  knowledge  of  abstraction 
thought  arrives  at  the  concrete.  The  principle  of 
negation  is  the  very  life  of  thought,  and  it  is  the 
life  of  thought,  rather  than  the  outcome  of  thought, 
which  is  reality.  The  most  general  form  of  the 
dialectical  process  contains  three  moments:  the 
moment  of  thesis,  in  which  affirmation  is  made ; 
the  moment  of  antithesis,  in  which  the  opposite  as- 
serts itself ;  and  the  moment  of  synthesis,  in  which 
a  reconciliation  is  effected  in  a  new  thesis.  Thus 
thought  is  the  progressive  overcoming  of  contra- 
diction; not  the  state  of  freedom  from  contradic- 
tion, but  the  act  of  escaping  it.  Such  processes 
are  more  familiar  in  the  moral  life.  Morality 
consists,  so  even  common-sense  asserts,  in  the  over- 
coming of  evil.  Character  is  the  resistance  of 
temptation;  goodness,  a  growth  in  grace  through 
discipline.  Of  such,  for  Hegel,  is  the  very  king- 
dom of  heaven.     It  is  the  task  of  the  philosopher, 


ABSOLUTE  IDEALISM  363 

a  task  to  wliicli  Hegel  applies  himself  most  as- 
siduously, to  analyze  the  battle  and  the  victory 
upon  wliicli  spiritual  being  nourishes  itself.  And 
since  the  deeper  processes  are  those  of  thought, 
the  Hegelian  philosophy  centres  in  an  ordering  of 
notions,  a  demonstration  of  that  necessary  pro- 
gression of  thought  which,  in  its  whole  dynamical 
logical  history,  constitutes  the  absolute  idea. 

§  180.  The  Hegelian  philosophy,  with  its  em- 
phasis upon  difference,  antagonism,  and  develop- 
The  Hegelian  mcnt,  is  peculiarly  qualified  to  be  a  phi- 
or'NaTure^  losophy  of  nature  and  history.  Those 
and  History,  principles  of  Spiritual  development 
which  logic  defines  are  conceived  as  incarnate  in 
the  evolution  of  the  world.  Xature,  as  the  very 
antithesis  to  spirit,  is  now  understood  to  be  the 
foil  of  spirit.  In  nature  spirit  alienates  itself  in 
order  to  return  enriched.  The  stages  of  nature 
are  the  preparation  for  the  reviving  of  a  spiritu- 
ality that  has  been  deliberately  forfeited.  The 
Romanticists,  whether  philosophers  like  Schelling 
or  poets  like  Goethe  and  Wordsworth,  were  led  by 
their  feeling  for  the  beauty  of  nature  to  attribute 
to  it  a  much  deeper  and  more  direct  spiritual  sig- 
nificance. But  Hegel  and  the  Romanticists  alike 
arc  truly  expressed  in  Emerson's  belief  that  the 


364  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

spiritual   interpretation   of  nature   is   the   "  true 
science." 

"  The  poet  alone  knows  astronomy,  chemistry,  vegeta- 
tion, and  animation,  for  he  does  not  stop  at  these  facts, 
but  employs  them  as  signs.  He  knows  why  the  plain  or 
meadow  of  space  was  strown  with  these  flowers  we  call 
suns  and  moons  and  stars ;  why  the  great  deep  is  adorned 
with  animals,  with  men,  and  gods;  for  in  every  word  he 
speaks  he  rides  on  them  as  the  horses  of  thought."* 

The  new  awakening  of  spirit  which  is  for  Hegel 
the  consummation  of  the  natural  evolution,  begins 
with  the  individual  or  subjective  spirit,  and  de- 
velops into  the  social  or  objective  spirit,  which  is 
morality  and  history.  History  is  a  veritable  dia- 
lectic of  nations,  in  the  course  of  which  the  con- 
sciousness of  individual  liberty  is  developed,  and 
coordinated  with  the  unity  of  the  state.  The  high- 
est stage  of  spirit  incarnate  is  that  of  absolute 
spirit,  embracing  art,  religion,  and  philosophy. 
In  art  the  absolute  idea  obtains  expression  in  sen- 
suous existence,  more  perfectly  in  classical  than  in 

^  Emerson:  Op.  cit.,  p.  25. 

The  possibility  of  conflict  between  this  method  of  nature 
study  and  the  empirical  method  of  science  is  significantly 
attested  by  the  circumstance  that  in  the  year  1801  Hegel 
published  a  paper  in  which  he  maintained,  on  the  ground 
of  certain  numerical  harmonies,  that  there  could  be  no 
planet  between  Mars  and  Jupiter,  while  at  almost  exactly 
the  same  time  Piazzi  discovered  Ceres,  the  first  of  the  as- 
teroids. 


ABSOLUTE  IDEALISM  365 

the  symbolic  art  of  the  Orient,  but  most  perfectly 
in  the  romantic  art  of  the  modern  period.  In  re- 
ligion the  absolute  idea  is  expressed  in  the  imagi- 
nation through  worship.  In  Oriental  pantheism, 
the  individual  is  overwhelmed  by  his  sense  of  the 
universal;  in  Greek  religion,  God  is  but  a  higher 
man ;  while  in  Christianity  God  and  man  are  per- 
fectly united  in  Christ.  Finally,  in  philosophy 
the  absolute  idea  reaches  its  highest  possible  ex- 
pression in  articulate  thought. 

§  181.  Such  is  absolute  idealism  approached 
from  the  stand-point  of  antecedent  metaphysics. 
Resumfe.  I*    ^^   the    most   elaborate    and    subtle 

firideatLP^^^i^ion  for  antagonistic  differences 
to  Solve  the      ^yithiu  uuitv  that  the  speculative  mind 

Problem  of  ./  i 

^^''-  of  man  has  as  yet  been  able  to  make. 

It  is  the  last  and  most  thorough  attempt  to  resolve 
individual  and  universal,  temporal  and  eternal, 
natural  and  ideal,  good  and  evil,  into  an  absolute 
unity  in  which  the  universal,  eternal,  ideal,  and 
good  shall  dominate,  and  in  which  all  terms  shall 
be  related  with  such  necessity  as  obtains  in  the  defi- 
nitions and  theorems  of  geometry.  There  is  to  be 
some  absolute  meaning  which  is  rational  to  the 
uttermost  and  the  necessary  ground  of  all  the  in- 
cidents of  existence.     Thought  could  undertake  no 


366  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

more  ambitious  and  exacting  task.  Nor  is  it  evi- 
dent after  all  that  absolute  idealism  enjoys  any 
better  success  in  this  task  than  absolute  realism. 
The  difference  between  them  becomes  much  less 
marked  when  we  reflect  that  the  former,  like  the 
latter,  must  reserve  the  predicate  of  being  for  the 
unity  of  the  whole.  Even  though  evil  and  con- 
tradiction belong  to  the  essence  of  things,  move  in 
the  secret  heart  of  a  spiritual  universe,  the  reality 
is  not  these  in  their  severalty,  but  that  life  within 
which  they  fall,  the  story  within  which  they 
"  earn  a  place."  And  if  absolute  idealism  has 
defined  a  new  perfection,  it  has  at  the  same  time 
defined  a  new  imperfection.  The  perfection  is 
rich  in  contrast,  and  thus  inclusive  of  both  the 
lights  and  shades  of  experience ;  but  the  perfection 
belongs  only  to  the  composition  of  these  elements 
wuthin  a  single  view.  It  is  not  necessary  to  such 
perfection  that  the  evil  should  ever  be  viewed  in 
isolation.  The  idealist  employs  the  analogy  of  the 
drama  or  the  picture  whose  very  significance  re- 
quires the  balance  of  opposing  forces ;  or  the  anal- 
ogy of  the  symphony  in  which  a  higher  musical 
quality  is  realized  through  the  resolution  of  discord 
into  harmony.  But  none  of  these  unities  requires 
any  eloinont  whatsoever  that  does  not  partake  of  its 


ABSOLUTE  IDEALISM  367 

beauty.  It  is  quite  irrelevant  to  tlie  drama  that 
the  hero  should  himself  have  his  own  view  of 
events  with  no  understanding  of  their  dramatic 
value,  as  it  is  irrelevant  to  the  picture  that  an  un- 
balanced fragment  of  it  should  dwell  apart,  or 
to  the  symphony  that  the  discord  should  be  heard 
without  the  harmony.  One  may  multiply  without 
end  the  internal  differences  and  antagonisms  that 
contribute  to  the  internal  meaning,  and  be  as  far 
as  ever  from  understanding  the  external  detach- 
ment of  experiences  that  are  not  rational  or  good 
in  themselves.  And  it  is  precisely  this  kind  of 
fact  that  precipitates  the  whole  problem.  We  do 
not  judge  of  sin  and  error  from  experiences  in 
which  they  conduct  to  goodness  and  truth,  but 
from  experiences  in  which  they  are  stark  and 
unresolved. 

In  view  of  such  considerations  many  idealists 
have  been  willing  to  confess  their  inability  to  solve 
this  problem.  To  quote  a  recent  expositor  of 
Hegel, 

"  We  need  not,  after  all,  be  surprised  at  the  apparently 
insoluble  problem  which  confronts  us.  For  the  question 
has  developed  into  the  old  difficulty  of  the  origin  of  evil, 
which  has  always  baffled  both  theologians  and  philoso- 
phers. An  idealism  which  declares  that  the  universe  is 
in  reality  perfect,  can  find,  as  most  forms  of  popular 


368  THE  APPROACH  TO   PHILOSOPHY 

idealism  do,  an  escape  from  the  difficulties  of  the  ex- 
istence of  evil,  by  declaring  that  the  universe  is  as  yet 
only  growing  towards  its  ideal  perfection.  But  this 
refuge  disappears  with  the  reality  of  time,  and  we  are 
left  with  an  awkward  difference  between  what  philosophy 
tells  us  must  be,  and  what  our  hfe  tells  us  actually  is." ' 

If  the  philosophy  of  eternal  perfection  persists  in 
its  fundamental  doctrine  in  spite  of  this  irreconcil- 
able conflict  with  life,  it  is  because  it  is  believed 
that  that  doctrine  must  be  true.  Let  us  turn,  then, 
to  its  more  constructive  and  compelling  argument. 

§  182.  The  proof  of  absolute  idealism  is  sup- 
posed by  tlie  majority  of  its  exponents  to  follow 
The  Construe-  f  rom  the  problem  of  epistemology,  and 

tive  Argument  j.'       t      i        n  j.i  'j!     j. 

for  Absolute  ^i^oi'G  particularly  from  the  manliest 
Bas'edTponthe^^ependence  of  truth  upon  the  knowing 
subjectivistic    jyiii^j^     In    its    initial    phase    absolute 

Theory  of  ^ 

Knowledge,  idealism  is  indistinguishable  from  sub- 
jectivism. Like  that  philosophy  it  finds  that  the 
object  of  knowledge  is  inseparable  from  the  state 
of  knowledge  throughout  the  whole  range  of  ex- 
perience. Since  the  knower  can  never  escape  him- 
self, it  may  be  set  down  as  an  elementary  fact  that 
reality  (at  any  rate  whatever  reality  can  be  known 
or  even  talked   about)    owes  its  being  to  mind. 

'  McTaggart:  Studies  in  Hegelian  Dialectic,  p.  181. 


ABSOLUTE  IDEALISM  369 

Thus  Green,  the  English  neo-Hegelian,  maintains 
that  "  an  object  which  no  consciousness  presented 
to  itself  would  not  be  an  object  at  all,"  and  won- 
ders that  this  principle  is  not  generally  taken  for 
granted  and  made  the  starting-point  for  philoso- 
phy.'^ However,  unless  the  very  term  "  object  "  is 
intended  to  imply  presence  to  a  subject,  this  prin- 
ciple is  by  no  means  self-evident,  and  must  be 
traced  to  its  sources. 

We  have  already  followed  the  fortunes  of  that 
empirical  subjectivism  which  issues  from  the  rel- 
ativity of  perception.  At  the  very  dawn  of  phi- 
losophy it  was  observed  that  what  is  seen,  heard, 
or  otherwise  experienced  through  the  senses,  de- 
pends not  only  upon  the  use  of  sense-organs,  but 
upon  the  special  point  of  view  occupied  by  each 
individual  sentient  being.  It  was  therefore  con- 
cluded that  the  perceptual  world  belonged  to  the 
human  knower  with  his  limitations  and  perspec- 
tive, rather  than  to  being  itself.  It  was  this  epi- 
stemological  principle  upon  which  Berkeley  foimd- 
ed  his  empirical  idealism.  Believing  knowledge 
to  consist  essentially  in  perception,  and  believing 
perception  to  be  subjective,  he  had  to  choose 
between  the  relegation  of  being  to  a  region  inac- 

'  Green:  Prolegomena  to  Ethics,  p.  15. 


370  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

cessible  to  knowledge,  and  the  definition  of  being 
in  terms  of  subjectivity.  To  avoid  scepticism  he 
accepted  the  latter  alternative.  But  among  the 
Greeks  with  whom  this  theory  of  perception  origi- 
nated, it  drew  its  meaning  in  large  part  from  the 
distinction  between  perception  and  reason.  Thus 
we  read  in  Plato's  "  Sophist  "  : 

"And  you  would  allow  that  we  participate  in  genera- 
tion with  the  body,  and  by  perception ;  but  we  participate 
with  the  soul  by  thought  in  true  essence,  and  essence 
you  would  affirm  to  be  always  the  same  and  immutable, 
whereas  generation  varies."* 

It  is  conceived  that  although  in  perception  man 
is  condemned  to  a  knowledge  conditioned  by  the 
affections  and  station  of  his  body,  he  may  nev- 
ertheless escape  himself  and  lay  hold  on  the 
"  true  essence  "  of  things,  by  virtue  of  thought. 
In  other  words,  knowledge,  in  contradistinction 
to  "  opinion,"  is  not  made  by  the  subject,  but  is 
the  soul's  participation  in  the  eternal  natures 
of  things.  In  the  moment  of  insight  the  varying 
course  of  the  individual  thinker  coincides  with  the 
unvarying  truth ;  but  in  that  moment  the  individ- 
ual thinker  is  ennobled  throiigh  being  assimilated 
to  the  truth,  while  the  truth  is  no  more,  no  less, 
the  truth  than  before. 

*  Plato:  The  Sophist,  248.     Translation  by  Jowett. 


ABSOLUTE   IDEALISM  37 1 

§  183.  In  absolute  idealism,  the  principle  of 
subjectivism  is  extended  to  reason  itself.  This 
The  Principle  extension  sccms  to  have  been  originally 
vism  Extend-  ^^^^  ^^  moral  and  religious  interests, 
ed  to  Reason,  ^j.^ju  ^ijg  nioral  stand-point  the  contem- 
plation of  the  truth  is  a  state ^  and  the  highest  state 
of  the  individual  life.  The  religious  interest  uni- 
fies the  individual  life  and  directs  attention  to  its 
spiritual  development.  Among  the  Greeks  of  the 
middle  period  life  was  as  yet  viewed  objectively 
as  the  fulfilment  of  capacities,  and  knowledge  was 
regarded  as  perfection  of  function,  the  exercise  of 
the  highest  of  human  prerogatives.  But  as  moral 
and  religious  interests  became  more  absorbing,  the 
individual  lived  more  and  more  in  his  own  self- 
consciousness.  Even  before  the  Christian  era  the 
Greek  philosophers  themselves  were  preoccupied 
with  the  task  of  winning  a  state  of  inner  serenity. 
Thus  the  Stoics  and  Epicureans  came  to  look  upon 
knowledge  as  a  means  to  the  attainment  of  an  inner 
freedom  from  distress  and  bondage  to  the  world. 
In  other  words,  the  very  reason  was  regarded  as  an 
activity  of  the  self,  and  its  fruits  were  valued  for 
their  enhancement  of  the  welfare  of  the  self.  And 
if  this  be  true  of  the  Stoics  and  the  Epicureans,  it 
is  still  more  clearly  true  of  the  neo-Platonists  of 


372  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

the  Christian  era,  who  mediate  between  the  an- 
cient and  mediaeval  worlds. 

§  184.  It  is  well  known  that  the  early  period 
of  Christianity  was  a  period  of  the  most  vivid 
Emphasis  on  self-consciousncss.  The  individual  be- 
sciousnessin    Ucved    that    his    natural    and    social 

Early  Christian  .  t  .        i  •       j 

Philosophy,  environment  was  alien  to  his  deeper 
spiritual  interests.  He  therefore  withdrew  into 
himself.  He  believed  himself  to  have  but  one 
duty,  the  salvation  of  his  soul;  and  that  duty  re- 
quired him  to  search  his  innermost  springs  of 
action  in  order  to  uproot  any  that  might  compro- 
mise him  with  the  world  and  turn  him  from  God. 
The  drama  of  life  was  enacted  within  the  circle 
of  his  own  self-consciousness.  Citizenship,  bodily 
health,  all  forms  of  appreciation  and  knowledge, 
were  identified  in  the  parts  they  played  here.  In 
short  the  Christian  consciousness,  although  renun- 
ciation was  its  deepest  motive,  was  reflexive  and 
centripetal  to  a  degree  hitherto  unknown  among 
the  European  peoples.  And  when  with  St.  Augus- 
tine theoretical  interests  once  more  vigorously 
asserted  themselves,  this  new  emphasis  was  in  the 
very  foreground.  St.  Augustine  wished  to  begin 
his  system  of  thought  with  a  first  indubitable  cer- 
tainty, and  selected  neither  being  nor  ideas,  but 


ABSOLUTE  IDEALISM  373 

self.  St.  Augustine's  genius  was  primarily  re- 
ligious, and  the  "  Confessions/'  in  which  he  re- 
cords the  story  of  his  hard  winning  of  peace  and 
right  relations  with  God,  is  his  most  intimate 
book.  How  faithfully  does  he  represent  him- 
self, and  the  blend  of  paganism  and  Christianity 
which  was  distinctive  of  his  age,  when  in  his 
systematic  writings  he  draws  upon  religion  for 
his  knowledge  of  truth!  In  all  my  living,  he 
argues,  whether  I  sin  or  turn  to  God,  whether  I 
doubt  or  believe,  whether  I  know  or  am  ignorant, 
in  all  I  know  thai  I  am  I.  Each  and  every  state 
of  my  consciousness  is  a  state  of  my  self,  and  as 
such,  sure  evidence  of  my  self's  existence.  If  one 
were  to  follow  St.  Augustine's  reflections  further, 
one  would  find  him  reasoning  from  his  own  finite 
and  evil  self  to  an  infinite  and  perfect  Self,  which 
centres  like  his  in  the  conviction  that  I  am  I,  but 
is  endowed  with  all  power  and  all  worth.  One 
would  find  him  reflecting  upon  the  possible  union 
with  God  through  the  exaltation  of  the  human 
self-consciousness.  But  this  conception  of  God  as 
the  perfect  self  is  so  much  a  prophecy  of  things 
to  come,  that  more  than  a  dozen  centuries  elapsed 
before  it  was  explicitly  formulated  by  the  post- 
Kantians.     We  must  follow  its  more  gradual  de- 


374  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

velopment  in  the  philosophies  of  Descartes  and 
Kant. 

§  185.  When  at  the  close  of  the  sixteenth  cen- 
tury the  Frenchman,  Rene  Descartes,  sought  to 
Descartes's      coustruct  philosoplij  auew  and  upon  se- 

Argument  for 

the  indepen-    cure  foundatious,  he  too  selected  as  the 

dence  of  the        .... 

Thinking  Self,  initial  certainty  of  thought  the  think- 
er's knowledge  of  himself.  This  principle  now 
received  its  classic  formulation  in  the  proposition, 
Cogito  ergo  sum — "  I  think,  hence  I  am."  The 
argument  does  not  differ  essentially  from  that  of 
St.  Augustine,  but  it  now  finds  a  place  in  a  system- 
atic and  critical  metaphysics.  In  that  my  think- 
ing is  certain  of  itself,  says  Descartes,  in  that  I 
know  myself  before  I  know  aught  else,  my  self  can 
never  be  dependent  for  its  being  upon  anything 
else  that  I  may  come  to  know.  A  thinking  self, 
with  its  knowledge  and  its  volition,  is  quite  ca- 
pable of  subsisting  of  itself.  Such  is,  indeed,  not 
tlie  case  with  a  finite  self,  for  all  finitude  is  sig- 
nificant of  limitation,  and  in  recognizing  my  limi- 
tations I  postulate  the  infinite  being  or  God.  But 
the  relation  of  my  self  to  a  physical  world  is  quite 
without  necessity.  Human  nature,  with  soul  and 
body  conjoined,  is  a  combination  of  two  substances, 
neither  of  wliich  is  a  necessary  consequence  of  the 


ABSOLUTE  IDEALISM  375 

other.  As  a  result  of  this  combination  the  soul  is 
to  some  extent  affected  by  the  body,  and  the  body 
is  to  some  extent  directed  by  the  soul;  but  the 
body  could  conceivably  be  an  automaton,  as  the 
soul  could  conceivably  be,  and  will  in  another  life 
become,  a  free  spirit.  The  consequences  of  this 
dualism  for  episteraology  are  very  grave.  If 
knowledge  be  tlie  activity  of  a  self-subsistent  think- 
ing spirit,  how  can  it  reveal  the  nature  of  an  ex- 
ternal world  ?  The  natural  order  is  now  literally 
"  external."  It  is  true  that  the  whole  body  of 
exact  science,  that  mechanical  system  to  which 
Descartes  attached  so  much  importance,  falls 
within  the  range  of  the  soul's  own  thinking.  But 
what  assurance  is  there  that  it  refers  to  a  province 
of  its  own — a  physical  world  in  space  ?  Descartes 
can  only  suppose  that  "  clear  and  distinct "  ideas 
must  be  trusted  as  faithful  representations.  It 
is  true  the  external  world  makes  its  presence  known 
directly,  when  it  breaks  in  upon  the  soul  in  sense- 
perception.  But  Descartes's  rationalism  and  love 
of  mathematics  forbade  his  attaching  importance 
to  this  criterion.  Eeal  nature,  that  exactly  de- 
finable and  predictable  order  of  moving  bodies 
defined  in  physics,  is  not  known  through  sense- 
perception,  but  through  thought.     Its  necessities 


376  THE  APPROACH  TO   PHILOSOPHY 

are  the  necessities  of  reason.  Descartes  finds 
himself,  then,  in  the  perplexing  position  of  seek- 
ing an  internal  criterion  for  an  external  world. 
The  problem  of  knowledge  so  stated  sets  going  the 
whole  epistemological  movement  of  the  eighteenth 
century,  from  Locke  through  Berkeley  and  Hume 
to  Kant.  And  the  issue  of  this  development  is  the 
absolute  idealism  of  Kant's  successors. 

§  186.  Of  the  English  philosophers  Avho  pre- 
pare the  way  for  the  epistemology  of  Kant,  Hume 
Empirical  ^^  ^^^  most  radical  and  momentous.  It 
S.^^t*'°r°vf      was    he    who    roused    Kant    from    his 

the  English 

Philosophers,  a  (^log^-iatic  slumbors  "  to  the  task  of  the 
"  Critical  Philosophy."  Hume  is  one  of  the  two 
possible  consequences  of  Descartes.  One  who  at- 
taches greater  importance  to  the  rational  necessi- 
ties of  science  than  to  its  external  reference,  is 
not  unwilling  that  nature  should  be  swallowed  up 
in  mind.  With  Malebranche,  Descartes's  imme- 
diate successor  in  France,  nature  is  thus  provided 
for  within  the  archetypal  mind  of  God.  With  the 
English  philosophers,  on  the  other  hand,  exter- 
nality is  made  the  very  mark  of  nature,  and  as 
a  consequence  sense-perception  becomes  the  crite- 
rion of  scientific  truth.  This  empirical  theory  of 
knowledge,  inaugurated  and  developed  by  Locke 


ABSOLUTE  IDEALISM  377 

and  Berkeley,  culminates  in  Hume's  designation 
of  the  impression  as  the  distinguishing  element  of 
nature,  at  once  making  up  its  content  and  certify- 
ing to  its  externality.  The  processes  of  nature  are 
successions  of  impressions ;  and  the  laws  of  nature 
are  their  uniformities,  or  the  expectations  of  uni- 
formity which  their  repetitions  engender.  Hume 
does  not  hesitate  to  draw  the  logical  conclusion. 
If  the  final  mark  of  truth  is  the  presence  to  sense 
of  the  individual  element,  then  science  can  consist 
only  of  items  of  information  and  probable  general- 
izations concerning  their  sequences.  The  effect  is 
observed  to  follow  upon  the  cause  in  fact,  but  there 
is  no  understanding  of  its  necessity ;  therefore  no 
absolute  certainty  attaches  to  the  future  effects  of 
any  cause. 

§  187.  But  what  has  become  of  the  dream  of 
the  mathematical  physicist?  Is  the  whole  system 
To  Save  Exact  of  Newton,  that  brilliant  triumph  of  the 

Science  Kant 

Makes  it  mechauical  method,  unfounded  and  dog- 
Dependent  ...  ,...  i-T  n 

on  Mind.  matic  ?  It  IS  the  logical  instability  of 
this  body  of  knowledge,  made  manifest  in  the  well- 
founded  scepticism  of  Hume,  that  rouses  Kant  to 
a  reexamination  of  the  whole  foundation  of  natural 
science.  The  general  outline  of  his  analysis  has 
been  developed  above.     It  is  of  importance  here 


378  THE  APPROACH  TO   PHILOSOPHY 

to  understand  its  relations  to  the  problem  of  Des- 
cartes. Contrary  to  the  view  of  the  English  phi- 
losophers, natural  science  is,  says  Kant,  the  work 
of  the  mind.  The  certainty  of  the  causal  rela- 
tion is  due  to  the  human  inability  to  think  other- 
wise. Hume  is  mistaken  in  supposing  that  mere 
sensation  gives  us  any  knowledge  of  nature.  The 
very  least  experience  of  objects  involves  the  em- 
ployment of  principles  which  are  furnished  by 
the  mind.  Without  the  employment  of  such  prin- 
ciples, or  in  bare  sensation,  there  is  no  intelligible 
meaning  whatsoever.  But  once  admit  the  employ- 
ment of  such  principles  and  formulate  them  sys- 
tematically, and  the  whole  Newtonian  order  of 
nature  is  seen  to  follow  from  them.  Furthermore, 
since  these  principles  or  categories  are  the  condi- 
tions of  human  experience,  are  the  very  instru- 
ments of  knowledge,  they  are  valid  wherever  there 
is  any  experience  or  knowledge.  There  is  but  one 
way  to  make  anything  at  all  out  of  nature,  and  that 
is  to  conceive  it  as  an  order  of  necessary  events  in 
space  and  time,  l^ewtonian  science  is  part  of 
such  a  general  conception,  and  is  therefore  neces- 
sary if  knowledge  is  to  be  possible  at  all,  even  the 
least.  Thus  Kant  turns  upon  Hume,  and  shuts 
him  up  to  the  choice  between  the  utter  abnegation 


ABSOLUTE  IDEALISM  379 

of  all  knowledge,  including  the  knowledge  of  his 
own  scepticism,  and  the  acceptance  of  the  whole 
body  of  exact  science. 

But  with  nature  thus  conditioned  by  the  neces- 
sities of  thought,  what  has  become  of  its  external- 
ity? That,  Kant  admits,  has  indeed  vanished. 
Kant  does  not  attempt,  as  did  Descartes,  to  hold 
that  the  nature  which  mind  constructs  and  con- 
trols, exists  also  outside  of  mind.  The  nature 
that  is  known  is  on  that  very  account  phenomenal, 
anthropocentric — created  by  its  cognitive  condi- 
tions. Descartes  was  right  in  maintaining  that 
sense-perception  certifies  to  the  existence  of  a  world 
outside  the  mind,  but  mistaken  in  calling  it  nature 
and  identifying  it  with  the  realm  of  science.  In 
short,  Kant  acknowledges  the  external  world,  and 
names  it  the  thing -in-itself ;  but  insists  that  be- 
cause it  is  outside  of  mind  it  is  outside  of  knowl- 
edge. Thus  is  the  certainty  of  science  saved 
at  the  cost  of  its  metaphysical  validity.  It  is 
necessarily  true,  but  only  of  a  conditioned  or  de- 
pendent world.  And  in  saving  science  Kant  has 
at  the  same  time  prejudiced  metaphysics  in  gen- 
eral. For  the  human  or  naturalistic  way  of 
knowing  is  left  in  sole  possession  of  the  field,  wath 
the   higher    interest   of   reasons   in   the    ultimate 


380  THE  APPROACH  TO   PHILOSOPHY 

nature  of  being,  degraded  to  the  rank  of  practical 
faith. 

§  188.  The  transformation  of  this  critical  and 
agnostic  doctrine  into  absolute  idealism  is  inevi- 
The  Post-        table.     The  metaphysical  interest  was 

Kantians 

Transform       bouud  to  Evail  itsclf  of  the  speculativc 

Kant's  Mind-  . 

in-general  into  suggestiveuess  With  which  the  Kantian 
Mind.  philosophy  abounds.     The  transforma- 

tion turns  upon  Kant's  assumption  that  whatever 
is  constructed  by  the  mind  is  on  that  account  phe- 
nomenon or  appearance.  Kant  has  carried  along 
the  presumption  that  whatever  is  act  or  content  of 
mind  is  on  that  account  not  real  object  or  thing-in- 
itself.  We  have  seen  that  this  is  generally  ac- 
cepted as  true  of  the  relativities  of  sense-percep- 
tion. But  is  it  true  of  thought?  The  post-Kan- 
tian idealist  maintains  that  that  depends  upon  the 
thought.  The  content  of  private  individual  think- 
ing is  in  so  far  not  real  object ;  but  it  does  not  fol- 
low that  this  is  true  of  such  thinking  as  is  univer- 
sally valid.  !N'ow  Kant  has  deduced  his  categories 
for  thought  in  general.  There  are  no  empirical 
cases  of  thinking  except  the  human  thinkers; 
but  the  categories  are  not  the  property  of  any 
one  human  individual  or  any  group  of  such 
individuals.     They  arc  tlic  conditions  of  experi- 


ABSOLUTE  IDEALISM  381 

ence  m  general,  and  of  every  possibility  of  ex- 
perience. Tlie  transition  to  absolute  idealism 
is  now  readily  made.  Thought  in  general  becomes 
the  absolute  mind,  and  experience  in  general  its 
content.  The  thing-in-itself  drops  out  as  having 
no  meaning.  The  objectivity  to  which  it  testified 
is  provided  for  in  the  completeness  and  self- 
sufficiency  which  is  attributed  to  the  absolute  ex- 
perience. Indeed,  an  altogether  new  definition  of 
subjective  and  objective  replaces  the  old.  The  sub- 
jective is  that  which  is  only  insufficiently  thought, 
as  in  the  case  of  relativity  and  error ;  the  objective 
is  that  which  is  completely  thought.  Thus  the 
natural  order  is  indeed  phenomenal;  but  only 
because  the  principles  of  science  are  not  the  high- 
est principles  of  thought,  and  not  because  nature 
is  the  fruit  of  thought.  Thus  Hegel  expresses 
his  relation  to  Kant  as  follows : 

"  According  to  Kant,  the  things  that  we  know  about 
are  to  us  appearances  only,  and  we  can  never  know  their 
essential  nature,  which  belongs  to  another  world,  which 
we  cannot  approach.  .  .  .  The  true  statement  of 
the  case  is  as  follows.  The  things  of  which  we  have 
direct  consciousness  are  mere  phenomena,  not  for  us 
only,  but  in  their  own  nature;  and  the  true  and  proper 
case  of  these  things,  finite  as  they  are,  is  to  have  their 
existence  founded  not  in  themselves,  but  in  the  universal 
divine  idea.     This  view  of  things,  it  is  true,  is  as  idealist 


382  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

as  Kant's,  but  in  contradistinction  to  the  subjective 
idealism  of  the  Critical  Philosophy  should  be  termed 
Absolute  IdeaUsm.'" 

§  189.  Absolute  idealism  is  thus  reached  after 
a  long  and  devious  course  of  development.  But 
The  Direct  ^he  argument  may  be  stated  much  more 
ThTMeTence  t)riefly.  Plato,  it  will  be  remembered, 
J^"^*^'^^^'^*^  found  that  experience  tends  ever  to 
Infinite  Mind,  transcend  itself.  The  thinker  finds 
himself  compelled  to  pursue  the  ideal  of  immu- 
table and  universal  truth,  and  must  identify  the 
ultimate  being  with  that  ideal.  Similarly  Hegel 
says : 

"That  upward  spring  of  the  mind  signifies  that  the 
being  which  the  world  has  is  only  a  semblance,  no  real 
being,  no  absolute  truth;  it  signifies  that  beyond  and 
above  that  appearance,  truth  abides  in  God,  so  that 
true  being  is  another  name  for  God." '" 

The  further  argument  of  absolute  idealism  dif- 
fers from  that  of  Plato  in  that  the  dependence  of 
truth  upon  the  mind  is  accepted  as  a  first  principle. 
The  ideal  with  which  experience  is  informed  is 
now  the  state  of  perfect  knowledge,  rather  than  the 

'Hegel:  Encyclopddie,  §45,  lecture  note.  Quoted  by 
McTaggart:  Op.  cit.,  p.  69. 

'"Hegel:  Encyclopddie,  §50.  Quoted  by  McTaggart:  Op. 
cit.,  p.  70. 


ABSOLUTE  IDEALISM  333 

system  of  absolute  truth.  The  content  of  the  state 
of  perfect  knowledge  will  indeed  be  the  system  of 
absolute  truth,  but  none  the  less  content,  precisely 
as  finite  knowledge  is  the  content  of  a  finite  mind. 
In  pursuing  the  truth,  I  who  pursue,  aim  to  realize 
in  myself  a  certain  highest  state  of  knowledge. 
Were  I  to  know  all  truth  I  should  indeed  have 
ceased  to  be  the  finite  individual  who  began  the 
quest,  but  the  evolution  would  be  continuous  and 
the  character  of  self -consciousness  would  never  have 
been  lost.  I  may  say,  in  short,  that  God  or  being, 
is  my  perfect  cognitive  self. 

The  argument  for  absolute  idealism  is  a  con- 
structive interpretation  of  the  subjectivistic  con- 
tention that  knowledge  can  never  escape  the  circle 
of  its  own  activity  and  states.  To  meet  the  de- 
mand for  a  final  and  standard  truth,  a  demand 
which  realism  meets  with  its  doctrine  of  a  being 
independent  of  any  mind,  this  philosophy  defines 
a  standard  mind.  The  impossibility  of  defining 
objects  in  terms  of  relativity  to  a  finite  self,  con- 
ducts dialectically  to  the  conception  of  the  abso- 
lute self.  The  sequel  to  my  error  or  exclusiveness, 
is  truth  or  inclusiveness.  The  outcome  of  the  dia- 
lectic is  determined  by  the  s}Tnmetry  of  the  antith- 
esis.    Thus,   corrected  experience   implies   a  last 


384  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

correcting  experience;  partial  cognition,  complete 
cognition;  empirical  subject,  transcendental  sub- 
ject; finite  mind,  an  absolute  mind.  The  follow- 
ing statement  is  taken  from  a  contemporary  ex- 
ponent of  the  philosophy : 

"What  you  and  I  lack,  when  we  lament  our  human 
ignorance,  is  simply  a  certain  desirable  and  logically 
possible  state  of  mind,  or  type  of  experience;  to  wit,  a 
state  of  mind  in  which  we  should  wisely  be  able  to  say- 
that  we  had  fulfilled  in  experience  what  we  now  have 
merely  in  idea,  namely,  the  knowledge,  the  immediate 
and  felt  presence,  of  what  we  now  call  the  Absolute 
Reality.  .  .  .  There  is  an  Absolute  Experience  for 
which  the  conception  of  an  absolute  reality,  i.  e.,  the 
conception  of  a  system  of  ideal  truth,  is  fulfilled  by  the 
very  contents  that  get  presented  to  this  experience. 
This  Absolute  Experience  is  related  to  our  experience 
as  an  organic  whole  to  its  own  fragments.  It  is  an  ex- 
perience which  finds  fulfilled  all  that  the  completest 
thought  can  conceive  as  genuinely  possible.  Herein 
lies  its  definition  as  an  Absolute.  For  the  Absolute 
Experience,  as  for  ours,  there  are  data,  contents,  facts. 
But  these  data,  these  contents,  express,  for  the  Absolute 
Experience,  its  own  meaning,  its  thought,  its  ideas. 
Contents  beyond  these  that  it  possesses,  the  Absolute 
Experience  knows  to  be,  in  genuine  truth,  impossible. 
Hence  its  contents  are  indeed  particular, — a  selection 
from  the  world  of  bare  or  merely  conceptual  possi- 
bilities,— but  they  form  a  self-determined  whole,  than 
which  nothing  completer,  more  organic,  more  fulfilled, 
more  transparent,  or  more  complete  in  meaning,  is 
concretely  or  genuinely  possible.  On  the  other  hand, 
these  contents  are   not   foreign   to   those  of   our  finite 


ABSOLUTE  IDEALISM  385 

experience,  but  are   inclusive  of  them  in  the  unity  of 
one  life."  " 

§  190.  As  has  been  already  intimated,  at  the 
opening  of  this  chapter,  the  inclusion  of  the  whole 
The  ReaUstic  ^^  rcalitj  within  a  single  self  is  clearly 
•^*'Ab"7t  ^  questionable  proceeding.  The  need 
ideaUsm.  q£  avoiding  the  relativism  of  empirical 
idealism  is  evident.  But  if  the  very  meaning  of 
the  self-consciousness  be  due  to  a  certain  selection 
and  exclusion  within  the  general  field  of  experi- 
ence, it  is  equally  evident  that  the  relativity  of 
self-consciousness  can  never  be  overcome  through 
appealing  to  a  higher  self.  One  must  appeal  from 
the  self  to  the  realm  of  things  as  they  are.  In- 
deed, although  the  exponents  of  this  philosophy 
use  the  language  of  spiritualism,  and  accept  the 
idealistic  epistemology,  their  absolute  being  tends 
ever  to  escape  the  special  characters  of  the  self. 
And  inasmuch  as  the  absolute  self  is  commonly 
set  over  against  the  finite  or  empirical  self,  as  the 
standard  and  test  of  truth,  it  is  the  less  distin- 

**  Royce:  Conception  of  God,  pp.  19,  43-44. 

This  argument  is  well  summarized  in  Green's  statement 
that  "  the  existence  of  one  connected  world,  which  is  the 
presupposition  of  knowledge,  implies  the  action  of  one  self- 
conditioning  and  self-determining  mind."  Prolegomena  to 
Ethics,  p.  181. 


386  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

guishable  from  the  realist's  order  of  independent 
beings. 

§  191.  But  however  much  absolute  idealism 
may  tend  to  abandon  its  idealism  for  the  sake  of 
The  concep-  its  absolutism  within  the  field  of  meta- 
crnsciousnJss  pliysics,  such  is  not  the  case  within  the 
Shks^ir^'  field  of  ethics  and  religion.  The  con- 
Absoiute         ception  of  the  self  here  receives  a  new 

Idealism.  ^ 

Kant.  emphasis.     The  same  self-consciousness 

which  admits  to  the  highest  truth  is  the  evidence 
of  man's  practical  dignity.  In  virtue  of  his  im- 
mediate apprehension  of  the  principles  of  self- 
hood, and  his  direct  participation  in  the  life  of 
spirit,  man  may  be  said  to  possess  the  innermost 
secret  of  the  universe.  In  order  to  achieve  good- 
ness he  must  therefore  recognize  and  express  him- 
self. The  Kantian  philosophy  is  here  again  the 
starting-point.  It  was  Kant  who  first  gave  ade- 
quate expression  to  the  Christian  idea  of  the  moral 
self-consciousness. 

"Duty!  Thou  sublime  and  mighty  name  that  dost 
embrace  nothing  charming  or  insinuating,  but  requirest 
submission,  and  yet  seekest  not  to  move  the  will  by 
threatening  aught  that  would  arouse  natural  aversion  or 
terror,  but  merely  boldest  forth  a  law  which  of  itself 
finds  entrance  into  the  mind,  ...  a  law  before 
which    all    inclinations    are    dumb,    even    though    they 


ABSOLUTE  IDEALISM  387 

secretly  counterwork  it;  what  origin  is  there  worthy  of 
thee,  and  where  is  to  be  found  the  root  of  thy  noble 
descent  which  proudly  rejects  all  kindred  with  the  in- 
clinations .  .  .  ?  It  can  be  nothing  less  than  a 
power  which  elevates  man  above  himself,  ...  a 
power  which  connects  him  with  an  order  of  things  that 
only  the  understanding  can  conceive,  with  a  world  which 
at  the  same  time  commands  the  whole  sensible  world, 
and  with  it  the  empirically  determinable  existence  of 
man  in  time,  as  well  as  the  sum  total  of  all  ends."  '^ 

With  Kant  there  can  be  no  morality  except  con- 
duct be  attended  by  the  consciousness  of  this  duty 
imposed  by  the  higher  nature  upon  the  lower.  It 
is  this  very  recognition  of  a  deeper  self,  of  a  per- 
sonality that  belongs  to  the  sources  and  not  to  the 
consequences  of  nature,  that  constitutes  man  as  a 
moral  being,  and  only  such  action  as  is  inspired 
with  a  reverence  for  it  can  be  morally  good.  Kant 
does  little  more  than  to  establish  the  uncompro- 
mising dignity  of  the  moral  will.  In  moral 
action  man  submits  to  a  law  that  issues  from 
himself  in  virtue  of  his  rational  nature.  Here 
he  yields  nothing,  as  he  owes  nothing,  to  that 
appetency  which  binds  him  to  the  natural  world. 
As  a  rational  being  he  himself  affirms  the  very 
principles  which   determine   the   organization   of 

**  Kant:  Critical  Examination  of  Practical  Reason.  Trans- 
lated by  Abbott  in  Kant's  Theory  of  Ethics,  p.  180. 


388  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

nature.  This  is  his  freedom,  at  once  the  ground 
and  the  implication  of  his  duty.  Man  is  free  from 
nature  to  serve  the  higher  law  of  his  personality. 
§  192.  There  are  two  respects  in  which  Kant's 
ethics  has  been  regarded  as  inadequate  by  those 
Kantian  Ethics  vvho  draw  f rom  it  their  fundamental 

Supplemented 

through  the     principles.     It  is  said  that  Kant  is  too 

Conceptions 

of  Universal     rigoristic,   that  he  makes  too  stern   a 

and  Objective     .        .  .  , .  .  ,  . 

Spirit.  business   01   morality,   m  speaking   so 

much  of  law  and  so  little  of  love  and  spontaneity. 
There  are  good  reasons  for  this.  Kant  seeks  to 
isolate  the  moral  consciousness,  and  dwell  upon  it 
in  its  purity,  in  order  that  he  may  demonstrate  its 
incommensurability  with  the  values  of  inclination 
and  sensibility.  Furthermore,  Kant  may  speak 
of  the  principle  of  the  absolute,  and  recognize  the 
deeper  eternal  order  as  a  law,  but  he  may  not,  if 
he  is  to  be  consistent  with  his  own  critical  prin- 
ciples, aflSrm  the  metaphysical  being  of  such  an 
order.  With  his  idealistic  followers  it  is  possible 
to  define  the  spiritual  setting  of  the  moral  life, 
but  with  Kant  it  is  only  possible  to  defi.ne  the  an- 
tagonism of  principles.  Hence  the  greater  opti- 
mism of  the  post-Kantians.  They  know  that  the 
higher  law  is  the  reality,  and  that  he  who  obeys 
it  thus  unites  himself  with  the  absolute  self.     That 


ABSOLUTE  IDEALISM  389 

which  for  Kant  is  only  a  resolute  obedience  to 
more  valid  principles,  to  rationally  superior  rules 
for  action,  is  for  idealism  man's  appropriation 
of  his  spiritual  birthright.  Since  the  law  is  the 
deeper  nature,  man  may  respect  and  obey  it 
as  valid,  and  at  the  same  time  act  upon  it  gladly 
in  the  sure  knowledge  that  it  will  enhance  his 
eternal  welfare.  Indeed,  the  knowledge  that  the 
very  universe  is  founded  upon  this  law  will  make 
him  less  suspicious  of  nature  and  less  exclusive  in 
his  adherence  to  any  single  law.  He  will  be  more 
confident  of  the  essential  goodness  of  all  manifes- 
tations of  a  universe  which  he  knows  to  be  fun- 
damentally spiritual. 

But  it  has  been  urged,  secondly,  that  the  Kan- 
tian ethics  is  too  formal,  too  little  pertinent  to  the 
issues  of  life.  Kant's  moral  law  imposes  only  obe- 
dience to  the  law,  or  conduct  conceived  as  suitable 
to  a  universal  moral  community.  But  what  is  the 
nature  of  such  conduct  in  particular  ?  It  may  be 
answered  that  to  maintain  the  moral  self -conscious- 
ness, to  act  dutifully  and  dutifully  only,  to  be 
self-reliant  and  unswerving  in  the  doing  of  what 
one  ought  to  do,  is  to  obtain  a  very  specific  char- 
acter. But  does  this  not  leave  the  individual's 
conduct  to  his  OAvn  interpretation  of  his   duty? 


390  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

It  was  just  this  element  of  individualism  which 
Hegel  sought  to  eliminate  through  the  applica- 
tion of  his  larger  philosophical  conception.  If 
that  which  expresses  itself  within  the  individual 
consciousness  as  the  moral  law  be  indeed  the  law 
of  that  self  in  which  the  universe  is  grounded,  it 
will  appear  as  objective  spirit  in  the  evolution  of 
society.  For  Hegel,  then,  the  most  valid  standard 
of  goodness  is  to  be  found  in  that  customary  mo- 
rality which  bespeaks  the  moral  leadings  of  the 
general  humanity,  and  in  those  institutions,  such  as 
the  family  and  the  state,  which  are  the  moral  acts 
of  the  absolute  idea  itself.  Finally,  in  the  realm 
of  absolute  spirit,  in  art,  in  revealed  religion,  and 
in  philosophy,  the  individual  may  approach  to  the 
self-consciousness  which  is  the  perfect  truth  and 
goodness  in  and  for  itself. 

§  193.  Where  the  law  of  life  is  the  implication 
in  the  finite  self-consciousness  of  the  eternal  and 
The  Peculiar     divine  self-consciousuess,  there  can  be 

Pantheism  ,  •    .    .  ,  •,  •  j 

and  Mysticism  uo  division  between  morality  and  re- 

of  Absolute         T    .  I  1  1      . 

Idealism.  ligion,  as  there  can  be  none  between 
thought  and  will.  Whatever  man  seeks  is  in  the 
end  God.  As  the  perfect  fulfilment  of  the  think- 
ing self,  God  is  the  truth ;  as  the  perfect  fulfilment 
of  the  willing  self,  God  is  the  good.     The  finite 


ABSOLUTE  IDEALISM  391 

self-consciousness  finds  facts  that  are  not  under- 
stood, and  so  seeks  to  resolve  itself  into  the  perfect 
self  wherein  all  that  is  given  has  meaning.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  finite  self-consciousness  finds 
ideals  that  are  not  realized,  and  so  seeks  to  resolve 
itself  into  that  perfect  self  wherein  all  that  is  sig- 
nificant is  given.  All  interests  thus  converge 
toward 

"some  state  of  conscious  spirit  in  which  the  opposition 
of  cognition  and  volition  is  overcome — in  wliich  we 
neither  judge  our  ideas  by  the  world,  nor  the  world  by 
our  ideas,  but  are  aware  that  inner  and  outer  are  in  such 
close  and  necessary  harmony  that  even  the  thought  of 
possible  discord  has  become  impossible.  In  its  unity 
not  only  cognition  and  volition,  but  feeling  also,  must 
be  blended  and  united.  In  some  way  or  another  it  must 
have  overcome  the  rift  in  discursive  knowledge,  and  the 
immediate  must  for  it  be  no  longer  the  alien.  It  must 
be  as  direct  as  art,  as  certain  and  universal  as  philoso- 
phy." " 

The  religious  consciousness  proper  to  absolute 
idealism  is  both  pantheistic  and  mystical,  but  with 
distinction.  Platonism  is  pantheistic  in  that  nat- 
ure is  resolved  into  God.  All  that  is  not  perfect 
is  esteemed  only  for  its  promise  of  perfection. 
And  Platonism  is  mystical  in  that  the  purification 
and  universalization  of  the  affections  brings  one 

"  Quoted  from  McTaggart:  Op.  cit.,  pp.  231-232. 


392  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

in  the  end  to  a  perfection  that  exceeds  all  modes 

of  thought   and   speech.     With   Spinoza,   on  the 

other  hand,  God  may  be  said  to  be  resolved  into 

nature.     !Nature  is  made  divine,  but  is  none  the 

less  nature,  for  its  divinity  consists  in  its  absolute 

necessity.     Spinoza's  pantheism  passes  over  into 

mysticism  because  the  absolute  necessity  exceeds 

in   both  unity   and  richness  the  laws  known  to 

the  human  understanding.     In  absolute  idealism, 

finally,  both  God  and  nature  are  resolved  into  the 

self.     For  that  which  is  divine  in  experience  is 

self-consciousness,  and  this  is  at  the  same  time  the 

ground  of  nature.     Thus  in  the  highest  knowledge 

the  self  is  expanded  and  enriched  without  being 

left  behind.^     The  mystical  experience  proper  to 

this  philosophy  is  the  consciousness  of  identity, 

together  with  the  sense  of  universal  immanence. 

The  individual  self  may  be  directly  sensible  of  the 

absolute    self,    for   these    are   one   spiritual   life. 

Thus  Emerson  says : 

"  It  is  a  secret  which  every  intellectual  man  quickly 
learns,  that  beyond  the  energy  of  his  possessed  and  con- 
scious intellect  he  is  capable  of  a  new  energy  (as  of  an 
intellect  doubled  on  itself),  by  abandonment  to  the 
nature  of  things;  that  beside  his  privacy  of  power  as  an 
individual  man,  there  is  a  great  public  power  upon  which 
he  can  draw,  by  unlocking,  at  all  risks,  his  human  doors, 
and   suffering  the   ethereal   tides  to   roll   and   circulate 


ABSOLUTE  IDEALISM  393 

through  him;  then  he  is  caught  up  into  the  life  of  the 
Universe,  his  speech  is  thunder,  his  thought  is  law,  and 
his  words  are  universally  intelligible  as  the  plants  and 
animals.  The  poet  knows  that  he  speaks  adequately 
then  only  when  he  speaks  somewhat  wildly,  or  'with 
the  flower  of  the  mind ' ;  not  with  the  intellect  used  as  an 
organ,  but  with  the  intellect  released  from  all  service 
and  suffered  to  take  its  direction  from  its  celestial  hfe.'"* 

§  194.  But  the  distinguishing  flavor  and  qual- 
ity of  this  religion  arises  from  its  spiritual  hos- 
The  ReUgion    pitality.     It  Is  not,  like  Platonism,  a 

of  Exuberant  .  /.     i       i  ^•^  ^ 

Spirituality.  Contemplation  of  the  best ;  nor,  like  plu- 
ralistic idealisms,  a  moral  knight-errantry.  It  is 
neither  a  religion  of  exclusion,  nor  a  religion  of 
reconstruction,  but  a  profound  willingness  that 
things  should  be  as  they  really  are.  For  this  rea- 
son its  devotees  have  recognized  in  Spinoza  their 
true  forerunner.  But  idealism  is  not  Spinozism, 
though  it  may  contain  this  as  one  of  its  strains. 
For  it  is  not  the  worship  of  necessity,  Emerson's 
"  beautiful  necessity,  which  makes  man  brave  in 
believing  that  he  cannot  shun  a  danger  that  is  ap- 
pointed, nor  incur  one  that  is  not " ;  but  the  wor- 
ship of  that  which  is  necessary. 

Not  only  must  one  understand  that  every  effort, 
however  despairing,  is  an  element  of  sense  in  the 
universal  significance ; 

"Emerson:  Op.  cit.,  pp.  30-31. 


394  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

"  that  the  whole  would  not  be  what  it  is  were  not  pre- 
cisely this  finite  purpose  left  in  its  own  uniqueness  to 
speak  precisely  its  own  word — a  word  which  no  other 
purpose  can  speak  in  the  language  of  the  divine  will";'* 

but  one  must  have  a  zest  for  such  participation, 
and  a  heart  for  the  divine  will  which  it  profits. 
Indeed,  so  much  is  this  religion  a  love  of  life, 
that  it  may,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Romanticists,  be 
a  love  of  caprice.  Battle  and  death,  pain  and  joy, 
error  and  truth — all  that  belongs  to  the  story  of 
this  mortal  world,  are  to  be  felt  as  the  thrill  of 
health,  and  relished  as  the  essences  of  God.  Re- 
ligion is  an  exuberant  spirituality,  a  fearless  sen- 
sibility, a  knowledge  of  both  good  and  evil,  and  a 
will  to  serve  the  good,  while  exulting  that  the  evil 
will  not  yield  without  a  battle. 

"  Royce:  The  World  and  the  Individual,  First  Series,  p.  465. 


CHAPTER   XII 

CONCLUSION 

§  195.  One  who  consults  a  book  of  philosophy 
in  the  hope  of  finding  there  a  definite  body  of 
Liability  of  truth,  Sanctioned  by  the  consensus  of  ex- 
RelS!"' *°  P^^*^'  cannot  fail  to  be  disappointed. 
Due  to  its       ^j^(j  {^  should  now  be  plain  that  this  is 

Systematic 

Character.  (j^g  uot  to  the  frailtics  of  philosophcrs, 
but  to  the  meaning  of  philosophy.  Philosophy  is 
not  additive,  but  reconstructive.  Natural  science 
may  advance  step  by  step  without  ever  losing 
ground;  its  empirical  discoveries  are  in  their 
severalty  as  true  as  they  can  ever  be.  Thus  the 
stars  and  the  species  of  animals  may  be  recorded 
successively,  and  each  generation  of  astronomers 
and  zoologists  may  take  up  the  work  at  the  point 
reached  by  its  forerunners.  The  formulation  of 
results  does,  it  is  true,  require  constant  correction 
and  revision — but  there  is  a  central  body  of  data 
which  is  little  affected,  and  which  accumulates 
from  age  to  age.  N^ow  the  finality  of  scientific 
truth  is  proportional  to  the  modesty  of  its  claims. 
395 


396  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

Items  of  truth  persist,  while  the  interpretation  of 
them  is  subject  to  alteration  with  the  general 
advance  of  knowledge;  and,  relatively  speaking, 
science  consists  in  items  of  truth,  and  philosophy 
in  their  interpretation.  The  liability  to  revision 
in  science  itself  increases  as  that  body  of  knowl- 
edge becomes  more  highly  unified  and  systematic. 
Thus  the  present  age,  with  its  attempt  to  construct 
a  single  comprehensive  system  of  mechanical  sci- 
ence, is  peculiarly  an  age  when  fundamental  con- 
ceptions are  subjected  to  a  thorough  reexamination 
— when,  for  example,  so  ancient  a  conception  as 
that  of  matter  is  threatened  with  displacement  by 
that  of  energy.  But  philosophy  is  essentially  uni- 
tary and  systematic — and  thus  superlatively  liable 
to  revision. 

§  196.  It  is  noteworthy  that  it  is  only  in  this 
age  of  a  highly  systematic  natural  science  that 
The  One  different  systems  are  projected,  as  in 
fhe^Many"**  the  casc  just  noted  of  the  rivalry 
Philosophies,  jjetweon  the  strictly  mechanical,  or  cor- 
puscular, theory  and  the  newer  theory  of  ener- 
getics. It  has  heretofore  been  taken  for  granted 
that  although  there  may  be  many  philosophies, 
there  is  but  one  body  of  science.  And  it  is  still 
taken  for  granted  that  the  experimental  detail  of 


CONCLUSION  397 

the  individual  science  is  a  common  fund,  to  the 
progressive  increase  of  which  the  individual  scien- 
tist contributes  the  results  of  his  special  research ; 
there  being  rival  schools  of  mechanics,  physics,  or 
chemistry,  only  in  so  far  as  fundamental  concep- 
tions or  principles  of  orderly  arrangement  are  in 
question.  But  philosophy  deals  exclusively  with 
the  most  fundamental  conceptions  and  the  most 
general  principles  of  orderly  arrangement.  Hence 
it  is  significant  of  the  very  task  of  philosophy  that 
there  should  be  many  tentative  systems  of  philoso- 
phy, even  that  each  philosopher  should  project  and 
construct  his  own  philosophy.  Philosophy  as  the 
truth  of  synthesis  and  reconciliation,  of  compre- 
hensiveness and  coordination,  must  be  a  living 
unity.  It  is  a  thinking  of  entire  experience,  and 
can  be  sufficient  only  through  being  all-sufficient. 
The  heart  of  every  philosophy  is  a  harmonizing  in- 
sight, an  intellectual  prospect  within  which  all 
human  interests  and  studies  compose  themselves. 
Such  knowledge  cannot  be  delegated  to  isolated  co- 
laborers,  but  will  be  altogether  missed  if  not  loved 
and  sought  in  its  indivisible  unity.  There  is  no 
modest  home-keeping  philosophy ;  no  safe  and  con- 
servative philosophy,  that  can  make  sure  of  a  part 
through  renouncing  the  whole.     There  is  no  phi- 


398  THE  APPROACH  TO   PHILOSOPHY 

losophy  without  intellectual  temerity,  as  there  is  no 
religion  without  moral  temerity.  And  the  one  is 
the  supreme  interest  of  thought,  as  the  other  is  the 
supreme  interest  of  life. 

§  197.  Though  the  many  philosophies  be  inev- 
itable, it  must  not  be  concluded  that  there  is 
Progress  in  therefore  no  progress  in  philosophy. 
xS^sopwItica- The  solution  from  which  every  great 
tidsm  ofthe'  pliilosophy  is  precipitated  is  the  min- 
Present  Age.  gjg^j  wisdom  of  some  latest  age,  with 
all  of  its  inheritance.  The  "  positive  "  knowledge 
furnished  by  the  sciences,  the  refinements  and  dis- 
tinctions of  the  philosophers,  the  ideals  of  society 
— these  and  the  whole  sum  of  civilization  are  its 
ingredients.  Where  there  is  no  single  system  of 
philosophy  significant  enough  to  express  the  age, 
as  did  the  systems  of  Plato,  Thomas  Aquinas, 
Descartes,  Locke,  Kant,  Hegel,  and  the  others  who 
])elong  to  the  roll  of  the  great  philosophers,  there 
exists  a  general  sophistication,  which  is  more  elu- 
sive but  not  less  significant.  The  present  age — at 
any  rate  from  its  own  stand-point — is  not  an  age  of 
great  philosophical  systems.  Such  systems  may 
indeed  be  living  in  our  midst  unrecognized;  but 
historical  perspective  cannot  safely  be  anticipated. 
It  is  certain  that  no  living  voice  is  known  to  speak 


CONCLUSION  399 

for  this  generation  as  did  Hegel,  and  even  Spencer, 
for  the  last.  There  is,  however,  a  significance  in 
this  very  passing  of  Hegel  and  Spencer, — an  en- 
lightenment peculiar  to  an  age  which  knows  them, 
but  has  philosophically  outlived  them.  There  is  a 
moral  in  the  history  of  thought  which  just  now  no 
philosophy,  whether  naturalism  or  transcendental- 
ism, realism  or  idealism,  can  fail  to  draw\  The 
characterization  of  this  contemporary  eclecticism 
or  sophistication,  difficult  and  uncertain  as  it  must 
needs  be,  affords  the  best  summary  and  interpre- 
tation with  which  to  conclude  this  brief  survey  of 
the  fortunes  of  philosophy. 

§  198.  Since  the  problem  of  metaphysics  is  the 
crucial  problem  of  philosophy,  the  question  of  its 
Metaphysics,    present  status  is  fundamental  in  any 

The  Antagonis- 
tic Doctrines  of  characterization    of    the    age.      It    will 
Naturalism  and 

Absolutism,  appear  from  the  foregoing  account  of 
the  course  of  metaphysical  development  that  two 
fundamental  tendencies  have  exhibited  themselves 
from  the  beginning.  The  one  of  these  is  natural- 
istic and  empirical,  representing  the  claims  of  what 
common  sense  calls  "  matters  of  fact " ;  the  other 
is  transcendental  and  rational,  representing  the 
claims  of  the  standards  and  ideals  which  are  im- 
manent in  experience,  and  directly  manifested  in 


400  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

the  great  human  interests  of  thought  and  action. 
These  tendencies  have  on  the  whole  been  antago- 
nistic ;  and  the  clear-cut  and  momentous  systems  of 
philosoiDhy  have  been  fundamentally  determined 
by  either  the  one  or  the  other. 

Thus  materialism  is  due  to  the  attempt  to  re- 
duce all  of  experience  to  the  elements  and  prin- 
ciples of  connection  which  are  employed  by  the 
physical  sciences  to  set  in  order  the  actual  motions, 
or  changes  of  place,  which  the  parts  of  experience 
undergo.  Materialism  maintains  that  the  motions 
of  bodies  are  indifferent  to  considerations  of  worth, 
and  denies  that  they  issue  from  a  deeper  cause 
of  another  order.  The  very  ideas  of  such  non- 
mechanical  elements  or  principles  are  here  pro- 
vided with  a  mechanical  origin.  Similarly  a  phe- 
nomenalism, like  that  of  Hume,  takes  immediate 
presence  to  sense  as  the  norm  of  being  and  knowl- 
edge. Individual  items,  directly  verified  in  the 
moment  of  their  occurrence,  are  held  to  be  at  once 
the  content  of  all  real  truth,  and  the  source  of 
those  abstract  ideas  which  the  misguided  ration- 
alists mistake  for  real  truth. 

But  the  absolutist,  on  the  other  hand,  contends 
that  the  thinker  must  mean  something  by  the  real- 
ity which  he  seeks.     If  he  had  it  for  the  looking, 


CONCLUSION  401 

thought  would  not  be,  as  it  so  evidently  is,  a  pur- 
posive endeavor.  And  that  vs^hich  is  meant  by 
reality  can  be  nothing  short  of  the  fulfilment  or 
final  realization  of  this  endeavor  of  thought.  To 
find  out  what  thought  seeks,  to  anticipate  the  con- 
summation of  thought  and  posit  it  as  real,  is 
therefore  the  first  and  fundamental  procedure  of 
philosophy.  The  mechanism  of  nature,  and  all 
matters  of  fact,  must  come  to  terms  with  this  ab- 
solute reality,  or  be  condemned  as  mere  appear- 
ance. Thus  Plato  distinguishes  the  world  of 
"  generation  "  in  which  we  participate  by  percep- 
tion, from  the  "  true  essence  "*in  which  we  par- 
ticipate by  thought;  and  Schelling  speaks  of  the 
modern  experimental  method  as  the  "  corruption  " 
of  philosophy  and  physics,  in  that  it  fails  to 
construe  nature  in  terms  of  spirit. 

§  199.  Now  it  would  never  occur  to  a  sophis- 
ticated philosopher  of  the  present,  to  one  who  has 
Concessions      thought  out  to  the  end  the  whole  tra- 

from  the  Side        ^   _  _  i    <•  i       i 

of  Absolutism,  ditiou  of  philosopliy,  and  felt  the  grav- 

Recognition        .  /•      i  i  •  •      i     • 

of  Natiire.  ity  of  the  great  historical  issues,  to 
Fichteans.  suffer  either  of  these  motives  to  domi- 
nate him  to  the  exclusion  of  the  other.  Abso- 
lutism has  long  since  ceased  to  speak  slightingly 
of  physical  science,  and  of  the  world  of  perception. 


402  THE  APPROACH  TO   PHILOSOPHY 

It  is  conceded  that  motions  must  be  known  in  the 
mechanical  way,  and  matters  of  fact  in  the  matter- 
of-fact  way.  Furthermore,  the  prestige  which  sci- 
ence enjoyed  in  the  nineteenth  century,  and  the 
prestige  which  the  empirical  and  secular  world  of 
action  has  enjoyed  to  a  degree  that  has  steadily 
increased  since  the  Renaissance,  have  convinced 
the  absolutist  of  the  intrinsic  significance  of  these 
parts  of  experience.  They  are  no  longer  reduced, 
but  are  permitted  to  flourish  in  their  own  right. 
From  the  very  councils  of  absolute  idealism  there 
has  issued  a  distinction  which  is  fast  becoming 
current,  between  the  World  of  Appreciation,  or  the 
realm  of  moral  and  logical  principles,  and  the 
World  of  Description,  or  the  realm  of  empirical 
generalizations  and  mechanical  causes.*  It  is 
indeed  maintained  that  the  former  of  these  is 
metaphysically  superior;  but  the  latter  is  ranked 
without  the  disparagement  of  its  own  proper  cate- 
gories. 

With  the  Fichteans  this  distinction  corresponds 
to  the  distinction  in  the  system  of  Fichte  between 
the  active  moral  ego,  and  the  nature  which  it 
posits  to  act  upon.      But  the  neo-Fichteans  are 

'  Cf.  Josiah  Royce:  The  Spirit  of  Modem  Philosophy, 
Lecture  XII;  The  World  and  the  Individual,  Second  Series. 


CONCLUSION  403 

concerned  to  show  that  the  nature  so  posited, 
or  the  World  of  Description,  is  the  realm  of  me- 
chanical  science,  and  that  the  entire  system  of 
mathematical  and  physical  truth  is  therefore  mor- 
ally necessary.^ 

§  200.  A  more  pronounced  tendency  in  the 
same  direction  marks  the  work  of  the  neo-Kan- 
The  Neo-  t^cins.  These  philosophers  repudiate 
Kantians.  ^]^g  spiritualistic  mctaphysics  of  Scho- 
penhauer, ¥"ichte,  and  Hegel,  believing  the  real 
significance  of  Kant  to  lie  in  his  critical  method, 
in  his  examination  of  the  first  principles  of  the  dif- 
ferent systems  of  knowledge,  and  especially  in  his 
analysis  of  the  foundations  of  mathematics  and 
physics.^     In  approaching  mathematics  and  phys- 

'  Cf.  Hugo  Miinsterberg:  Psychology  and  Life.  The  more 
important  writings  of  this  school  are:  Die  Philosophie 
im  Beginn  des  zwanzigsten  Jahrhunderts,  edited  by  Wilhelm 
Windelband,  and  contributed  to  by  Windelband,  H.  Rickert, 
O.  Liebmann,  E.  Troeltsch,  B.  Bauch,  and  others.  This 
book  contains  an  excellent  bibliography.  Also,  Rickert: 
Der  Gegenstand  der  Erkenntnis ;  Die  Grenzen  der  natur- 
vrissenschaftlichen  Begriffsbildung,  and  other  works.  Windel- 
band: ProiKdien;  Geschichte  und  Naturwissenschaft.  Miinster- 
berg: Grundziige  der  Psychologie.  Eucken:  Die  Grundhegriffe 
der  Gegenwart. 

^  Cf.  F.  A.  Lange:  History  of  Materialism,  Book  II,  Chap.  I, 
on  Kant  and  Materialism;  also  Alois  Riehl:  Introduction 
to  the  Theory  of  Science  and  Metaphysics.  Translation  by 
Fairbanks.  The  more  important  writings  of  this  school 
are:    Hermann  Cohen:  Kant's   Theorie  der  Erfahrung;  Die 


404  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

ics  from  a  general  logical  stand-point,  these  neo- 
Kantians  become  scarcely  distinguishable  in  inter- 
est and  temper  from  those  scientists  who  approach 
logic  from  the  mathematical  and  physical  stand- 
point. 

§  201.  The  finite,  moral  individual,  with  his 
peculiar  spiritual  perspective,  has  long  since  been 
Recognition  of  I'scognized  as  essential  to  the  meaning 
Pe'sl^'nal''*"^^"  ^^  ^^^  uuivcrse  rationally  conceived. 
Idealism.         ^^j.    jj^    j^g    g^g^    movement    absolute 

idealism  proposed  to  absorb  him  in  the  indivisible 
absolute  self.  It  is  now  pointed  out  that  Fichte, 
and  even  Hegel  himself,  means  the  absolute  to  be 
a  plurality  or  society  of  persons.'*  It  is  commonly 
conceded  that  the  will  of  the  absolute  must  coincide 
with  the  wills  of  all  finite  creatures  in  their  sever- 
alty, that  God  wills  in  and  through  men.^  Cor- 
responding to  this  individualistic  tendency  on  the 
part  of  absolute  idealism,  there  has  been  recently 

Logik  derreinen  Erkenntniss,  and  other  works.  Paul  Natorp: 
Sozialpadagogik;  Einleitung  in  die  Psychologie  nach  kritischer 
Methode,  and  other  works.  E.  Cassirer:  Leibniz'  System  in 
seinen  wissenschaftlichen  Gnindlagen.  Riehl:  Der  philoso- 
phische  Kriticismus,  und  seine  Bedeuhing  fiir  die  Positive 
Wissenschaft.    Cf .  also  E.  Husserl :  Logische  Unterstichungen. 

*  Cf.  J.  M.  E.  McTaggart:  Studies  in  Hegelian  Cosmology, 
Chap.  III. 

*  Cf.  Royce:  The  Conception  of  God,  Supplementary  Essay, 
pp.  13.5-322;  The  World  and  the  Individual,  First  Series. 


CONCLUSION       '  405 

projected  a  personal  idealism,  or  humanism,  -which 
springs  freshly  and  directly  from  the  same  motive. 
This  philosophy  attributes  ultimate  importance  to 
the  human  person  with  his  freedom,  his  interests, 
his  control  over  nature,  and  his  hope  of  the  ad- 
vancement of  the  spiritual  kingdom  through  co- 
operation with  his  fellows.® 

§  202.  Naturalism  exhibits  a  moderation  and 
liberality  that  is  not  less  striking  than  that  of 
Concessions  absolutism.  This  abatement  of  its 
of'NaturaUsm  claims  began  in  the  last  century  with 
Recognition  of  ao;nosticism.     It    was    then    conceded 

Fundamental        ° 

Principles.  ti^at  there  is  an  order  other  than  that 
of  natural  science;  but  this  order  was  held  to  be 
inaccessible  to  human  knowledge.  Such  a  theory 
is  essentially  unstable  because  it  employs  prin- 
ciples which  define  a  non-natural  order,  but  re- 
fuses to  credit  them  or  call  them  knowledge.     The 

•  This  movement  began  as  a  criticism  of  Hegelianism  in 
behalf  of  the  human  personality.  Cf.  Andrew  Seth:  Hegelian- 
ism and  Personality;  Man  and  the  Cosmos;  Two  Lectures  on 
Theism.  G.  H.  Howison:  The  Limits  of  Evolution.  The 
important  writings  of  the  more  independent  movement 
are:  William  James:  The  Will  to  Believe.  H.  Sturt,  editor: 
Personal  Idealism,  Philosophical  Essays  by  Eight  Members 
of  Oxford  University.  F.  C.  S.  Schiller:  Humanism.  Henri 
Bergson :  Essoi  sitr  les  donnces  immcdiates  de  la  conscience ; 
Matiere  et  mcmoire.  This  movement  is  closely  related  to  that 
of  Pragmatism.     See  under  §  203. 


406  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

agnostic  is  in  the  paradoxical  position  of  one  who 
knows  of  an  unknowable  world.  Present-day 
naturalism  is  more  circumspect.  It  has  interested 
itself  in  bringing  to  light  that  in  the  very  pro- 
cedure of  science  which,  because  it  predetermines 
what  nature  shall  be,  cannot  be  included  within 
nature.  To  this  interest  is  due  the  rediscovery 
of  the  rational  foundations  of  science.  It  was 
already  kno^^•n  in  the  seventeenth  century  that 
exact  science  does  not  differ  radically  from  mathe- 
matics, as  mathematics  does  not  differ  radically 
from  logic.  Mathematics  and  mechanics  are  now 
being  submitted  to  a  critical  examination  which 
reveals  the  definitions  and  implications  upon 
which  they  rest,  and  the  general  relation  of  these 
to  the  fundamental  elements  and  necessities  of 
thought.*^ 

^  Cf.  Bertrand  Russell :  Principles  of  Mathematics, 
Vol.  I.  Among  the  more  important  writings  of  this  move- 
ment are  the  following:  Giuseppi  Peano:  Forviulaire  de 
Mathematique,  published  by  the  Rivista  di  matematica, 
Tom.  I-IV.  Richard  Dedekind:  Was  sind  und  ivas  sollen 
die  Zahlen?  Georg  Cantor:  Grundlagen  einer  allgemeinen 
Mannigfaltigkeitslehre.  Louis  Couturat:  De  I'lnfini  Mathe- 
matique, and  articles  in  Revue  de  Metaphysique  et  de  Morale. 
A.  N.  Whitehead :  A  Treatise  on  Universal  A  Igebra.  Heinrich 
Hertz:  Die  Prinzipien  der  Mechanik.  Henri  Poincar6:  La 
Science  et  I'Hypoth'ese.  For  the  bearing  of  these  investiga- 
tions on  philosophy,  see  Royce:  The  Sciences  of  the  Ideal,  in 
Science,  Vol.  XX,  No.  510. 


CONCLUSION  407 

§  203.  This   rationalistic  tendency  in  natural- 
Recognition  ism  is  balanced  bv  a  tendency  which  is 
oftheWiU.  .   .     ,     ,"                 „          , 
Pragmatism,  morc  empirical,  but  equally  subversive 

of  the  old  ultra-naturalism.     Goethe  once  wrote: 

"  I  have  observed  that  I  hold  that  thought  to  be  true 
which  is  fruit  Jul  for  me.  .  .  .  When  I  know  my 
relation  to  myself  and  to  the  outer  world,  I  say  that  I 
possess  the  truth." 

Similarly,  it  is  now  frequently  observed  that  all 
knowledge  is  humanly  fruitful,  and  it  is  proposed 
that  this  shall  be  regarded  as  the  very  criterion  of 
truth.  According  to  this  principle  science  as  a 
whole,  even  knowledge  as  a  whole,  is  primarily  a 
human  utility.  The  nature  which  science  defines 
is  an  artifact  or  construct.  It  is  designed  to  ex- 
press briefly  and  conveniently  what  man  may  prac- 
tically expect  from  his  environment.  This  ten- 
dency is  known  as  pragmatism.  It  ranges  from 
systematic  doctrines,  reminiscent  of  Fichte,  which 
seek  to  define  practical  needs  and  deduce  knowl- 
edge from  them,  to  the  more  irresponsible  utter- 
ances of  those  who  liken  science  to  "  shorthand,"  ® 
and  mathematics  to  a  game  of  chess.  In  any  case 
pragmatism  attributes  to  nature  a  certain  depend- 
ence on  will,  and  therefore  implies,  even  when  it 
'  The  term  used  by  Karl  Pearson  in  his  Grammar  of  Science. 


408  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

does  not  avow,  that  will  with  its  peculiar  principles 
or  values  cannot  he  reduced  to  the  terms  of  nat\ire. 
In  short,  it  would  he  more  true  to  say  that  nature 
expresses  will,  than  that  will  expresses  nature.® 

§  204.  Such,  then,  is  the  contemporary  eclecti- 
cism as  respects  the  central  problem  of  meta- 
Summary,  and  physics.  There  are  naturalistic  and  in- 
ESstemok)gy.  dividualistic  tendencies  in  absolutisms- 
rationalistic  and  ethical  tendencies  in  naturalism; 
and  finally  the  independent  and  spontaneous  move- 
ments of  personal  idealism  and  pragmatism. 

Since  the  rise  of  the  Kantian  and  post-Kantian 
philosophy,  metaphysics  and  epistemology  have 
maintained  relations  so  intimate  that  the  present 
state  of  the  former  cannot  he  characterized  with- 
out some  reference  to  the  present  state  of  the 
latter.     Indeed,  the  very  issues  upon  which  meta- 

'  The  important  English  writinge  of  the  recent  inde- 
pendent movement  known  as  pragmatism  are:  C.  S.  Peirce: 
Illustrations  of  the  Logic  of  Science,  in  Popular  Science 
Monthly,  Vol.  XII.  W.  James:  The  Pragmatic  Method,  in 
Journal  of  Philosophy,  Psychology,  and  Scientific  Methods, 
Vol.  I;  Humanism  and  Truth,  in  Mind,  Vol.  XIII,  N.  S.;  The 
Essence  of  Humanism,  in  Jour,  of  Phil.,  Psych.,  and  Sc. 
Meth.,  Vol.  II  (with  bibliography);  The  ]T'i7/  to  Believe.  John 
Dewey:  Studies  in  Logical  Theory.  W.Caldwell:  Pragmatism, 
in  Mind,  Vol.  XXV.,  N.  S.  See  also  literature  on  personal 
idealism,  §  201.  A  similar  tendency  has  appearcx:l  in  France 
in  Bergson,  LeRoy,  Milhaud,  and  in  Germany  in  Simmel. 


CONCLUSION  409 

physicians  divide  are  most  commonly  those  pro- 
voked by  the  problem  of  knowledge.  The  counter- 
tendencies  of  naturalism  and  absolutism  are  always 
connected,  and  often  coincide  with,  the  episte- 
mological  opposition  between  empiricism,  which 
proclaims  perception,  and  rationalism,  which  pro- 
claims reason,  to  be  the  proper  organ  of  knowl- 
edge. The  other  great  epistemological  controversy 
does  not  bear  so  direct  and  simple  a  relation  to  the 
central  metaphysical  issues,  and  must  be  exam- 
ined on  its  own  account. 

§  205.  The  point  of  controversy  is  the  depend- 
ence or  independence  of  the  object  of  knowledge 
The  Antagonis-  OH  the  State  of  knowledge ;  idealism 
of  ReaUsm*^  maintaining  that  reality  is  the  knower 
Realistic  ^™  ^^  ^^^  content  of  mind,  realism,  that 
Emprrkai'"  ^^iug  kuowu  is  a  circumstaucc  which 
ideaUsm.  appertains  to  some  reality,  without 
being  the  indisj^ensable  condition  of  reality  as 
such.  'Now  the  sophisticated  thought  of  the  pres- 
ent age  exhibits  a  tendency  on  the  part  of  these 
opposite  doctrines  to  approach  and  converge.  It 
has  been  already  remarked  that  the  empirical  ideal- 
ism of  the  Berkeleyan  type  could  not  avoid  tran- 
scending itself.  Hume,  who  omitted  Berkeley's 
active  spirits,  no  longer  had  any  subjective  seat  or 


410  THE  APPROACH  TO   PHILOSOPHY 

locus  for  the  perceptions  to  which  Berkeley  had 
reduced  the  outer  world.  And  perceptions  which 
are  not  the  states  of  any  subject,  retain  only  their 
intrinsic  character  and  become  a  series  of  elements. 
When  there  is  nothing  beyond,  which  appears,  and 
nothing  within  to  which  it  appears,  there  ceases 
to  be  any  sense  in  using  such  terms  as  appearance, 
phenomenon,  or  impression.  The  term  sensation 
is  at  present  employed  in  the  same  ill-considered 
manner.  But  empirical  idealism  has  come  gradu- 
ally to  insist  upon  the  importance  of  the  content 
of  perception,  rather  than  the  relation  of  percep- 
tion to  a  self  as  its  state.  The  terms  element  and 
experience,  which  are  replacing  the  subjectivistic 
terms,  are  frankly  realistic.^^ 

§  206.  There  is  a  similar  realistic  trend  in  the 
development  of  absolute  idealism.  The  pure 
Realistic  Hegelian  philosophy  was  notably  ob- 
Absofute^  '°  jective.  The  principles  of  development 
ideaUsm.         jj^  which  it  ccutres  were  conceived  by 

The  Conception  ^ 

of  Experience.  Hcgol  himsclf  to  manifest  themselves 
most  clearly  in  the  progressions  of  nature  and  his- 
tory. Many  of  Hegel's  followers  have  been  led 
by  moral  and  religious  interests  to  emphasize  con- 

'"  Cf .  Ernst  Mach:  Analysis  of  Sensation.     Translation  by 
Williams. 


CONCLUSION  411 

sciousness,  and,  upon  epistemological  grounds,  to 
lay  great  stress  upon  the  necessity  of  the  union  of 
the  parts  of  experience  within  an  enveloping  self. 
But  absolute  idealism  has  much  at  heart  the  over- 
coming of  relativism,  and  the  absolute  is  defined 
in  order  to  meet  the  demand  for  a  being  that  shall 
not  have  the  cognitive  deficiencies  of  an  object  of 
finite  thought.  So  it  is  quite  possible  for  this 
philosophy,  while  maintaining  its  traditions  on  the 
whole,  to  abandon  the  term  self  to  the  finite  sub- 
ject, and  regard  its  absolute  as  a  system  of  rational 
and  universal  principles — self-sufficient  because 
externally  independent  and  internally  necessary. 
Hence  the  renewed  study  of  categories  as  logical, 
mathematical,  or  mechanical  principles,  and  en- 
tirely apart  from  their  being  the  acts  of  a  think- 
ing self. 

Furthermore,  it  has  been  recognized  that  the 
general  demand  of  idealism  is  met  when  reality  is 
regarded  as  not  outside  of  or  other  than  knowledge, 
whatever  be  true  of  the  question  of  dependence. 
Thus  the  conception  of  experience  is  equally  con- 
venient here,  in  that  it  signifies  what  is  imme- 
diately present  in  knowledge,  without  affirming  it 
to  consist  in  being  so  presented. ^^ 

"  Cf.  F.  H.  Bradley:  Appearance  and  Reality. 


412  THE  APPROACH  TO   PHILOSOPHY 

§  207.  And  at  this  point  idealism  is  met  by  a 
latter-day  realism.  The  traditional  modern  real- 
ideaiistic  ^^™  springing  from  Descartes  was 
hT^eTiism  dualistic.  It  was  supposed  that  reality 
The  im-  jj^  itsolf  was  essentiallv  extra-mental, 

manence  "^  ' 

Philosophy,  g^d  tliiis  Under  the  necessity  of  being 
either  represented  or  misrepresented  in  thought. 
But  the  one  of  these  alternatives  is  dogmatic,  in 
that  thought  can  never  test  the  validity  of  its  rela- 
tion to  that  which  is  perpetually  outside  of  it; 
while  the  other  is  agnostic,  providing  only  for  the 
knowledge  of  a  world  of  appearance,  an  improper 
knowledge  that  is  in  fact  not  knowledge  at  all. 

But  realism  is  not  necessarily  dualistic,  since  it 
requires  only  that  being  shall  not  be  dependent 
upon  being  known.  Furthermore,  since  empiri- 
cism is  congenial  to  naturalism,  it  is  an  easy  step 
to  say  that  nature  is  directly  known  in  perception. 
This  first  takes  the  form  of  positivism,  or  the 
theory  that  only  such  nature  as  can  be  directly 
known  can  be  really  known.  But  this  agnostic 
provision  for  an  unknown  world  beyond,  inevitably 
falls  away  and  leaves  reality  as  that  ivJiich  is 
directly  Tcnown,  hut  not  conditioned  hy  hnowledge. 
Again  the  term  experience  is  the  most  useful,  and 
provides  a  common  groimd  for  idealistic  realism 


CONCLUSION  413 

with  realistic  idealism.  A  new  epistemological 
movement  makes  this  conception  of  experience  its 
starting-point.  What  is  known  as  the  immanence 
philosophy  defines  reality  as  experience,  and  means 
by  experience  the  subject  matter  of  all  knowledge 
— not  defined  as  such,  but  regarded  as  capable  of 
being  such.  Experience  is  conceived  to  be  both 
in  and  out  of  selves,  cognition  being  but  one  of 
the  special  systems  into  which  experience  may 
enter.^^ 

§  208.  Does  this  eclecticism  of  the  age  open 
any  philosophical  prospect?  Is  it  more  than  a 
The  interpre-  general  Compromise — a  confession  of 
tationofTra-  failure  ou  the  part  of  each  and  every 

dition  as  the  ^  " 

Basis  for  a      radical  and  clear-cut  doctrine  of  meta- 

New  Con- 
struction,        physics    and    epistemology  ?     There    is 

no  final  answer  to  such  a  question  short  of  an  in- 

"  Cf.  Carstanjen:  Richard  Avenarius,  and  his  General 
Theory  of  Knowledge,  Empiriocriticism.  Translation  by 
H.  Bosanquet,  in  Mind,  Vol.  VI,  N.  S.  Also  James:  Does 
Consciousness  Exist?  and  A  World  of  Pure  Experience,  in 
Jour,  of  Phil.,  Psych.,  and  Sc.  Meth.,  Vol.  I;  The  Thing  and 
its  Relations,  ibid.,  Vol.  II. 

The  standard  literature  of  this  movement  is  unfortunately 
not  available  in  English.  Among  the  more  important  writ- 
ings are:  R.  Avenarius:  Kritik  der  reinen  Erfahrung;  Der 
menschliche  Weltbegriff,  and  other  works.  Joseph  Petzoldt: 
Einfuhrung  in  die  Philosophic  der  reinen  Erfahrung.  Ernst 
Mach:  Die  Analyse  der  Empflndung  und  das  Verhdltniss  des 
PhysischenzumPsychischen,2.Auff.  Wilhelm Schuppe: Grund- 


414  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

dependent  construction,  and  such  procedure  would 
exceed  the  scope  of  the  present  discussion.  But 
there  is  an  evident  interpretation  of  tradition  that 
suggests  a  possible  basis  for  such  construction. 

§  209.  Suppose  it  to  be  granted  that  the  cate- 
gories of  nature  are  quite  self-sufficient.  This 
The  Truth  of    would  mean  that  there  might  conceiv- 

the  Physical 

System,  but  ablj  bc  a  strictlj  physical  order,  gov- 
tempt  to  Re-    cmed   Only   by   mechanical   principles, 

duce  All  Ex-  i     i  i  i     t       •      i  i 

perience  to  it.  ^ud  by  the  morc  general  logical  and 
mathematical  principles.  The  body  of  physical 
science  so  extended  as  to  include  such  general  con- 
ceptions as  identity,  difference,  number,  quality, 
space,  and  time,  is  the  account  of  such  an  order. 
This  order  need  have  no  value,  and  need  not  be 
known.  But  reality  as  a  whole  is  evidently  not 
such  a  strictly  physical  order,  for  the  definition  of 
the  physical  order  involves  the  rejection  of  many 
of  the  most  familiar  aspects  of  experience,  such 
as  its  value  and  its  being  knowni  in  conscious  selves. 
Materialism,  in  that  it  proposes  to  conceive  the 
whole  of  reality  as  physical,  must  attempt  to  re- 

riss  der  Erkenntnisstheorie  und  Logik.  Friedrich  Carstanjen: 
Einfithrung  in  die  " Kritik  der  reinen  Erfahrung" — an  exposi- 
tion of  Avenarius.  Also  articles  by  the  above,  R.  Willy,  R.  v. 
Schubert-Soldem,  and  others,  in  the  Vierteljahrsschrift  fUr 
wisse  n  sch  a  J  t  liche  Phi  losophie. 


CONCLUSION  415 

duce  the  residuum  to  physical  terms,  and  with  no 
hope  of  success.  Goodness  and  knowledge  can- 
not be  explained  as  mass  and  force,  or  shown  to  be 
mechanical  necessities. 

§  210.  Are  we  then  to  conclude  that  reality  is 
not  physical,  and  look  for  other  terms  to  which  we 
Truth  of         may  reduce  physical  terms  ?     There  is 

Psychical  Re- 
lations, but      no  lack  of  such  other  terms.     Indeed,  we 

of  General       could  as  fairly  have  begun  elsewhere. 

Reduction  rn^  .  i- 

to  Them.  ihus  some  parts  oi  experience  compose 
the  consciousness  of  the  individual,  and  are  said 
to  be  known  by  him.  Experience  so  contained  is 
connected  by  the  special  relation  of  being  known 
together.  But  this  relation  is  quite  indifferent  to 
physical,  moral,  and  logical  relations.  Thus  we 
may  be  conscious  of  things  which  are  physically 
disconnected,  morally  repugnant,  and  logically  con- 
tradictory, or  in  all  of  these  respects  utterly  irrel- 
evant. Subjectivism,  in  that  it  proposes  to  con- 
ceive the  whole  of  reality  as  consciousness,  must 
attempt  to  reduce  physical,  moral,  and  logical  rela- 
tions to  that  co-presence  in  consciousness  from 
which  they  are  so  sharply  distinguished  in  their 
very  definition.  The  historical  failure  of  this 
attempt  was  inevitable. 

§  211.  But  there  is  at  least  one  further  start- 


416  THE  APPROACH  TO   PHILOSOPHY 

ing-point,  the  one  adopted  by  the  most  subtle 
and  elaborate  of  all  reconstructive  philosophies. 
Truth  of         Logical  necessities  are  as  evidently  real 

Logical  and  °  '' 

Ethical  Prin-    ^g  ^odics  Or  sclvcs.     It  is  Dossible  to 

ciples. 

vaUdity  of       define  general   types   of  inference,    as 

Ideal  of 

Perfection,       well  as  compact  and  internally  neces- 

but  Impossi- 
bility of  De-     sary  systems  such  as  those  of  mathe- 

ducing  the  .  .  »       ,  ,.      . 

Whole  of  Ex-  matics.  There  is  a  perfectly  distm- 
fromit  guishable  strain  of  pure  rationality  in 

the  universe.  Whether  or  not  it  be  possible  to 
conceive  a  pure  rationality  as  self-subsistent,  inas- 
much as  there  are  degrees  it  is  at  any  rate  possible 
to  conceive  of  a  maximum  of  rationality.  But 
similarly  there  are  degrees  of  moral  goodness.  It 
is  possible  to  define  with  more  or  less  exactness  a 
morally  perfect  person,  or  an  ideal  moral  com- 
munity. Here  again  it  may  be  impossible  that 
pure  and  unalloyed  goodness  should  constitute  a 
universe  of  itself.  But  that  a  maximum  of  good- 
ness, with  all  of  the  accessories  which  it  might 
involve,  should  be  thus  self-subsistent,  is  quite 
conceivable.  It  is  thus  possible  to  define  an  abso- 
lute and  perfect  order,  in  which  logical  necessity, 
the  interest  of  thought,  or  moral  goodness,  the 
interest  of  will,  or  both  together,  should  be  real- 
ized to  the  maximum.     Absolutism  conceives  real- 


CONCLUSIOxN  417 

ity  under  the  form  of  tins  ideal,  and  attempts  to 
reconstruct  experience  accordingly.  But  is  the 
prospect  of  success  any  better  than  in  the  cases  of 
materialism  and  subjectivism  ?  It  is  evident  that 
the  ideal  of  logical  necessity  is  due  to  the  fact  that 
certain  parts  of  knowledge  approach  it  more  closely 
than  others.  Thus  mechanics  contains  more  that 
is  arbitrary  than  mathematics,  and  mathematics 
more  than  logic.  Similarl}^,  the  theory  of  the  evo- 
lution of  the  planetary  system,  in  that  it  requires 
the  assumption  of  particular  distances  and  par- 
ticular masses  for  the  parts  of  the  primeval  nebula, 
is  more  arbitrary  than  rational  dynamics.  It  is 
impossible,  then,  in  view  of  the  parts  of  knowledge 
which  belong  to  the  lower  end  of  the  scale  of  ration- 
ality, to  regard  reality  as  a  whole  as  the  maximum 
of  rationality;  for  either  a  purely  dynamical,  a 
purely  mathematical,  or  a  purely  logical,  realm 
would  be  more  rational.  The  similar  disproof  of 
the  moral  perfection  of  reality  is  so  unmistakable 
as  to  require  no  elucidation.  It  is  evident  that 
even  where  natural  necessities  are  not  antagonistic 
to  moral  proprieties,  they  are  at  any  rate  indiffer- 
ent to  them. 

§  212.  But  thus  far  no  reference  has  been  made 
to  error  and  to  evil.     These  are  the  terms  which 


418  THE  APPROACH  TO   PHILOSOPHY 

the  ideals  of  rationality  and  goodness  must  repudi- 
ate if  they  are  to  retain  their  meaning.  Never- 
Error  and  EvU  t^eless  experience  contains  them  and 
Reduced^'to  psychology  describes  them.  We  have 
the  Ideal.  already  followed  the  efforts  which  abso- 
lute idealism  has  made  to  show  that  logical  per- 
fection requires  error,  and  that  moral  perfection 
requires  evil.  Is  it  conceivable  that  such  efforts 
should  be  successful  ?  Suppose  a  higher  logic  to 
make  the  principle  of  contradiction  the  very  bond 
of  rationality.  What  was  formerly  error  is  now 
indispensable  to  truth.  But  what  of  the  new 
error — the  unbalanced  and  mistaken  thesis,  the 
unresolved  antithesis,  the  scattered  and  discon- 
nected terms  of  thought?  These  fall  outside  the 
new  truth  as  surely  as  the  old  error  fell  outside  the 
old  truth.  And  the  case  of  moral  goodness  is  pre- 
cisely parallel.  The  higher  goodness  may  be  so 
defined  as  to  require  failure  and  sin.  Thus  it  may 
be  maintained  that  there  can  be  no  true  success 
without  struggle,  and  no  true  spiritual  exaltation 
except  through  repentance.  But  what  of  failure 
unredeemed,  sin  unrepented,  evil  uncompensated 
and  unresolved  ?  Nothing  has  been  gained  after 
all  but  a  new  definition  of  goodness — and  a  new 
definition  of  evil.     And  tins  is  an  ethical,  not  a 


CONCLUSION  419 

metaphysical  question.  The  problem  of  evil,  like 
the  problem  of  error,  is  as  far  from  solution  as 
ever.  Indeed,  the  very  urgency  of  these  problems 
is  due  to  metaphysical  absolutism.  For  this  phi- 
losophy defines  the  universe  as  a  perfect  unity. 
Measured  by  the  standard  of  such  an  ideal  uni- 
verse, the  parts  of  finite  experience  take  on  a  frag- 
mentary and  bafiiing  character  which  they  would 
not  otherwise  possess.  The  absolute  perfection 
must  by  definition  both  determine  and  exclude  the 
imperfect.  Thus  absolutism  bankrupts  the  uni- 
verse by  holding  it  accountable  for  what  it  can 
never  pay. 

§  213.  If  the  attempt  to  construct  experience 
in  the  special  terms  of  some  part  of  experience  be 
Collective  abandoned,  how  is  reality  to  be  defined  ? 
thTumVerse  ^^  ^^  evident  that  in  that  case  there  can 
as  a  Whole.  -^^  j^^  definition  of  reality  as  such.  It 
must  be  regarded  as  a  collection  of  all  elements, 
relations,  principles,  systems,  that  compose  it. 
All  truths  will  be  true  of  it,  and  it  will  be  the 
subject  of  all  truths.  Reality  is  at  least  physical, 
psychical,  moral,  and  rational.  That  which  is 
physical  is  not  necessarily  moral  or  psychical,  but 
may  be  either  or  both  of  these.  Thus  it  is  a 
commonplace  of  experience  that  what  has  bulk  and 


420  THE  APPROACH  TO   PHILOSOPHY 

weight  may  or  may  not  be  good,  and  may  or  may 
not  be  known.  Similarly,  that  which  is  psychical 
may  or  may  not  be  physical,  moral,  or  rational; 
and  that  which  is  moral  or  rational  may  or  may 
not  be  physical  and  psychical.  There  is,  then,  an 
indeterminism  in  the  universe,  a  mere  coincidence 
of  principles,  in  that  it  contains  physical,  psy- 
chical, moral,  logical  orders,  without  being  in  all 
respects  either  a  physical,  a  psychical,  a  moral,  or  a 
logical  necessity.^^  Reality  or  experience  itself  is 
neutral  in  the  sense  of  being  exclusively  predeter- 
mined by  no  one  of  the  several  systems  it  contains. 
But  the  different  systems  of  experience  retain  their 
specific  and  projDer  natures,  without  the  compro- 
mise which -is  involved  in  all  attempts  to  extend 
some  one  until  it  shall  embrace  them  all.  If  such 
a  universe  seems  inconceivably  desultory  and 
chaotic,  one  may  always  remind  one's  self  by  di- 
rectly consulting  experience  that  it  is  not  only 
found  immediately  and  unreflectively,  but  re- 
turned to  and  lived  in  after  every  theoretical 
excursion. 

§  214.  But  what  implications  for  life  would  be 

"  It  is  not,  of  course,  denied  that  there  may  be  other 
orders,  such  as,  e.  g.,  an  aesthetic  order;  or  that  there  may 
be  definite  relations  between  these  orders,  such  as,  e.  g., 
tl>e  psyc'ho-pliysical  relation. 


CONCLUSION  421 

contained  in  such  a  pliilosophy?  Even  if  it  be 
theoretically  clarifying,  through  being  hospitable 
Moral  impu-  ^^  ^^^  differences  and  adequate  to  the 
^^JJ'JJ^"^^^^"'^^  multifarious  demands  of  experience,  is 
Philosophy       j^   j^Q^   Qjj   |.j^^^   ygj.y   account   morallv 

Punty  of  the  ''  "^ 

Good.  dreary    and    stultifying?      Is    not    its 

refusal  to  establish  the  universe  upon  moral  foun- 
dations destructive  both  of  the  validity  of  goodness, 
and  of  the  incentive  to  its  attainment  ?  Certainly 
not — if  the  validity  of  goodness  be  determined  by 
criteria  of  worth,  and  if  the  incentive  to  goodness 
be  the  possibility  of  making  that  which  merely 
exists,  or  is  necessary,  also  good. 

This  philosophy  does  not,  it  is  true,  define  the 
good,  but  it  makes  ethics  autonomous,  thus  distin- 
guishing the  good  which  it  defines,  and  saving  it 
from  compromise  with  matter-of-fact,  and  logical 
or  mechanical  necessity.  The  criticism  of  life  is 
founded  upon  an  independent  basis,  and  affords 
justification  of  a  selective  and  exclusive  moral 
idealism.  Just  because  it  is  not  required  that  the 
good  shall  be  held  accountable  for  whatever  is  real, 
the  ideal  can  be  kept  pure  and  intrinsically  worthy. 
The  analogy  of  logic  is  most  illuminating.  If  it 
be  insisted  that  whatever  exists  is  logically  neces- 
sary, logical  necessity  must  be  made  to  embrace 


422  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

that  from  which  it  is  distinguished  by  definition, 
such  as  contradiction,  mere  empirical  existence, 
and  error.  The  consequence  is  a  logical  chaos 
which  has  in  truth  forfeited  the  name  of  logic. 
Similarly  a  goodness  defined  to  make  possible  the 
deduction  from  it  of  moral  evil  or  moral  indiffer- 
ence loses  the  very  distinguishing  properties  of 
goodness.  The  consequence  is  an  ethical  neutral- 
ity which  invalidates  the  moral  will.  A  meta- 
physical neutrality,  on  the  other  hand,  although 
denying  that  reality  as  such  is  predestined  to 
morality — and  thus  affording  no  possibility  of  an 
ethical  absolutism — ^becomes  the  true  ground  for 
an  ethical  purism. 

§  215.  But,  secondly,  there  can  be  no  lack  of 
incentive  to  goodness  in  a  universe  which,  though 
The  Incentive  ^^^  all-good,  is  in  uo  rcspcct  incapable 
to  Goodness.  q£  jjecomiug  good.  That  which  is  me- 
chanically or  logically  necessary,  and  that  which 
is  psychically  present,  may  he  good.  And  what 
can  the  realization  of  goodness  mean  if  not  that 
what  is  natural  and  necessary,  actual  and  real, 
shall  be  also  good.  The  world  is  not  good,  will 
not  be  good,  merely  through  being  what  it  is,  but 
is  or  shall  be  made  good  through  the  accession  of 
goodness.     It  is  this  belief  that  the  real  is  not 


CONCLUSION  423 

necessarily,  but  may  be,  good;  that  the  ideal  is 
not  necessarily,  but  may  be,  realized;  which  has 
inspired  every  faith  in  action.  Philosophically  it 
is  only  a  question  of  permitting  such  faith  to  be 
sincere,  or  condemning  it  as  shallow.  If  the  world 
be  made  good  through  good-will,  then  the  faith  of 
moral  action  is  rational ;  but  if  the  world  be  good 
because  whatever  is  must  be  good,  then  moral 
action  is  a  tread-mill,  and  its  attendant  and  animat- 
ing faith  only  self-deception.  Moral  endeavor  is 
the  elevation  of  physical  and  psychical  existence 
to  the  level  of  goodness. 

"Relate  the  inheritance  to  life,  convert  the  tradition 
into  a  servant  of  character,  draw  upon  the  history  for 
support  in  the  struggles  of  the  spirit,  declare  a  war  of 
extermination  against  the  total  evil  of  the  world;  and 
then  raise  new  armies  and  organize  into  fighting  force 
every  belief  available  in  the  faith  that  has  descended 
to  you."  " 

Evil  is  here  a  practical,  not  a  theoretical,  prob- 
lem. It  is  not  to  be  solved  by  thinking  it  good, 
for  to  think  it  good  is  to  deaden  the  very  nerve  of 
action ;  but  by  destroying  it  and  replacing  it  with 
good. 

§  216.   The  justification  of  faith  is  in  the  prom- 

'*  Quoted  from  George  A.  Gordon:  The  New  Epoch  for 
Faith,  p.  27. 


424  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHH.OSOPHY 

ise  of  reality.  For  what,  after  all,  woul  be  the 
meaning  of  a  faith  which  declares  that  all  things, 
The  justifica-  S^od,  bad,  and  indifferent,  are  everlast- 
tion  of  Faith,  ingly  and  necessarily  wdiat  they  are — 
even  if  it  were  concluded  on  philosophical  grounds 
to  call  that  ultimate  necessity  good.  Faith  has 
interests;  faith  is  faith  in  goodness  or  beauty. 
Then  what  more  just  and  potent  cause  of  despair 
than  the  thought  that  the  ideal  must  be  held  ac- 
countable for  error,  ugliness,  and  evil,  or  for  the 
indifferent  necessities  of  nature  ?  ^^  Are  ideals  to 
be  prized  the  less,  or  believed  in  the  less,  when 
there  is  no  ground  for  their  impeachment  ?  How 
much  more  hopeful  for  what  is  worth  the  hoping, 
that  nature  should  discern  ideals  and  take  some 
steps  toward  realizing  them,  than  that  ideals 
should  have  created  nature — such  as  it  is !  How 
much  better  a  report  can  we  give  of  nature  for  its 
ideals,  than  of  the  ideals  for  their  handiwork,  if 
it  be  nature !     Emerson  writes : 

"Suffice  it  for  the  joy  of  the  universe  that  we  have 
not  arrived  at  a  wall,  but  at  interminable  oceans.  Our 
life  seems  not  present  so  much  as  prospective;  not  for 
the  affairs  on  which  it  is  wasted,  but  as  a  hint  of  this 
vast-flowing  vigor.     Most  of  life  seems  to  be  mere  ad- 

'*  Cf.  James:  The  Will  to  Believe,  essay  on  The  Dilemma 
of  Determinism,  passim. 


CONCLUSION  425 

vertisement  of  faculty;  information  is  given  us  not  to 
sell  ourselves  cheap;  that  we  are  very  great.  So,  in 
particulars,  our  greatness  is  always  in  a  tendency  or 
direction,  not  in  an  action.  It  is  for  us  to  believe  in  the 
rule,  not  in  the  exception.  The  noble  are  thus  known 
from  the  ignoble.  So  in  accepting  the  leading  of  the 
sentiments,  it  is  not  what  we  believe  concerning  the 
immortality  of  the  soul  or  the  like,  but  the  universal 
impulse  to  believe,  that  is  the  material  circumstance  and 
is  the  principal  fact  in  the  history  of  the  globe."" 

§  217.  If  God  be  rid  of  the  imputation  of  moral 
evil  and  indifference,  he  may  be  intrinsically  wor- 
The  Worship  sliipful,  because  regarded  imder  the 
of  God.  form  of  the  highest  ideals.     And  if  the 

great  cause  of  goodness  be  in  fact  at  stake,  God 
may  both  command  the  adoration  of  men  through 
his  purity,  and  reenforce  their  virtuous  living 
through  representing  to  them  that  realization  of 
goodness  in  the  universe  at  large  v^^hich  both  con- 
tains and  exceeds  their  individual  endeavor. 

§  218.  Bishop  Berkeley  wrote  in  his  "  Com- 
monplace Book  " : 

"  My  speculations  have  the  same  effect  as  visiting  foreign 
countries :  in  the  end  I  return  where  I  was  before,  but  my 
heart  at  ease,  and  enjoying  life  with  new  satisfaction." 

If  it  be  essential  to  the  meaning  of  philosophy 

that  it  should  issue  from  life,  it  is  equally  essen- 

^*  Essays,  Second  Series,  p.  75. 


426  THE  APPROACH  TO   PHILOSOPHY 

tial  that  it  should  return  to  life.  But  this  con- 
nection of  philosophy  with  life  does  not  mean  its 
The  Phiioso-    reductiou  to  the  terms  of  life  as  con- 

pher  and  the 

Standards  of    ccivcd  in  the  markot-placc.    Philosophy 

the  Market- 

place.  cannot  emanate  from  life,  and  quicken 

life,  without  elevating  and  ennobling  it,  and  will 
therefore  always  be  incommensurable  with  life 
narrowly  conceived.  Hence  the  philosopher  must 
alw^ays  be  as  little  understood  by  men  of  the  street 
as  was  Thales  by  the  Thracian  handmaiden.  He 
has  an  innocence  and  a  wisdom  peculiar  to  his 
perspective. 

"  When  he  is  reviled,  he  has  nothing  personal  to  say 
in  answer  to  the  civilities  of  his  adversaries,  for  he  knows 
no  scandals  of  anyone,  and  they  do  not  interest  him; 
and  therefore  he  is  laughed  at  for  his  sheepishness ;  and 
when  others  are  being  praised  and  glorified,  he  cannot 
help  laughing  very  sincerely  in  the  simplicity  of  his  heart; 
and  this  again  makes  him  look  like  a  fool.  When  he 
hears  a  tyrant  or  king  eulogized,  he  fancies  that  he  is 
listening  to  the  praises  of  some  keeper  of  cattle — a  swine- 
herd, or  shepherd,  or  cowherd,  who  is  being  praised  for 
the  quantity  of  milk  which  he  squeezes  from  them;  and 
he  remarks  that  the  creature  whom  they  tend,  and  out 
of  whom  they  squeeze  the  wealth,  is  of  a  less  tractable 
and  more  insidious  nature.  Then,  again,  he  observes 
that  the  great  man  is  of  necessity  as  ill-mannered  and 
uneducated  as  any  shepherd,  for  he  has  no  leisure,  and 
he  is  surrounded  by  a  wall,  which  is  his  mountain-pen. 
Hearing  of  enormous  landed  proprietors  of  ten  thousand 


CONCLUSION  427 

acres  and  more,  our  philosopher  deems  this  to  be  a  trifle, 
because  he  has  been  accustomed  to  think  of  the  whole 
earth;  and  when  they  sing  the  praises  of  family,  and 
say  that  some  one  is  a  gentleman  because  he  has  had 
seven  generations  of  wealthy  ancestors,  he  thinks  that 
their  sentiments  only  betray  the  dulness  and  narrow- 
ness of  vision  of  those  who  utter  them,  and  who  are  not 
educated  enough  to  look  at  the  whole,  nor  to  consider 
that  every  man  has  had  thousands  and  thousands  of 
progenitors,  and  among  them  have  been  rich  and  poor, 
kings  and  slaves,  Hellenes  and  barbarians,  many  times 
over."  " 

It  is  not  to  be  expected  that  the  opinion  of 
the  "  narrow,  keen,  little,  legal  mind "  should 
appreciate  the  philosophy  which  has  acquired 
the  "  music  of  speech,"  and  hymns  "  the  true 
life  which  is  lived  by  immortals  or  men  blessed  of 
heaven."  Complacency  cannot  understand  rever- 
ence, nor  secularism,  religion. 

§  219.  If  we  may  believe  the  report  of  a  con- 
The  Secular-     temporary  philosopher,  the  present  age 

ism  of  the  .  ,  •  r« 

Present  Age.  IS  made  inscnsible  to  the  meaning  of 
life  through  preoccupation  with  its  very  achieve- 
ments : 

"  The  world  of  finite  interests  and  objects  has  rounded 
itself,  as  it  were,  into  a  separate  whole,  within  which 
the  mind  of  man  can  fortify  itself,  and  live  securus  ad- 
versus    deos,    in    independence   of   the   infinite.     In   the 

"  Plato:  Thecetetus,  174-175.     Translation  by  Jowett. 


428  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

sphere  of  thought,  there  has  been  forming  itself  an  ever- 
increasing  body  of  science,  which,  tracing  out  the  rela- 
tion of  finite  things  to  finite  things,  never  finds  it  neces- 
sary to  seek  for  a  beginning  or  an  end  to  its  infinite 
series  of  phenomena,  and  which  meets  the  claims  of 
theology  with  the  saying  of  the  astronomer,  *I  do  not 
need  that  hypothesis.'  In  the  sphere  of  action,  again, 
the  complexity  of  modern  life  presents  a  thousand  isolated 
interests,  crossing  each  other  in  ways  too  subtle  to  trace 
out — interests  commercial,  social,  and  political — in  pur- 
suing one  or  other  of  which  the  individual  may  find 
ample  occupation  for  his  existence,  without  ever  feehng 
the  need  of  any  return  upon  himself,  or  seeing  any  reason 
to  ask  himself  whether  this  endless  striving  has  any 
meaning  or  object  beyond  itself."'* 

§  220.  There  is  no  dignity  in  living  except 
it  be  in  the  solemn  presence  of  the  universe ;  and 
The  Value  of    only  Contemplation  can  summon  such  a 

Contemplation  . 

for  Life.  presence.     Moreover,  the  sessions  must 

be  not  infrequent,  for  memory  is  short  and  visions 
fade.  Truth  does  not  require,  however,  to  be  fol- 
lowed out  of  the  world.  There  is  a  speculative 
detachment  from  life  which  is  less  courageous, 
even  if  more  noble,  than  worldliness.  Such  is 
Dante's  exalted  but  mediaeval  intellectualism. 

"  And  it  may  be  said  that  (as  true  friendship  between 
men  consists  in  each  wholly  loving  the  other)  the  true 
philosopher  loves  every  part  of  wisdom,   and   wisdom 

'*  E.  Cuird:  Literature  and  Philosophy,  Vol.  I,  pp.  218-219. 


CONCLUSION  429 

every  part  of  the  philosopher,  inasmuch  as  she  draws 
all  to  herself,  and  allows  no  one  of  his  thoughts  to  wander 
to  other  things." 

Even  though,  as  Aristotle  thought,  pure  contem- 
plation be  alone  proper  to  the  gods  in  their  per- 
fection and  blessedness,  for  the  sublunary  world 
this  is  less  worthy  than  that  balance  and  unity  of 
faculty  which  distinguished  the  humanity  of  the 
Greek. 

"  Then,"  writes  Thucydides,  "  we  are  lovers  of  the  beau- 
tiful, yet  simple  in  our  tastes,  and  we  cultivate  the  mind 
without  loss  of  manliness.  Wealth  we  employ,  not  for  talk 
and  ostentation,  but  when  there  is  a  real  use  for  it.  To 
avoid  poverty  with  us  is  no  disgrace;  the  true  disgrace  is 
in  doing  nothing  to  avoid  it.  An  Athenian  citizen  does 
not  neglect  the  State  because  he  takes  care  of  his  own 
household ;  and  even  those  of  us  who  are  engaged  in  busi- 
ness have  a  very  fair  idea  of  poHtics.  We  alone  regard  a 
man  who  takes  no  interest  in  public  affairs  not  as  a 
harmless,  but  as  a  useless  character ;  and  if  few  of  us  are 
originators,  we  are  all  sound  judges,  of  a  policy.  The 
great  impediment  to  action  is,  in  our  opinion,  not  discus- 
sion, but  the  want  of  that  knowledge  which  is  gained  by 
discussion  preparatory  to  action.  For  we  have  a  peculiar 
power  of  thinking  before  we  act,  and  of  acting  too, 
whereas  other  men  are  courageous  from  ignorance,  but 
hesitate  upon  reflection."  " 

Thus  life  may  be  broadened  and  deepened  with- 
out being  made  thin  and  ineffectual.     As  the  civil 

"  Translation  by  Jowett.  Quoted  by  Laurie  in  his  Pre- 
Christian  Education,  p.  213. 


430  THE  APPROACH  TO  PHILOSOPHY 

community  is  related  to  the  individual's  private 
interests,  so  the  community  of  the  universe  is  re- 
lated to  the  civil  community.  There  is  a  citizen- 
ship in  this  larger  community  which  requires  a 
wider  and  more  generous  interest,  rooted  in  a 
deeper  and  more  quiet  reflection.  The  world,  how- 
ever, is  not  to  be  left  behind,  but  served  with  a 
new  sense  of  proportion,  with  the  peculiar  forti- 
tude and  reverence  which  are  the  proper  fruits 
of  philosophy. 

"  This  is  that  which  will  indeed  dignify  and  exalt 
knowledge,  if  contemplation  and  action  may  be  more 
nearly  and  straitly  conjoined  and  united  together  than 
they  have  been;  a  conjunction  like  unto  that  of  the  two 
highest  planets:  Saturn,  the  planet  of  rest  and  contem- 
plation, and  Jupiter,  the  planet  of  civil  society  and 
action."^" 

^  Bacon:  Advancement  of  Learning,  Book  I. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

The  references  contained  in  tliis  bibliography  have  been 
selected  on  the  score  of  availability  in  English  for  the  general 
reader  and  beginning  student  of  philosophy.  But  I  have 
sought  wherever  possible  to  include  passages  from  the  great 
philosophers  and  men  of  letters.  These  are  placed  first  in 
the  list,  followed  by  references  to  contemporary  writers  and 
secondary  sources. 

CHAPTER   I,   THE   PRACTICAL   MAN   AND   THE 
PHILOSOPHER. 

Plato:    Republic,  especially  Book  VII.        Translations  by 
Jowett  and  Vaughan.    Theaetetus,  172  ff.     Trans- 
lation by  Jowett. 
Aristotle:  Ethics,  Book  X.     Translation  by  Welldon. 
Marcus  Aurelius:  Thoughts.     Translation  by  Long. 
Epictetus:  Discourses.     Translation  by  Long. 
Bacon:  The  Advancement  of  Learning. 
Emerson:    Representative   Men — Plato;    or  the  Philosopher. 

Conduct  of  Life — Culture.     Essays,  Second  Series 

— Experience. 


RoYCE,  Josiah:  Spirit  of  Modem  Philosophy.     Introduction. 
HiBBEN,  J.  G. :  Problems  of  Philosophy.     Introduction. 

CHAPTER  II,   POETRY  AND   PHILOSOPHY. 

Plato:    Republic,  Books  II  and  III.     Translation  by  Jowett. 

(Criticism  of  the  poets  as  demoralizing.) 
Wordsworth:  Observations  Prefixed  to  the  Second  Edition  of 

the  Lyrical  Ballads, 
Shelley:  Defence  of  Poetry. 

431 


432  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Everett,  C.  C.  :  Poetry,  Comedy,  and  Duty.    (Discussion  of  the 
philosophy  of  poetry.)     Essays,  Theologi- 
cal and  Literary.     (On  the  poetry  of  Emer- 
son, Goethe,  Tennyson,  Browning.) 
Cairo,  Edward:  Literature  and  Philosophy.     (Wordsworth, 

Dante,  Goethe,  etc.) 
RoYCE,  Josiah:  Studies  of  Good  and  Evil.   Essay  on  Tennyson 

and  Pessimism. 
Santa Y ana,  George:  Poetry  and  Religion.     (Philosophy  of 
poetry;  Greek  poetry,  Shakespeare, 
etc.) 
Sneath,  E.  H.:  Philosophy  in  Poetry:  A  Study  of  Sir  John 
Dames' s  Poem,  "Nosce  Teipsum." 

CHAPTERS   III   AND   IV,   RELIGION. 

Plato:    Republic,  Book   III.     Translations   by  Jowett   and 
Vaughan.     (Criticism  of  religion  from  the  stand- 
point of  morality  and  politics.) 
St.  Augustine:  Con/csszons.     Translation  by  Pusey.    (Docu- 
ment of  religious  experience.) 
Thomas  a  Kempis:   Imitation    of    Christ.     Translation    by 
Stanhope.      (Mediaeval  programme  of 
personal  religion.) 
Spinoza:  Theological-Political  Treatise.     Translation   by  El- 
wes.     (One  of  the  first  great  pleas  for  religious 
liberty  and  one  of  the  first  attempts  to  define  the 
essential  in  religion. 
Kant:  Critique  of  Pure  Reason — The  Canon  of  Pure  Reason. 
Translation  by  Max  Miiller.     Critique  of  Practical 
Reason.     Translation  by  Abbott  in  Theory  of  Ethics. 
(Defines  religion  as  the  province  of  faith,  distin- 
guishes it  from  knowledge,  and  relates  it  to  mo- 
rality.) 
Schleiermacher:  On  Religion.     Speeches  to  its  Cultured  De- 
spisers.     Translation  by  Oman.     (Pon- 
derous, dogmatic  in  its  philosophy,  but 
profound  and  sympathetic  in  its  under- 
standing of  religion.)- 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  433 

Arnold:  Literature  and  Dogma.     (On  the  essence  of  religion 
as  exemplified  in  Judaism  and  Christianity.) 


Sabatier,  a.:  Outlines  of  a  Philosophy  of  Religion  based  on 
Psychology  and   History.     Translation    hy 
Seed.     Religions  of  Authority  and  the  Re- 
ligion of  the  Spirit.     Translation  by  Hough- 
ton.    (These  books  empliasize  the  essential 
importance   of    the   believer's  attitude    to 
God.) 
James,  William:  The  Varieties  of  Religious  Experience.     (A 
rich  storehouse  of  religion,  sympatheti- 
cally interpreted.) 
Everett,  C.  C.  :  The  Psychological  Elements  of  Religious  Faith. 
(A  study  in  the  definition  and  meaning  of 
religion.) 
Cairo,  Edward:   Evolution  of  Religion.     (Indoctrinated  with 

the  author's  idealistic  philosophj'.) 
Fielding,  H.:    The  Hearts  of  Men.     (A  plea  for  the  universal 
religion.     Special    feeling    for    Indian    re- 
ligions.) 
Harnack,  a.:    What  is  Christianity?    Translation  by  Saun- 
ders.    (Attempt   to   define   the   essence   of 
Christianity.) 
Palmer,  G.  H.:  The  Field  of  Ethics,  Chapters  V  and  VI.   (On 

the  relation  of  ethics  and  religion.) 
Brown,  W.  A.:   The  Essence  of  Christianity.     (Special  study 

of  the  definition  of  religion.) 
Jastrow,  M.:  The  Study  of  Religion.     (Method  of  history  and 

psychology  of  religion.) 
Smith,  W.  Robertson:  The  Religion  of  the  Semites.     (Excel- 
lent study  of  tribal  religions.) 
Clarke,  W.  N.:  What  Shall  We  Think  of  Christianity?     (An 

interpretation  of  Christianity.) 
Leuba,  J,  H.:  Introduction  to  a  Pyschological  Study  of  Re- 
ligion.    In  The  Monist,  Vol.  XI,  p.  195. 
Starbuck,  E.  D.:  The  Pyschology  of  Religion. 


434  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

CHAPTER  V,  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  CRITICISM 
OF  SCIENCE.* 

Plato:    Republic,  Book  VII,  526  ff.     Translations  by  Jowett 
and    Vaughan.     Phaedo,  96  ff.     Translation    by 
Jowett, 
Berkeley:  Alciphron,   the   Fourth   Dialogue.     Siris,    espe- 
cially 234-264.     (On  the  failure  of  the  scientist 
to  grasp  the  deeper  truth  respecting  causes 
and  substances.) 
Descartes:   Discourse  on  Method.     Translation  by  Veitch. 
Spinoza:  On  the  Improvement  of  the  Understanding.     Trans- 
lation by  Elwes. 
Kant:  Critique  of  Pure  Reason — Transcendental  /Esthetic  and 
Transcendental  Analytic.     Translation  by  Max  Mid- 
ler.    (Studies  of  the  Method  of  Science.) 


Ward,  James:  Naturalism  and  Agnosticism.     (Full  but  clear 
account  of  recent  development  of  natural 
science,  and    criticism  of    its  use  as  phi- 
losophy.) 
Mach,  Ernst:  Science  of  Mechanics.     (Historical  and  meth- 
odological.) 
James,  William:  Principles   of   Psychology,    Vol,    II,  Chap, 
xxviii.        (Emphasizes  the  practical  in- 
terest underlying  science.) 
RoTCE,  JosiAH :  The  World  and  the  Indiindual,  Second  Series, 
Man  and  Nature.     (Interpretation  of  the 
province  of  natural  science  from  the  stand- 
point of  absolute  idealism.) 
Pearson,  Karl:  The  Grammar  of  Science.     (The  limits  of 

science  from  the  scientific  stand-point.) 
Clifford,  W,  K.:  Lectures  and  Essays:  On  the  Aims  and  In- 
struments of  Scientific  Thought;  The  Phi- 
losophy of  the  Pure  Sciences;  On  the  Ethics 
of  Belief. 

*  For  further  contemporary  writings  on  this  topic,  see  foot-notes  under 
S§  199,  200,  203. 


B1J3LIOGRAPHY  435 

Huxley,  T.  H.:  Method  and  Results.  (The  positivistic  posi- 
tion.) 

MuENSTERBERG,  HuGo:  Psychulugy  and  Life.  (Epistemo- 
logical  limitations  of  natural  sci- 
ence applied  to  psychology,  from 
idealistic  stand-point.) 

FuLLERTON,  G.  E. :  A  System  of  Metaphysics,  Part  II. 

Taylor,  A.  E. :  Elements  of  Metaphysics,  Book  III. 

CHAPTERS  VI  AND  VII,  THE  SPECIAL  PROBLEMS 
OF   PHILOSOPHY. 

Plato:  Dialogues,  especially  Protagoras  and  Theaetetus. 
Translation  by  Jowett.  (The  actual  genesis  of 
special  problems.) 


KuELPE,  Oswald:  Introduction  to  Philosophy.   Translation  by 
Pillsbury  and  Titchener.     (Full  and  ac- 
curate account  of  the  traditional  terms 
and  doctrines  of  philosophy.) 
HiBBEN,  J.  G. :  Problems  of  Philosophy.  (Brief  and  elementary.) 
SiDGWiCK,  Henry:   Philosophy ,  its  Scope  and  Relations. 
Paulsen,  Friedrich:  Introduction  to  Philosophy.    Transla- 
tion by  Thilly. 
Baldwin,  J.  M.:   Dictionary  of  Philosophy.     (Full,  and  con- 
venient for  reference.) 
Ferrier,  J.  F.:  Lectures  on  Greek  Philosophy.     (Interpreta- 
tion of  the  beginning  and  early  develop- 
ment of  philosophy.) 
Burnet,  J.:  Early    Greek    Philosophy.     Translation    of    the 

sources. 
Fairbanks,  A.:   The  First  Philosophers  of  Greece. 
GoMPERZ,  Th.:  Greek  Thinkers,  Vol.  I.     Translation  by  Mag- 
nus.    (On   the  first  development  of  phil- 
osophical problems.) 
Palmer,  G.  H.:    The  Field  of  Ethics.     (On  the  relations  of 

the  ethical  problem.) 
Puffer,  Ethel:    The  Psychology  of  Beauty.     (On  the  rela- 
tions of  the  iEsthetical  problem.) 


436  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

CHAPTER  VIII,   NATURALISM.* 

Lucretius:  On  the  Nature  of  Things.    Translation  by  Munro. 

(Early  materialism.) 
HoBBEs:  Metaphysical  System.     Edited  by  Calkins.     Levia- 
than, Part  I.     (Modern  materialism.) 


BuECHNER,  Louis:  Force  and  Mattel-.   Translation  by  CoUing- 
wood.      (Nineteenth   century   material- 
ism.) 
Janet,  Paul:  Materialism  of  the  Present  Day.     Translation 

by  Masson. 
Lange,    F,   a.:    History   of    Materialism.      Translation   by 

Thomas. 
Haeckel,  Ernst:  The  Riddle  of  the  Universe.     Translation  by 

McCabe.     ("Monism  of  Energy.") 
Clifford,  W.  K.:  Lectures  and  Essays:  The  Ethics  of  Belief; 
Cosmic  Emotion;  Body  and  Mind.  (Pos- 
itivism.) 
Huxley,  T.  H.:  Evolution  and    Ethics;  Prologomena.     (Dis- 
tinguishes between  the  moral  and  natural.) 
'  Science  and  Hebrew  Tradition;  Science  and 
Christian     Tradition.     (Controversies     of 
the  naturalist  with  Gladstone  and  Duke 
of  Argyle.) 
Spencer,  Herbert:  First  Principles.     (The  systematic  eA'o- 
lutionary  philosophy.)     Principles  of 
Ethics.     (Ethics  of  naturalism.)     The 
Nature  and  Reality  of  Religion.     (Con- 
troversy with  Frederick  Harrison.) 
Balfour,  A.  J.:  Foundations  of  Belief,  Part  I.     (On  the  re- 
ligious, moral,  and  aesthetic  consequences 
of  naturalism.) 
Pater,  Walter:  Marius    the    Epicurean.     (Refined    hedo- 
nism.) 
Romanes,  G.  J.:  Thoughts  on  Religion.     (Approached  from 
stand-point  of  science.) 

*  For  histories  of  philosophy,  fee  supplementary  bibliography  at  end. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  437 

Bentham,  J.;  Introduction  to  the  Principles  of  Morals  and 

Legislation.     (Utilitarian.) 
Stephen,  L.:  Science  of  Ethics.     (Evolutionary  and  social.) 

CHAPTER   IX,   SUBJECTIVISM. 

Flato  :  Theaetetus.     Translation  by  Jowett.     (Exposition  and 

criticism  of  Protagoras.) 
Berkeley:    Three  Dialogues  between  Hylas   and  Philonous; 

Principles  of  Human  Knowledge. 
Hume:  An  Enquiry  Concerning  Human  Understanding. 
Schopenhauer:  The  World  as  Will  and  Idea.     Translation 

by  Haldane  and  Kemp. 
Mill,  J.  S.:  An  Examination  of  Sir  William  Hamilton's  Phi- 
losophy, X-XIII. 


Clifford,  W.  K.:  Lectures  and  Essays:  On   the  Nature  of 

Things  in  Themselves.    (Panpsychism.) 
Deussen,  Paul:  Elements  of  Metaphysics.     Translation  bj'' 
Duff.      (Following     Schopenhauer     and 
Oriental  philosophy.) 
Paulsen,  Fr.:  Introduction   to   Philosophy.     (Panpsychism.) 
Strong,  C.  A.:  Why  the  Mind  Has  a  Body.     (Panpsj'chism.) 
James,  William:  Reflex  Action  and  Theism,  in  The  Will  to 
Believe.     (Morality   and   religion   of   in- 
dividualism.) 

CHAPTER  X,   ABSOLUTE  REALISM. 

Parmenides:  Fragments.     Arrangement  and  translation  by 

Burnet  or  Fairbanks. 
Plato:  Republic,  Books  VI  and  VII.     Translations  by  Jowett 
and  Vaughan.     Symposium,  Phcedrus,  Phcedo,  Phil- 
ebus.     Translation  by  Jowett. 
Aristotle*:  Psychology.     Translations  by    Hammond    and 
Wallace.     Ethics.     Translation  by  Welldon. 

*  The  Metaphysics  of  Aristotle,  Fichte,  and  Hegel  must  be  found  by 
the  English  reader  mainly  in  the  secondary  sources. 


438  Bibliography 

Spinoza:  Ethics,  especially  Parts  I  and  V.  Translations  by 
Elwes  and  Willis. 

Leibniz:  Mo/iado/ogr?/,  and  Selections.  Translation  by  Latta. 
Discourse  on  Metaphysics.  Translation  by  Mont- 
gomery. 

Marcus  Aurelius:  Thoughts.    Translation  by  Long. 

Epictetus:  Discourses.     Translation  by  Long. 


Cairo,  Edward:  The  Evolution  of  Theology  in  the  Greek  Phi- 
losophers.  (The  central  conceptions  of 
Plato  and  Aristotle.) 

Joachim:  A  Study  of  the  Ethics  of  Spinoza. 

CHAPTER  XI,  ABSOLUTE   IDEALISM. 

Descartes:   Meditations.    Translation  by  Veitch. 
Kant:  Critique  of  Pure  Reason.     Translation  by  Max  Miiller. 
Critique  of  Practical  Reason.     Translation  by  Ab- 
bott, in  Kant's  Theory  of  Ethics. 
FiCHTE*:  Science  of  Ethics.     Translation  by  Kroeger.    Popu- 
lar Works:  The  Nature  of  the  Scholar;  The  Voca- 
tion of  Man;  The  Doctrine  of  Religion.     Transla- 
tion by  Smith. 
Schiller:  Esthetic  Letters,  Essays,  and  Philosophical  Letters. 

Translation  by  Weiss.  (Romanticism.) 
Hegel*:  Ethics.  Translation  by  Sterrett.  Logic.  Transla- 
tion, with  Introduction,  by  Wallace.  Philosophy 
of  Mind.  Translation,  with  Introduction,  by 
Wallace.  Philosophy  of  Religion.  Translation 
by  Spiers  and  Sanderson.  Philosophy  of  Right. 
Translation  by  Dyde. 
Green,  T.  H.:  Prolegomena  to  Ethics. 

Emerson:  The  Conduct  of  Life — Fate.     Essays,  First  Series — 
The  Over-Soul;  Circles.     Essays,  Second  Series — 
The  Poet;  Experience;  Nature.     (The  apprecia- 
tion of  life  consistent  with  absolute  idealism.) 
Wordsworth:   Poems,  passim. 
Coleridge:   Aids  to  Reflection.     The  Friend. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  439 

RoYCE,  J."  Spirit  of  Modem  Philosophy.    (Sympathetic  ex- 
position of  Kant,  Fichte,  Romanticism,  and 
Hegel.)     The  Conception  of  God.    (The  episte- 
mological  argument.)      The  World  and  the  In- 
dividual,   First    Series.        (Systematic    devel- 
opment of  absolute  idealism;  its   moral   and 
religious  aspects.) 
Cairo,  Edward:   The  Critical  Philosophy  of  Kant.     (Exposi- 
tion and  interpretation  from  stand-point 
of  later  idealism.) 
Everett,  C.  C:  Fichte' s  Science  of  Knotvledge. 
McTaggart,  J.  M.  E.:  Studies  in  Hegelian  Dialectic.     Studies 
in  Hegelian  Cosmology. 

SUPPLEMENTARY    BIBLIOGRAPHY    ON    THE    HIS- 
TORY  OF   PHILOSOPHY. 

I.— GENERAL. 

Rogers:  Student's  History  of  Philosophy.     (Elementary'  and 

clear;  copious  quotations.) 
Weber:  History  of  Philosophy.     Translation  bj' Thilly.  (Com- 
prehensive and  compact.) 
Windelband:  A  History  of  Philosophy.    Translation  by  Tufts. 
(Emphasis  upon  the  problems  and  their  de- 
velopment.) 
Erdmann:  History    of    Philosophy.     Translation    edited    by 
Hough;  in  three  volumes.     (Detailed  and  accu- 
rate exposition.) 
Ueberweg:  a  History  of  Philosophy.     Translation  by  Morris 
and  Porter,  in  two  volumes.     (Very  complete; 
excellent  account  of  the  literature.) 

II.— SPECIAL   PERIODS. 

Ferrier:  Lectures  on  Greek   Philosophy.     (Excellent  intro- 
duction.) 
Marshall:  Short  History  of  Greek  Philosophy.     (Brief  and 
clear.) 


440  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Windelband:  History  of  Ancient  Philosophy.     Translation  by 
Cushman.     (Very    accurate    and    scholarly; 
also  brief.) 
Zeller:  Pre-Socratic    Philosophy.     Translation    by    Alleyne. 
Socrates  and  the  Socralic  Schools.     Translation  bj'^ 
Reichel.     (Full  and  accurate.) 
GoMPERz:  Greek  Thinkers.     Translated  by  INIagnus,   in  four 
volumes.     (Verj'  full;  especially  on  Plato.    Goes 
no  further  than  Plato.) 
Burnet:   Early   Greek    Philosophy.      (Translations  of  frag- 
ments, with  commentary.) 
Fairbanks:    The  First  Philosophers  of  Greece.     (Translations 

of  fragments,  with  commentarj-.) 
Turner:  History    of    Philosophy.     (Excellent    account    of 

Scholastic  philosophy.) 
Royce:    The  Spirit   of  Modern  Philosophy.     (Very   illumin- 
ating introductory  exposition  of  modem  idealism.) 
Falckenberg:  History  of  Modern  Philosophy. 
Hoeffding:   History  of  Modern  Philosophy.     Translation  by 
Meyer,  in  two  volumes.     (Full  and  good.) 


INDEX 


Absolute,  the,  307,  309,  332, 
391,  392,  400,  404;  being, 
308;  substance,  312;  ideal, 
326;  spirit,  349  (note),  358 
ff.;  mind,  349  (note),  358, 
380,  322  ff. 

Absolute  Idealism,  chap,  xi; 
general  meaning,  177,  349 
(note),  400;  criticism  of,  349, 
365,  385,  411,416;  epistemol- 
ogy  of,  368  ff . ;  as  related 
to  Kant,  380;  direct  argu- 
ment for,  383 ;  ethics  of,  386 
ff.;  religion  of,  390  f f . ;  of 
present  day,  402  ff.,  410. 

Absolute  Realism,  chap,  x; 
general  meaning,  306  {jiote), 
400;  epistemology  of,  339; 
ethics  of,  342;  religion  of, 
346;  criticism  of,  338,  416. 

Abstract,  the,  139. 

Activity,  209,  285,  295. 

.^Esthetics,   189. 

Agnosticism,  168,  252  ff. 

Anaxagoras,  239 ;  quoted,  162. 

Anaximander,  224. 

Anselm,  S.\int,  200. 

Anthropomorphism,  109. 

Appreciation,  25,  402. 

Aristotle,  in  formal  logic,  186; 
ethics  of,  195,  345;  psy- 
chology of,  208;  philosophy 
of,  306,  332  ff . ;  and  Plato, 
333,  336;  and  Spinoza,  336; 
epistemology  of,  339 ;  religion 
of,  346,  429;  on  e\il,  353. 

Atomism,  166,  229.  Also  see 
under  Leucippus,  and  De- 
mocritus. 

Attitude,  62. 

Attribute,  in  Spinoza,  312  ff. 

Augustine,  Saint,  on  com- 
munion with  God,  68;  on 
pietism,  195;  his  conception 
of  self,  372. 

Automatis.m,  248. 


B.\al,  religion  of,  88. 

Bacon,  Francis,  on  thought 
and  action,  430. 

B.\LFOUR,  A.  J.,  on  materialism, 
264. 

Beauty,  in  aesthetics,  189;  in 
Plato,  327,  332. 

Being,  Eleatic  conception  of, 
308  ff. 

Belief,  key  to  definition  of  re- 
ligion, 58 ;  general  characters 
appUed  to  religion,  59  ff. ;  in 
persons  and  dispositions,  62; 
examples  of  religions,  66  ff . ; 
object  of  religions,  65,  82, 
97 ;  relation  to  logic,  182,  183. 

Benth.\m,  262. 

Berkeley,  on  idealism,  176; 
relation  to  common  -  sense, 
267;  his  refutation  of  ma- 
terial substance,  275  ff . ;  epis- 
temology of,  277,  296,  369; 
theory  of  mathematics,  279; 
his  spiritualism,  280,  284, 
292;  his  conception  of  God, 
284,  293;  ethics  of,  302;  re- 
Ugion  of,  304. 

Buddhism,  78. 

Cause,  in  science,  131 ;  God  as 
first,  203;  of  motion,  231  f  f . ; 
spirit  as,  293  ff. 

Christianity,  persistence  of, 
76;  essence  of,  86;  develop- 
ment from  Judaism,  94; 
ethics  of,  195,  198,  386;  idea 
of  God  in,  200  ff.,  205;  em- 
phasis on  self-consciousness 
in,  372. 

COMTE,    115. 

Contemplation,  428. 

Conversion,  69  ff. 

Corporeal  Being,  224;  proc- 
esses of,  225;  Berkeley's 
critique  of,  278;  liistorical 
conceptions  of,  229. 


441 


442 


INDEX 


CosMOLOGiCAL  Proof,  the,  of 
God,  203. 

Cosmology,  general  meaning 
of,  159;  mechanism  in,  161, 
225;  teleology  in,  161. 

Cosmos,  origin  of,  242. 

Critical  Method,  319  ff. 

Cynicism,  259. 

Cyren.mcism,  259. 

Dante,  as  philosopher-poet,  42 
ff . ;  general  meaning  of  the 
Divine  Comedy,  43;  and 
Thomas  Aquinas,  43,  46; 
his  vision  of  the  ways  of  God, 
46;  on  contemplation,  428. 

Darwin,  204. 

Deism,  207. 

Democritus,  247.  Also  see 
Atomism. 

Descartes,  on  function  of 
philosophy,  154;  dualism  of, 
272,  412;  his  theory  of  space 
and  matter,  229;  automa- 
tism of,  248 ;  epistemology  of, 
341,  375;  his  conception  of 
self,  374. 

Description,  as  method  of 
science,  128. 

Dialectic,  in  Plato,  320;  in 
Hegel,  361. 

Diogenes,  259. 

Dogmatism,  167. 

Dualism,  general  meaning, 
162;  of  Descartes,  272,  412. 

Duty,  196,  356,  360,  386. 

Eclecticism,  contemporary, 
398  ff.,  413. 

Eleatics.  See  under  Parmen- 
iDEs,  and  Zeno. 

Emerson,  on  spirit,  359;  on 
nature,  364;  on  absolute, 
392;  on  necessity,  393;  on 
faith,  424. 

Empiricism,  general  meaning, 
168;  in  logic,  187;  in  natural- 
ism, 252  ff. ;  of  Locke,  274; 
of  Berkeley,   274  ff. 

Energy,  development  of,  con- 
ception of,  236  ff. 

Epistemology,  relation  to 
metaphysics,  150;  definition 
of,  164;  fundamental  prob- 
lems of,  168,  172;  argument 


for  God  from,  202;  of  natu- 
ralism, 248,  252  ff.,  257;  of 
Descartes,  273,  341,  375;  of 
Berkeley,  277,  296;  of  ab- 
solute realism,  339,  351 ;  of 
Leibniz,  340,  341;  of  Plato, 
340,  341;  of  Hume,  376;  of 
Aristotle,  340,  341;  of  abso- 
lute idealism,  351,  368  ff.; 
of  present  day,  408  ff. 

Eternal,  the,  309. 

Ether,  230. 

Ethics,  relation  to  metaphys- 
ics, 151, 196  ff.,  360;  its  origin 
in  Socratic  method,  181 ; 
definition  of,  191 ;  special 
problems  and  theories  in, 
191  ff.;  of  Socrates,  192,  194; 
of  Aristotle,  195,  345;  of 
naturalism,  258  ff. ;  of  sub- 
jectivism, 298  ff . ;  of  Schopen- 
hauer, 299;  argument  for 
God  from,  203;  individual- 
ism in,  301 ;  pluralism  in,  302, 
421 ;  of  Stoics  and  Spinoza, 
342;  Platonic,  342;  of  Kant, 
386;  of  absolute  idealism, 
388. 

Eud^monism,  195. 

Evil,  Problem  of,  317,  336, 
339,  352,  365  ff . ;  in  Greek 
philosophy,  352;  in  absolute 
idealism,  367,  418. 

Evolution,  of  cosmos,  242  ff. ; 
of  morality,  262. 

Experience,  410,  411,  412; 
analysis  of,  by  Kant,  354. 

Faith,  424;  special  interests  of, 
199.  See  also  Religion  and 
Belief. 

Ferguson,  Chas.,  quoted,  265. 

Fichte,  360,  402. 

Fielding,  H.,  quoted  on  re- 
ligion, 59,  74. 

Force,  development  of  con- 
ception of,  231  ff. 

Form,  in  Aristotle,  334. 

Freedom,  in  ethics,  196,  388; 
meanings  and  theories,  211. 

Gon,  as  guarantee  of  ideals,  18, 
425;  personality  of,  62,  108 
ff . ;  St.  Augustine's  commun- 
ion with,  68;  presence  of,  68; 


INDEX 


443 


as  a  disposition  from  which 
consequences  may  be  ex- 
pected, 85;  meaning  of,  in 
religion,  87  ;  idea  of,  in  Juda- 
ism and  Cliristianity,  92; 
why  historical,  102;  social 
relation  with,  103;  the  onto- 
logical  proof  of,  200;  ethical 
and  epistemological  argu- 
ments for,  202;  cosmological 
proof  of,  203;  teleological 
proof  of,  204;  relation  to  the 
world,  in  theism;  pantheism 
and  deism,  205  ff . ;  will  of, 
212;  conception  of,  in  Berke- 
ley, 284,  293  ff. ;  conception 
and  proof  of,  in  Spinoza, 
312  ff.,  392,  393 ;  conception 
of,  in  Plato,  331,  352,  391, 
393;  conception  of,  in  Leib- 
niz, 338,  353.  Also  see  Ab- 
solute. 

Goethe,  on  Spinoza,  and  on 
philosopliy,  51 ;  on  pragma- 
tism, 407. 

Good,  the,  theories  of,  in  ethics, 
191  ff. ;  and  the  real,  326  ff., 
421  ff. 

Greek,  religion,  in  Homer  and 
Lucretius,  89;  ideals,  195, 
198,  429. 

Green,  T.  H.,  quoted,  369, 
385  {note). 

H.'VEckel,  quoted,  236,  266. 

Hedonism,  192. 

Hegel,  on  science,  129;  philos- 
ophy of,  150,  361  ff.;  rela- 
tion to  Kant,  381 ;  on  the  ab- 
solute, 382;  ethics  of,  390. 

Her.\clitus,  308. 

History,  philosophy  of,  in 
Hegel,  363. 

HoBBEs,  his  misconception  of 
relations  of  philosophy  and 
science,  115;  quoted  on  eth- 
ics, 261. 

HoLBACH,  251,  252. 

Homer,  on  Greek  religion,  90. 

Humanism,  320,  404,  405. 

Hume,  positivism  of,  115,  377; 
phenomenalism  of,  283;  and 
Descartes,  376. 

Huxley,  quoted,  255,  266. 

Hylozoism,  225. 


Ideal,  the,  in  Plato,  326 ;  valid- 
ity of,  416. 

Ide.\lism,  various  meanings  of 
term,  173  (note);  meaning  of, 
as  theory  of  knowledge,  175 
ff.,  409;  of  present  day,  409 
ff. ;  empirical,  see  Subjec- 
tivism, Phenomenalism, 
Spiritualism;  absolute,  see 
Absolute    Idealism. 

Ideals,  in  life,  10  ff. ;  adoption 
of,  17  ff. 

Ideas,  the,  in  Plato,  329. 

Imagination,  in  poetry,  99; 
place  of,  in  religion,  80,  97 
ff. ;  special  functions  of,  in 
religion,  101  ff. ;  scope  of,  in 
religion,  105  ff. ;  and  the 
personality  of  God,  110. 

Imit.vtio   Christi,   quoted,  68. 

Immanence  Theory,  412,  413. 

Immortality,  212. 

Individualism,  301,  320,  338, 
404. 

Intuitionism,  in  ethics,  196. 

J.-vMEs,  William,  quoted  on  re- 
ligion, 65,  71,  305. 

Judaism,  development  of,  92; 
and  Christianity,  94. 

K.A.NT,  his  transcendentalism, 
177,  356;  his  critique  of 
knowledge,  354  ff.,  377  ff.; 
and  absolute  idealism,  380; 
etliics  of,  386. 

Kepler,  quoted,  129. 

Knowledge,  of  the  means  in 
Ufe,  8;  of  the  end,  10;  in 
poetry,  27  ff . ;  in  religion,  82, 
85,  97,  105;  general  theory 
of,  on  epistemology,  164  ff. ; 
problem  of  source  and  cri- 
terion of,  168  ff. ;  problem  of 
relation  to  its  object,  172  ff., 
277,  340,  351,  368  ff . ;  rela- 
tion of  logic  to,  183  ff. ;  ac- 
count of,  in  naturalism,  253 
ff.     Also  see  Epistemology. 

L.\  Mettrie,  quoted,  250. 

La  Place,  242;  quoted,  241. 

Leibniz,  on  function  of  philos- 
ophy, 155;  philosophy  of, 
333,  336  ff.;  epistemology  of, 
339. 


444 


INDEX 


Leucippus,  quoted,  161. 

Life,  as  a  starting-point  for 
thought,  3;  definition  of, 
5  ff. ;  and  self-consciousness, 
6;  philosophy  of  17  ff.,  153; 
mechanical  theory  of,  244  ff . ; 
return  of  pliilosophy  to,  427 
ff. ;  contemplation  in,  428. 

Locke,  epistemology  of,  273. 

Logic,  origin  in  Socratic  meth- 
od, 181;  affiliations  of,  182, 
188;  definition  of,  183;  parts 
of  formal,  184  ff. ;  present 
tendencies  in,  187  ff. ;  alge- 
bra of,  189. 

Lucretius,  his  criticism  of 
Greek  religion,  quoted,  89 
ff. ;  on  mechanism,  226,  240. 

McTaggart,  J.  M.  E.,  on  Hegel, 
367;  on  the  absolute,  391. 

Mach,  E.,  283;  on  philosophy 
and  science,   120. 

m.\lebranche,  376. 

Marcus  Aurelius,  348. 

Materialism,  254,  256;  gen- 
eral meaning,  223,  414;  de- 
velopment, 224  ff. ;  and 
science,  228;  French,  249; 
theory  of  mind  in,  250. 

M.A.THEMATICS,  importance  in 
science,  132;  logic  in,  188; 
Berkeley's  conception  of, 
279;  Plato's  conception  of, 
329,  335;  Spinoza's  concep)- 
tion  of,  311,  335. 

Matter,  225,  228;  and  space, 
229;  Berkeley's  refutation  of, 
275  f  f . ;  in  Plato  and  Aristotle, 
334. 

Mechanical,  Theory,  practi- 
cal significance  of  its  exten- 
sion to  the  world  at  large, 
20;  in  cosmology,  161,  225; 
of  Descartes,  231 ;  of  Newton 
232;  of  origin  of  cosmo.s, 
242;  of  life,  244;  ir.  Spinoza, 
336. 

Metaphysics,  relation  to  epis- 
temology, 150;  relation  to 
ethics,  151,  196  ff. ;  definition 
of,  158;  relation  to  logic,  188; 
relation  to  theology,  207; 
present  tendencies  in,  399 
ff.,  408. 


Mill,  J.  S.,  283  {twtc). 

Mind,  explanation  of  in  nat- 
urali.sm,  237,  247  ff . ;  of  God, 
in  Berkeley,  284,  294,  296; 
absolute,  349  (note),  358, 
382  ff.  Also  see  under  Self, 
and  Soul. 

Mode,  in  Spinoza,  313. 

Monads,  in  Leibniz,  338. 

Monism,  159,  163. 

MoR.\LiTY,  and  religion,  73; 
grounds  of,  according  to 
Kant,  356 ;  incentive  to,  422. 

Mysticism,  general  account, 
171;  Schopenhauer's,  290; 
types  of  religions,  391. 

Naegeli,  C.  v.,  quoted,  287. 

Natural  Science,  true  rela- 
tions of,  with  philosophy, 
116;  sphere  of,  with  reference 
to  philosophy,  117  ff.;  phil- 
osophy of,  its  procedure,  121, 
135,  142,  154,  401 ;  origin  of, 
as  special  interest,  123  ff. ; 
human  value  of,  126,  127, 
143;  method  and  fundament- 
al conceptions  of,  406,  128 
ff. ;  general  development  of, 
134;  hmits  of,  because  ab- 
stract, 136  ff.,  414;  validitv 
of,  142;  logic  and,  188;  de- 
velopment of  conceptions  in, 
229  ff. ;  grounds  of,  according 
to  Kant,  355,  377 ;  Hume  on, 
377;  permanence  and  prog- 
ress in,  395  ff. 

N.vruRAL  Selection,  204,  245. 

Naturalism,  chap,  viii;  gen- 
eral meaning,  217,  223  (note), 
399 ;  claims  of,  239 ;  task  of, 
241;  criticism  of,  117,  257, 
263;  of  present  day,  405,  412. 
Also  see  under  Materialism, 
and  Positivism. 

Nature,  160,  244,  337;  in 
Berkeley,  294;  in  Spinoza, 
317,  338;  in  Hegel,  363;  in 
Kant,  377  ff. ;  in  contem- 
porary philosophy,  401. 
Also  see  Natural  Science, 
and  Naturalism. 

Nehular  Hypothesis,  242. 

Necessity,  of  will,  211;  ethics 
of,  342;  religion  of,  393. 


INDEX 


445 


Neo-Fichteans,       402,       403 

(}iote). 
Neo-Kantians,  403. 
Newton,   232,   235,   242,   355, 

377. 
Normative  Sciences,  the,  180. 

Omar  Khayyam,    quoted,    16; 

as  a  philosopher-poet,  36. 
Ontological,  Proof,  of  God, 

200. 
Ontology,  159. 
Optimism,  104,  388,  422,  424. 

Panpsychism,  176,  238,  285  ff. 

Pantheism,  in  primitive  re- 
ligion, 78;  general  meaning, 
205;  types  of,  390. 

Parker,  Theodore,  quoted  on 
religion,  67. 

Parmenides,  and  rationalism, 
168;  philosophy  of,  308  ff., 
337;  and  Ari.stotle,  336. 

Pater,  Walter,  on  Words- 
worth, 38;  on  Cyrenaicism, 
260;  on  subjectivism,  270. 

Paulsen,  Friedrich,  ethics  of, 
quoted,  302. 

Pearson,  Karl,  quoted,  230. 

Perception.  See  Sense-per- 
ception. 

Person.\l  Ide.\lism,  404,  405. 

Person.\lity,  of  God,  impor- 
tant in  understanding  of  re- 
ligion, 62;  essential  to  relig- 
ion?   108  ff. 

Persons,  description  of  be- 
lief in,  62;  imagination  of, 
101,  110. 

Pessimism,  104,  299,  424. 

Phenomenalism,  general 
meaning,  176,  267  {note) ;  of 
Berkeley,  272,  275  ff.;  of 
Hume,  283;  various  ten- 
dencies in,  281. 

Philosopher,  the  practical 
man  and  the,  chap,  i;  the 
role  of  the,  306,  426. 

Philosophy,  commonly  mis- 
conceived, 3;  of  the  devotee, 
13;  of  the  man  of  affairs,  14; 
of  the  voluptuary,  16;  of  life, 
its  general  meaning,  17  ff., 
153 ;  its  relations  with  poetry, 
chap,    ii,    112;    lack    of,    in 


Shakespeare,  33;  as  expres- 
sion of  personality,  33;  as 
premature,  33 ;  in  poetry  of 
Omar  Khayyam,  36;  in  poe- 
try of  Wordsworth,  38  ff . ;  in 
poetry  of  Dante,  42  ff. ;  differ- 
ence between  philosophy  and 
poetry,  48  ff. ;  in  religion,  108 
ff . ;  compared  with  reUgion, 
112;  true  attitude  of,  toward 
science,  116;  sphere  of,  in  re- 
lation to  science,  117,  395  ff. ; 
procedure  of,  with  reference 
to  science,  121,  135,  142, 
154,  160;  human  value  of, 
143,  426  ff. ;  can  its  problem 
be  divided?  149,  155;  origin 
of,  157;  special  problems  of, 
chap.  \\,  vii;  and  psychol- 
ogy, 216;  peculiar  object  of, 
308;  self-criticism  in,  319 
ff.,  325;  permanence  and 
progress  in,  395  f f . ;  contem- 
porary, 398  ff. 

Physical.  See  Corpore.\l 
Being,  Materialism,  etc. 

Physiology,  246. 

Piety,  description  and  inter- 
pretation of,  72;  in  ethics, 
195. 

Plato,  on  Protagoras,  167,  269, 
270,  298;  quoted,  on  Socra- 
tes, 170,  192,  194;  historical 
preparation  for,  324;  psy- 
chology of,  209;  philosophy 
of,  306,  318,  326  ff.,  382; 
and  Aristotle,  333;  and 
Spinoza,  318,  335;  epistemol- 
ogy  of,  339,  ethics  of,  342; 
religion  of,  346,  391,  393;  on 
evil,  352;  on  spirit,  359; 
on  reason  and  perception, 
370 ;  on  the  philosopher,  426. 

Pluralism,  general  meaning 
of,  159,  163,  419;  in  etliics, 
302,  421  ff. ;  in  reUgion,  304. 

Poetry,  relations  with  phi- 
losophy, chap,  ii;  as  appre- 
ciation, 25;  virtue  of  sincer- 
ity in,  27;  the  "barbarian" 
in,  28 ;  constructive  knowl- 
edge in,  30;  difference  be- 
tween pliilosophy  and,  48  ff. 

Positivism,  on  relation  of 
philosophy  and  science,  115, 


446 


INDEX 


122;  general  meaning  of,  16S, 
234,  252  ff.,  412. 

Practical  Knowledge,  of 
means,  8  ff . ;  of  end  or  pur- 
pose, 10  ff . ;  implied  in  relig- 
ion, 85,  97;  pliilosophy  as, 
153. 

Practical  Man,  the,  and  the 
philosopher,  chap,  i  ;  his 
failure  to  understand  phi- 
losophy, 3;  his  ideal,  14;  virt- 
ually a  philosopher,  22. 

Pragm.\tism,   151,  407,  408. 

Prayer,  103. 

Prediction,  in  science,  130. 

Present  Day,  philosophy  of 
the,  398  ff. 

Protagoras,  scepticism  of, 
166,  271;  subjectivism  of, 
269 ;  ethics  of,  298. 

Psychology,  of  religion,  58, 
82;  inadequate  to  religion, 
82;  as  branch  of  philosophv, 
208  ff.,  216;  as  natural 
science,  213;  affiUations  of, 
215;  limits  of,  415. 

Psycho-physical  Parallel- 
ism, 215,  252. 

Purpose,  in  Ufe,  10  ff. ;  adop- 
tion of  life-purpose,  17  f f . ; 
practical  significance  of,  in 
the  world  at  large,  20.  Also 
see  Teleology,   Ideal,  etc. 

Qualities,  primary  and  sec- 
ondary, 254,  274,  277. 

Rationalism,  general  meaning, 
168,  416;  in  logic,  180,  184; 
in  ethics,  193 ;  of  eleatics, 
310;  of  Spinoza,  311;  in  ab- 
solute realism,  339;  criti- 
cism of,  418. 

Realism,  various  meanings  of 
term,  173  (note) ;  meaning  of, 
as  theory  of  knowledge,  172; 
of  Parmenides,  308  ff.;  of 
Plato  and  Aristotle,  341 ;  of 
present  day,  409  ff. 

Reason,  370.  See  Ration- 
alism. 

Relativism,  166,  267  ff.;  in 
ethics,  298. 

RELiciioN,  chaps,  iii,  iv;  rela- 
tion    to     poetry    and    phi- 


losophy, 49,  52 ;  difficulty  of 
defining,  53;  possibility  of 
defining,  54 ;  profitableness 
of  defining,  54;  true  method 
of  defining,  56;  misconcep- 
tions of,  56;  as  possessing 
the  psychological  character 
of  belief,  59  ff . ;  degree  of,  in 
individuals  and  moods,  60, 
61 ;  definition  of,  as  belief  in 
disposition  of  universe,  64 
ff.,  82;  and  morahty,  73; 
symbolism  in,  75;  prophet 
and  preacher  of,  75;  con- 
veyance of,  76;  primitive, 
77;  Buddhism,  78;  the  criti- 
cal or  enlightened  tj'pe  of, 
80 ;  means  to  be  true,  82  f  f . ; 
implies  a  practical  truth, 
85;  cases  of  truth  and  error 
in,  88  ff. ;  of  Baal,  88;  Greek, 
89;  of  Jews,  its  development, 
92 ;  Christian,  94 ;  definition  of 
cognitive  factor  in,  97;  place 
of  imagination  in,  80,  97  ff . ; 
special  functions  of  imagina- 
tion in,  101  ff. ;  relation  of 
imagination  and  truth  in, 
105;  philosophy  impUed  in, 
108  ff. ;  is  personal  god  es- 
sential to,  108;  compared 
with  philosophy,  112;  com- 
pared with  science,  145; 
special  pliilosophical  prob- 
lems of,  199  ff. ;  of  natural- 
ism, 263  ff. ;  of  subjectivism 
and  spiritualism,  302  ff . ; 
of  Plato  and  Aristotle,  346, 
393;  of  Stoics  and  Spinoza, 
348,  393;  philosophy  of,  in 
Hegel,  365 ;  of  absolute  ideal- 
ism, 390  ff. 

Religious  Phenomena,  inter- 
pretation of,  69  ff. 

Representative  Theory,  of 
knowledge,  174,  412. 

ROM.\NTICISM,  361. 

Rousseau,  quoted  on  nature, 

64. 
RoYCE,     JosiAH,     quoted      on 

abisolutc  idealism,    178,  384, 

394. 

Santayana,  George,  quoted 
on  poetry  28,  29. 


INDEX 


447 


Scepticism,  166,  267  ff.  See 
under  Positivism,  and  Ag- 
nosticism. 

ScHELLiNG,  misconception  of 
science,  116. 

Scholasticism,  333;  idea  of 
God  in,  201. 

Schopenhauer,  his  panpsych- 
ism  or  voluntarism,  177, 
285  ff. ;  universalizes  subjec- 
tivism, 290;  mysticism  of, 
290;  ethics  of,  299;  reUgion 
of,  303. 

Science.  Also  see  under  Na- 
tural Science,  and  Nor- 
mative Science. 

Secularism,  of  Shakespeare, 
34;  of  Periclean  Age,  320; 
of  present  age,  427. 

Self,  problem  of,  216;  proof  of, 
in  St.  Augustine,  372;  proof 
of,  in  Descartes,  374;  deeper 
moral  of,  387;  in  contempo- 
rary pliilosophy,  411,  413. 
Also  see  Soul,  and  Mind. 

Self-consciousness,  essential 
to  human  life,  6;  develop- 
ment of  conception  of,  371 
ff . ;  in  absolute  idealism,  383 ; 
in  idealistic  ethics,  386. 

Sensationalism,  247,  255,  269. 

Sense-perception,  168,  247, 
269,  370;  being  as,  in  Berke- 
ley, 281. 

Shakespeare,  general  criti- 
cism of,  30  ff . ;  his  universal- 
ity, 31 ;  lack  of  philosophy 
in,  33. 

Shelley,  quoted  on  poetry,  50. 

Social  Relations,  belief  in- 
spired by,  analogue  of  re- 
ligion, 62;  imagination  of, 
extended  to  God,  101. 

Socrates,  rationalism  of,  169; 
and  normative  science,  180; 
ethics  of,  192,  194;  method 
of,  321  ff. 

Sophists,  the,  epistemology  of, 
165;  scepticism  of,  271,  320; 
ethics  of,  298,  301;  age  of, 
320. 

Soul,  the,  in  Aristotle,  208;  in 
Plato,  209;  as  substance, 
209 ;  intellectualism  and  vol- 
untarism in  theory  of,  210; 


immortality  of,  212;  Berke- 
ley's theory  of,  284.  Also  see 
under  Mind,  and  Self. 

Space,  importance  in  science, 
130;  and  matter,  229. 

Spencer,  236  {note),  243,  265. 

Spinoza,  and  Goethe,  51; 
quoted  on  philosophy  and 
hfe,  153;  philosophy  of,  306, 
311  f f . ;  criticism  and  esti- 
mate of,  315  ff. ;  and  Plato, 
318,  335;  and  Aristotle,  336; 
epistemology  of,  339;  etliics 
of,  342;  religion  of,  348,  392, 
393. 

Spirit,  the  absolute,  358  ff. 

Spiritualism,  general  mean- 
ing, 176,  267  {note) ;  in  Berke- 
ley, 280,  292;  in  Schopen- 
hauer, 285 ;  criticism  of,  288 ; 
objective,  292. 

Stevenson,  R.  L.,  quoted  on 
religion,  67. 

Stoicism,  ethics  of,  342;  relig- 
ion of,  348. 

Subjectivism,  chap,  ix;  gen- 
eral meaning,  175,  218,  267 
{note),  415;  in  aesthetics,  190; 
of  Berkeley,  275  ff. ;  univer- 
salization  of,  in  Schopen- 
hauer, 290;  criticism  of,  297, 
415;  ethics  of,  298  ff.;  in  ab- 
solute idealism,  368;  of  pres- 
ent day,  409. 

Substance,  spiritual,  209,  284; 
material,  Berkeley's  refuta- 
tion of,  275  ff. ;  Spinoza's 
conception  of,  311;  the  in- 
finite, in  Spinoza,  312;  Aris- 
totle's conception  of,  334; 
Leibniz's  conception  of,  338. 

Symbolism,  in  religion,  75. 

Teleology,  in  cosmology,  161 ; 

proof    of    God    from,     204; 

Spinoza   on,    318;   in    Plato, 

326    ff.,    336;    in    Aristotle, 

336. 
Theism,  205. 
Theology,  relation  to  religion, 

98;    in    philosophy,    199    f  f . ; 

relation  to  metaphysics,  207. 
Thomson,  J.,  quoted,  104. 
Thought,    and   life,    6    ff. ;   as 

being,  in  Hegel,  361  ff. 


448 


INDEX 


Thucydides,   on   thought    and 

action,  429. 
Time,    importance    in    science, 

Transcendentalism,  177,  349 
(note),  356.  See  Idealism, 
absolute. 

Tyndall,  115. 

Universal,  scientific  knowl- 
edge as,  125,  139. 

Universe,  the,  as  object  of 
religious  reaction,  64;  com- 
mon object  of  philosophy 
and  religion,  112;  as  collec- 
tive, 419. 

Utilitarianism,  261. 


Virtue,  198,  345. 
Voltaire,  quoted,  231,  251. 
Voluntarism,    in    psychology, 
210;  in  Schopenhauer,  285. 

Whitman,  Walt,  27  ff. 

Will,  in  psychology,  210;  free- 
dom and  determination  of, 
211;  in  Schopenhauer,  177; 
as  cause,  in  Berkeley,  293 
ff. ;  in  pragmatism,  407. 

Wordsworth,  as  philosopher- 
poet,  38  ff . ;  his  sense  for  the 
universal,  40;  quoted  on 
poetry  and  philosophy,  48, 50. 

Zend,  337. 


AA      000  276145    0 


